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Km. Kr Km. Kuppan Chettiar v. Masa Godndan

Madras High Court
Dec 14, 1936
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Comprehensive Summary of the Opinion — Second Appeal Concerning Partition and Execution

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion arises from a second appeal brought by the legal representatives of a decree-holder who sought to set aside a claim order. The plaintiffs' father obtained a money decree dated 17 September 1926 against the first defendant in O.S. No. 1400 of 1926 in respect of three promissory notes (Exs. D, D-1 and D-2). Between the dates of Ex. D and Ex. D-1 a partition arrangement (Ex. V, dated 13 October 1925) was executed between the first defendant (the father) and his sons (defendants 2 to 5).

The plaintiffs allege that the father was not aware of the partition and advanced further moneys to him under Exs. D-1 and D-2 in November and December 1925. The original suit for recovery named only the father (first defendant), and a decree was obtained. During execution, the plaintiffs attached certain properties, but defendants 2 to 5 filed a claim petition asserting that the attached properties had fallen to their shares under the partition deed (Ex. V); as a result those properties were released from attachment. The plaintiffs then instituted the present suit seeking a declaration entitling them to attach the properties alleged to belong to the sons.

The lower appellate court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit. The matter proceeded to this second appeal. The appellate court ultimately dismissed the second appeal with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, despite the partition evidenced by Ex. V, the shares allotted to defendants 2 to 5 (the sons) are liable to be proceeded against in execution of a money decree obtained solely against the father.
  2. Whether the decree can be split so that the decree-holder may execute against the sons' shares to the extent that it represents a pre-partition debt (specifically the claim under Ex. D).
  3. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to execute the decree in respect of properties comprised in the "D schedule" to the partition deed (i.e., property purportedly allotted for maintenance/marriage of wife and daughters or otherwise specifically dealt with in the partition).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' (Plaintiffs') Arguments

  • The plaintiffs (decree-holder's representatives) sought to set aside the claim order and obtain a declaration that the sons' shares (including those in the D schedule) were attachable to satisfy the money decree obtained against the father alone.
  • It was contended (by the appellant's counsel, Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar) that, at least in respect of properties in the D schedule, the plaintiffs should be able to execute the decree; and alternatively the suit should be allowed to be treated as a suit to recover money from the sons in respect of the pre-partition promissory note (Ex. D).
  • The plaintiffs alleged that the father may have been unaware of the partition and that some advances (Exs. D-1 and D-2) were made after the partition; implicitly they challenged the effectiveness of the partition to protect the sons' shares from execution.

Respondents' (Defendants') Arguments

  • Defendants 2 to 5 asserted, by way of claim petition during execution, that the properties attached had been allotted to them under the partition deed (Ex. V) and should be released from attachment.
  • The respondents maintained (and the lower appellate court found) that the partition was genuine (not merely nominal) and that there was no attempt to conceal it from creditors — the partition deed was presented for registration the day after execution.
  • Implicitly and as applied by the Court, the respondents relied on the legal principle that once a genuine partition (division in status) has taken place the father's power to dispose of the sons' shares for his debts ends, and therefore those shares cannot be subjected to execution of a decree obtained against the father alone.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Thirumalamuthu Adaviar v. Subramania Adaviar (1937) 1 M.L.J. 243 Recent judgment by the same Bench addressing similar question of partition and effectiveness against creditors. The court referred to that judgment, stating it had dealt with the question at length there and would not repeat that reasoning; it noted the present case was distinguishable because that earlier case was stronger for the decree-holder on the facts (partition intended to defeat creditor).
Sat Narain v. Rai Bahadur Sri Kishen Das (1936) 71 M.L.J. 812; L.R. 63 I.A. 384; I.L.R. 17 Lah. 644 (P.C.) Confirmed that the father's power of sale for debts exists only so long as the joint family remains undivided. The court relied on the Judicial Committee's observations to support the proposition that a division in status ends the father's power and hence the ability of a decree-holder to attach the sons' shares in execution following partition.
Baluswami Aiyar, In re (1928) 55 M.L.J. 726; L.R. 51 Mad. 417 (Full Bench) Holds that even a division in status will suffice to put an end to the father's power to sell the sons' shares (and that partition filed on behalf of minors to defeat official assignee still effected division in status if genuine). The court referenced this decision with approval to show that division in status, even if motivated to defeat creditors, terminates the father's disposing power over sons' shares for execution purposes.
Subramania Aiyar v. Sabapathy Ayyar (1927) 54 M.L.J. 726; I.L.R. 51 Mad. 361 (Full Bench) Recognised the distinction between a creditor's remedy in execution (against property of judgment-debtor or property over which judgment-debtor has disposing power) and a creditor's remedy by an independent suit against the sons. The court relied on this Full Bench decision to refuse to follow other High Court decisions which ignored the distinction and to hold that after bona fide partition the father's creditor cannot pursue execution against the sons' shares though an independent suit might be maintainable in different circumstances.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the dispositive question as whether the sons' shares, standing as allotted under Ex. V, could be subjected to execution of a decree obtained solely against the father. The analysis proceeded primarily from Section 60 of the Civil Procedure Code: properties are liable to attachment in execution only if they either belong to the judgment-debtor or the judgment-debtor has a disposing power over the properties (or their profits) which he may exercise for his own benefit.

