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Amichand Nagindas & Co. v. Raoji Bhai Moti Bhai Patel

Madras High Court
Dec 10, 1929
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Judgment Summary — Reilly, J. (with Cornish, J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

Two brothers (the plaintiffs) sued for arrears of salary at Rs. 100 each for certain months and for a 2% commission as remuneration for services connected with an expedition sent in 1919 to Saigon and Singapore to purchase gold intended to be brought into India.

At trial (before the learned Chief Justice sitting as Beasley, J.), the plaintiffs were held not entitled to the claimed salary and commission, but were held entitled to a share of the profits of the gold-importing venture. The trial judge found a group of persons concerned in the venture and apportioned the profits as follows: the defendants were entitled to one-half of the profits; of the remaining half, the plaintiffs were entitled to 50/115ths, Chunilal to 31/115ths, Lakshmichand to 17/115ths, and Maoji Bhai to 17/115ths. The matter was referred to the Official Referee for a report as to the monetary amounts of those shares.

The defendants appealed the decree. The plaintiffs did not file a cross-appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the contract/execution for importing gold had an unlawful object (i.e., whether it was intended to bring gold into British India at a time when such importation was prohibited), rendering the contract unenforceable.
  2. Whether the decree for an account and division of profits was invalid for non-joinder of Chunilal, Lakshmichand and Maoji Bhai (persons found by the trial judge to have been entitled to shares in the profits).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Defendants') Arguments

  • The contract had an illegal object: it was made for the purpose of bringing gold into British India at a time when that importation was prohibited under Act II of 1916; accordingly the contract is unlawful and the plaintiffs are entitled to no relief.
  • The trial decree is defective because Chunilal, Lakshmichand and Maoji Bhai, who were found to be entitled to shares in the profits, were not made parties (non-joinder / necessary parties).

Respondents' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • Mr. Grant (for the plaintiffs) argued that the question of the contract's legality was res judicata by a prior suit, O.S. No. 212 of 1921, in which Coutts-Trotter, J. found the contract to be for bringing gold into Pondicherry (French India) and not into British India.
  • Mr. Grant also argued that the defendants did not raise the specific non-joinder objection at trial and that, by Rule 13 of Order I, such an objection cannot be raised at this stage. He further relied on Order I, Rule 9 (no suit to be defeated by misjoinder/non-joinder) to contend the court could properly decree between parties before it.

Arguments / Submissions by Others

  • The Advocate-General urged that if the object of the contract was to bring gold into British India, the contract was unlawful and unenforceable even if that object was not fully realized.
  • Mr. Somayya (for the defendants at one point) conceded that if the plaintiffs were servants employed under separate agreements (each to be remunerated by a share of profits), it would not have been necessary to implead other employees in a suit to recover remuneration.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ramdoyal v. Junmenjoy Coondoo Establishes that when several persons under one and the same agreement are entitled to share proceeds of a fund, all such persons are necessary parties to a suit for account; a suit by some only is defective. The court applied this principle to hold that because the plaintiffs and the three other persons were found to be parties to one contract dividing the profits, the plaintiffs could not obtain an account and have shares fixed without making the other three parties (Chunilal, Lakshmichand and Maoji Bhai) parties to the suit.
O. S. No. 212 of 1921 (previous suit between the same parties; judgment by Coutts-Trotter, J.) Prior adjudication (res judicata) on the character/nature of the contract — found to be for bringing gold into Pondicherry (French India), not British India, and therefore not illegal on that basis. The court treated the finding in that prior suit as res judicata: it constrained the trial judge's approach to the question of illegality and was relied upon to reject the defendants' contention that the contract was conclusively unlawful.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court dealt with two principal contentions in the appeal (of three originally raised by the defendants), addressing them in turn.

1. Illegality of the Contract

- The trial judge (Beasley, J.) used strong language suggesting the venture was a "smuggling expedition" and that the object was to import gold into British India. However, he did not make any definitive finding that the contract was unlawful; indeed he made a decree in favour of the plaintiffs, which would have been impermissible had he found the contract illegal.

- The appellate court observed that the evidence did not definitively show the object was to bring gold into British India rather than into French India (Pondicherry or Karaikal). The defendants had not pleaded that the object was to bring gold into British India, and evidence (including witnesses for the defendants) described the contract as one for bringing gold into Pondicherry.

