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Sundaresan Chettiar v. Viswanada Pandara Sannadhi
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Krishnan, J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff sued the late Pandara Sannadhi of Vedaranniyam Devastanam for money alleged to be due on a bond executed by the Pandara Sannadhi to the plaintiff's deceased grand-uncle. The plaintiff sought a decree against the defendant personally and against the temple (devastanam) trust funds, alleging the borrowing was for devastanam purposes. At trial the Pandara Sannadhi raised several pleas but did not plead that the debt was not binding on the devastanam properties.
The Subordinate Judge entered judgment in favour of the plaintiff, decreeing payment by the defendant personally and out of the temple funds. The Pandara Sannadhi appealed, contesting the trial court's findings and pleading that he was not personally liable; he did not specifically object to the liability of temple properties. While the appeal was pending the Pandara Sannadhi was removed from office in another suit and a Receiver (the contesting second respondent) was appointed as manager/receiver of the temple properties. The Receiver was added as a party-appellant on his own motion and sought leave to raise a new ground of appeal — that the temple funds were not liable for the bond amount.
The appellate court granted leave to raise that new ground on the condition that it be argued purely as a question of law: there would be no challenge to facts, and it was to be conceded that the borrowing was for temple necessity, within the trustee's powers, and that by the contract itself it was arranged the debt would be paid from the trust funds. Those conditions were accepted, and the new ground was allowed to be raised. The District Judge later held that, absent an express charge created by the trustee on the trust property, no decree could be entered against the trust property; he relied on Swaminatha Aiyar v. Srinivasa Aiyar. The matter reached this Court on second appeal.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, in the absence of an express charge created on temple (trust) properties by the trustee, a decree can be entered making the trust property liable for a debt incurred by the trustee.
- Whether the Receiver (appointed later and added as party) could be permitted in appeal to raise a new plea (that temple funds were not liable) which had not been raised in the suit or in the original appellant's grounds of appeal, and whether permission to raise that plea subject to conditions was properly given.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff/Appellant's Arguments
- The plaintiff maintained the Subordinate Judge's decree was correct and challenged the District Judge's reliance on Swaminatha Aiyar v. Srinivasa Aiyar, arguing that the District Judge's view that no decree could be given against the trust property in the absence of an express charge was incorrect in the present facts.
- Implicit in the proceedings (and accepted as a condition for allowing the new ground) is the concession that the borrowing was for temple necessity and within the trustee's powers, and that the contract arranged repayment from the trust funds.
Receiver / Pandara Sannadhi (Respondent/Appellant on new ground) Arguments
- The Receiver sought to raise a new ground on appeal asserting that the temple funds were not liable for the bond amount. Initially the Pandara Sannadhi (earlier in appeal) had also contended that he was not personally liable but had not specifically objected to liability on temple properties.
- An objection was advanced (by the opposing side) that a legal representative (or a subsequently added representative like the Receiver) ought not to be permitted to raise a plea in appeal that had not been raised in the suit or in the original grounds of appeal — reliance was placed on Inaganti Venkatarama Row v. U.R.R.D.K. Venkatalingama Nayanim Bahadur Varu (a decision under Order XXII, Rule 3).
- The Receiver accepted the conditions imposed by the appellate court (that the point be argued as a pure question of law with factual concessions) and sought leave accordingly.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Swaminatha Aiyar v. Srinivasa Aiyar | Holds that where the creditor only obtains a promise on the personal credit of the trustee (e.g., a promissory note) and no charge is created on trust property, the creditor does not obtain any charge on the trust property. | The Court distinguished this case: it was held not properly applicable here because in Swaminatha Aiyar the only contract was a promissory note pledging personal credit and there was no obligation on trust funds, whereas in the present case the contract (as conceded for the appeal) provided for repayment from the temple/mutt funds. |
| Inaganti Venkatarama Row v. U.R.R.D.K. Venkatalingama Nayanim Bahadur Varu | Under Order XXII, Rule 3, a legal representative can only ask for such amendment as the deceased (or person represented) could have asked for. | The Court considered the authority but held that the present situation involved representation of an institution at different stages (Rule 10 of Order XXII applicable), giving the court a wider discretion; even if the rule applied strictly, allowing the Pandara Sannadhi (or permitting the point as a pure question of law) was open and the objection to the Receiver raising the plea failed. |
