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Vatti Kuti Veeranna v. Katuri Sayamma

Madras High Court
Dec 10, 1928
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Second Appeal on Hindu Law of Adoption)

Factual and Procedural Background

The relevant facts, stated in the opinion, are as follows. The 1st defendant and his son Abbulu were the only members of a joint Hindu family. On 30 August 1918 Abbulu gave his wife (his widow-to-be) authority to adopt. Abbulu died on 29 September 1918. On 3 October 1918 the father (the 1st defendant) settled practically the whole of the family property on his daughters. On 22 November 1918 the plaintiff was adopted by Abbulu's widow. In 1919 a suit was brought on behalf of the minor adopted son seeking a half share on partition with his adoptive grandfather; while the suit was pending the grandfather died, and the plaintiff claimed entitlement to the whole of the family property.

At first instance the Munsif decided that the plaintiff was entitled to the properties. The Subordinate Judge reversed that decision and held that the plaintiff must take subject to the grandfather's disposition (i.e., effectively the settlement of 3 October 1918). The matter reached this Second Appeal.

The central factual conflict for decision was whether the plaintiff's adoption could "relate back" to the date of his adoptive father's death (29 September 1918) so as to defeat the grandfather's settlement of 3 October 1918, or whether the plaintiff must take subject to that settlement.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the nature of the estate enjoyed by a surviving member of a coparcenary (the "last male-holder") when the only other member has died leaving a widow who has power to adopt?
  2. Where a surviving member alienates or settles family property after such death but before any subsequent adoption by the widow, what are the rights of a son subsequently adopted by the widow as against those alienations (i.e., does the adoption relate back to the adoptive father's death to divest prior alienations)?
  3. More specifically, does a settlement by the grandfather (the surviving coparcener) on 3 October 1918 divert the course of devolution under Hindu law so as to defeat the adopted son's claim based on an adoption made later (22 November 1918)?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (presented by Mr. Varadachariar)

  • The adoption by the widow should be treated as relating back to the death of her husband; therefore the adopted son's rights must be determined as if he existed at the adoptive father's death.
  • So long as the widow is alive and has power to adopt there is a "potentiality of inheritance"; the estate taken by an intermediate holder (including the surviving coparcener) is provisional or conditional and cannot be treated as absolute for the purpose of alienation.
  • If the intermediate holder's estate is only provisional, then any alienee of that intermediate holder (including by settlement) cannot be in a better position than his transferor; consequently the adopted son should be able to divest such alienations by relation back.