- The prior litigation (O.S. No. 212 of 1921) had already produced a finding by Coutts-Trotter, J. that the contract was for bringing gold into Pondicherry and therefore not illegal. The plaintiffs had earlier pleaded the contract was for bringing gold into British India (and thus illegal) in that prior suit, but the earlier judge rejected that and found Pondicherry was the destination. The appellate court accepted that this issue was res judicata and therefore the unlawful-object argument failed.

2. Non-joinder / Necessary Parties (the decisive point)

- The court regarded this as the more serious objection. Beasley, J. had accepted the defendants' case that there was a single contract between the defendants, the plaintiffs and the three other men (Chunilal, Lakshmichand, Maoji Bhai) dividing the profits in specified fractional parts. On that basis, the plaintiffs were given shares of the profits.

- The appellate court reviewed the fundamental legal principle that a suit for an account cannot be maintained by some only of the persons who are, under one agreement, entitled to share proceeds; all such persons must be made parties because a decree fixing and dividing shares would effectively operate against absent persons.

- The court applied Ramdoyal v. Junmenjoy Coondoo and concluded the arrangement in evidence (a meeting at defendant 2's house where sharing terms were settled, and subsequent participation by the other three men) supported the trial judge's finding that there had been a single arrangement binding all concerned. The court found nothing in the evidence suggesting separate, successive engagements between the defendants and the plaintiffs distinct from those with the other three persons.

- The appellate judges considered procedural objections by the plaintiffs that the defendants had not expressly raised this particular non-joinder point at trial and invoked Order I, Rules 9 and 13. The court rejected those procedural defenses as insufficient to validate the decree: Rule 9 (no suit defeated for misjoinder/non-joinder) does not empower the court to make an illegal decree against persons behind their backs; Rule 13's bar did not prevent the appellate court from interfering where non-joinder affects jurisdiction.

- The court noted that the time for impleading the three absent persons has now passed and the bar of limitation prevents their being impleaded at this stage, so the defect could not be cured.

Concurrence

- Cornish, J. concurred. He emphasized that the prior finding in O.S. No. 212 of 1921 must be treated as res judicata on the legality point, and agreed with the application of Ramdoyal to conclude non-joinder rendered the plaintiffs' suit defective and that it should have been dismissed.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The appeal was allowed and the plaintiffs' suit was dismissed.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The decree of Beasley, J. awarding shares of profits to the plaintiffs (and directing accounting) was set aside because necessary parties (Chunilal, Lakshmichand and Maoji Bhai) entitled to shares had not been impleaded.
  • The court declined to grant costs to the defendants; instead it ordered that each party shall bear his own costs throughout. The Official Assignee may take his costs out of the office charges fund.
  • No novel legal principle was created; the decision turned on application of existing authorities (notably Ramdoyal) and the prior finding in O.S. No. 212 of 1921 (res judicata). The judgment does not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond applying established principles on necessary parties and res judicata.

N. R. R. Appeal allowed.

Show all summary ...

Reilly, J. — In this case the plaintiffs, who are two brothers, sued-for arrears of salary at Rs. 100 each for a certain number of months and for a commission of 2 per cent. as their remuneration for services rendered to the defendants in connection with an expedition sent in 1919 to Saigon and Singapore for the purchase of gold, which was to be brought into India. The learned Chief Justice, who tried the suit as Beasley, J., found that the plaintiffs were not entitled to the remuneration which they claimed but that they were entitled to a share in the profits of this gold importing venture. He found that a certain number of people were concerned in the venture and that of the profits made in it the defendants themselves were entitled to one-half, the plaintiffs 50-115ths of the remaining half. One Chunilal was entitled to 31-115ths, one Lakshmichand to 17-115ths, and one Maoji Bhai to 17-115ths of the second half; and on that basis he made a decree that the defendants were entitled to one-half of the profits and the plaintiffs to 50-115ths of the other half. He referred the matter to the Official Referee for a report what those shares amounted to. The defendants have appealed. The plaintiffs, although they did not get what they had sued for, have not filed any cross appeal.

The defendants have raised three objections before us at the hearing of this appeal with only two of which I think it is necessary now to deal. The first objection is that this execution for importing gold had an illegal object; the contract between the parties and any body else who was concerned in it was unlawful, because its object was that gold bought outside India should be brought into British India, and it happened that at the time with which we are concerned that was prohibited by the Government of India under Act II of 1916. The learned Advocate-General has urged before us that, if that was the object of the contract, then, even if that object was not entirely fulfilled by gold being brought into British India, it was an unlawful contract and the plaintiffs are entitled to get no relief from the court in connection with it. In his judgment Beasley, J., has referred in several places to this matter. In one place he says:

“In my view this expedition had only one object and that was to get gold which could be purchased very much cheaper outside British India into British India.”

