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Taduri Ramachandra Jagannatha Rao v. Vadrevu Visvesam
Judgment Summary — Ramesam, J. (with Jackson, J. concurring)
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff sued to recover (1) Rs. 2,500 deposited with the 1st defendant on 6 July 1917 and (2) Rs. 350 for money paid for the 1st defendant. Defendants 2–5 were sons of the 1st defendant and had been members of a joint family until 1918. In 1918 the present 2nd defendant sued his father and brothers for partition. No written statement was filed; the suit was compromised and a decree in terms of the compromise was passed on 23 January 1920. The compromise provided for paying most of the 1st defendant's debts but not the plaintiff's debt; it made no specific allotments of property to the 1st defendant and provided for maintenance of Rs. 30 per month to him (an annuity of Rs. 360 per year).
The present suit was filed on 6 July 1920, seeking to make defendants 2–5 liable with reference to the shares in their hands of what had been joint family property prior to 1920. The defendants denied the genuineness of the debts; the District Judge found the debts true but had doubts about the bona fides of the partition. The District Judge decreed the suit on the ground that under the compromise all the debts of the 1st defendant were agreed to be paid by all the defendants. All defendants appealed. The 1st defendant died during the appeal. On appeal, the court (Ramesam, J.) disagreed with the District Judge's construction of the compromise and proceeded to consider the legal question whether sons are liable for their father's antecedent debts in the circumstances of this case.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether, where a partition has been effected and a son has received a share of what was formerly joint family property, the son is liable in a suit (joined as a party) for the father's debts incurred before partition and not illegal or immoral.
- Whether the particular partition (decree of 23 January 1920) was bona fide for the purposes of any exception to sons' liability relied on by the respondent.
- Whether decisions such as Karri Venkatareddi v. Sesha Sahi and Peda Venkanna v. Sreenivasa Deekshatulu are correctly decided or are binding in relation to the question of sons' liability after partition.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments (defendants 2–5)
- The appellants did not dispute the District Judge's finding that the debts were genuine and did not claim the debts were illegal or immoral.
- They contended that, after partition, the sons are not liable for the father's debts (if the debt was not charged on property) and relied on Karri Venkatareddi v. Sesha Sahi, which followed Peda Venkanna v. Sreenivasa Deekshatulu.
Respondent's Arguments (plaintiff)
- The respondent argued that the partition was not bona fide within the meaning of exceptions recognised in earlier cases, so the sons should remain liable.
- Alternatively, if the partition were held bona fide, the respondent contended that Karri Venkatareddi v. Sesha Sahi was incorrectly decided. As to Peda Venkanna v. Sreenivasa Deekshatulu, the respondent conceded the actual decision but disputed parts of the reasoning that were not grounded on the renewal of the promissory note after partition.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Karri Venkatareddi v. Sesha Sahi | Held (as relied on by appellants) that sons were not liable after partition; followed Peda Venkanna. | The Court refused to treat Karri as binding because it rested on Peda Venkanna; the Court concluded Karri was not binding on them and declined to follow it. |
| Peda Venkanna v. Sreenivasa Deekshatulu | Discussed sons' liability after partition; involved considerations whether certain earlier cases were overruled and considered renewal of promissory note after partition. | The Court accepted that Peda Venkanna is correctly decided insofar as it rests on renewal of the note by the father after partition but rejected Peda Venkanna as an authority for overruling Ramachandra Padayachi and Kameswaramma. |
| Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lall | Establishes principle that ancestral property in which a son has interest by birth is liable for father's debts; discusses scope of son's duty to pay. | Cited as foundational authority for the proposition that a son's interest in ancestral/joint property may be liable for the father's debts; the Court used it as part of the historical development of law on liability. |
| Hunooman Persaud Panday v. Mussumat Babooee Munraj Koonwaree | Quoted on the nature of the son's pious duty to discharge the father's debts irrespective of the nature of estate. | Quoted by the Court (via Girdharee Lall) to show background authority that ancestral property may be liable and to frame the historical principle. |
| Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Persad Singh | Application of Girdharee Lall in Bengal context. | Mentioned as a case where Calcutta High Court gave full effect to Girdharee Lall. |
| Ponnappa Pillai v. Pappuvaiyangar | Madras High Court Full Bench consideration whether Girdharee Lall applies to Madras. | Cited as part of the judicial history showing that Madras Full Bench concluded Girdharee Lall applied to Madras. |
| Mutayan v. Zamindar of Sivagiri | Privy Council noted no ground for not applying Girdharee Lall to Madras. | Referred to as confirmation that Girdharee Lall's principle is applicable beyond Bengal. |
| Ramasami Nadan v. Ulaganatha Goundan | Held father and son liability co-extensive; cause of action against son arises simultaneously with that against father. | Referred to among cases on the co-extensive liability of father and son and procedural limitations (son cannot be sued alone during father's life in some contexts). |
| Periasami Mudaliar v. Seetharama Ckettiar | Procedural/authority reference in context of co-extensive liability (cited parenthetically). | Referred to as an additional authority in the discussion of liability scope and procedure. |
| Krishnasami Konan v. Ramasami Ayyar | Considered effect of partition where suit was after partition against father alone; held property taken by son in partition cannot be seized in execution of decree obtained against father alone (absent mala fide partition). | Quoted and discussed at length: Court explained Krishnasami Konan turned on plaintiff's execution rights and distinguished it from cases where son is impleaded in the suit; Court treated it as an early case considering the effect of partition. |
| Ramachandra Padayachi v. Kondayya Chetty | Held that where sons were parties to the suit, son was liable to extent of family property which had come to him under partition. | The Court followed and treated Ramachandra Padayachi as a controlling authority supporting liability of a son in suit after partition when impleaded; the Court held it was not overruled. |
| Kameswaramma v. Venkata Subba Row | Affirms that a Hindu son is liable for the father's debt to extent of joint family property which came to his hands at partition. | The Court described this case as conclusive against appellants and followed it together with Ramachandra Padayachi to support its holding. |
| Lakshmana Chettiar v. Govindarajulu Naidu | Applied similar views on attachment and partition (cited alongside other similar cases). | Referred to as a case taking the same view as Kameswaramma; used to show consistency of authorities. |
| Rathna Naidu v. Aiyanachariar | Similarity of authority in support of Kameswaramma (discussed in relation to execution/attachment). | