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Govindaswami Pillai ... v. Dasai Goundan And An...
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Sadasiva Aiyar, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The assignee-decree-holder is the appellant. On 20 September 1912 a final decree for sale of hypothecated properties was passed. Items 4 and 5 of those properties were later acquired by the Government under the Land Acquisition Act and Rs. 3,400 (compensation) was deposited in Court for the Government on 11 August 1914 to the credit of the suit. The decree-holder stated that the decree amount with interest on that date amounted to Rs. 3,926. The decree-holder withdrew Rs. 3,400 from Court on 11 August 1914 and filed an execution application for sale of two other hypothecated items on 10 August 1917.
The Lower Court (District Court) on 30 September 1919 held, on the second point, that only Rs. 103-7-8 was due under the decree on 11 August 1914. On the first point the Lower Court held that because the Rs. 3,400 compensation was paid to the decree-holder on account of the decree by consent of the judgment-debtors on 11 August 1914, Section 20 of the Limitation Act gave a fresh starting point for limitation, and therefore the execution petition filed on 10 August 1917 was not barred. The Lower Court directed execution to issue for the Rs. 103 and odd with interest.
The decree-holder appealed, contending that Rs. 500 and odd (with interest) was due on 11 August 1914 rather than the Rs. 103 and odd found by the Lower Court. The appellate court (Sadasiva Aiyar, J.) agreed with the Lower Court that only Rs. 103 and odd was due and dismissed the appeal with costs.
The 1st defendant (judgment-debtor) filed a memorandum of objections raising two contentions: (1) that the ex parte payments did not fall within Section 20 of the Limitation Act so the execution petition was barred; and (2) that the decree had been fully satisfied by payments made. The court rejected the second contention and proceeded to consider the first.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the execution petition filed on 10 August 1917 was barred by limitation.
- What was the balance due under the decree on the material date (whether it was Rs. 500 and odd with interest from 11 August 1914 as claimed by the decree-holder, or a lesser sum, and if so what sum)?
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant (decree-holder)
- Contended that on 11 August 1914 the balance due under the decree was approximately Rs. 500 and odd (with interest), not merely Rs. 103 and odd as found by the Lower Court.
- Relied on the fact that he had drawn Rs. 3,400 (compensation) from Court on 11 August 1914 and subsequently sought execution for sale of other hypothecated properties by filing on 10 August 1917.
1st Defendant (judgment-debtor) — memorandum of objections
- The ex parte payments made in August 1914 did not fall within Section 20 of the Limitation Act, and therefore the execution petition was barred by limitation.
- In any event, the decree had been fully satisfied by payments made.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Ragoonath Doss Cookman v. Ranee Shiromanee Pat Mahadebee | Authority cited in relation to whether a sale-realisation can be considered part-payment under the relevant provision (analogous to Sect. 20 / earlier Sect. 21) that gives a new period of limitation. | The court observed that the report gives no reasons for the opinion and that the condition as to handwriting was not considered in that case. The appellate court declined to accept the headnote of the reporter as accurately representing the Judges' opinion for present purposes and therefore did not treat that decision as controlling against their interpretation of the Limitation Act. |
| Ramchandra Ganesh v. Devba | Cited as a reported instance where a rule was discharged in favour of the judgment-debtors (arguments included reliance on English decisions requiring a promise to pay). | The court noted no judgment was given and the rule was discharged without reasons; the report does not show whether English authorities were followed, and therefore the appellate court did not treat it as decisive against its construction of the Indian Limitation Act. |
| Oudh Bihari Pande v. Mahabir Sahai | Considered on the narrow point whether part-payment by sale in execution, not appearing in the handwriting of the judgment-debtor, can save limitation. | The appellate court accepted that the only question decided in that case was that part-payment by sale in execution not appearing in the judgment-debtor's handwriting could not save limitation; this supports the handwriting requirement but does not negate the court's view that a court's or officer's act may satisfy the agent/handwriting conditions. |
| Brew v. Brew (and Chinnery v. Evans) | Principle that payment by a receiver or a sheriff appointed under law may be treated as payment by the agent of the person liable; such payments operate on the debtor's assets and discharge the debtor to the extent paid. | The court relied on this line of English decisions to support the proposition that payments made by an officer operating on the debtor's assets (for example, a sheriff or receiver) are to be treated as payments by the debtor's agent and hence can satisfy the "agent duly authorised" requirement in Section 20. |
| Lakshumanan Chetty v. Sadayappa Chetty | Holds that an acknowledgment of a debt made by a receiver appointed by the Court on behalf of a firm under dissolution is a valid acknowledgment saving limitation under Section 19, as the receiver was an agent authorised to make the acknowledgment. | The appellate court cited this as authority supporting a liberal view that an agent appointed by the Court (or acting in a capacity created by law) can be treated as an "agent duly authorised" for purposes of Sections 19 and 20. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court addressed the two issues in turn and explained its reasoning as follows.
On the quantum due on the material date: The appellate judge reviewed the accounts and records and agreed with the Lower Court's conclusion that only Rs. 103 and odd remained due on the material date (the Lower Court had found Rs. 103-7-8 due on 11 August 1914). The appellant's contention that Rs. 500 and odd was due was rejected, and the appeal failed on this ground.
On the limitation point under Section 20 of the Limitation Act: The court examined Sect. 20 (as quoted in the opinion) which provides that where part of the principal of a debt is paid before the expiration of the prescribed period, a fresh period of limitation runs from the time of that payment, provided that in the case of part-payment the fact of payment appears in the handwriting of the person making the same; Explanation: "Debt includes money payable under a decree." The court identified two sub-questions: (1) whether the fact of payment appeared in the handwriting of the person making the payment, and (2) whether the payment was made by the debtor or by his duly authorised agent.
On the handwriting requirement, the court found that court records produced showed the Judge had signed a paper indicating that Rs. 3,400 was paid to the decree-holder "in the presence of the Judge and through the Court." The court concluded that this record satisfied the statutory condition that the fact of payment appear in the handwriting of the person making the payment.
On whether the Judge (or the Court) could be regarded as an "agent duly authorised" of the judgment-debtor, the court engaged in legal analysis of the Limitation Act and relevant authorities:
- The court rejected the English fiction that acknowledgments operate by implying a fresh promise to pay as the basis for Sects. 19 and 20, observing that Indian provisions (including Explanation 1 to Sect. 19) operate differently and that the handwriting requirement was intended to exclude fraudulent oral testimony rather than to import an implied promise doctrine.
- The court read the statutory phrase "agent duly authorised" liberally. It noted Sect. 21(1) (of the Limitation Act) which expressly treats agents acting for persons under disability (guardians, committees, managers) as agents "duly authorised" and observed that such authority may arise by law rather than by voluntary act of the person under disability — supporting a broad construction of "agent duly authorised."
- The court surveyed authorities (including decisions where receivers and sheriffs were treated as operating on the debtor's assets and whose payments were treated as payments by the debtor's agent) and concluded there was no principled reason to deny that a Court (or its Judge) making payment in the course of its duty could be considered a legally constituted agent of the judgment-debtor for the limited purpose of satisfying Section 20.
- The court thus held that the statutory requirements of Sect. 20 were satisfied: (a) the payment was part payment of the principal; (b) the fact of payment appeared in writing (the Judge's signed paper); and (c) the payment was made by an agent "duly authorised" in the sense contemplated by the statute — here the Court acting in its capacity over the debtor's assets.
The court also addressed and distinguished earlier decisions that might be thought to conflict with this view (noting gaps or the absence of reasoning in those reports) and relied on precedent where court-appointed officers' acts were treated as acts of the debtor's agent.
A brief concurring opinion (Trotter, J.) added that the principle from Chinnery v. Evans supports treating the acts of a person other than the debtor (who is in a position to realise the debtor's assets) as the act of the debtor, because the volition of the debtor in such cases is neither requisite nor relevant. Trotter, J. therefore also concluded the Judge's act satisfied the "agent duly authorised" requirement and that the Judge's handwriting could rightly be described as that of the person making the payment.