The court relied on binding and persuasive authorities to interpret how partition affects the father's disposing power. The Judicial Committee's decision in Sat Narain established that a father's power of sale for his debts ceases once the joint family has been divided. The court treated Baluswami Aiyar (Full Bench) as confirming that even a "division in status" (i.e., a genuine partition) is sufficient to terminate that power. The Full Bench decision in Subramania Aiyar v. Sabapathy Ayyar was used to emphasise a crucial distinction: execution remedies are limited by the father's then-existing disposing powers, whereas an independent suit by a creditor against the sons is a distinct remedy and may remain available in certain circumstances.

Applying those principles to the facts, the court accepted the finding of the lower appellate court that the partition was not nominal but a real transaction (presented for registration the next day and not concealed from creditors). Because a genuine partition had occurred before the decree (the partition dated 13 October 1925 preceded the 17 September 1926 decree), the court concluded that the father's disposing power over the sons' allotted shares had ceased for purposes of execution. Therefore, those shares could not be attached in execution of the decree obtained against the father alone.

The court observed that questions about whether the partition was "bona fide" in the sense of making adequate provision for the father's debts need not be determinative for execution proceedings: once a genuine partition (division in status) has occurred, the father's power to sell the sons' shares is at an end for execution purposes. The court noted that while some dicta go further (suggesting that partition should make specific provision for debts to be bona fide), the court did not accept that broader rule and considered it unnecessary to express a final opinion on that contentious point within the limited scope of this second appeal.

On the narrower questions raised by the parties, the court expressed uncertainty as to whether a decree could be split so that only the portion representing a pre-partition debt (Ex. D) could be executed against the sons' shares, but treated that uncertainty as immaterial to the resolution of this appeal and found the lower appellate court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' suit to be correct.

The court also rejected the contention that the plaintiffs could execute against properties in the D schedule (those allotted for maintenance/marriage etc.), finding that under Section 60 the father no longer retained the power to dispose of such allotted property once it had been made the subject of partition with remainders to the sons. Finally, the court refused the appellant's request to convert the proceeding into a suit to recover money directly from the sons in respect of Ex. D because such a change would materially alter the nature of the suit and raised prima facie limitation concerns (the suit had been instituted more than three years after Ex. D), and the record did not clearly show that a money claim would not be time-barred.

Burn, J. concurred in the dismissal, reiterating that if a partition is genuine and effects a division in status, the father's power of disposal ends and consequently the decree-holder cannot pursue the sons' shares in execution of a decree obtained against the father alone. He cited Baluswami Ayyar (In re) as authority for the proposition that even if partition was undertaken to defeat creditors, a genuine partition nonetheless brings an end to the father's power.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED WITH COSTS.

Holding: The second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. The Court held that a genuine partition (division in status), evidenced by the partition deed Ex. V, terminated the father's disposing power over the sons' allotted shares; accordingly those shares could not be attached in execution of a decree obtained solely against the father. The lower appellate court was correct in dismissing the plaintiffs' suit.

Immediate consequences for the parties: the plaintiffs (decree-holder's representatives) are not entitled to execute their father's decree against the properties allotted to defendants 2 to 5 under the partition deed; the properties claimed by the sons remain protected from execution arising from the father's decree. The court also refused to allow the suit to be converted into a direct money claim against the sons for the pre-partition promissory note (Ex. D) without clearer record evidence that limitation would not bar such a claim.

Broader legal implications: The decision applies established principles (Section 60 CPC and the cited authorities) rather than announcing a novel rule. The Court relied on prior authorities to confirm that a genuine partition brings an end to the father's disposing power for execution purposes; it did not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond applying and following those authorities.