Again,

“There is very little doubt in my mind that this was a gold smuggling expedition.”

Again.

“These observations apply equally to the 2nd plaintiff, to Roopchand, to Lallubhai and to Ghunilal, all of whom were clearly engaged in a smuggling enterprise”

and again,

“I can well understand that, as this was a smuggling enterprise, it would not be considered advisable to reduce any of the terms of the agreement into writing.”

Those are strong expressions of opinion. But I think it is quite clear that Beasley, J., did not arrive at any definite finding that the object of this contract was unlawful, as, if he had, he could not have made the decree which he has made in favour of the plaintiffs. No doubt, there is, as has been freely admitted for both sides before us, a certain amount of suspicion about the proceedings of the parties in connection with this gold—a suspicion that they must have intended that eventually it should be brought into British India, where the Defendants conducted a business of dealing in gold and where they could make a very large profit from it. But the contract as shown by the evidence was not necessarily an unlawful one. It is not shown definitely that the object was to bring gold further into India than to French, India, Pondicherry or Karaikal. It must be noticed that the Defendants never pleaded that the object was to bring the gold into British India. By some curious process, which has not been explained to us thoroughly and which I do not understand, an issue was raised by consent whether this contract was unlawful. How that appeared upon the issue paper without any pleadings, it is difficult to understand. But, when we look at the actual evidence in the case, Defendant 2, Defendant 3, and their munim Chunilal all describe the contract as one for bringing gold into Pondicherry. Apart from all that, this matter has been before the Court in previous litigation between the same parties. In O.S No. 212 of 1921, the present defendants sued the present plaintiffs and other members of their family and another defendant called Besson for damages in respect of the first consignment of gold, which was sent as a result of this expedition from Saigon to Pondicherry. In that suit, which was tried by Coutts-Trotter, J., the defendants described this contract as one for bringing gold into Pondicherry. The present plaintiffs strangely enough described the contract as one for bringing gold into British India and pleaded that it was, therefore, unlawful. But Coutts-Trotter, J., found that the contract was only for bringing gold into Pondicherry and on that finding he was able to give a decree to the present defendants against Besson, though he made no decree against the present plaintiffs. Mr. Grant, who appears for the Plaintiffs, has reasonably urged before us that this question of the nature of the contract and its legality is res judicata having been decided in the previous suit by Coutts-Trotter, J., and that the defendants cannot now succeed by turning round in this curious way and saying that they got a decree in that suit on an unlawful contract. I do not think I need spend any more time on the first objection which has been raised by the defendants in this appeal.

