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Unnaithanakath Puthan Veettil v. Munnodath
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The dispute arises under Order 21, Rule 89, Schedule 1, Civil Procedure Code (CPC) and concerns whether a person other than the judgment-debtor who pays money into Court under that rule can insist that the decree-holder shall not withdraw the sum without furnishing security.
The facts date from 1905. Sri Devi conveyed her entire property to Thuppan Nambudiri by a sale deed dated 16 November 1905 (Ex. 1) for Rs. 16,000 and directed the purchaser to pay certain debts of the vendor and “all other lawful debts due by her.” Eramutti (brother of the 1st defendant) obtained a decree against Sri Devi for a sum due; because of Ex. 1, Thuppan became liable to discharge the decree. Thuppan failed to pay and the decree remained unsatisfied.
Eramutti attached and sold some items purchased by Thuppan. Thuppan claimed under Order 21, Rule 58, but his claim was rejected. He filed O.S. No. 414 of 1911, sought to stop the sale and used dilatory applications; after refusals, he applied under Order 21, Rule 89 to set aside the sale and deposited the amount required by that rule. Before the deposit could be withdrawn by the decree-holder, Thuppan (or on his behalf) asked that security be taken from the decree-holder; the Court directed that security be furnished and the heirs of Eramutti (including the 1st defendant) executed a security bond (Ex. A) dated 18 December 1911 promising to bring back the amount into Court if Thuppan succeeded in his regular suit.
Thuppan ultimately succeeded in O.S. No. 414 of 1911, with judgments upheld before the High Court. Thuppan died; his brother Nilakantan (the present plaintiff) later asserted (in a 1921 written statement in a different suit) that the decree debt had been fully paid. In 1923 the plaintiff filed the present suit to enforce the security bond and claim the amount from the 1st defendant.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a person other than the judgment-debtor who pays the decretal amount into Court under Order 21, Rule 89 (CPC) may insist that the decree-holder shall not withdraw the sum without furnishing security (i.e., whether payment may be made subject to conditions or "under protest").
- Whether the Court had power to accept the security bond in the present circumstances (i.e., whether the Court acted within its authority in directing that security be furnished and in taking Ex. A).
- Whether, assuming the Court acted beyond its powers in taking the bond, equitable considerations or the duty of the Court to prevent injury to suitors required enforcement of the bond in favour of the plaintiff.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Narayan v. Amgauda | Holds that a payment made under Order 21, Rule 89 is to be taken as voluntary and unconditional; a depositor cannot later sue for recovery on the ground that the payment was involuntary. | Quoted (including Macleod, C.J.) to support the proposition that deposit under R.89 is voluntary and unconditional and thus cannot be reclaimed; used as authority for the court's view that payment made in the procedure cannot be made "under protest." |
| Raghu Ram Pandey v. Deokali Pande | Establishes that once payment is made under O.21, R.89 the depositor cannot contend that the sale was invalid and claim repayment; such a deposit is voluntary and a suit for refund is not maintainable. | Quoted passage used to reinforce the legal principle that deposit under R.89 precludes a subsequent suit for refund even if the depositor later proves ownership of the property. |
| Kunja Behari Singha v. Bhupendra Kumar Dutt | Adopts the same view as Raghu Ram Pandey and Narayan v. Amgauda about the finality and voluntariness of deposits under O.21, R.89. | Cited as another decision consistent with the proposition that payment under R.89 is voluntary and cannot be recovered by the depositor. |
| Kanhaya Lal v. National Bank of India Ltd. | Distinguished: held that the Code's procedural provisions are permissive and a party who paid before sale (not under O.21, R.89) could pursue other lawful remedies; payment in that case was before sale and not under R.89. | Distinguished on the ground that the payment there was made before sale and not under O.21, R.89, so it does not support the plaintiff's position in the present case. |
| Rodger v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Paris | States the general principle that courts must take care to ensure that acts of the court do not injure suitors. | The Court considered whether this principle could justify enforcing a bond taken in excess of power, but concluded that the facts (including inequity of the plaintiff's claim) took the case outside application of this principle. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by focusing on the object and scope of Order 21, Rule 89 (CPC). It explained that the special provision is intended to end disputes about attachment and sale: (1) the judgment-debtor is saved from deprivation of property; (2) the decree-holder's claim is satisfied; and (3) the auction purchaser is compensated. The Court reasoned that this scheme would be frustrated if a person who pays under R.89 could do so "under protest" or subject to conditions.