Respondent / Other Counsel Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • Mr. S. Varadachariar's position was challenged: the absolute statement in Mayne (that a male owner holds ordinary powers of alienation until adoption) needs modification because no Hindu is an absolute owner while a power to adopt is outstanding — but this contention was met with counter-arguments in the opinion.
  • Mr. Alladi Krishnaswami Aiyar's submission (as recounted) was that the doctrine of relation back is concerned with divesting intermediate holders and establishing succession (inheritance), and that it should not be extended to validate or invalidate alienations made by a male holder prior to adoption.
  • Practical and doctrinal objections were advanced against the appellant's expansive theory: it would render titles to immovable property insecure by requiring inquiries on every transaction about outstanding authorities to adopt; it would impose an intolerable fetter on male coparceners.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For (as stated in opinion) Application by the Court (how the opinion used or distinguished it)
Mayne (paragraph 198, 9th ed.) Until adoption has taken place the person in possession (including a male proprietor) holds an estate giving ordinary powers of alienation; purchaser should not be deprived because of a contingency which may never happen. Quoted at length and treated as the textual starting point for the view that a male holder may validly alienate before adoption. The Court examined and balanced this against contrary authorities raised by appellant.
Bamundoss Mookerjea v. Mussamut Tarinee Held that until a widow exercised her power of adoption she is possessed of the property and can sue in her own character despite an unexecuted power of adoption. Regarded as a leading authority on a widow's right to possess and sue; relied on in discussions of relation back and limits of widow's powers; its scope was examined and its applicability limited by the Court.
Mussumat Bhoobun Moyee Debia v. Ram Kishen Acharj Chowdhry Example concerning the limits on the power to adopt; observation touching on doctrine that husband and wife are one. Referred to as illustrating limits on adoption power; cited in discussing theoretical bases (e.g., survival of husband in widow).
Sri Virada Pratapa Raghunada Deo v. Sri Brozo Kishoro Patta Deo Privy Council held that on widow exercising power to adopt the adopted son divested the uncle; mesne profits decreed only from date of suit, showing intermediate holder not a trespasser. Used to show that an intermediate holder's estate may be conditional and to illustrate limitations (mesne profits date) when an adopted son divests another; cited by Sir Arnold White in support of limiting effect of male alienations.
Madana Mohana Deo v. Purushotthama Deo (Madana Mohana v. Purushothama) Described the succession of an intermediate heir as provisional and used language like "estate subject to defeasance". Cited in relation to the "defeasible" character of certain intermediary estates; Court noted uncertainty whether the "estate subject to defeasance" is the correct legal expression but acknowledged the case's role in the inheritance class of decisions.
Bheenta Deo v. Behari Deo Held that estates of certain descendants were defeasible. Cited as further authority on defeasible estates within the inheritance context.
Krishna v. Sami Held that the existence of a power creates potentiality of inheritance; likened to a son in the womb; estate taken conditionally. Used as an example supporting the notion of potential or conditional vesting in the context of inheritance; cited in discussion of relation back.
Babu Anaji v. Ratnoji Effect of adoption must always be to divest to some extent an estate vested elsewhere; adoption for inheritance purposes was treated as relating back to death. Cited as authority that adoption may relate back for inheritance purposes and can divest intermediate holders.
Venkappa Bapu v. Jivaji Krishna Case about limitation on widow's power to adopt; dependent on whether such adoption derogates from others' rights. Referred to as a case limiting widow's adoption power; used in the Court's survey of authorities.
Bachoo v. Mankorebai (including Privy Council) Held that an estate had not absolutely vested in one because of existence of a power in the widow to adopt; applied Sri Virada Pratapa decision. Cited as an example where the existence of a widow's power diminished the sole co-parcener's absolute vesting.
Pratapsingh Shivsingh v. Agarsingji / Ayarsingji Rajasangji (Privy Council) Held there was no hiatus in the line; adoption had retrospective effect for succession; adopted son prevents reversion (analogy to posthumous son). Examined closely by the Court. Used as authority for relation back in the succession context, but the Court read it as not affecting alienations by a male-holder.
Vaidyanatha Sastri v. Savithri Ammal Held that an adopted son can set aside widow's alienations not made for family necessity; adopted son's cause of action arises from date of adoption. Used to show that an adopted son is in a stronger position than an ordinary reversioner as regards widow's alienations; cited in the alienations discussion.
Sivagnanam Servaigar v. Ramsawmy Chettiar Held that when an estate is divested by subsequent adoption the adopted son's rights date only from his adoption and he takes subject to alienations by the holder for the time being. Described as a clear authority directly against the appellant's contention that adoption relates back to invalidate prior alienations by a male-holder.
Rambhat v. Lakshman Chintaman Mayalay (fragment cited) Held alienation by a Hindu without issue binds subsequent born or adopted male issue; such issue take vested interest only as is that of the father at that time. Quoted to show that a subsequent (born or adopted) issue takes only the interest that existed at that earlier time.
Moro Narayan Joshi v. Balaji Raghunath On limitation: adoption does not relate back to the death of the adoptive father for limitation purposes; also adopted son bound by acts of widow as natural heirs would be. Cited to support the view that adoption does not relate back for the purpose of making prior alienations ineffective; used in limitation and alienations context.
Sreeramulu v. Kristamma Contained a view (Sir V. Bhashyam Aiyangar) that widow's unauthorised alienations are valid at least for her widowhood and may not be questioned until after her death. Noted as a view that was subsequently disapproved; the Court observed later authorities that limit such a position.
Ramakrishna v. Tripurabai Disapproved Sreeramulu and held that alienations not for necessity by a widow cease to have any effect after an adoption made by her. Cited in the discourse distinguishing the effect of widow's alienations from those of a male-holder; shows evolution of authority.
Maharaja of Bobbili v. Zamindar of Chundi Contained obiter dicta suggesting intermediate holder's estate analogous to limited owner; decision turned on sufficiency of enquiry by lender. Regarded as obiter on the key point; Court declined to treat it as authoritative for broad propositions about intermediate-holder powers.
Jagannadha Rao By Guardun Vasanta Rao v. Ramayamma Held that a sole co-parcener had power to make dispositions (will, appoint guardian, nominate son to be adopted after death). Cited as authority that a sole co-parcener can exercise an absolute power of disposition.
Krishnamurthi Ayyar v. Krishnamurthi Aygar (Privy Council) Held that inter vivos dispositions by one with full power carry portions of property away such that subsequently adopted son's rights cannot affect that portion; same for wills made before adoption. Relied upon by the Court as conclusive authority that alienations by a male-holder before adoption are not affected by subsequent adoption.
Lakshmana Rau v. Lakshmi Ammal Held that the title of an adopted son does not relate back to the death of the adopting widow's husband; widow's estate is neither greater nor less before adoption. Referenced for the proposition that acts of widow authorized and effective against reversioners will bind adopted son, and unauthorised acts may be challenged after adoption; used to delimit relation-back theory.
Bhubaneswari Debi v. Nilcomul Lahiri In a succession to a collateral relation, relation back was not applied; adoption after death of collateral does not make adopted son an heir. Cited in support of courts refusing to apply relation back in collateral succession contexts.
Harek Chand Babu v. Bijoy Chand Mahatab On limitation: one view held adopted son for certain purposes regarded as existing at adoptive father's death; another view in same case held rights date only from adoption. Cited to show conflicting judicial views on the extent of relation back; used in the survey of authorities.
Ganapati Ayyan v. Savithri Ammal Rejected the contention that adopted son's title related back; adopted son's rights arise from time of adoption. Quoted as direct rejection of relation back for the purpose of invalidating prior alienations; relied upon by the Court.
Mata Prasad v. Nageshar Sahai Referenced as a case where adoption of a boy was related back to the death of the father (short reference/comparison). Cited for comparison under relation-back discussion; not analysed in depth in the opinion.
Text Authorities: West & Buhler; Sarkar; Mayne (already above) Textual exposition: West & Buhler favor survival fiction; Sarkar's discussion confined to widow's acts; Mayne on alienation by male owner. Text authorities were used as background exposition: West & Buhler's view supports prolongation-of-personality theory; Sarkar's discussion limited to widow's alienations; the Court engaged with these texts while assessing case-law.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion presents a structured and pragmatic analysis. The Court first recognized that the law of adoption, particularly under the Mitakshara-influenced authorities, is judge-made to a large extent and that decided cases overlap and must be read in context. Odgers, J. divided the authorities into three classes to clarify their relevance:

  • Cases affecting inheritance — dealing with continuity of line, divesting intermediate holders, and the doctrine of relation back for succession;
  • Cases concerning the doctrine of relation back — whether adoption is to be fictionally treated as taking effect at the adoptive father's death;
  • Cases affecting alienations — whether alienations by the holder in possession (particularly a male-holder) prior to adoption are rendered ineffective by a later adoption.

Applying these categories, the Court observed the following main propositions (as developed in the opinion):

  • Many authorities and certain textual commentators treat the widow's position and the adopted son's succession through a fiction of continuity (either prolongation of husband in wife or relation back) but those fictions are introduced primarily for the purpose of creating a continuous line of succession and divesting intermediate holders for inheritance purposes.
  • The doctrine of relation back, read in light of the case-law surveyed, is principally confined to matters of succession (i.e., placing an adopted son into the line of inheritance so that intermediate holders may be divested). The Court emphasized limits on this doctrine and declined to extend it beyond succession contexts.
  • As for alienations by the male-holder (the sole surviving coparcener), the Court found the authorities (including Krishnamurthi Ayyar v. Krishnamurthi Aygar and Sivagnanam Servaigar v. Ramsawmy Chettiar) strongly indicate that a subsequently adopted son takes his rights only from the date of adoption and therefore takes subject to prior alienations made by the holder in possession.
  • There is a distinctive rule for widow's alienations: an adopted son can, in certain circumstances, challenge widow's unauthorized alienations (i.e., those beyond her powers or not made for family necessity). The Court noted that adopted sons often enjoy stronger rights against widow's alienations than ordinary reversioners. However, that special position of the widow does not justify treating the male-holder's prior alienations as similarly invalid.
  • The Court rejected the appellant's broad contention that every outstanding power to adopt suspends a male owner's ability to alienate more than half (or otherwise restrict his powers) because such a rule would create intolerable uncertainty in titles and severely fetter male coparceners. The Court accepted Mayne's practical point that purchasers and alienees should not be deprived of rights obtained from a apparently competent owner because of a contingency which may never happen.