A more serious objection in my opinion is that to this decree Chunilal, Lakshmichand and Maoji Bai have not been made parties. As I have said, Beasley, J., accepted the defendants' case that there was a contract between the defendants, the plaintiffs, Chunilal, Lakshmichand and Maoji Bhai that they should take part in this expedition and that the profits should be divided in the proportions I have named. If that is so, how can a decree now be made for an account to which Chunilal, Lakshmichand and Maoji Bhai are not parties? If all these persons were partners, it is not disputed that no such decree could be made in the absence of those three persons. It is well known that a suit for account cannot be maintained between some only of the partners of a firm, but that every partner must be made a party. The reason is that every partner has an interest in the determination of his share in the profits and in the working out of that share by the account. If a decree is made in the absence of one of the partners, then in a sense that is a decree against that partner, limiting his interest, limiting the amount which he has to recover and determining the amount which he has to contribute to the other partners, and it would be obviously improper and illegal to make such a decree against him without impleading him. But in this case it is urged for the plaintiffs that they were not partners with the defendants and the other three men I have named. Beasley, J., has found that they were not partners in the full sense. His finding is that the plaintiffs were “working partners,” which he explains as partners who have shares in the profits but have no share in the losses of the business. Mr. Grant has urged that persons in that position are no more than servants. I do not know that it makes any difference whether they are described as working partners entitled to share in the profits but not sharing in the losses or as servants who are to be remunerated by a share in the profits. Servants who are to be remunerated by shares in the profits are entitled to sue for account. But, if there are several servants in one business, each entitled to remuneration by a share in the profits, can they sue separately? I think it is clear that they can do so, if their engagements are separate. If a master engaged several servants successively and independently, each to be remunerated by a share in the profits, and if one of those servants wished to sue him for his share in the profits, it would not be necessary for that servant to implead all the other servants. But the position is very different when by one arrangement or contract a master and a number of servants agree that they will work together for a certain time for a certain venture and that the whole profits will be divided among them in certain proportions. If that is the contract between them and one servant is allowed to sue for his share without impleading the others, we reach the same difficulty as in a case where there is a suit between some of the partners leaving out the other partners. The suit could only result, if it were possible and successful, in a decision which would be against the servants who were not parties to the suit. Now that that is impossible was decided so long ago in Ramdoyal v. Junmenjoy Coondoo, from which no dissent has ever been expressed. In the present case was there one contract between the parties before us and Chunilal, Lakshmichand and Maoji Bhai, or were the plaintiffs engaged by the defendants separately from the engagements of those other three persons? As I have said, the plea of the defendants, which Beasley, J., has found to be true, is that there was only one contract, to which they were all parties. According to the evidence, before this expedition set out to buy gold in foreign parts, there was a meeting at the house of defendant 2 in Madras, at which plaintiff 1, his father who is not a party here, the defendants and Chunilal were present, and the terms of the arrangement as to sharing profits were settled then. Plaintiff 2 was not present, according to the evidence on that occasion, but he appeared the next day or the day after that and agreed to the arrangement. Lakshmichand and Maoji Bhai, who under the arrangement were each to get 17-115th of half the profits, were not, according to the evidence, present. But it appears that they are members of defendant 3's family and there is no question that they did go out on this expedition, and the reasonable inference from that is that they also accepted this arrangement and entered into this contract. It may also be noticed that the arrangement divides up the whole of the possible, profits into specific and rather unusual fractions. I find nothing in the evidence to suggest that in this case the defendants engaged the plaintiffs as servants on a certain share of the profits as remuneration and afterwards engaged Chunilal or afterwards engaged Lakshmichand and Maoji Bhai. That is not the defendants' case, which has been accepted by Beasley, J., nor is it the case as shown in the evidence, though it must be noticed that the evidence on this subject is not very full or explicit because it happened that this aspect of the case was not very prominently before the parties or the Judge at the trial. I think it is clear on principle that in a case like this the plaintiffs cannot get their shares fixed not get an account of the profits without making Chunilal, Lakshmichand and Maoji Bhai parties to the suit.

It has been urged before us by Mr. Grant that, whatever the plaintiffs should have done in the suit, the Defendants did not take this particular objection of the explicity atthe trial of Chunilal, Lakshmichand and Maoji Bhai explicity at the trial and that under R. 13 of O. 1, no such objection can be raised now. An objection was raised in the suit about non-joinder; but I agree with Mr. Grant that that was not an explicit objection relating to this particular point that in a suit for an account it was necessary to add Chunilal, Lakshmichand and Maoji Bhai. It was a rather futile objection on another question of non-joinder, that the plaintiffs' father and other members of their family had not been brought in. Now R. 9 of O. 1, as Mr. Grant points out, lays down that,

“no suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non-joinder of parties, and the court may in every suit deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it.”

Would that enable an effective decree to be made in this case in the absence of Chunilal, Lakshmichand and Maoji Bhai. That rule enables the Court, and makes it the duty of the Court, to make a decree between the parties actually before it, if that can legally and effectively be done. But that rule was never intended, and could never have been intended, to direct the court to make an illegal decree—a decree which would violate the elementary principle that a decree shall Dot be made against a person behind his back. If no decree fixing the shares in the profits or for an account can be made in this case in the absence of Chunilal, and Lakshmichand and Maoji Bhai without affecting them and to make such a decree without impleading them would be to make a decree against them behind their backs R. 9 of O. 1 can never give the court power to make such a decree.

Mr. Grant also urged that the defendants had treated the plaintiffs very unfairly in this case by raising indeed a plea of non-joinder, not directed to this particular point but keeping this particular plea of non-joinder, that Chunilal, Lakshmichand and Maoji Bhai ought to have been impleaded, up their sleeves for Use at a later stage. If they had done that, it would certainly have been very unfair and improper. But we must remember that the suit which the plaintiffs brought was one for remuneration by salary and commission; to that suit an objection that Chunilal, Lakshmichand and Maoji Bhai were not joined would have been no objection. We cannot reproach or penalise the defendants for not raising in the suit, as it then was, an objection which would have been wholly inapplicable to it. It happens unfortunately in this case that the suit was never regarded, so far as we can see, at the trial as a suit for an account of the profits on the basis of the contract which the defendants set up. It only became a suit of that nature at the time of the Judgment.