The Court relied on Clause 2 of Rule 89, which prevents a person who applies under Rule 90 from simultaneously prosecuting an application under Rule 89, to show the incompatibility of keeping a dispute alive while using the indulgence of R.89. The logical consequence, the Court held, is that payment made under Rule 89 must be unconditional and has the effect of extinguishing the decretal liability once the Court sets aside the sale (see also Rule 92 which obliges the Court to set aside sale where the deposit is made within thirty days).
The Court extended this interpretation to third parties who have title to the property: a third party who avails himself of R.89 to avoid sale must be taken to have admitted the validity of the sale and cannot subsequently dispute it or claim the deposited money back. The Court illustrated this by reference to trustees paying to discharge a debtor's obligation — allowing them to retain a right to contest or recover the money would be contrary to the principle underlying R.89.
The Court then surveyed supporting authorities (Narayan v. Amgauda; Raghu Ram Pandey v. Deokali Pande; Kunja Behari Singha v. Bhupendra Kumar Dutt) whose holdings were consistent with the proposition that deposits under R.89 are voluntary and unconditional and cannot be reclaimed by the depositor. It distinguished Kanhaya Lal v. National Bank of India Ltd. because the payment there occurred before sale and outside the R.89 procedure.
Applying these principles to the facts, the Court concluded that the trial Court had no power to insist on or to accept the security bond (Ex. A) when the deposit was made under R.89 and that taking the bond was an act in excess of jurisdiction. The Court nonetheless considered whether the higher duty of the Court to prevent injury to suitors (Rodger v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Paris) required a different result, but held that the equities in the present case were wholly against the plaintiff.
The Court emphasized various factual points to show inequity: Thuppan had earlier represented he would bring the decretal amount into Court (1911) and later (in 1921) the plaintiff himself stated the decree had been fully paid; these admissions demonstrated consciousness of the obligation and were inconsistent with the plaintiff's present claim to enforce the bond. The subordinate courts' differing treatment was noted, but the appellate review found the plaintiff's claim unjust and inconsistent with prior statements.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The suit is dismissed.
The Court held that, as a matter of law, a payment made under Order 21, Rule 89 must be voluntary and unconditional; consequently the trial Court had no power to take the security bond (Ex. A) and acted in excess of its jurisdiction in accepting it. Notwithstanding that illegality, on the facts the plaintiff's claim to enforce the bond was inequitable and inconsistent with earlier admissions, and therefore the suit is dismissed.
Direct consequences and costs: the plaintiff is to pay only the costs of this second appeal; the 1st defendant will not be given costs in the courts below because some blame attaches to him for voluntarily executing the security bond.
The opinion does not purport to establish a new exception to Order 21, Rule 89; it applies existing interpretive authority to hold that deposits under that rule are final and unconditional and that a security bond taken by the Court in these circumstances was beyond power and cannot be the basis of equitable relief in the present factual setting.
This appeal raises a question in regard to O. 21, R. 89, Sch. 1, Civil Procedure Code. If a person other than a judgment-debtor pays money into Court under that section, can he insist that the decree-holder shall not draw the sum out without furnishing security? The facts of the case take us so far back as 1905. One Sri Devi of Mundathode Illam conveyed in Jenm to Thuppan Nambudiri, the brother of the plaintiff, her entire property (consisting of 140 items). The sale deed (Ex. 1), is dated 16th November 1905 and mentions the consideration as Rs. 16,000. The purchaser by that deed is directed to pay certain specified debts of the vendor and it then provides that he shall also be bound to pay up all other lawful debts due by her. Eramutti, the brother of the 1st defendant, filed against Sri Devi O. S. No. 561 of 1905 claiming a certain amount as due. It was to Thuppan's interest, having regard to Ex. 1, to get the suit dismissed. He accordingly fought the case on behalf of Sri Devi and lost it in spite of his vigorous defence. As the District Munsif points out, the case was fought out up to the High Court and it was decided that the debt claimed by Eramutti was due. Thuppan then became under the terms of Ex. 1, instantly liable to discharge this decree debt. He, however, committed default and the decree remained unsatisfied; Sri Devi, as I have said, by the sale deed completely deprived herself of all property. Eramutti, in the circumstances, followed the only course open to him, that of attaching some items bought by Thuppan. The latter thereupon preferred a claim under O. 21, R. 58. The Court rejected it, observing that the debt not having been discharged, the property conveyed under Ex. 1 remained liable. Even then, Thuppan did not honestly pay up the debt. He filed a regular suit (O.S No. 414 of 1911) contesting the order rejecting the claim. In the meantime, the attached property was brought to sale. Thuppan applied in his suit that the sale might be stopped. On 23rd October 1911, his application was dismissed. Every dilatory method was resorted to; he next applied that the sale might be adjourned. The petition he filed (Ex. 3) contains the following significant statement:—
“The properties obtained by me from the defendant are proclaimed. The sale must be adjourned to enable me to produce the decree-amount.”