Holding and Implications
Holding: APPEAL DISMISSED — the appellate court agreed with the Lower Court that only Rs. 103 and odd remained due on the material date and dismissed the decree-holder's appeal with costs.
Additional disposition: MEMORANDUM OF OBJECTIONS DISMISSED — the 1st defendant's memorandum of objections was dismissed with costs after the court found the requirements of Section 20 were satisfied by the payments made through the Court/Judge.
Implications (direct and as stated in the opinion):
- The Lower Court's decree directing execution for the Rs. 103 and odd (with interest) stands; the decree-holder's claim of a larger balance (about Rs. 500 and odd) was rejected.
- The court interpreted Section 20 of the Limitation Act to permit part-payment effected through the Court (with a judge's written endorsement of payment) to operate as a part-payment that restarts limitation where the statutory handwriting requirement is satisfied and where the person effecting payment (here the Court/Judge) can be treated as an "agent duly authorised" within the statutory meaning. The court applied a liberal construction to the phrase "agent duly authorised."
- The opinion distinguishes English authorities that rely on a fiction of an implied promise to pay, and it emphasizes that the Indian statutory scheme (Sects. 19 and 20) should be construed according to its text and purposes — particularly to guard against fraudulent oral testimony and to accommodate practical modes by which payments may be made out of a debtor's assets by persons other than the debtor himself.
- The decision resulted in immediate concrete effects for the parties (dismissal of the appeal and of the objections, and maintenance of the direction to execute for the balance found due). The opinion articulates an interpretive rule about the application of Section 20 in contexts where payments are effected through court processes, but the court framed its reasoning by reference to the facts and authorities before it rather than asserting a broader doctrinal innovation beyond those circumstances.
Result as recorded in the opinion: "Appeal dismissed, Objections dismissed." (per the concluding lines of the judgment)
Sadasiva Aiyar, J. — The assignee-decree-holder is the appellant. The following are the relevant facts and dates. On 20th September 1912, the final decree for sale of the hypothecated properties was passed. Items 4 and 5 of the hypothecated properties were afterwards acquired by the Government under the Land Acquisition Act and Rs. 3,400 (compensation money) was deposited in Court for the Government on 11th August 1914 to the credit of the suit. The decree amount with interest on that date amounted to Rs. 3,926 according to the decree-holder. The decree-holder drew the compensation amount of Rs. 3,400 from the Court on 11th August 1914 and he filed the present execution application for sale of two other hypothecated items on 10 August 1917. The questions for consideration are (1) whether the execution petition is barred by limitation and (2) what was the balance due under the decree, whether it was Rs. 500 and odd with interest from 11th August 1914 as claimed by the decree-holder or a lesser sum and if so, what sum?
The Lower Court on 30th September 1919 held on the second point that only Rs. 103-7-8 was the sum due on 11th August 1914 under the decree. On the first point, it held that because on 11th August 1914 the compensation amount Rs. 3,400 was paid to the decree-holder on account of the decree by consent of the judgment debtors, Sect. 20 of the Limitation Act gave a fresh starting point of limitation and hence the execution petition of 10th August 1917 was not barred by limitation. It accordingly directed execution to issue for the Rs. 103 and odd with interest. This appeal by the decree-holder was based on the ground that really Rs. 500 and odd was due and not merely Rs. 103 and odd on 11th August 1914 under the decree. Having heard both sides and gone through the records, I agree with the Lower Court in its conclusion that only Rs. 103 and odd was really due on the above date. So the appeal fails and has to be dismissed with costs.
But there is a memorandum of objections filed by the 1st defendant (the judgment-debtor) and the contentions in that Memorandum are:
1. The learned Judge ought to have held that the payments made exparte having reference to their nature and mode did not come within Sect. 20 of the Limitation Act and the execution petition was therefore barred.