Venkatasubba Rao, J., in a concurring opinion, framed the issue as the rights of a son subsequently adopted by a deceased member's widow regarding alienations already made by the surviving member; he developed the same conclusions: relation back is not to be applied so as to make prior alienations by a male-holder ineffective and the practical consequences of doing so would be unacceptable. He surveyed the same authorities and emphasized that the adopted son's rights generally arise from the date of the adoption.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: This Second Appeal is DISMISSED. The Court upheld the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge that the plaintiff (the adopted son) must take subject to the grandfather's settlement made on 3 October 1918. Each party is to bear their own costs (the opinion records the costs directions).

Implications:

  • The direct effect on the parties: the adopted plaintiff cannot impeach or set aside the grandfather's settlement of the family property made prior to the adoption; the settlement remains effective as against the plaintiff.
  • The Court limited the doctrine of relation back to its role in establishing a line of succession and divesting intermediate holders for inheritance purposes; it refused to extend that doctrine so as to invalidate or disturb alienations voluntarily made by a male-holder prior to the adoption.
  • The opinion distinguishes between the special position of widow's alienations (where an adopted son may have stronger rights to challenge certain widow alienations) and alienations made by the male-holder in possession, concluding the latter are not affected by a subsequent adoption.
  • No novel broad rule was laid down beyond the conclusions above; the Court principally reconciled and limited existing authorities rather than announcing a sweeping new precedent. The decision resolves the specific dispute by affirming that prior alienations by the male surviving coparcener are valid against a subsequently adopted son.
Show all summary ...

Odgers, J. — This Second Appeal has opened a very wide field in the Hindu Law of adoption and we have had a very learned and instructive argument on both sides and I should like to say personally that I feel very much indebted to the learned advocates who appeared. The question opened up by the arguments have been very far reaching and several topics perhaps not strictly germane to the actual point for decision have been touched upon, but this is only an illustration of the way in which the different elements in the Hindu Law of adoption inter-act upon each other and it is almost impossible in discussing the case-law, on which after all the law of adoption is developed at least as far as this Presidency is concerned and on which it now depends, not to discover a great variety of elements which largely overlap. Thus we shall find in the cases to be examined that most of them deal with more than one of these clements and the question which presents the greatest difficulty is as to how far the decisions and particularly the dicta on which the decisions seem to be based are reconcilable and whether it is possible to obtain from the present state of those decisions any really definite line to guide us to a decision on this and similar cases.

The facts of this case can be stated in a very few words.

The 1st defendant had a son called Abbulu and they formod a joint Hindu family. This son Abbulu on the 30th August 1918 gave his wife an authority to adopt. A month afterwards namely, on the 29th September, 1918 the son Abbulu died and four days after that on the 3rd October 1918 the father settled practically the whole of the family property on his daughters. On the 22nd November, 1918 the plaintiff was adopted by Abbulu's widow and in 1919 this suit was brought on behalf of the minor adopted son claiming a half share on partition with his adoptive grandfather who died while the suit was pending in the first Court. Hence the plaintiff now claims to be entitled to the whole of the family property. The question thus arises whether the plaintiff receives practically nothing (i.e) takes the family property subject to the settlement of the 3rd October 1918 or whether his adoption can relate back to the date of his adoptive father's death, namely, the 29th September, 1918, in order to defeat the grandfather's settlement. The Munsif decided that the plaintiff was entitled to the properties. The Subordinate Judge decided on the other hand that the plaintiff must take subject to the disposition by the grandfather (i.e) as I understand it, practically nothing.

This appeal therefore opens up questions of the highest importance which owing, as I think, to the interaction of the elements in the Hindu Law of adoption do not perhaps appear very clearly from the decided cases, so that we shall have to consider (a) the nature of the estate taken by the surviving member of a co-parcenary when the only other member has died leaving a widow with power to adopt and (b) the position of a donee of the surviving member in competition with a subsequently adopted son, in other words, does the settlement by the grandfather of the 3rd October 1918 divert the course of devolution of the property under the Hindu Law? And this of course opens the first of these questions, namely, the estate of the surviving member.

Perhaps it is as well to begin an examination of the authorities with a text and the text that I would begin with can be found in Mayne, paragraph 198 (9th edition). This paragraph of Mayne comes after a discussion, of which there are many examples in the cases, on the power of an adopted son to challenge alienations made prior to his adoption by the widow who adopts him. Mr. Mayne says:—

“I am not aware of any case which has raised the same question, where the person whose estate was divested by adoption was a male, and therefore a full owner. But I conceive the same principles would apply. Until adoption has taken place he is lawfully in possession, holding an estate which gives him the ordinary powers of alienation of a Hindu proprietor. No doubt he is liable to be superseded; but on the other hand, he never may be superseded. It would be intolerable that he should be prevented from dealing with his own, on account of a contingency which may never happen. When the contingency has happened, it would be most inequitable that the purchaser should be deprived of rights which he obtained from one who, at the time, was perfectly competent to grant them.”

