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Krishnaswami Iyer (Petitioner.) v. Seethalakshmi Ammal And Others S (S).

Madras High Court
Sep 18, 1918
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Factual and Procedural Background

This is a Letters Patent Appeal from an order of Ayling, J., dismissing C.R.P. 877 of 1916. The petitioner-appellant was one of the "next set of reversioners" who sought to continue O.S. No. 27 of 1914 (Temporary Sub-Court, Tanjore). The original suit had been instituted by the nearest reversioner for setting aside alienations effected by the 1st defendant (a Hindu widow). The original plaintiff died in April 1914. On 17 July 1914, before six months had expired, the Subordinate Judge passed an order declaring that the suit had abated, without hearing the petitioner-appellant or any other surviving reversioner. The petitioner was present in court intending initially to apply but did not do so. His name did not appear on the record prior to the abatement order. The Subordinate Judge's abatement order was in accordance with the then prevailing decisions of the High Court, but in March 1915 the Privy Council decided Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subbammal, which affected the legal position regarding a next reversioner's right to continue such a suit.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a "next reversioner" (or other reversioner) is entitled to continue a suit instituted by the nearest reversioner after the death of the original plaintiff.
  2. Whether the next reversioner who seeks to continue the suit falls within the definition of "legal representative" under Section 2, Sub-section 11, Civil Procedure Code.
  3. Whether an order declaring a suit to have abated, made without hearing a person who claims the right to continue the suit, is binding on that person or may be treated as a nullity by him.
  4. Whether the appropriate remedy for a person aggrieved by an abatement order is to appeal against that order, or alternatively to apply to continue the suit (including consideration of relief under Order 22, Rule 9, C.P.C., or as an application for review), and what effect limitation (including Article 181) has on such an application.
  5. Whether the High Court should interfere, under Section 115, with the discretion of the Lower Court in refusing to excuse delay in applying to set aside an abatement order or in treating an application as one for review.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments (as presented by Mr. Rajah Iyer)

  • The petitioner's exclusive remedy was by way of appeal against the Subordinate Judge's order treating the suit as having abated.
  • Reliance was placed on the decision in "Suppu Nayakan… Plaintiff v. Perumal Chetty… Defendant" to the effect that an order declaring a suit to have abated on the ground that the right to sue did not survive is a decree and the aggrieved party's only remedy is an appeal.
  • It was noted that in the Suppu Nayakan case the person claiming to be the legal representative had been heard before the order of abatement was passed; this fact distinguished some of the present circumstances.

Appellant's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Venkatarama Aiyar)

  • An abatement order passed without giving the person entitled to continue (i.e., the legal representative or next reversioner) an opportunity to show cause is not binding on that person and may be treated as a nullity by him.
  • On the elementary principle that a party is not bound by an order passed "behind his back," an aggrieved person need not first set aside such an order on appeal but may apply to continue the suit as if no such order existed.
  • Such orders (including orders of course) may be vacated on application to the Court which passed the order, which is bound to pass a fresh order after hearing both sides.
  • Although the appellant had mistakenly cited an incorrect provision of law when applying, the core contention was that he should be allowed to continue the suit in the exercise of the Court's powers.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subbammal (Privy Council) The Privy Council held that a suit brought by the next reversioner is brought on behalf of the entire body of reversioners and that if the reversioner conducting the suit died, the next reversioner is entitled to continue the conduct of the suit; the Judicial Committee expressed a doubt whether such a next reversioner is a "legal representative" under Section 2, Sub-sec. 11, C.P.C., but rested its decision on the broader ground that the next reversioner was already a party. The court treated this decision as altering the then-prevailing law and as persuasive for allowing a next reversioner facilities to continue or revive a suit; it influenced the Court to permit the appeal to succeed and to remand the petition for fresh disposal in light of that principle.
Sivagurunatha Chettiar v. Ramasami Aiyangar (Abdur Rahim, J.) Holding that a representative suit (under Order 1, Rule 8) is distinct from a suit by a plaintiff in a representative capacity, and that when such a plaintiff dies any person having the same interest who applies to continue the suit does not fall within the definition of "legal representative"; the learned Judge also held there was no limitation at all for such an application. The court acknowledged this authority but noted Sadasiva Aiyar, J.'s inclination that Article 181 might apply to such an application if the suit had been treated as having abated within three years; however, in the present case the application was made within two years, so the point was unnecessary to decide finally.
Suppu Nayakan… Plaintiff v. Perumal Chetty… Defendant Decision that an order declaring a suit as having abated on the ground that the right to sue did not survive (and not on the ground that six months had elapsed when application was made by the legal representative) is a decree, and the only course for the aggrieved party is to prefer an appeal. The respondents relied on this case for the proposition that the petitioner's remedy was by appeal. The court observed that in Suppu Nayakan the legal representative had been heard before the abatement order, thus distinguishing the factual posture of the present matter.
Subramama Iyer v. Venkataramier The case was cited in relation to the question whether the legal representative had been heard before an abatement order was made (bearing on whether the remedy was appeal). The presiding Judge stated he was unable to find in the available papers whether in that case the legal representative had been heard; no further application of this precedent is recorded in the opinion.
Gal Salvanl Bal Savaut v. Narayana Dhond Savant Cited for the proposition that certain redemption suits brought by members of an undivided Hindu family were treated as suits brought in a representative character within the meaning of the relevant provision (supporting the concept of representative character). Justice Spencer relied on this authority in support of his view that a suit by a reversioner can be both a representative suit and a suit by a plaintiff in a representative character; it reinforced his conclusion that the appellant should have been allowed to continue the suit under the then-prevailing law.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by recounting the procedural history and then evaluating the applicable legal principles as developed by prior decisions. The principal strands of reasoning were:

  1. Change in legal position: The Subordinate Judge's abatement order had been in line with the prevailing High Court decisions at the time it was made. However, the Privy Council decision in Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subbammal (March 1915) altered the relevant law by recognizing that a suit brought by the next reversioner is effectively on behalf of the whole body of reversioners and that the next reversioner is entitled to continue the suit after the death of the plaintiff who had been conducting it. The Privy Council's reasoning was that the next reversioner was already a party entitled to continue.
  2. Character of representative suits: The court discussed the distinction drawn by Abdur Rahim, J. in Sivagurunatha Chettiar v. Ramasami Aiyangar between a representative suit (Order 1, Rule 8) and a suit brought by a plaintiff in a representative capacity (executor, administrator, guardian, trustee). While Abdur Rahim, J. had held that an applicant in a representative suit may not fall within the statutory definition of "legal representative" and that no limitation applied, Sadasiva Aiyar, J. expressed an inclination that Article 181 might apply where the suit had been treated as abated within three years — though he did not decide the point finally because the application in the present case was made within two years of the original plaintiff's death.
  3. Remedy and procedural consequence of an abatement order made without hearing: The respondents argued (relying on Suppu Nayakan) that an abatement order founded on non-survival of the right to sue is a decree and only appeal is available. The court distinguished Suppu Nayakan on the ground that in that case the legal representative had been heard before the abatement order. The court accepted the appellant's submission that an order passed without giving the interested person an opportunity to be heard is not binding on that person and may be treated by him as a nullity (unless statute makes it binding). Accordingly, such a person could seek to vacate the abatement order and continue the suit by applying to the court rather than necessarily appealing first.
  4. Discretion and interference under Section 115: The court observed that if the discrete question were whether the High Court should interfere under Section 115 with the Lower Court's discretion in refusing to excuse delay under Order 22, Rule 9, C.P.C. (or in refusing review), the court would be reluctant to interfere. Nevertheless, in light of the Privy Council's observations favoring permitting next reversioners to bring declaratory suits and to avoid multiplicity of litigation, the court decided to allow the appeal and remand the matter for fresh disposal, treating the application as if the correct provision had been invoked.
  5. Costs and conditional dismissal: Because the appellant had persistently relied on an incorrect statutory provision in his pleadings and applications, the court directed that the appellant pay all costs incurred by the respondents in all Courts within two months of the return of the records to the Subordinate Judge's Court; failing payment, the appeal was to stand dismissed.
  6. Concurring opinion (Spencer, J.): Spencer, J. agreed with the result and amplified that a suit by a reversioner should be regarded not only as a representative suit but also as a suit by a plaintiff in a representative character (Order 7, Rule 4). He emphasized that the Privy Council decision should be implemented so that the next reversioner be given facility to have the matter finally heard and determined, and he noted that under Order 1, Rules 1 and 8(2) the trial Court had power to bring the appellant on the record as plaintiff in place of the deceased.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Letters Patent Appeal was allowed. The matter is remanded for the petition to be disposed of afresh in the light of the Privy Council decision (Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subbammal) and the observations made in this judgment.

Direct consequences for the parties:

  • The appellant is to have the petition re-opened and dealt with on the correct legal footing (treating the provision invoked as amended in the proper manner), giving effect to the principle that a next reversioner may be entitled to continue the suit.
  • The appellant was ordered to pay all costs incurred by the respondents in all Courts within two months from the date of receipt of the records in the Subordinate Judge's Court; if he fails to pay within that time, the appeal will stand dismissed.