| Strickland v. Symons (English case) | Shows that where a trustee carries on unauthorized business beyond the powers conferred by the trust instrument, debts incurred in that unauthorized business do not create a lien on trust property. | The Court held Strickland is not in point here because that case involved unauthorized activity and no dedication of trust property to trade, unlike the present case where borrowing was for temple worship and (as conceded) arranged to be repaid from temple funds. |
| In re Johnson; Shearman v. Robinson | Establishes that when an executor incurs debts in carrying on trade, creditors step into the executor's position and may claim indemnity from estate assets earmarked for trade (principle of subrogation) only according to the executor's right to indemnity. | The Court found the principle one of subrogation and accounting between trustee and cestui que trust and held it not to have bearing on the facts before it, where the contract provided for repayment from trust funds. |
| Lakshmindrathirtha Swamiar v. Raghavendra Rao (also cited as Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar v. Raghavendra Rao) | Holds that where the head of a Mutt (a sanyasi) incurs debt for mutt purposes, mutt properties may be held liable even in the absence of an express charge on the mutt properties (the Court there presumed such liability from the trustee's position). | The Court treated this authority as in point and followed it to the extent that it supports liability of mutt/temple properties for debts properly borrowed on the credit of such funds; here the present case even had proof of arrangement to repay from mutt/temple funds, so the Court was prepared to follow the decision. |
| Srinath Daivasikamani Pandara-sannadhi v. Noor Mahomed Routhan | Applied the principle that purchases incurred by a matadhipati for the use of a mutt can render mutt properties liable; likened trustee borrowing powers to those of a guardian of an infant heir in certain respects. | The Court cited and followed this decision where appropriate, noting it had been applied to hold mutt properties liable for necessary expenses incurred for worship and mutt use; the present Court indicated it would follow it where the debt was not incurred purely on the debtor's personal liability. |
| Konwur Doorganath Ray v. Ramchander Sen (Privy Council) | Contains observations about the powers of trustees/managers being similar to guardians when incurring debts for necessary purposes of the trust. | The Court referenced the Privy Council observations as supporting the view that a debt incurred for carrying on worship in a temple is for a necessary purpose and recoverable from temple funds. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in two main strands: (A) the procedural propriety of allowing the Receiver to raise a new ground in appeal, and (B) the substantive question whether temple trust property could be made liable in the absence of an express charge.
(A) Procedural Issue — Allowing the Receiver to raise a new plea on appeal
- The Court recognized an objection, relying on Inaganti, that a legal representative added later should not be permitted to raise matters that the person he represents did not raise (Order XXII, Rule 3). The Court observed that the present situation involved representation of an institution by different persons at different stages, governed by Rule 10 of Order XXII rather than Rule 3, and that in such cases the Court has a wider discretion to permit amendments or new pleas to avoid multiplicity of suits, provided there is no change to the character of the suit and no prejudice or embarrassment to the opposite side.
- Even if the Inaganti rule were strictly applicable, the Court held that allowing the Pandara Sannadhi himself to raise the point in appeal as a pure question of law would be open; since the Receiver accepted the conditions imposed (no facts to be raised, concessions as to borrowing for temple needs and arrangement for repayment), the leave granted was not improperly given. Consequently the objection to permitting the new plea failed.
(B) Substantive Issue — Liability of temple/trust properties without an express charge
- The District Judge had relied principally on Swaminatha Aiyar v. Srinivasa Aiyar to hold that, absent an express charge created on trust property, no decree can be made against trust property. The Court examined that authority and distinguished it on the facts: in Swaminatha Aiyar the contract was merely a promissory note pledging personal credit, and there was no contractual creation of an obligation on trust funds.
- The Court considered English authorities cited in Swaminatha Aiyar (Strickland v. Symons and In re Johnson/Shearman v. Robinson) and explained why those do not govern the present case: Strickland concerned unauthorized acts by a trustee (carrying on unauthorized business) and thus did not create a lien on trust property; Johnson/Shearman involved subrogation principles applicable to executors carrying on trade and did not fit the facts here.
- The Court relied on Indian precedents (Lakshmindrathirtha Swamiar v. Raghavendra Rao and Srinath Daivasikamani Pandara-sannadhi v. Noor Mahomed Routhan) as supporting the proposition that where a trustee (head of a mutt/temple) incurs debt for the necessary purposes of the institution, and where there is either an arrangement or sufficient connection to treat the debt as being on the credit of the mutt/temple funds, the mutt/temple properties can be made liable. In the present case the appeal proceeded on concessions and conditions that the borrowing was for temple necessity and that by contract repayment was to be from temple funds; on those facts the Court found the District Judge's rigid reliance on Swaminatha Aiyar to be misplaced.
