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Raja Bollapragada Venkata Lakshmamma Garu v. Menda Seetayya
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff (appellant) asserted he was the proprietor of a village holding and sought to enforce a statutory prior charge for rent created by Section 5 of the Madras Estates Land Act to bring the holding to sale to recover arrears. One Akula Ammanna had been the ryot of the holding until at least 1908 and sold it by registered deed to the 2nd defendant. The 1st defendant contended that Ammanna's sale was nominal and that Ammanna continued as tenant; in execution of a money decree against Ammanna (Small Cause Suit No. 3 of 1910) the holding was attached and purchased by the 1st defendant in court auction, who obtained possession through the court.
The plaintiff had earlier obtained a money decree for rent (in a revenue Court—Rent Suit No. 219 of 1913) against the 2nd defendant. That decree was subsequently transferred to the District Munsif's Court of Cocanada for execution, where the plaintiff attempted to enforce his alleged statutory prior charge by attaching the holding. The 1st defendant, relying on his purchase in execution and possession, filed a claim petition which was allowed and the attachment by the plaintiff was raised.
The plaintiff then instituted the present suit to declare his right to have the property sold by virtue of the alleged prior charge for the rent decreed to him. The lower courts dismissed the suit on the ground that under Order 34, Rule 14 read with Rule 15 of the Civil Procedure Code the plaintiff could enforce a prior charge only by obtaining a decree for sale in a suit for sale brought on the charge. The plaintiff appealed; the present opinion is from the Second Appeal, which was dismissed by the court with costs.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a landlord's remedy to enforce a statutory prior charge for rent (created by Sect. 5 of the Madras Estates Land Act) is available when the relationship of landlord and tenant no longer exists at the time the remedy is sought (drawing on Forbes v. Maharaja Bahadur Singh).
- Whether the statutory charge for arrears of rent under Sect. 5 of the Madras Estates Land Act falls within the definition of "charge" in Sect. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act and consequently whether Order 34, Rule 14, Civil Procedure Code applies to enforcement of that charge.
- Whether a Civil Court, to which a revenue Court's rent decree has been transferred for execution, has the power to enforce the statutory prior charge or exercise the special powers conferred on revenue courts (in particular under Sect. 132 of the Madras Estates Land Act) in execution proceedings.
- Whether sales or purchases in execution (and subsequent titles) affect the priority or enforceability of statutory rent charges and whether sales carried out under revenue procedures remove prior encumbrances vis-à-vis purchasers in execution (as discussed in relation to Sect. 132 and related provisions).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (Plaintiff)
- The plaintiff relied on Section 5 of the Madras Estates Land Act, asserting that rent due on ryoti land is a first charge on the holding and that he was entitled to have the holding sold to satisfy his rent decree.
- The appellant's counsel (Mr. Ramamurthi) relied upon observations in Suranna v. Suryanarayana Jagapathi Raju to contend that Order 34, Rule 14, Civil Procedure Code does not apply to the charge created by Section 5 of the Estates Land Act—i.e., that the statutory rent charge is not to be enforced under the same procedure as a charge defined by Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act.
- Implicit in the plaintiff's approach was that, by virtue of the statutory charge and his decree, he should be able to enforce sale of the holding even though the decree had been transferred for execution to a Civil Court.
1st Defendant's Arguments
- The contesting 1st defendant asserted (in the written statement) that the plaintiff's right as proprietor had been sold at court auction to Nyapathi Subba Rao (or that the holding was otherwise alienated in execution), and therefore the plaintiff could not claim a prior charge for rent.
- The 1st defendant relied on his purchase at execution (Small Cause Suit No. 3 of 1910), his possession obtained through the court, and successfully filed a claim petition which led to the raising of the plaintiff's attachment.
- There was contention that the sale by Ammanna to the 2nd defendant might have been nominal and that Ammanna continued as tenant, a factual contention relevant to priority and existence of the landlord-tenant relationship at critical times.