Broader implications noted by the Court: The court recorded and operated in the spirit of the Privy Council's recommendation that next reversioners should, where appropriate, be permitted to bring a declaratory suit so that questions peculiar to the body of reversioners may be decided in one litigation and unnecessary multiplicity of suits avoided. The judgment does not purport to lay down a new statutory test beyond applying the cited authorities and the Privy Council's guidance.

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JUDGMENT

Sadasiva Aiyar, J. — This Letters Patent Appeal is against the order of Ayling, J., dismissing C. R. P. 877 of 1916 filed by the next reversioner (or one of the next set of reversioners) who was entitled to continue a suit O. S. No. 27 of 1914 (Temporary Sub-Court, Tanjore) brought by a person who was then the nearest reversioner for setting aside certain alienations effected by the 1st defendant (a Hindu widow). The original plaintiff died in April 1914 and on the 17th July 1914 (before the six months expired) the Subordinate Judge without hearing the petitioner-appellant or any other among the surviving body of reversioners passed an order declaring that the suit had abated. The petitioner was no doubt present in Court intending at first to present an application when the order was passed, but he thought it was useless to make such an application. The Subordinate Judge did not treat him as a person who was entitled to be heard on the question whether the suit had abated and his name did not appear on the record of the suit or in any proceedings connected with the suit, prior in date to the order of abatement. The Subordinate Judge's order was justified by the then current decisions of this Court but in the beginning of 1915 the Privy Council decided the case reported in Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subbammal in which their Lordships held that a suit brought by the next reversioner is a suit really brought on behalf of the entire body of the reversioners and that if the reversioner who was conducting the suit died, the next man is entitled to come in for the purpose of continuing the conduct of the suit. Their Lordships express a doubt on the question whether the next reversioner who has the right to continue the suit comes within the definition of “legal representative “in Sect. 2, Sub-Sect. 11, Civil Procedure Code. But they base their decision on a broader ground, namely, that he was already a party to the suit though the conduct of it was in the hands of the 1st reversioner and that therefore he was entitled to continue the suit after the plaintiff's death. Abdur Rahim, j., held in a case reported in Sivagurunatha Chettiar v. Ramasami Aiyangar(2) that a person who brings a suit on behalf of himself and others having the same interest (after having got permission under O. 1, R. 8), brings what is known as a representative suit (which, I think, must be distinguished from a suit brought by a plaintiff in a representative capacity, i.e, as executor, administrator, guardian or trustee for some other person having the beneficial or legal interest) and the learned Judge seems to think that when such a plaintiff dies, any person who has the same interest and on whose behalf also the suit was brought, when he applies for liberty to continue the suit does not fall within the definition of legal representative, though he has got a right as a person on whose behalf also the suit was originally brought, to continue the suit on the death of the plaintiff who had till then the conduct of the suit. The learned Judge also holds that there is no limitation at all for an application by such a person to continue the suit. I am, however, inclined to hold that article 181 might apply to such a case, and that such an application must be made, if the suit had been treated by the Court as having abated within three years of the order so declaring. However, it is unnecessary to express a final opinion on that question because in the present case, the application was made within two years of the death of the original plaintiff himself.

It was, however, contended on the side of the respondents by Mr. Rajah Iyer that the petitioner's only remedy was by way of appeal against the Subordinate Judge's order treating the suit as having abated. It has no doubt been held in Suppu Nayakan…Plaintiff v. Perumal Chetty…Defendant . that an order of the Court declaring a suit as having abated not on the ground that six months had elapsed when the application was made by the legal representative but on the ground that the right to sue did not survive, is a decree and the only course open to the party aggrieved by such an order is to prefer an appeal against it. As regards the case in Suppu Nayakan v. Perumal Chetty the person who claimed to be the legal representative and who applied for leave to continue the suit as such was heard and the order of abatement was then passed overruling his contentions. As regards the case in Subramama Iyer v. Venkataramier. I am unable to find out from the papers available to me just now whether that case also was not one in which the legal representative was heard before the order was passed,