- Accordingly, the Court concluded that on the admitted facts (including the contractual arrangement to repay from the temple funds) the temple properties could be made liable for the debt.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Court set aside the decree of the District Judge and restored the decree of the Subordinate Judge. Costs here and in the Court below were awarded payable out of the temple funds.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The plaintiff's decree (as earlier entered by the Subordinate Judge) in his favour is restored — the defendant is liable personally and the temple trust funds are ordered to pay the decree and costs (as the Court directed).
- The Court distinguished and limited the application of Swaminatha Aiyar to its facts and relied on other authorities to support the conclusion that where a trustee incurs debt for necessary institutional purposes and there is an arrangement (by contract or on established principles) that repayment is to be made from trust funds, the trust properties may be held liable.
- The opinion does not purport to lay down a broad new rule of law beyond the decision on these facts; the judgment grounds its conclusion on the admitted factual concessions (that the borrowing was for temple necessities and that repayment was arranged from trust funds) and on the authorities it considered and followed.
Disposition recorded in the opinion: the decree of the District Judge is set aside and the Subordinate Judge's decree restored, with costs payable out of temple funds. Justice Ayling concurred.
Krishnan, J.:— This Second Appeal arises from a suit brought by the plaintiff against the late Pandara San-nadhi of Vedaranniyam Devastanam for money due on a bond executed by him to plaintiff's deceased grand-uncle. Plaintiff claimed a decree against the defendant personally and against the trust funds, as he alleged that the money was borrowed for devastanam purposes. The defendant raised several pleas which are not material now but did not set up any plea that the debt was not binding on the devastanam properties.
The Subordinate Judge decreed the suit as brought in plaintiff's favour and gave him a decree for payment by the defendant personally and out of the temple funds. The Pandara Sannadhi appealed and, besides raising objections to the findings of the trial Court, pleaded that he was not in any event personally liable. He did not specifically object to the liability cast on the temple properties. Pending this Appeal the Pandara Sannadhi was removed from office in another suit and the contesting second respondent before us was appointed Receiver of the temple properties. He was added as party appellant on his own motion, and he asked leave of the Court to file a new ground of appeal, viz., that the temple funds’ were in any event not liable for the bond amount. Leave was given on condition that the point was to be argued as a pure question of law, whether in the absence of an express charge on the temple property for the bond amount such property could be made liable. No question of fact was to be raised and it was to be conceded that the borrowing was for temple necessity and within the powers of the trustee, and that by the contract of borrowing itself it was arranged that the debt was to be paid from the trust funds. These conditions were accepted and the new ground was allowed to be raised. There is no question now before us whether these conditions should have been insisted on; having accepted them, it is not open to the Receiver now to go back upon what he did, and ask for a trial on facts on the point. For the purpose of this Second Appeal, we must take the point set out above as the basis of our decision, even though it is not very clear from the terms of the bond that the repayment of the whole debt was to be made from the temple funds.
The learned District Judge has held that whatever the nature of the debt and of the contract regarding it might be, no decree could be given against the trust property because no express charge had been created on that property by the trustee, and he relies on Swamina-tha Aiyar v. Srinivasa Aiyar(1) as the authority for his view. It is urged by the appellant plaintiff that this view is not right.
Before considering that point, it is necessary to consider the objection that the lower appellate Court should not have allowed the new plea to be raised in Appeal by the Receiver who had been added as the legal representative of the Pandara Sannadhi when it had not been raised in the suit or in the grounds of Appeal by the latter. In support of this contention Inaganti Venkatarama Row v. U.R.R.D.K. Venkatalingama Nayanim Bahadur Varu(2) is relied on. That was a case under Order XXII, Rule 3, Civil Procedure Code. It was no doubt ruled there that a legal representative could only ask for such amendment as the deceased, or the person whose representative he is, could have asked for. It is not necessary to express an opinion whether this rule should be strictly followed in all cases under Rule 3 or whether there is not a discretion left in the Court to allow further amendments; for it may be pointed out that the present case is one where an institution is represented at different stages of the suit by different representatives, one not claiming under the other and the rule applicable is Rule 10 of Order XXII and not Rule 3. In such a case the Court must be held to have a wider discretion to allow amendments and new pleas to avoid multiplicity of suits, provided the character of the suit is not changed and the opposite side is not prejudiced and the trial embarrassed. Such difficulties do not arise here.
But even if we assume that the rule laid down in the case cited strictly applied to the present case, the leave to raise the new plea under the conditions insisted on was not improperly given; for it was open to the Court to allow the Pandara Sannadhi himself to raise such a plea on Appeal as a pure question of law. The objection therefore fails and must be overruled.