2nd Defendant and Other Factual Contentions
- The 2nd defendant was the grantee under a registered sale deed from Akula Ammanna; the plaintiff had earlier sued the 2nd defendant in the Revenue Court for rent arrears and obtained a personal decree against the 2nd defendant.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Forbes v. Maharaja Bahadur Singh | Held that a landlord may enforce the remedy provided by law for a prior charge for rent only when the landlord-tenant relationship exists at the time the remedy is sought to be enforced. | The court applied this principle to conclude that the plaintiff's statutory charge ceased to exist when he lost his estate; on that short ground the suit had to be dismissed. |
| Suranna v. Suryanarayana Jagapathi Raju | Contains judgments (and reliance on Calcutta decisions) holding that Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act and consequently Order 34, R. 14, CPC would not apply to enforcement of a charge for rent under the Estates Land Act. | Justice Sadasiva Aiyar respectfully differed from those judgments as to the applicability of Sect. 100 and O.34, R.14 to rent charges payable in money, and he analysed and rejected aspects of the reasoning relied upon in Suranna. |
| Fotick Chunder Dey Sircar v. Foley | Decision that a landlord with a money decree for rent could execute against properties other than the holding; contains an obiter that the 'charge' in Sect. 65 Bengal Tenancy Act is not the same as the charge defined in Sect. 100 Transfer of Property Act. | The court treated the obiter dictum as vague and not sufficient to hold that Order 34, R. 14 is inapplicable where a charge for rent is sought to be enforced; distinguished the case as not involving enforcement of a prior charge. |
| Srimati Maharanee Dasya v. Harendra Lal Roy | Observation: no strict analogy between a charge for rent and a mortgage charge; money due for rent is both a personal debt and a first charge on the land. | The court stated that this observation did not have bearing on whether Order 34, R. 14 applies when a Civil Court is asked in execution to enforce the charge. |
| Tariniprosad Roy v. Narayan Kumari Debi | Decision on whether the landlord can pursue personal remedies against the tenant without first having the holding sold. | The court noted this was a decision on that limited point and not directly determinative of the issue whether Order 34, R. 14 applies to enforcement of the statutory charge. |
| Royzuddi Sheik v. Kali Nath Mookerjeei | Considered whether a bond or mortgage in lieu of arrears affected the original rent charge; included an obiter that Sect. 65 Bengal Tenancy Act's charge may not be the same as Sect. 100 TP Act's charge. | The court observed the main ground of that decision was limitation and substitution of liability; the obiter was not treated as decisive for the present question. |
| Gopinath Mahapatra v. Kasinath Beg | Decided matters under Sect. 65 and Sect. 107 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, including purchaser's right in execution to apply to the Collector to annul prior encumbrances; did not decide question of necessity of bringing a suit as prescribed under O.34, R.14. | The court noted the case does not decide the precise necessity of bringing a suit under O.34, R.14; Phillips, J.'s remarks about Sect. 100 were noted but treated as not dispositive for the issue before the court. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The judgment contains separate but harmonious reasoning by two judges. The following are the essential steps in the court's legal analysis as presented in the opinion:
- Primary short ground (Sadasiva Aiyar, J.): The suit was founded solely on the alleged existence of the statutory prior charge created by Section 5 of the Madras Estates Land Act. Relying on Forbes v. Maharaja Bahadur Singh, the court accepted the principle that the landlord is entitled to enforce the remedy for a prior charge only when the landlord-tenant relationship exists at the time the remedy is sought. Because the plaintiff had lost his estate (it appears his proprietorship had been sold or otherwise extinguished), the statutory charge had ceased to exist, and hence the suit had to be dismissed on that short ground.
- On the question whether the statutory rent charge falls within Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act and whether Order 34, Rule 14, CPC applies: Justice Sadasiva Aiyar conducted a detailed examination of the authorities relied upon for the contrary proposition (notably decisions from the Calcutta High Court and the Privy Council's remarks as interpreted in those cases). He expressed difficulty in accepting that a statutory charge for rent (at least where rent is payable in money) does not fall within the definition of "charge" in Section 100. He analysed and distinguished the Calcutta decisions (Fotick Chunder Dey Sircar v. Foley, Srimati Maharanee Dasya, Royzuddi Sheik, Tariniprosad Roy, Gopinath Mahapatra) and considered that many of their observations were either obiter or addressed different factual points (such as enforcement of a mere money decree against other properties or substitution of liability by bond). He respectfully disagreed with parts of Suranna v. Suryanarayana Jagapathi Raju insofar as those judgments held that Section 100 and O.34, R.14 would not apply to rent charges payable in money.
- On the effect of transfer of a revenue Court's rent decree to a Civil Court for execution: Both judges (Sadasiva Aiyar J. and Spencer J.) emphasised that when a money decree passed by a revenue Court is transferred to a Civil Court (District Munsif) under the relevant procedural provisions, the Civil Court exercises execution under the Civil Procedure Code and does not acquire the distinct execution powers conferred on revenue Courts and Collectors by the Madras Estates Land Act (notably the special procedures under Chapter VI and Section 132). Spencer, J. stressed that the executing Civil Court cannot go behind the decree to enforce a charge which is not declared in that decree, nor assume the special powers reserved to revenue Courts/Collectors.