Mr. Venkatarama Aiyar for the appellant argued that if the Court passed such an order, the person interested (that is, the legal representative) not being given an opportunity to show cause against the passing of such an order, it is not binding on him and he need not have it set aside on appeal but could proceed by applying to continue the suit just as if no such order was in existence. I think that on the elementary principle of law that a party is not bound by any order passed behind his back and without his (or any person representing then his interest) having been given an opportunity to be heard against it, (unless of course there is any statutory provision, whether substantive or processual which makes it binding on him), such a person might treat it as a nullity, so far as he is concerned. Such an order need not be set aside on appeal. Even orders of the nature of what are called “orders of course “need not be set aside on appeal but can be vacated on application to the Court which passed the order, such Court being bound to pass a fresh order after hearing both sides. The appellant is therefore entitled to treat the order of abatement passed on the Court's own motion without hearing him as one not binding on him and apply in the ordinary course to vacate it and to continue, in the present case, his application which purported to be made under O. 22, R. 9, C. P. C., to set aside the abatement order as one passed under O. 22 and if a very strict technical view is taken by us in arriving at our decision in this case, the petition itself having been misconceived may be treated as having been properly dismissed by the Lower Courts and this Court was not bound to interfere under Sect. 115, C. P. C. I might also state that not only did the petitioner misquote the provision of law under which he was entitled to apply to continue the suit but he persisted in that mistake both in the appeal to the District Court and in the Revision Petition argued before Ayling, J. In the arguments advanced before us in this Letters Patent Appeal more time was spent in arguing that mistaken point than the point on which he is in my opinion, really entitled to succeed.

The question whether the application to the Subordinate Judge cannot be treated as a petition of review was also put forward and argued at great length before us and before Ayling, J. I might state that it the question is whether the discretion of the Lower Court in refusing to excuse the delay in applying under O. 22, R. 9, to set aside the order of abatement or the delay in applying for review (treating the petition as one for review) should be interfered with in revision, I would have little hesitation in holding that under Sect. 115 the discretion of the Lower Court in refusing to excuse the delay should not be interfered with by this Court. However their Lordships of the Privy Council indicate in Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subbammal, that to save the widow and all the reversioners repeated harassments, it is advisable to have a declaratory suit permitted to be brought by the next reversioner (in order that evidence as to the character of the alienation made by the widow may not be lost by lapse of time), that such a suit should be decided, if possible, in one litigation and that the questions usually raised in such a suit should not be allowed to be fought out repeatedly in a multiplicity of suits. I would therefore allow this Letters Patent Appeal treating the provision of law under which this application was put in as amended in the proper manner and remand the case for disposal of the petition afresh in the light of the above observations. Having in view the mistaken view of the right procedure into which the appellant fell, and in which he persisted, I would direct that he should pay all the costs incurred by the respondents up to this date in all the Courts within two months from the date of the receipt of the records in the Subordinate Judge's Court (the same to be paid in any event to the respondent) and if he fails to do so, this appeal will stand dismissed.

Spencer, J.—I agree with the judgment just pronounced by my learned brother and the order proposed to be made. Only I am inclined to think that a suit by a reversioner is not only a representative suit but is also a suit by a plaintiff in a representative character as mentioned in O. 7, R. 4. It is true that the illustrations to the old Sect, 50 are illustrations of suits brought by executors, administrators, and guardians. But these illustrations are not repeated in the new Code, and as a rule illustrations are not necessarily exhaustive of the words of the section. In Gal Salvanl Bal Savaut v. Narayana Dhond Savant, certain redemption suits brought by members of an undivided Hindu family were treated as suits brought in a representative character within the meaning of this section. In Venkatanarayana Pillai v. Subbammal, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council at p. 411 speak of a suit brought by a presumptive reversioner to declare “an adoption made by a widow to be invalid as being brought in a representatve capacity and on behalf of all reversioners.” But I feel no doubt that the Privy Council intended to give the widest scope to reversioners to agitate once for all and as early as possible all claims peculiar to the body of reversioners in one suit and that the decision in such a suit should be binding on all the reversioners. Acting in that spirit, I think that Courts should on the death of the nearest reversioner give every facility to the next reversioner to have the matter in dispute finally heard and determined. At the time when the appellant put in his Petitions Nos. 384 and 385 on August 2nd and No. 386 on August 16th, 1915, asking the Subordinate Judge to restore the suit by setting aside the order of dismissal and abatement and at the time when the Subordinate Judge passed his order thereon dated the 11th of October 1915, the prevailing law on the subject was that contained in the Privy Council decision of March 15, 1915; and following the law there laid down, the appellant should have been allowed to revive or rather to continue the suit which had been filed by the deceased plaintiff as representing the body of reversioners, and under O. 1, Rr. 1 and 8 (2), the Court that tried the suit had full power to bring the appellant on the record as a plaintiff in the place of the deceased plaintiff. I agree and have nothing to add on the questions of limitation and the maintainability of the revision petition.

K. V. S.Appeal allowed