Of course if that text can be taken to be literally true and correct, there is an end of the matter and tili the adoption has taken place, the grandfather was in the position of full owner and could do what he liked with the property and therefore pass by his settlement a perfectly valid and indisputable title to his donees. Bur Mr. S. Varadachariar challenges the accuracy of this absolute statement and undertakes to show from the authorities that it needs very considerable modification. In fact his contention may be fairly indicated by saying that no Hindu is an absolute owner so long as there is a power of adoption outstanding which if and when exercised will diminish his interest in the family property by one half. This has been called by Mr. Justice Seshagiri Aiyar in Madana Mohana v. Purushothama “an estate subject to defeasance.” With great respect, I rather doubt if that is the correct expression to apply to an estate of this kind which is of course familiar to every Hindu—I mean the possibility of the interest of one—co-parcener in joint family property being increased or decreased on partition according as more co-parceners come into being or co-parceners go out of being. That is inherent in the conception of a Hindu joint family. What, I take the learned Judge meant is, that, where you have a single co-parcener, though he still remains owner of the whole on the birth or coming into existence of a second co-parcener, still on a division he has lost the absolute estate which he had as sole surviving member of the co-parcenary but will now only be able to take as his separate property one half of the whole or less according to the number of new members, so that the theory with regard to the surviving member of a co-parcenary in the position of the grandfather in this case is that so long as the power to adopt is outstanding he has really only got an absolute estate in a half because, if and when an adoption to his deceased son takes place, that adopted son becomes immediately a co-parcener with himself, entitled to half of the property on a partition. So that what we have to see is whether this theory is supported by the decision and even supposing it is so supported, is it to apply to alienations made by the adoptive grandfather before the adoption took place? It is settled that an after-born aurasa son cannot question the alienations made e.g, by the manager of his co-parcenary, his father, prior to his birth and it seems startling if it is true that an adopted son should be in any better position. Many inconveniences suggest themselves to the mind if this theory is true as for instance, the effect it would have on succession, for it would make all succession provisional. It would add a further element of infirmity to titles to immoveable property in this country because it would be necessary to enquire on every transaction involving immoveable property whether there was an outstanding authority to adopt because if there were, on this theory the transferor would not have absolute power to alienate more than one half. However, inconvenience is of course by way of being an argument in the last resort. Although enough has been said to show that, if the argument is adopted, an extremely serious state of things may ensue, yet if the law is as stated in the proposition, then of course the fact that it entails inconveniences or infirmities of title is no excuse for evading its recognition.

This theory advanced by Mr. Varadachariar is according to his contention illustrated in a number of cases and as I have already stated, the cases are what we have to look to in a matter of this sort, because as is well known, the ancient texts are singularly bare of authority with regard to adoption and the law on this subject has been practically entirely judge-made. The cases, 1 have analysed under three heads. Although as will presently appear the decision in any particular case may over-lap more than one head, that is an illustration of what I was saying just now as to the interaction of the various elements in this branch of the Hindu Law. The heads that I propose to examine the cases under I have called

(a) as affecting inheritance,

(b) with regard to the doctrine of relation back and

(c) as affecting alienations.

I have dealt with the cases under each head repeating if necessary reference to the same case when it falls under more than one head.

(a) The earliest case to which our attention has been called is the well-known case in Bamundoss Mookerjea v. Mussamut Tarinee. That was a case in which the Sudder Dewanny delivered a very full judgment covering a number of points in the law of adoption and which the Privy Council adopted in its entirety both upon the question of law and the question of fact save for one incidental observation which is not material. That decision inter alia laid down that until a widow exercised the power of adoption vested in her, she is possessed of the property from the death of her husband and can therefore sue in her character as widow in order to claim succession to the estate of her husband in spite of the fact that she possesses an unexecuted power of adoption. In Mussumat Bhoobun Moyee Debia v. Ram Kishen Acharj Chowdhry(2), we have an example of the limit on the power to adopt. Several cases were quoted with regard to the limit of the power (i.e) as to when it comes to an end because as their Lordships laid down in the case last cited, there must be some limit, but that seems to me to be a definite topic that we can dispense with in considering the case before us. Then we have the cases from the Chinnakimidy Zamindari beginning with Sri Virada Pratapa Raghunada Deo v. Sri Brozo Kishoro Patta Deo, where it was contended that the widow could not displace by adoption an heir in whom the estate had once vested, It was a case of an impartible estate where the widow of the senior co-parcener and late Zamindar adopted two years after his death and divested the late Zamindar's next younger brother who had succeeded to the Zamindari on his death in 1868. The Privy Council held that on the widow exercising the power conferred on her by the late Zamindar to adopt, the adopted son divested his uncle, though in the case of the youngest brother of the late Zamindar who also had an adopted son, it was held that there was no relation back in the case of an adoption by a male. Now this case is cited to show that the estate of the next younger brother was only conditional till a possible adoption took place. At the same time their Lordships point out at page 83 that

“at that time Raghunadha (that is to say, the next younger brother) was in default of a son of Adikonda (the deceased Zamindar) natural or adopted, unquestionably entitled to the Zamindari.”