2. The Courts below ought to have held that even otherwise, the decree has been fully satisfied by payments made.
As regards the second contention that full satisfaction had been made there is nothing in it and the District Judge was right in finding that Rs. 103 and odd still remained due on 11th August 1917
The much more important contention remains, namely that “the payment made ex parte” in August 1914 did not come within Sect. 20 of the Limitation Act and could not therefore save limitation, Sect. 20 of the Limitation Act (omitting the words unnecessary for the decision in this case) is as follows:—“Where part of the principal of a debt is, before the expiration of the prescribed period, paid by the debtor or by his agent duly authorised in this behalf, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the payment was made; provided that in the case part-payment of the principal of a debt, the fact of the payment appears in the handwriting of the person making the same. Explanation 1. Debt includes money payable under a decree.”
The payment of Rs. 3400 was clearly part payment of the principal of the decree-debt. But two other questions remain to be considered, namely, (1) Whether the fact of the payment appears in the handwriting of the person making the same; (2) Whether the payment was made by the debtor or by his agent duly authorised in that behalf,
On the first question, the decree-holder in the case produced before us copies of Court records showing that when the Rs. 3,400 was paid out, the Judge signed a paper indicating that Rs. 3,400 was paid to the decree-holder in the presence of the Judge and through the Court, I think this record sufficiently satisfies the condition that the fact of payment should appear in the handwriting of the person making the same.
The only question that remains therefore for consideration is whether the Judge can be called an agent duly authorised by the judgment-debtor to make the payment.
Notwithstanding some obiter dicta of their Lordships of the Privy Council based on English decisions that the reason why an acknowledgment of indebtedness gives a fresh starting point for limitation is that it gives a fresh cause of action by reason of its implying a fresh promise to pay, I am clear that the provisions in Sects. 19 and 20 of the Indian Limitation Act could not have been based upon any such fiction of an implied new promise to pay. Under Sect. 19, Explanation 1, an acknowledgment signed by the party liable is sufficient even when accompanied by a refusal to pay whereas in consequence of the fiction of an implied promise to pay being necessary under the English decisions, an acknowledgment accompanied by a refusal to pay is insufficient under the English Law to afford a fresh starting point for limitation as that fiction of an implied promise to pay becomes still-born in consequence of such refusal to pay. I think the Indian Law must be held to have required the handwriting of the person making the payment merely in order to exclude fraudulent oral testimony as to such payment just as the Statute of frauds tried to prevent Courts being fooded with perjury in the case of sales of goods etc. The fiction of an implied promise to pay and the accrual of anew cause of action by an unregistered acknowledgment of a payment of interest as such would not help mortgage-creditors to obtain decrees for sale as the new promise not being evidenced by a registered deed cannot be made to affect immoveable property. The law of limitation is partly intended to promote deligence on the part of creditors in the matter of recovery of their debts. The concessions made in favour of creditors by the provisions of Sects. 19 and 20 of the Limitation Act are intended to express the view of the legislature that a creditor will not be considered wanting in such deligence in bringing his suit and he will not be penalised by the bar of limitation if he had been deligent enough to get the handwriting of the debtor to evidence an acknowledgment of the fact of part-payment within the period of limitation.