Turning now to the main question argued, whether in the absence of an express charge on the temple properties a decree could be given against such properties or not, it seems to me the learned District Judge's view that it could not be given is not correct, on the facts of this case. He has based his judgment entirely on Swaminatha Aiyar v. Srinivasa Aiyar which I am inclined to think is not properly applicable here. In that case, though the debtor was a trustee and the loan was intended and utilized for the benefit of the trust the only contract between him and the lender was contained in a promissory note pledging only his personal credit for the debt. The learned Judges say that he (the creditor) did not obtain any charge on the property but only a promise on the part of the debtor to repay the debt. In other words, no obligation had been imposed on the trust funds either by contract or by deed of charge. They do not, however, consider the position where a trustee acting within his powers of borrowing for necessary purposes of the trust has created by his contract a right of resort to the trust funds for repayment of the debt, which is the case before us. The English cases cited, Strickland v. Symons and In re Johnson. Shearman v. Robinson, the observations in which are relied on by the learned Judges, do not seem to be in point here. The first was a case where a trustee carried on the business of a lunatic asylum when the marriage settlement which created the trust only authorized the sale of it for the benefit of the wife and children of the settlor. He had borrowed moneys for the business but the carrying on of the business itself was unauthorized. The trustee therefore could not have validly borrowed on the credit of the trust funds and had not purported to do so. In such a case, as the Lord Chancellor, the Earl of Selborne, points out,
“There is no principle or authority for saying that if a trustee mates himself personally liable for goods the creditor thereby obtains a lien on the trust property.”
There was in that case
“no dedication or application of the trust property to trade purposes and no provision that the business was to be carried as by the trustee”
as the Lord Chancellor says. These observations obviously do not apply to a case like the present where the head of a temple having to carry on, in the proper discharge of the duties of his office, the worship in the temple, finds himself without the necessary funds to do so and borrows with an express stipulation that the creditor should be repaid from the temple properties. The second case referred to by the learned Judges Johnson Shearman v. Robinson was one of an executor under the will of a trader, who was directed to carry on the trade employing a specific portion of the estate for the purpose. He had incurred debts in the course of that trade and for trade purposes. It was not disputed that he, the executor, was personally liable for those debts, the argument being only that as he was entitled to be indemnified from the estate of the testator ear-marked for the trade, the creditors could also have direct recourse to such assets for payment of their debts. Jessel, M.R, held that the creditors were only entitled to stand in the place of the executor, as the debts were created on his personal responsibility, and claim payment from such assets only when the executor himself is not in default and is entitled to the indemnity. This is the principle of subrogation which obviously cannot be availed of without reference to the state of the account between the trustee and the cestui que trust. That case again seems to have no bearing on the case before us.
On the other hand, there is a recent decision of this Court, in Lakshmindrathirtha Swamiar v. Raghavendra Rao which is in point. There, as here, the debt was incurred by a Pandara Sannadhi, the head of a Mutt, who is necessarily a sanyasi, and for purposes binding on the mutt. There was no charge on the mutt properties. It was nevertheless held that those properties could be held liable for the debt. There was no evidence there that the debt was borrowed on the credit of the mutt properties as we should take it there is in the present case; the learned Judges, however, presumed it from the fact that the trustee was a sanyasi. It is not necessary to decide whether we should follow them in raising that presumption, for here we have proof that it was arranged that the debt was to be met from the mutt funds. But it is an authority for holding that for a debt properly borrowed on the credit of mutt funds mutt properties can be made liable and to that extent I am prepared to follow it, though I should not be taken as concurring in all the observations of the learned Judges.
We have again Srinath Daivasikamani Pandara-sannadhi v. Noor Mahomed Routhan where a decree was given against mutt properties for the price of articles purchased by the matadhipati for the use of the mutt. There was no question raised there that the purchases were on the personal credit of the matadhipati, on the other hand I think it was assumed that the purchases were on the credit of the mutt funds. The learned Judges refused to follow the rule as to executors, and pointed out that the powers of a trustee or manager of a temple in borrowing were similar to those of a guardian of an infant heir, following the observations of the Privy Council in Konwur Doorganath Ray v. Ramchander Sen. A debt incurred for the purpose of carrying on the worship in the temple is clearly for a necessary purpose and is in my opinion recoverable from the temple funds. Though doubt has been thrown on the correctness of Srimath Daivasikamani Pandarasannadhi v. Noor Mahomed Routhan in Swaminatha Aiyar v. Srinivasa Aiyar(3), above cited, it has been followed by Spencer, J., in Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar v. Raghavendra Rao and I am also inclined to follow it where the debt is not incurred purely on the personal liability of the debtor.
For the above reasons T would set aside the decree of the District Judge and restore that of the Subordinate Judge with costs here and in the Court below payable out of the temple funds.
Ayling, J.:— I agree.
N.R
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