The case is also of importance from the fact that their Lordships of the Privy Council decreed mesne profits against Raghunadha only from the date of suit, which shows of course that he was not a trespasser as he was entitled in default of a nearer heir of Adikonda. It is important to note this feature in the case as it is relied on in a subsequent case for another proposition under one of the several heads. Madana Mohana v. Purushotthama referred to supra and Madana Mohana Deo v. Purushotthama Deo(3) are further cases as to the succession to this same Chinnakimidy estate. These cases involved the power of the widow of Adikonda to adopt when there was the son's widow alive who might have adopted to that son. The plaintiff who had been adopted in 1907 by the widow of Adikonda claimed the property as against the son's sons of Raghunatha, the younger brother of Adikonda. Mr. Justice Seshagiri Aiyar pointed out that a Hindu estate can never be in abeyance but must vest in somebody or other. The “intermediate holder” as he was called is not to be regarded as the absolute owner of the property. This case went up to the Privy Council in Madana Mohana Deo v. Purushotthama Deo where their Lordships held that the succession of Raghunadha was only provisional and that the widow of Adikonda can have had no further right to adopt after the death of her original adopted son who had attained full legal capacity to continue the line. The third of the Chinnakimidy Cases is Bheenta Deo v. Behari Deo where it was held that the estates of Viswanatha and Purushottam that is, the son and grandson of Raghunada were defeasible estates. The question involved in this case was the validity of the adoption made by Ratnamala the widow of the first son adopted to Adikonda. To continue the cases in the order of date Krishna v. Sami shows that the existence of the power creates the potentiality of inheritance. As pointed out in Babu Anaji v. Ratnoji the effect of adoption must always be to divest to some extent an estate vested elsewhere. Venkappa Bapu v. Jivaji Krishna(4) was a case of limitation on a widow's power to adopt which the learned Judges said depended upon the question as to whether by such adoption she derogates from any other rights but her own and in Bachoo v. Mankorebai(5) which went to the Privy Council in Bachoo v. Mankorebai(6) it was decided that the estate had not absolutely vested in one Bachoo, the plaintiff in the suit, owing to the existence of a power in the widow of Bhagwandas to adopt. Their Lordships applied the decision in Sri Varada Pratapa Raghunada Deo v. Sri Brozo Krishoro Patta Deo(7) that the estate did not absolutely vest and this may be an example of the diminution of the interest of a sole co-parcener by the emergence of another which was referred to in the opening of this judgment. Pratapsingh Shivsingh v. Ayarsingji Rajasangji(8) in the Privy Council was a question of succession to a Jivai grant. There it was held that there was no hiatus in the succession and no extinction of the line until the death of the widow without having adopted. Now, it will be apparent from a consideration of these cases and the decisions which have been extracted above that all these cases have in view mainly the question of inheritance and as Mr. Varadachariar suggested and as we shall see when we come to consider the class (b) cases as to relation back that two theories are possible, namely that the existence of the deceased husband is fictionally prolonged in his widow or that the adoption of the son is fictionally related back to the death of his adoptive father. As to which if either is the correct theory I am rather doubtful whether it can be established from the decisions. The former theory is favoured by Messrs. West and Buhler who on page 983 of their work state:

“It is true that in many instances the supposed prohibition (i.e, against adoption) coincides in its operation with the actual principles of the Hindu Law as drawn from the Hindu sources, but in others it does not. It is desirable, therefore, that these principles and their bearing on the matter in question should, if possible, be ascertained and established. The sacra of a Hindu family are regarded as descending regularly with its estate from father to son for ever.”

The widow's life is, in the view of the learned authors, a prolongation of her husband's and her adoption to her deceased husband simply a deferred act of the husband himself.

(b) I want now to take the second class of cases and see if the decisions in which this theory of relation back has been applied has, as Mr. Alladi Krishnaswami Aipar contends nothing to do with any question of validating or invalidating alienations but only to do with the question of divesting intermediate holders by the fiction that the adoption took place either at the same moment or prior to the possession obtained by the person or persons so divested. I gather there are only some eight decisions on this point of relation back. The earliest and the one very often relied on is Bamundoss Mookerjea v. Mussamut Tarinee though how far this reliance is now well founded may perhaps he questioned owing to the view of the Privy Council in Pratapsingh Shivsingh v. Agarsingji Rajasangji where they held that this case only decided as to a widow's right to maintain an action in her own name when she possesses a power to adopt. There the Sudder Dewanny said:

“The after-born son's right is to his share of the estate as it stands at the time of his birth, and not retrospectively with reference to its state at any supposed period of his conception.”

So in Lakshmana Rau v. Lakshmi Ammal where Bamundoss Mookerjea v. Mussamut Tarinee is relied on, it was held that the title of an adopted son does not relate back to the death of the widow's deceased husband. Further in Moro Narayan Joshi v. Balaji Raghunath which was a question of limitation, adverse possession was said not to begin to run till adoption and the adoption did not relate back to the adoptive father's death again relying on Bamundoss Mookerjea v. Mussamut Tarinee. In Babu Anaji v. Ratnoji it was held that for purposes of inheritance the adoption must be considered as relating back to the death of the adoptive father—compare Mata Prasad v. Nageshar Sahai where the adoption of a boy was related back to the death of the father to whom he was adopted. In Harek Chand Babu v. Bijoy Chand Mahatab another question of limitation, Harington, J., held that for certain purposes an adopted son is regarded as being in existence at the adoptive father's death. On the other hand, Mookerjee, J., held that the rights of an adopted son did not relate back to a period earlier than the date of adoption. Of authority in this Court as to relation back there is but little. In Madana Mohana Deo v. Purushotthama Deo to which reference has already been made, it was observed that Adikonda's widow at one time by exercising her power could establish the direct succession to the estate of her husband which related back to his death. In Pratapsingh Shivsingh v. Agarsingji Rajasangji, to which also reference has already been made, it will be remembered that the Privy Council held that there was no hiatus in the continuity of the line and that so far as this is concerned the adoption had a retrospective effect.