Show all summary ...

1. This second appeal arises out of a suit instituted by the legal representatives of a decree-holder to get a claim order set aside.

2. The father of the plaintiffs obtained a money decree against the first defendant on 17th September, 1926 on three promissory notes executed by the first defendant, Exs. D, D-1 and D-2. Between the dates of Exs. D and D-1 a partition arrangement was entered into between the first defendant and his sons, defendants 2 to 5. {Vide Ex. V, dated 13th October, 1925.) It is alleged that the plaintiff's father was not aware of this partition and so happened to make further advances to the first defendant under Exs. D-1 and D-2 in the course of November and December 1925. The suit, O.S. No. 1400 of 1926, was instituted for the recovery of money due under these three promissory notes but the first defendant alone was impleaded as defendant thereto and a decree was obtained in due course. When the plaintiffs proceeded to attach certain properties in execution of this money decree the defendants 2 to 5 came forward with a claim petition and prayed that the properties which had fallen to their shares under Ex. V should be released from attachment. As the properties were accordingly released, the plaintiffs filed this suit to obtain a declaration that they are entitled to attach the properties which the defendants 2 to 5 claimed to have fallen to them in the partition.

3. The question for determination is whether, in spite of the partition evidenced by Ex. V, the shares taken by defendants 2 to 5 are liable to be proceeded against in execution of the money decree obtained against the father alone. I have dealt with this question at some length in a judgment recently delivered by me in Thirumalamuthu Adaviar v. Subramania Adaviar (1937) 1 M.L.J. 243 and I do not propose to repeat what has been said there. I shall only add that the case for the decree-holder was much stronger in that case than in the present instance because in that case I proceeded on the footing that the partition was entered into with a view to defeat the creditor.

4. Whatever may be the rights under the Hindu Law of a father's creditor to secure satisfaction of the debts due by the father from the son's shares in the joint family, the question arising for determination in this second appeal has to be decided with reference to the language of Section 60 of the Civil Procedure Code. In order that properties may be liable to attachment in execution, it must be shown that they either belong to the judgment-debtor or that the judgment-debtor has a disposing power over the properties or their profits, which power he may exercise for his own benefit.

5. It is well settled and the proposition has now been placed beyond doubt by the observations of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Sat Narain v. Rai Bahadur Sri Kishen Das (1936) 71 M.L.J. 812 : L.R. 63 I.A. 384 : I.L.R. 17 Lah. 644 (P.C.) that the father's power of sale for his debts exists only so long as the joint family remains undivided. Their reference with approval to the decision of this Court in Baluswami Aiyar, In re (1928) 55 M.L.J. 726 : L.R. 51 Mad. 417 (F.B.), shows that even a division in status will suffice to put an end to this power. It would therefore follow that after a division in status the father's creditor cannot, any more than the Official Assignee, claim that the property is saleable by the father and therefore attachable by himself. That the position is different as regards the creditor's remedy by independent suit against the sons has been recognised by the judgment of a Full Bench of this Court in Subramania Aiyar v. Sabapathy Ayyar (1927) 54 M.L.J. 726 : I.L.R. 51 Mad. 361 (F.B.). Having regard to this well-understood distinction between the creditor's remedy in execution and the creditor's remedy by a separate suit, we are with due respect unable to follow the observations which were cited to us from certain decisions of the other High Courts which either ignore this distinction or proceed on a basis different from the Full Bench decision in Subramania Aiyar v. Sabapathy Ayyar (1927) 54 M.L.J. 726 : I.L.R. 51 Mad. 361 (F.B.), and hold that after a bona fide partition the father's creditor will not even have a right of suit against the sons.