This application met with the same fate as the previous one. Thuppan then determined to save his property, applied under O. 21, R. 89, for the setting aside of the sale. He made the deposit prescribed by that rule. But, before it could be drawn out by the persons entitled, he applied that security should be taken from the decree-holder. The Court, for some reason not disclosed, complied with this request and directed that security should be furnished. Ex. A, dated 18th December 1911, was thereupon executed by the heirs of Eramutti, including the 1st defendant. It contains the clause that they would bring back the amount into Court, if Thuppan should succeed in the regular suit then pending. The rest of the story may be briefly told. Thuppan won O.S No. 414 of 1911, which dragged a weary length. The case went up as far as the High Court. All the Courts, that dealt with the suit in its various stages, held that the sale was valid; but the point to note is, that the sale was upheld on the sole ground, that Sri Devi acted honestly and got Thuppan to undertake by the deed to discharge her debts. There is one further fact which-is important. Sri Devi's reversioners (Attaladakkam heirs) filed a suit questioning the alienation evidenced by Ex. 1. Thuppan having died, his brother, Nilakantan, the present plaintiff, filed a written statement (Ex. 4.) Seeking to justify the sale, he asserts that the terms of the sale deed were carried out and that the amount due to Kunhutti was fully paid up. This statement (made in March 1921) implies that the deposit made by Thuppan under O. 21, R. 89 had the effect of discharging the decree debt. Whether this result follows in law of not, it shows that the plaintiff was conscious that he was under a moral duty to pay up the debt. It now suits him to suggest that he made a false allegation in the written statement, to defeat the claim of the reversioners. In any event that allegation is inconsistent with the present claim based on the security bond. That claim is shortly this. Under the bond, if Thuppan's suit was decreed, the executants bound themselves to bring back the money. Now, Thuppan having succeeded, the plaintiff seeks to enforce the bond and claim the amount from the 1st defendant. It may be mentioned that this suit was filed in 1923.
The first question that arises is, was it competent to the Court to have taken the bond in question? To answer this question, one must have regard to the object and scope of O. 21, R. 89. The Code in various sections lays down in what circumstances a judgment-debtor may contest the sale of his property. Similarly, there are sections under which a person claiming adversely to a judgment-debtor, may object to attachment and sale. But O. 21, R. 89 enacts a special provision. Its object is to put an end to every kind of contention and dispute. The judgment-debtor is saved from the threatened deprivation of his property; the decree-holder's claim is satisfied and the auction purchaser is compensated. The section would be frustrated if the person paying money under it is permitted to do so under protest. Cl. 2 R. 89 enacts:
“Where a person applies under R. 90 to set aside the sale of his immovable property he shall not, unless he withdraws his application, be entitled to make or prosecute an application under this rule.”
This shows that the two proceedings referred to in this clause are utterly incompatible. If the debtor wants to keep a dispute open, he cannot claim the benefit of this section. In fact, this accords to him a special indulgence. While he is thus favoured, care is taken to provide that the interests neither of the decree-holder nor the purchaser, are sacrificed. It follows from this, that when the judgment-debtor pays the amount specified, he pays it unconditionally. The payment followed by the order setting aside the sale, has the effect of automatically extinguishing the decree debt. If an application is made under R. 89 and the deposit required by that rule is made within 30 days from the date of the sale, the Court has no option but to make an order setting it aside. (See R. 92). This assumes that the decree debt is discharged and the decree-holder's remedy is gone. The section then, is inconsistent with the notion that payment can be made either under protest or coupled with conditions. I have so far dealt with the question on the footing that the person making the deposit is a judgment-debtor; but under the rule, any person owning an interest in the property by virtue of a title acquired before the sale, can make the application. Supposing such a person happens to be not a judgment-debtor but a third party, even then, he is subject to the same restrictions. If the property is not liable to be attached for the debt, he can ignore the attachment and sale. If, on the other hand, it is liable, or he believes it to be liable, he can avail himself of this provision and get rid of the sale. But, in that case, he must be taken to have admitted the validity of the sale and it is not open to him either to dispute the sale or to get back the money. Take the case, for instance, of a debtor who, before the decree, had conveyed his property to trustees for the benefit of his creditors. The trustees, if they choose, may dispute the attachment and the court-sale. But they may gain nothing by such a course, and being under a duty to pay up the debt, may choose to take advantage of this provision. To hold that they would still be entitled to contest the sale, or, to claim a refund of the money, would be wholly opposed to the principle underlying the section.