- Interaction of revenue-sale protections and civil execution: The opinion recognises that Section 132 (and Section 125 read with it) of the Madras Estates Land Act provide that where property is sold for arrears of rent, the purchaser takes it free of certain encumbrances (subject to the Act's temporal limitations). The court accepted that the reasoning in Suranna to the extent it relied on Section 132 as a reason for distinguishing the applicability of Section 100 and Order 34, R.14 (in revenue sales) may be correct when the sale is conducted by a revenue Court under the Act; however, where the decree has been transferred to a Civil Court, those special revenue powers do not follow the decree.
- Result on facts: Applying the principal short ground (Forbes) and the procedural distinction about transferred decrees, the court held the plaintiff's suit unsustainable and dismissed the Second Appeal with costs.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
SECOND APPEAL DISMISSED WITH COSTS.
The direct consequences for the parties as stated in the opinion are:
- The plaintiff's suit to establish and enforce a statutory prior charge under Section 5 of the Madras Estates Land Act was dismissed (on the short ground that the charge had ceased to exist when the plaintiff lost his estate).
- The Second Appeal against the dismissal of that suit fails and is dismissed with costs.
Broader implications and observations recorded in the opinion (as expressed by the judges):
- Justice Sadasiva Aiyar expressed the view that, at least where rent is payable in money, the statutory charge under Section 5 of the Madras Estates Land Act may fall within the definition of "charge" in Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act and that Order 34, Rule 14, CPC can be relevant to enforcement; he explicitly differed from earlier decisions (Suranna) to that extent. However, on the facts of this case the suit was dismissed on the basis that the prior charge no longer existed when enforcement was sought.
- Both judges made clear that where a rent decree passed by a revenue Court is transferred to a Civil Court for execution, the Civil Court applies the Civil Procedure Code in execution and does not possess the special execution powers conferred on revenue Courts/Collectors by the Madras Estates Land Act—therefore a Civil Court cannot assume or exercise those revenue powers or enforce a charge not declared in the decree being executed.
- The opinion contains critical discussion of a number of earlier authorities and obiter remarks in Calcutta High Court decisions; the court treated many of those remarks as not dispositive of the central procedural question before it.
The opinion does not purport to lay down an unequivocal new rule in all circumstances; its immediate effect is the dismissal of the Second Appeal and the plaintiff's claim. Where the opinion records disagreement with earlier judgments (notably on the applicability of Sect. 100 and O.34, R.14), those are judicial views expressed in the course of disposing of this appeal.
JUDGMENT
Sadasiva Aiyar, J. — The plaintiff is the appellant. In paragraph 3 of the plaint it is said that the plaintiff was the proprietor of the Village of Guttinadevi. The contesting 1st defendant says in paragraph 7 of the written statement that the plaintiff's right as the proprietor of the village had been sold in court auction to Nyapathi Subba Rao and therefore the plaintiff could not claim prior charge for any rent due to him as he does in the plaint. Though this question was not made the subject of any issue, it seems not to have been denied that the property had been sold away to Nyapathi Subba Rao. But there seems to have been a question before the Lower Appellate Court as to whether the purchase was prior to the bringing of the Summary Suit No. 219 of 1918 by the plaintiff in the Revenue Court against the 2nd defendant for rent or subsequent to that suit. Whether it was prior or subsequent to it, it has been held by the Privy Council in a case in Forbes v. Maharaja Bahadur Singh, that if the remedy provided by law in favour of the landlord to claim a prior charge for rent is sought to be enforced, he is entitled to do so only when the relationship of landlord and tenant exists at the time when the “remedy provided by law is sought to be enforced.” As this suit is based in my opinion solely on the alleged existence of the prior statutory charge created by Sect. 5 of the Madras Estates Land Act in the landlord's favour and of his right in consequence to bring the holding to sale to enforce that first charge as against all other claims, the suit has to be dismissed on the short ground that the charge (even if it existed before) ceased to exist or when the plaintiff lost his estate.
As however, other questions of law were argued at some length, I shall express my opinion on those questions. Before considering those questions, some of the facts have to be stated.
One Akula Ammanna was the ryot of the holding (for the rent due on which the plaintiff obtained his decree in the suit of 1913) till at least 1908. Ammanna sold it then to the 2nd defendant by means of registered sale deed. The 1st defendant contends that the sale deed was a nominal transaction and that Akula Ammanna continued to be the tenant of the holding even after 1908. In execution of the money decree passed against Akula Ammanna in Small Cause Suit No. 3 of 1910 the holding was attached as the property of Ammanna and was purchased by that 1st defendant. 1st defendant obtained possession of the property through Court. Then the plaintiff had his money decree transferred to the District Munsif's Court of Coconada from the revenue Court and attached the holding. The 1st defendant on the strength of his purchase in Court-auction and possession thereunder put in a claim petition and on that strength the claim was allowed and the attachment was raised. Hence the present suit was brought to declare the plaintiff's right to have the property sold by virtue of his alleged prior charge for the money due under the rent decree. The Lower Courts dismissed the suit on the ground that under O. 34, R. 14 read with R. 15 the plaintiff can enforce his prior charge only by obtaining a decree for sale in a suit for sale brought on the charge.