6. In the above view, it seems to me unnecessary to consider how far the contention on the one side or the other as to whether the partition in this case can be described as bona fide within the meaning of the authorities is tenable. In my judgment in Thirumalamuthu Adaviar Subramania Adaviar (1937) 1 M.L.J. 243, I have endeavoured to show that the expression "bona fide partition" has been used by different learned Judges in different senses. If, as recognised by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the recent case, the father's power to sell is at an end once there is a genuine partition, it does not seem to me material for the purpose of execution proceedings to consider whether the partition is bona fide or not, in the sense that it has made sufficient provision for the discharge of the father's debts. Their Lordships, no doubt, recognise that in a suit for partition it is proper that the Court should make provision for the discharge of the father's debts and that the remaining property alone should form the subject-matter of division between the coparceners. But it nevertheless seems to me too much to say that, except in cases where the father's debts are specifically referred to and provided for in a partition deed, the partition deed cannot be regarded as a bona fide partition arrangement. In the present case the finding of the lower appellate Court is not merely that the partition was not nominal but that the plaintiffs had not shown that the share allotted to the first defendant was not enough for the discharge of his debts subsisting at the time of the partition and for his maintenance. There are, no doubt, dicta in some of the cases which go so far as to lay down that, unless the partition not merely makes provision for the discharge of the existing debts but allots in addition a share to the father equal to the shares allotted to the sons, it should not be regarded as a bona fide partition. As at present advised, I am unable to concur in that view. But, having regard to the limited scope of the question to be determined in this second appeal, it seems to me unnecessary to express any final opinion on that question.

7. Some of the cases in the other High Courts draw a distinction between a partition which takes place after the money decree had been obtained against the father and a partition which takes place before the money decree. In that connection I may point out that in the present case the partition took place nearly a year before the passing of the decree in the money suit and that the suit comprised claims under two promissory notes in respect of which moneys were advanced only after the partition. It is only the claim under Ex. D, a promissory note for Rs. 500 that had accrued due before the partition. It does not seem to be material whether the plaintiffs' father was or was not aware of the partition. Both the Courts have found that there was no particular attempt to keep the partition concealed from the creditors and we find that the partition deed was presented for registration the very next day after execution.

8. I am not sure if it is possible to split up a decree like the one obtained by the plaintiffs' father in this case and give the decree-holder a right of execution against the sons' shares in respect of so much of it as may represent the claim under Ex. D which alone was a pre-partition debt. But that question also is immaterial in the view I have taken. The Lower Appellate Court was, in my opinion, right in dismissing the plaintiffs' suit.

9. A further point was raised before us that at least in respect of the properties comprised in the D schedule to the partition deed, the plaintiffs must be entitled to execute the decree obtained by their father. I am unable to accede to this contention. It has, no doubt, been held that the claim which a wife has under the Hindu Law for maintenance against her husband cannot take precedence over the claims of his creditors, and the same principle has been applied to a widow's claim for maintenance against her husband's estate. But that is not exactly the position here. I am not satisfied that the earned Counsel for the appellant was correct in the contention that, even when a partition takes place in a joint Hindu family, the Hindu Law does not permit of a provision being made by allotment of property for the maintenance of the wife and for the marriage of the daughters as long as the father is alive. The wife has, no doubt, a personal claim for maintenance against her husband independently of the possession of any property, but that does not exclude the liability of the coparcenary property to provide for her maintenance, at any rate when the whole family property is made the subject of a partition between the father and the sons. In the present case the allotment has been made not merely for the benefit of the wife and the daughters but also with a further provision that the properties so allotted to them should be divided after their lifetime by the sons. Applying the test involved in the language of Section 60 of the Civil Procedure Code, it is impossible to hold that the father any longer continued to have the power of disposing of the property that was allotted to his wife and daughters with remainder over to his sons.

10. Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar finally asks that the suit may at least be permitted to be treated as a suit to recover money from the sons in respect of the claim due under the promissory note, Ex. D. We regret we are unable to accede even to this prayer. It will be wholly changing the nature of the suit, and prima facie the suit has been instituted more than three years after the date of Ex. D. We do not feel that we are justified in allowing the change of the basis of the claim without further information clearly available from the record that the money claim would not be barred by limitation.

11. The result is that the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Burn, J.

12. I agree that the second appeal must be dismissed with costs, and I have very little to add. The finding is clear in this case that the partition was a genuine partition, a real transaction and not a mere sham. And that being so, it is clear that it put an end to the joint family in which the first defendant was the father. The motive which was behind this partition is, I think, irrelevant. It follows from the decision in the case Baluswami Ayyar, In re (1928) 55 M.L.J. 175 : I.L.R. 51 Mad. 417 (F.B.) (in which it was clear that the partition suit was filed on behalf of the minor sons in order to defeat the claim of the Official Assignee who wished to exercise the father's power of disposal of his minor sons' shares) that, even if a partition is entered upon in order to defeat the claims of creditors nevertheless, provided that it is a genuine partition, division of status takes place, and the power of the father to sell the shares of the sons is brought to an end. If that be so, there can be no possibility of the decree-holder pursuing the shares of the sons in execution of the decree obtained against the father alone.