(c) Now it seems to me from my examination of the cases that the only case in which it can be said that the adopted son can on the theory of relation back object to alienations made before his adoption is confined to the case of alienations by a widow. It is well known that a reversioner may object successfully to a widow's alienations except for family necessity while the estate of her husband is in her hands, she possessing a Hindu widow's estate in the same. It is of course also well known that since Vaidyanatha Sastri v. Savithri Ammal an adopted son can set aside alienations by the widow not made for necessity during her lifetime, his cause of action having arisen from the date of adoption. He is thus in a better position than the ordinary reversioner with regard to a widow's alienations and it is perhaps significant that in Sarkar's learned exposition on the law of adoption, to which we have been referred, in his paragraph on page 416 on the relation back of adoption and alienations made by a widow before adoption, his discussion is entirely confined to the rights and acts of the widow. As Sir Arnold White, C. J., said in Sivagnanam Servaigar v. Ramsawmy Chettiar the question of the effect of an alienation by a man holding a full estate with reference to a subsequent divesting as the result of a subsequent adoption does not seem to have been considered in any reported case. That case is of importance because it is a clear authority for the decision that when an estate is divested by subsequent adoption the adopted son's rights date only from his adoption and therefore he takes the estate subject to alienations by the holder for the time being. Bamundoss Mookerjea v. Mussamut Tarinee is relied on as also Harek Chand Babu v. Bijoy Chand Mahatab. Sir Arnold White also relies in his judgment on Sri Virada Pratapa Raghunada Deo v. Sri Brozo Kishoro Patta Deo where it will be remembered the Privy Council decreed mesne profits against the intermediate holder only since the date of the suit to show that the male owner can deal as he likes with his own. In Rambhat…(Original Defendant), v. Lakshman Chintaman Mayalay…(Original Plaintiff), .* it was held that alienation by a Hindu without issue binds the subsequent born or adopted male issue and such issue take a vested interest in such property only as is that of the father at that time. In Moro Narayan Joshi v. Balaji Raghunath it was held that the adopted son comes in bound by such acts of the widow as would bind the natural heirs of the husband after her and entitled to set aside unauthorised alienations of the widow. The well-known case in Sreeramulu v. Kristamma which was subsequently overruled in this Court contains Justice Sir V. Bhashyam Aiyangar's view that all alienations of any kind by a Hindu widow are valid at least for her widowhood. She takes an estate of inheritance only restricted as to her power of disposition and she is not guardian of the property, so that even an unauthorised alienation (i.e) one not for family necessity, cannot be questioned until after her death. In Ramakrishna v. Tripurabai, Sreeramulu v. Kristamma was disapproved and the Court held that alienations not for necessity by a widow cease to have any effect after an adoption made by her as she has by then ceased to represent the estate. There is an obiter dictum in Maharaja of Bobbili v. Zamindar of Chundi(9) to the effect that the 1st defendant's estate in that case was only that of a limited owner like a widow and not being absolute it could not validate loans and alienations but that cannot be regarded as a serious decision on the point as it is distinctly obiter and really turned on the question as to whether sufficient enquiry had been made by an intending lender. In Jagannadha Rao By Guardun Vasanta Rao…Defendant, v. Ramayamma…(Plaintiff), .* a decision to which I was a party a sole co-parcener made a will having an absolute power of disposition. He appointed a guardian to manage the property and the son to be adopted after his death. We held that he had the power to do so. Finally, in Krishnamurthi Ayyar v. Krishnamurthi Aygar their Lordships of the Privy Council say as follows:

“When a disposition is made inter vivos by one who has full power over property under which a portion of that property is carried away, it is clear that no rights of a son who is subsequently adopted can affect that portion which is disposed of. The same is true when the disposition is by will and the adoption is subsequently made by a widow who has been given power to adopt. For the will speaks as at the death of the testator, and the property is carried away before the adoption takes place.”

It is suggested that that decision of their Lordships cannot stand in view of what is said in their earlier decisions but it seems to me that if we construe the earlier decisions I have quoted, apart from those referring to alienations by a widow, as applying entirely to matters of inheritance, (i.e) continuity of line, divesting of an intermediate holder, fiction that the adoption is a deferred act by the father, that his life is prolonged in the widow, or that the adoption relates back, we shall find that all these fictions are simply introduced for the purpose of introducing a new heir into the succession, the ordinary rule being that when the succession opens, there must be, as so often pointed out in the decisions referred to above, somebody to take the property even if he is only a temporary or intermediate holder. There must, in a word, be somebody to catch the property when the previous holder relaxes his possession of it. So that, adoption regarded of course by Hindus, as of the extremest importance from both spiritual and temporal points of view, is really an exception to the rule that the successor must be in existence to take the property immediately the succession opens. The fact cannot but be recognised that there is in reality no such successor in the case of adoption by a deceased coparcener's widow, so that various devices and fictions have had to be invented to place the adopted son in the same position as a natural son, that being according to the texts and the judicial authorities his proper position. See Pratapsingh Shivsingh v. Agarsingji Rajasangji.

My opinion therefore is that the doctrine of relation back has nothing to do with a last male-holder. It seems to me that a sole surviving coparcener has always been regarded as the owner of the coparcenary property. The theory of relation back has only to do with establishing a line of succession to the adoptive father and in order to establish that line, it is necessary that certain intermediate holders should give way to the adopted son's superior claims as that of a natural born son of his adoptive father. There are limits. We have seen some of them but I have not discussed all the cases in this connection regarding his power of divesting as for instance when the succession to the property gets into a collateral line. But within these limits, he can so to speak insist on the property devolving in a direct line as far as possible from father to son or from grandfather to grandson and it is in this connection and this alone that the doctrine of relation back and the cases I have quoted in the first category of inheritance are to be regarded. What authority there is with regard to alienations by a male-holder is strongly, and it seems to me conclusively, against the contention argued by the appellant. We cannot conclude that the Privy Council in Krishnamurthi Ayyar v. Krishnamurthi Ayyar were oblivious of their previous decisions and it seems to me that their Lordships must clearly be held to distinguish the case of interference with alienations from cases of divesting on the theory of relation back or any theory of continuity of succession or no hiatus in the line as they put it in Pratapsingh Shivsingh v. Agarsingji Rajasangji.

For these reasons, I am of opinion that the learned Subordinate Judge was right and this Second Appeal must be dismissed. We think that each party should bear their own costs throughout.

Venkatasubba Rao, J.—I agree.

This appeal raises an important question, which may be stated in this form; when in a joint family, the property on the death of a co-parcener is taken by the surviving member and he alienates it either wholly or in part, what are the rights of a son subsequently adopted by the deceased member's widow, in regard to the alienations already made?

The facts of the case may be briefly stated. The 1st defendant and his son were the only members of a joint Hindu family. Before his death, the son (against the wishes of the father) gave his wife authority to adopt. In less than a month, the son died and on the fifth day after his death, the father settled all the joint family property on his daughters. The son's widow, about fifty days thereafter, made an adoption and the minor plaintiff is the adopted son. He filed the present suit against his adoptive grandfather (the 1st defendant) for partition of the joint family property. He impleaded the alienees and attacked the settlement and asked for a declaration that it was not binding upon him. While the suit was pending the grandfather (the 1st defendant) died and the action was converted into one for possession of the entire property. The lower appellate Court disagreeing with the District Munsif dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff is not entitled to impeach the alienation made before his adoption. The question is, what is the effect of the adoption on the settlement previously made?