This view receives support from several decisions. In Narayan v. Amgauda , the property was sold in execution of a decree obtained by the defendant against a third party, and purchased by the former. The plaintiff claiming to be the owner of the property, protested against the sale and ultimately got it set aside under O. 21, R. 89 by paying the required amount into Court. The money having been paid over to the defendant, the plaintiff sued for a refund of it, as having been involuntarily paid. It was held that the amount must be taken to have been deposited voluntarily and unconditionally and therefore no suit could lie for its recovery. Macleod, C. J., observes:—
“If then, the plaintiff to suit his own convenience, got rid of the sale of the judgment-debtor's right, title and interest in the property by paying the decretal amount into Court, it is quite clear that he could not recover the amount as having been involuntarily paid.”
In Raghu Ram Pandey v. Deokali Pande , a decree had been obtained by defendants 1 and 2 against defendant No. 3. In execution of that decree, a certain property was brought to sale and the plaintiff objected, stating that it belonged to him and not to the debtor, but his objection was disallowed. He then deposited the decretal amount and 5 per cent. under O. 21, R. 89 and got the sale set aside. The money was withdrawn by defendants 1 and 2 and the plaintiff filed the suit in question, for a declaration that the property belonged to him and for a refund of the amount withdrawn. In spite of a finding that he was the owner of the property, his suit was dismissed, on the ground that he was not entitled to get the money back. I quote the following passage from the judgment:—
“Once a payment is made under O. 21, R. 89, it is clear that the person making the payment cannot be heard to say that the sale was not a valid sale and that the money deposited should not be paid to the decree-holder. The judgment-debtor or the person interested is under no compulsion to make the deposit under O. 21, R. 89. Such a deposit is a voluntary deposit and the person making the deposit cannot in my opinion maintain a suit for a refund of the money deposited by him.”
The same view was taken in Kunja Behari Singha v. Bhupendra Kumar Dutt . The case relied upon for the plaintiff, Kanhaya Lal v. National Bank of India Ltd., does not help him. The defendant Bank had obtained a decree against the Delhi Cotton Mills Company and attached certain Mills. The plaintiff, claiming to be the owner of the Mills, paid the decree amount under protest and having freed his property from the attachment brought an action claiming a return of the money so paid. The Judicial Committee held that the procedure provided in the Code, in regard to claims to attached property, is merely permissive and the fact that such a procedure is open to him if he chooses to adopt it, interferes in no way, with his right to take any other lawful alternative. In that case, the money was paid before the sale and the payment was not made under O. 21, R. 89. The decision has clearly no application.
If this be the correct view, it follows that the Court had no right to take the security bond in question. It acted clearly in excess of its powers. But it may be contended, that though its action was illegal, there is a higher rule which is called into play, namely, “One of the first and highest duties of all Courts is to take care that the act of the Court does no injury to any of the suitors;” Rodger v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Paris . But the facts to which I have referred take the case clean out of this principle. The claim of the plaintiff is utterly inequitable and unjust. The District Munsif has carefully analysed the facts and stated them in detail. The Subordinate Judge, who has reversed his judgment, does not advert to them and, confining his attention merely to the security bond, thinks, that there are equities in favour of the plaintiff. The truth is, as I have shown, not only is there no equity in the plaintiff's claim, but all the equities appear to be the other way. The facts I have fully set forth and I do not propose to repeat them. It would suffice to point out again that first in 1911, Thuppan stated when applying for an adjournment of the sale, that he would bring into Court the decree amount, and that in 1921, ten years later; the plaintiff himself (Thuppan having in the meantime died) asserted in the reversioner's suit, that the decree debt had been fully paid up. These assertions show, that Thuppan as well as the plaintiff were fully conscious of their obligation under Ex. 1. The present claim is not only unjust but inconsistent with their own declarations.
The suit is dismissed, but I direct the plaintiff to pay only the costs of this second appeal. Some blame attaches to the 1st defendant, who voluntarily executed the security bond and that is the reason why I do not propose to give him costs in the courts below.
N.R.RSuit dismissed.
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