Provided therefore the evidence of the payment is in a writing binding on the debtor it seems to me the object of the legislature is satisfied, and in construing the words ‘agent duly authorised,’ the Courts ought in my opinion to be as liberal as possible. Sect. 21 (1) of the Limitation Act says that the expression “agent duly authorised in this behalf” in Sects. 19 and 20 shall “in the case of a person under disability, include his lawful guardian, committee or manager, or an agent duly authorised by such guardian, committee or manager to sign the acknowledgment or make the payment.” This shows that the authorization need not be a voluntary authorisation; for the guardian of a person under disability does not get his authority through any voluntary act of the person under disability but by law. In Ragoonath Doss Cookman v. Ranee Shiromanee Pat Mahadebee there is a sentence in the decision as follows: “As regards the sale made on the 8th March 1869, from which a sum of Rs. 206 was realised, we think that cannot be considered a part-payment under Sect. 21 so as to give a new period of limitation”. Sect. 21 considered therein was Sect. 21 of Act IX of 1871 which is similar to Sect. 20 of the present Limitation Act so far as the question under consideration is concerned. No reasons are given for the opinion. Further, the point whether the condition as to the payment appearing in the handwriting of the person making the payment or his duly authorised agent was not raised or considered in that case. In Ramchandra Ganesh v. Devba, no judgment was given and the Court discharged the rule granted in favour of the decree-holder without giving any reasons. Whether the Court intended to adopt all or only some of the arguments advanced by the vakil for the judgment-debtors as found in the report does not appear. One of such arguments was that an acknowledgment must have contained an express or implied promise to pay, quoting English decisions. I have shown that those decisions are inapplicable in construing the Indian Limitation Act. Of course from an involuntary payment a promise to pay the balance cannot be implied. Raghoonath Doss Cookman v. Ranee Shiromanee Pat Mahadabee, was also quoted in that case not in the arguments before the High Court but only by the Lower Court in support of its opinion. It appears from the report that the payment relied upon was not part-payment of the principal in the handwriting of the person making the payment but payment of interest and it was argued by the creditor that the recovery of rent decreed in a suit brought by the usufructuary mortgagee on a bond providing for payment of rent in lieu of interest was payment of interest on the mortgage bond. The defendants argued that the payment in satisfaction of the decree passed for rent is not a payment to the creditor of interest as such. It may be that this argument was accepted and so the rule was discharged by the Bombay High Court on that ground. I am unable therefore to accept the headnote of the reporter as really representing the opinion of the Judges in that case. In Oudh Bihari Pande v. Mahabir Sahai, the only question decided was that because the part-payment by sale in execution of the judgment-debtor's property did not appear in the handwriting of the judgment-debtor, it could not save limitation. In Brew v. Brew, decided by four Judges on the language of a statute which requires that “some part of the principal money or some interest thereon, shall have been paid or some acknowledgment of the right thereto shall have been given in writing signed by the person by whom the same shall be payable or his agent,” in order to save limitation, the Court followed the principle of the decision in Chinnery v. Evans(4). In that case, the payment by a receiver appointed under the Mortgage Act was held to be payment by the agent of the person liable to pay though the receiver was appointed by the Court and not by the mortgagor and was appointed for the benefit of the mortgagee to receive “for him particularly” the rents of the mortgagor's property. Johnson, J. says: in Brew v. Brew “Whether it is by the agency of a receiver or sheriff, the payment is made to the creditor on foot of the debt which the debtor is bound in law to pay, and out of the debtor's rents or chattels as the case may be, for the debtor and on his account: to the extent of such payment, the debtor is discharged from so much of the judgment-debt. I therefore think that such payments by a Sheriff are not payments by a stranger to the judgment-debtor but are payments out of the debtor's chattels' by a person paying for him and on his account what he is bound to pay.’ Per Lord Cranworth in Chinnery v. Evans.”
In Lakshumanan Chetty v. Sadayappa Chetty, a Bench of this Court held that an acknowledgment of a debt made by a receiver appointed by the Court on behalf of a firm under dissolution is a valid acknowledgment saving limitation by reason of the provisions of Sect. 19 of the Limitation Act as he was an agent authorised to make the acknowledgment.
If a Sheriff of the Court making the payment can be considered an agent of the debtor, I see nothing in principle or reason which should prevent me from holding that a Court paying in the course of its duty the money due by the judgment-debtor is also a legally constituted agent of the judgment-debtor for that purpose.
In the result, I think that the requirements of Sect. 20 are satisfied and I would dismiss the memorandum of objections also with costs.
Courts Trotter, J.—I entirely agree. My Lord has covered the ground so thoroughly that I only propose to add a word on the last point. I think the principle deducible from Chinnery v. Evans is this:—that, if a debtor's assets are so placed, either by his own act or by operation of law, that if some one other than he alone can realise them for the purpose of making payments due from him, then the act of that other in operating upon the debtor's assets must be treated as the act of the debtor himself, the volition of the debtor in such a case being neither requisite nor relevant. If that be so, it appears to me that the words “his agent duly authorised in that behalf” in Sect. 20 of the Limitation Act are satisfied by the act of the Judge of the Court which authorises the payment: and that his handwriting is rightly described as that of the person making the payment.
d,
C.KAppeal dismissed, Objections dismisse.
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