The main contention advanced by Mr. Varadachari for the appellant in his able and interesting argument is, that the adoption whenever made by the widow dates back to the death of her husband and that the rights of the adopted son must, subject to a narrow exception, be determined on that footing. He presents the same argument in another form. When a Hindu dies leaving a widow, the estate, by whomsover it is taken, vests in that person only provisionally. If the intermediate holder (as the person in whom the estate vests is called) is no more than a provisional heir, it follows, Mr. Varadachari contends, that his alienee cannot be in a better position than himself, the alienor. He puts his argument some-what thus:—The legal effect of an adoption made by a widow is that the adopted son devests the estate in the hands of a third party, whether that person is the widow herself or some other inferior heir. How can this devesting be accounted for except on the hypothesis that the adoption dates back to the death of the husband? The governing principle according to him is, that so long as there is the widow alive, there is potentiality of inheritance, for by making an adoption she brings an heir into existence whose title is retrospective. According to the Hindu Law, he contends, there is no gap between the adoptive father's death and the adoption itself. This is said to rest on one of two fictions: the personality of the deceased husband may be supposed to survive in the widow (that is, the dead husband never died): or the adoption may be ante-dated (that is, the non-existing person existed) the result in either case being, that there is no hiatus in the continuity of the line.

Our attention has been drawn to various passages either in judgments or text books, which have recognised one or the other of the theories to which I have adverted. In Mussumat Bhoobun Moyee Debia v. Ram Kishen Acharj Chowdhry, the Judicial Committee after negativing the power of a mother to adopt on the death of her son leaving a widow, observed thus at the close of their judgment at page 312:

“An additional difficulty in holding the estate of the widow of Bhawani Kishore (the son) to be devested may, perhaps be found in the doctrine of Hindu Law, that the husband and wife are one, and that as long as the wife survives, one half of the husband survives; but it is not necessary to press this objection.”

In Krishna v. Sami, the sons of a deaf and dumb member of an undivided Hindu family were held entitled to a share of the family estate in the lifetime of their father, not-withstanding that they were born after the death of their grandfather. Sir Charles Turner, C. J., in delivering the judgment of the Full Bench referred by way of analogy to the position of an adopted son and after citing Sri Virada Pratapa Raghunada Deo v. Sri Brozo Kishoro Patta Deo observed thus:

“The existence of valid power created a potentiality of inheritance which may be likened to that of a son in the womb. The estate is taken conditionally.”

This was referred to as an example in support of the conclusion that in certain cases the Hindu Law recognises devesting. Having thus cited the case of an adopted son as an instance the learned Chief Justice for further elucidation, compared an adopted son to a posthumous son.

In Babu Anaji v. Ratnoji, the adoption in regard to its effect, was treated as relating back to the death of the adoptive lather. The intermediate estate was referred to in the judgment as having vested conditionally. These are the observations that are now relied on by the appellant.

Then we come to two recent cases of the Privy Council on which he strongly relies. The first of them is Madana Mohana Deo v. Purushotthama Deo. To understand the argument founded on this case, one has to turn to the pedigree given in the judgment. Their Lordships refer to the adoption of Brojo Deo as relating back to the death of Adikonda. Raghunadha's succession is described as being provisional and subject to defeasance by the emergence of a male heir to Adikonda. It is on these expressions that the learned counsel relies. We are not concerned in the present enquiry with the actual decision in the case or the reasons on which it rests; nor is it necessary to examine whether this case affects (as is suggested) the authority of any earlier rulings on the subject of adoption.

Now turning to the second Privy Council case, Pratapsingh Shivsingh v. Agarsingji Rajasangji the point actually decided was that an adopted son, quite as much as a natural son, would prevent the grant from reverting. In affirming the right of the adopted son, their Lordships proceed on the analogy of a posthumous son and observed at page 108:

“But it was admitted that a posthumous son would prevent the reversion. If the widow happened to be enceinte, the reversion naturally would remain in suspense until the birth of the child, to see whether it was a male or a female. It is futile, therefore, to say that the property reverts to the grantor's estate immediately the breath leaves the body of the Jivaidar.”

From those observations found in the various judgments can a principle of general application be deduced? Can it be inferred, for instance, that the position of an adopted son is in every respect similar to that of a posthumous son? To explain certain legal results, this theory of relation back has been adopted. Can it be accepted as an inflexible legal formula, on the ground that every rule must be logically applied? The theory is, that a Hindu cannot be said to have died without male issue, until the death of the widow, makes adoption impossible: in other words, so long as the widow is alive, there is the possibility of an heir coming into existence. [West & Buhler 4th Edition, 890: Pratapsingh Shivsingh v. Agarsingji Rajasangji]. Supposing this doctrine is carried to its logical results, what follows? The mere fact that the widow of a deceased member exists, hinders the male owner from dealing with, what is presumably his own property. The widow may never adopt and yet the fetter is quite effectual. If the widow happens to outlive the surviving co-parcener, the restriction on his power lasts till his, death. With the conception that a widow has limited powers over property, the Hindu Law has made us familiar; but the doctrine we are now asked to accept leads to the startling result, that the position of a male proprietor is infinitely worse than that of the widow under the law. As Mayne observes:

“It would be intolerable that he (a Hindu proprietor) should be prevented from dealing with his own, on account of a contingency which may never happen. When the contingency has happened, it would be most inequitable that the purchaser should be deprived of his rights which he obtained from one, who at the time was perfectly competent to grant them.”—Ninth Edition paragraph 198.

Granting that the alienee satisfies himself that the widow had no pre-existing authority from her husband to adopt, is he even then safe? She may adopt in the absence of her husband's authority in this province with the consent of the sapindas and in Bombay even without such consent. The result is, that in no circumstances can a male co-parcener give a valid title, so long as there is a widow in the family, alive. Then again, in a joint family any one at his will, may sever himself from his co-parceners and deal freely with the property, that falls to his share; but, according to the theory put forward, the last survivor where a widow exists, is helpless and without a remedy. Is there anything that compels us to enforce a rule leading to such strange results? The contention seems on the contrary to be inconsistent with well established principles of the Hindu Law. It is a normal incident of a joint family that a bare possibility of a concurrent interest coming into existence imposes no fetter on alienation. A sonless father enjoys power of alienation without restraint; with the son, the fetter comes into being and on his death, the father's full rights re-emerge. But according to the contention advanced the restriction depends not on the existence of a concurrent interest but upon the possibility of such an interest coming into being. That the rule Mr. Varadachari contends for, cannot be applied without some reservation, he himself is constrained to admit. Any alienation for a necessary purpose, he concedes, would be binding on the adopted son. This is scarcely consistent with his main argument; for where is the question of a necessary purpose, in the case of a provisional owner? In other words, he is willing to import into this branch of the law, considerations pertaining to a Hindu widow's estate. He is driven again to suggest that the theory of provisional vesting may be confined to the possible share of the future adopted son. This is a conception unknown to the Hindu Law.