The appellant's learned Vakil Mr. Ramamurthi relied upon certain observations in Suranna v. Suryanarayqna Jagapathi Raju for his contention that O. 34, R. 14, Civil Procedure Code does not apply at all to the charge created by Sect. 5 of the Estates Land Act, Sect. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act says:—” Where immoveable property of one person is by an act of parties or operation of law made security for the payment of money to another and the transaction does not amount to a mortgage, the latter is said to have a charge on the property.” I am unable to understand why the charge created by statute for rent under the Madras Estates Land Act at least in cases where the rent is payable in money does not fall under Sect. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act. Reliance is placed by the learned Judges in their judgments in Suranna v. Suryanarayana Jagapathi Raju, on certain decisions of the Calcutta High Court. I might at once state that those decisions were based upon the construction of the provisions of Bengal Tenancy Act, especially Sect. 65 of that Act and those of the Madras Estates Land Act, Sect. 65 of the Bengal Tenancy Act as stated by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Forbes v. Maharaj Bahadur Singh is not a “happily worded section”. I shall deal shortly with these Calcutta decisions. Fotick Chunder Dey Sircar v. Foley there was no question of enforcing any prior charge. The landlord got a money decree for rent and he attached other properties of the judgment-debtor, that is the properties other than the holding on which the rent had become due. The only question there was whether though he obtained a money decree merely he ought to be deemed as having also obtained a mortgage decree for the sale of the holding and whether he should first bring to sale the holding and should not be allowed to proceed against thes other properties of his tenant in execution of a mere money decree for rent. The Court held that Sect. 68 of Act IV of 1882 had no application and the landlord could execute his money decree by attaching and bringing to sale other properties. Having decided the direct point involved the learned judges proceeded thus: “This we think is a sufficient and complete answer to Dr. Banerjee's argument. But we are not prepared to admit that the ‘charge’ refered to in Sect. 65 of the Bengal Tenancy Act 1885 is such a ‘charge’ as is defined by Sect. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act.” Where the difference lies the learned judges do not point out. On this vague obiter dictum, I do not think it is possible to hold that O. 34, R. 14 is not applicable where the charge for rent is sought to be enforced. The next case referred to is Srimati Maharanee Dasya v. Harendra Lal Roy. I do not find any reference made to Fortick Chandra Dey Sincar v. Foley in the judgment in this case but seems to have been referred to only in the judgment of the Subordinate Judge who first decided the case. The only relevant observation in Srimati Maharanee Dasya v. Harendra Lal Roy is that there is no strict analogy between a charge for rent and a mortgage charge because money due for rent is both a personal debt and a first charge on the land in respect of which it is due and the landlord can enforce his decree either by selling the land in some cases or by selling other properties. I cannot say that this case has any bearing on the question whether when a Civil Court is asked in execution to enforce the charge O. 34, R. 14 is applicable. As regards Tariniprosad Roy v. Narayan Kumari Debi this, also is a decision merely on the point whether the landlord can pursue his personal remedy against the tenant without first having the holding sold. In the case of Royzuddi Sheik v. Kali Nath Mookerjeei, the question was whether when a regular mortgage deed or a regular bond creating a charge is taken for the arrears of rent the charge under Bengal Tenancy Act Still existed. Mookerjee, J., says “the present suit is in no sense a suit to enforce the original rent charge. It is in substance as it is in form a suit to enforce the rights of the plaintiff under the instalment bond by which in lieu of the original liability, a new liability was substituted. Besides if the plaintiff had sued to enforce the rent charge, his claim would be barred by limitation.” That ground was sufficient for the disposal of that case and it was not necessary to consider at all the nature of the charge referred to in Sect. 65 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. But as an obiter dictum again the learned judge remarks that as decided in Fotick Chunder Dey Sircar v. Foley “the charge referred to in Sect. 65 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is not such a charge as that defined by Sect. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act and does not require to be enforced in the same manner.”