Mr. Grant has also urged before us that by reason of Sect. 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure we have no power to interfere in appeal on the ground of non-joinder. But I cannot agree that in this case we have no power to interfere, as that section does not prevent the appellate Court from interfering on the ground of misjoinder or non-joinder which affects the jurisdiction of the trial Court. As I view this case, Beasley, J., had no jurisdiction to make a decree for the division of the profits of this enterprise in the absence of Chunilal, Lakshmichand and Maohi Bhai, who were found to be entitled to certain shares in those profits. Unfortunately the matter cannot be put right now as the time for impleading those three persons has long gone by and the bar of limitation prevents them from being impleaded now. I have no doubt myself that the decree was made in the form it was made by Beasley, J., by inadvertance and that when he came to the end of his judgment, he had forgotten for the moment in deciding between the plaintiffs and the defendants that there were these three other persons concerned in the matter. And it appears to me extremely unfortunate that no one who was appearing in the case brought that to the learned Judge's notice when he was delivering his Judgment. If that had been done, a great deal of time, trouble and money might have been saved.

In my opinion this appeal must be allowed and the plaintiff's’ suit dismissed. As to the costs, there are in my opinion two reasons why we should not award costs to the defendants. One is that, as Beasley, J., has pointed out their conduct in the suit was in some ways reprehensible; and the other is that I think it is largely due to them that they have had to bring this appeal, which they might have avoided by making suitable representations to the learned Judge when he was delivering his judgment. In my opinion, therefore, the proper order will be that each party shall bear his own costs throughout. The Official Assignee may take his costs out of the office charges fund.

Cornish, J.—I am of the same opinion. I think the question whether the agreement between the parties was or was not for an illegal purpose must be treated as res judicata by the finding in O. S. No. 212 of 1921. The defendants in that suit, who are the plaintiffs here, definitely averred in their written statement that the agreement being for the purpose of importing gold into British India was an illegal agreement and, therefore, unenforceable. The learned Judge who tried that suit found that the agreement was to bring gold from Saigon into French India and was not illegal, though he expressed the opinion that it was probably the intention to smuggle gold into British India as opportunity offered. That finding was not disturbed by the appellate court, and it was, of course, present to the mind of the learned Judge who tried this suit. He expressed a strong opinion upon the real character of the enterprise. But it is clear that he felt himself bound by the finding in the previous suit; otherwise, he would not have passed a decree upon the footing that the parties were co-adventurers in the enterprise and entitled to shares in its profits. Apart from this view of the case, the evidence at the trial would not, in my opinion, justify a finding that the agreement between the parties was for an illegal purpose, although I agree that the evidence gives rise to a very strong suspicion.

On the other point, that of non-joinder, I have felt some doubt upon the evidence. There is no question that on the finding of the learned trial Judge the plaintiffs were employees whose remuneration was fixed on the basis of a share of the profits and that they were not partners with the defendants. And it is conceded by Mr. Somayya, the learned Council for the defendants that if the plaintiffs were servants or employees and the defendants had entered into separate agreements with them, for their remuneration, it would not have been necessary for the plaintiffs in a suit to recover that remuneration to implead the other employees who were engaged on similar terms of remuneration. Three witnesses for the defendants have given evidence as to the circumstances in which this agreement was entered into; and I think, on the whole, that is probably correct that their, agreement with the plaintiffs and the other three persons, Chunilal, Lakshmichand and Maoji Bhai, was entered into at one and the same time or practically at one and the same time, so that, in fact they are to be regarded as joint contractors in a common undertaking. The agreement was not in writing. It was merely a verbal agreement. I think that it must certainly have been completed before the expedition left Madras for Pondicherry, and that the version given by the 3rd defendant may be accepted. That being so, it appears to me that the case in Ramdoyal v. Junmenjoy Coondoo, applies, and, as was there observed, at page 794:

“That being the state of things, the suit, as originally framed, was clearly defective, because, when there are three persons who, under one and the same agreement amongst themselves, are entitled to share in the proceeds of a fund which they hope will be brought into existence, it is obvious that all these three persons must be necessary parties to a suit, the object of which is to take an account necessary for the purpose of ascertaining the assets of the fund and dividing them.”

On that ground, in my opinion, the plaintiffs' suit was defective without impleading the other three persons and should have been dismissed; and I have no doubt that it would have been dismissed if the objection as to necessary parties not having been impleaded, which is made to us in additional grounds of appeal, had been brought to the notice of the learned Judge at the trial.

N. R. R. Appeal allowed.