The doctrine of relation back, has been discussed in several reported cases and the Courts have refused to extend its application. In regard to a widow's alienation, a different test is not applied in the case of an adopted son, from what is applied in the case of a reversioner; her dealing with the property is not dealt with, on the footing of her being the guardian of a possible adopted son. In Lakshmana Rau v. Lakshmi Ammal the contention was put forward that the title of the adopted son related back to the death of the adopting widow's husband (see page 162). The learned Judges observe:

“In the interval then between the death of her husband and the exercise of the power, the widow's estate is neither greater nor less than it would be if she enjoyed no such power or died without making an adoption. She has the same power no greater and no less to deal with the estate. Such acts of her as are authorised and would be effective against reversioners will bind the son taken in adoption. Such acts as are unauthorised and in excess of her powers may be challenged by the son adopted or by any other successor to the estate.”

In that case Bamundoss Mookerjea v. Mussamut Tarinee, was referred to and treated as authority for the proposition

“that an authority to adopt a son possessed by a widow does not supersede or destory her personal rights as widow and that those rights continue in force until an adoption is actually made.”

In Bhubaneswari Debi v. Nilcomul Lahiri in the case of a succession to a collateral relation, the doctrine of relation back was not applied. It was laid down in that decision that an adoption after the death of a collateral, does not entitle the adopted son to come in as an heir. In Moro Narayan Joshi v. Balaji Raghunath the question was whether the suit of the adopted son to recover possession was barred. Farran, J., after stating that under Art. 144, limitation runs from the date when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff, observes: “His adoption, however, does not relate back to the death of his adoptive father.” It was held that the suit was not barred by limitation. In Harek Chand Babu Bijoy v. Chand Mahatab Mookerjee, J., examines the authorities on the subject fully and comes to the conclusion, that the fiction that the adopted son was in existence at the death of the husband, cannot be applied for the purpose of enabling the son, to take the property as it stood at the moment of the death of the person to whom he was adopted, by ignoring the previous acts of the adoptive mother or other persons whose estate is divested by the adoption. This point is discussed in connection with the question of limitation; but the observations made have a direct bearing on the present case. The learned Judge says:

“He (the adopted son) cannot dispute the pervious acts of the adoptive mother unless they were in excess of her legal powers as widow in possession, nor can he question the acts of a previous male holder in whom as a member of a joint Mitakshara family, the property had vested as full owner and whose estate was divested by adoption.”

In Jagannadha Rao By Guardun Vasanta Rao…Defendant, v. Ramayamma…(Plaintiff), .* it was argued that a son adopted by a widow under authority stands in exactly the same position as a posthumous son and that in his case also the appointment of a testamentary guardian is incompetent. For this proposition, reliance was placed upon the case already quoted, Pratapsingh Shivsingh v. Agarsingji Rajasingji.

Ayling, J., and my learned brother who heard the case repelled that argument. Mr. Justice Ayling made an observation with which I entirely concur. “This process of argument is attractive, but we must be on our guard not to follow it too blindly.” In Ganapati Ayyan v. Savithri Ammal a Hindu, shortly before his death, directed his widow to employ a part of his property in the upkeep of a charitable institution, and at the same time empowered her to make an adoption. Accordingly, the widow, ten days after her husband's death, executed a document creating a charitable trust and some time later made an adoption. It was contended that the title of the adopted son related back to the date of his adoptive father's death, and that as the document was later, the alienation was not binding on the son. Subramania Aiyar, J., summarily rejects the contention remarking:

“The first part of the contention may be dismissed from notice, for it is too late to question the doctrine that the adopted son's rights arise from the time of the adoption.”

It is unnecessary to refer to the other cases cited, which have only an indirect bearing. The point directly arose in two cases. The first of them is, Sivagnanam Servaigar v. Ramsawmy Chettiar, Arnold White, C. J., and Phillips, J., held that the adopted son took the property, subject to the mortgage created by the intermediate holder. The passage from Mayne which I have extracted above, is relied on by the learned Chief Justice. This case is a direct authority against the appellant's contention. The second case is Maharaja of Bobbili v. Zamindar of Chundi. Some dicta in this case which are obiter, are relied on for the appellant. The case relates to an impartible Zamindari. Certain debts incurred by an intermediate holder were held binding on an adopted son who devested the former's estate. In that case, the learned Judges (Abdur Rahim and Krishnaswami Aiyar, JJ.) held on the facts that there was enquiry by the lender, which was reasonably sufficient to justify the loan, so as to make it recoverable from the estate. As the debts were held to be binding on this limited ground, it became unnecessary to deal with the contention that was put forward namely, that the intermediate holder was the full owner and therefore could deal with the property just as he pleased. The rival contention advanced was, that the intermediate holder occupied the position of the holder of a life-estate. This contention was negatived and in the course of the judgment, the following observation was made:

“The analogy of the 1st defendant's (intermediate holder) estate is rather to that of limited owner like a widow than to that of a life owner.”

It will thus be seen that in this case, although the learned Judges were inclined to hold that the powers of an intermediate holder were restricted, they did not decide the point, whether or not he possessed plenary powers. With the obiter dicta in this judgment, with great respect, I am unable to agree.

In the view I take, it makes no difference whether the alienation was or was not for value—though I may state that I regard the alienation in the present case as purely voluntary.

The appellant's contention is thus against principle and opposed to authority. It introduces, as Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar has forcibly pointed out, a novel and perplexing rule into the law of adoption. It is too obvious to need mention, that the conduct of the 1st defendant was morally wrong; but that cannot affect our decision.

The judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge is upheld and the Second Appeal is dismissed. Each party shall bear his costs throughout.

N. R. R.Appeal dismissed.