I shall lastly refer to the case in Gopinath Mahapatra v. Kasinath Beg, also referred to in Suranna v. Suryanarayana Jagapathi Raju. That case decided not only under Sect. 65 of the Bengal Tenancy Act but also under Sect. 107 of that Act under which the purchaser in execution of a rent decree has got the right to apply to the Collector to annul all prior encumbrances. But the question relating to the necessity of bringing a suit as prescribed under O. 34, R. 14 was not decided in that case nor was it necessary to decide it. Phillips, J. however mentions in his Judgments in Suranna v. Suryanarayana Jagapathi Raju two other considerations as to why Sect. 100 of the Transfer of Property Act cannot include a charge for rent under Sect. 5 of the Estates Land Act. He says ‘it may also be noted that where rent is payabe in kind the charge for arrears of rent cannot come within the definition of Sect. 100 which refers only to payment of money and it would be most anomalous that a charge created by statute should be a charge within the meaning of Sect. 100 in some cases and not so in others.” With the greatest respect, I do not see why if a particular charge falls within the words of Sect 100 it should riot be a charge under that section because another kind charge created by the same statute does not fall within the section. Further even the rent payable in kind becomes really payable in money whenever the rent is sued for and a decree in the alternative for the value of the rent payable in kind is asked for and granted. So far therefore as the judgments in Suranna v. Suryanarayana Jagapathi Raju held that Sect. 100 of Act IV of 1862 and consequently O.34, R.14 Civil Procedure Code would not apply to the enforcement of a charge for rent even payable in money, I respectfully differ from them. But it was argued that under Sect. 132 of the Madras Estates Land Act where the property is sold for arrears of rent due on it, the purchaser takes it free of all incumbrances except those created before the Act came into force reading Sect. 132 with Sect. 125 of the Madras Estates Land Act. That is, I take it, the main ground of the judgments in Suranna v. Suryanarayana Jagapathi Raju and I agrees with the judgments in that respect provided of course the sale was one conducted in execution of its decree as expressly restricted by the provisions of Sect. 182. But in this case, the decree had been transferred to Coconada District Munsif's Court and that Court has under Sect. 42 Civil Procedure Code power to execute it only in the same manner as if it was a decree passed for money by itself and it cannot exercise the powers conferred by the revenue Court by Sect. 132 of the Madras Estates Land Act. In the Calcutta cases there is nothing to show that execution and sales in execution in question were held in any other Court than a revenue Court.
In the result the Second Appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
Spencer, J.—The suit land belonged to one Akula Ammanna who sold his holding by a private sale to the 2nd defendant
The 1st defendant purchased the property at an auction held in execution of Small Cause decree in S. C. No. 3 of 1910 obtained by a third party against Akula Ammanna.
The plaintiff brought a suit (Rent Suit No. 219 of 1913) in a Revenue Court as a landholder to recover arrears of rent from 2nd defendant and obtained a personal decree for payment of Rs. 137-8-6 with interest.
When in execution of this decree he attached the holding, the 1st defendant preferred a claim under O. 21, R. 58, Civil Procedure Code and it was allowed.
The plaintiff now sues to establish his right to recover by sale of the land the amount of rent decreed to him relying not on the weakness of the 1st defendant's title as auction purchaser but on the strength of his own title based on Sect. 5 of the Madras Estates Land Act which provides that the rent due upon ryoti land shall be a first charge upon the holding.
The plaintiff's decree for rent was transferred to a Civil Court (viz) the Court of the District Munsif of Coconada for execution and it is there that the plaintiff sought to enforce his statutory charge and was defeated.
Now under the Madras Estates Land Act it is in exercise of the right to a charge conferred by Sect. 5 that the landholder can bring the ryot's holding to sale under Sect. 111. This he can do either summarily by an application to the Collector or under Order Sect. 132 when he has obtained a decree for arrears of rent and executes it in a revenue court. But if a money decree passed by revenue Court is transferred to a Civil Court under Sect. 201 for execution, the power to execute it under the provisions of Chapter VI does not go with it to the executing Court, as those powers are peculiar to Collectors as may be seems from part B of the schedule to the Act, Serial No. 18 and from the words of Sect. 132 which runs thus:—“The provisions of this chapter shall be applicable, as far as may be, to the execution by revenue Court of any decree for arrears of rent.”
If a decree for rent is transferred to a Civil Court for execution, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code at once applicable to the execution proceedings and the Court executing the decree paseed by another court transferred to it for execution has no authority to go behind the decree to be executed and enforce a charge which is not declared in that decree nor can the Civil Court assume powers which by law have been definitely conferred on Revenue Courts only.
This in my opinion is the short answer to the plaintiff's present claim.
I think that his suit was rightly dismissed by the Courts below and that the second appeal should now be dismissed with costs.
C.KAppeal dismissed.
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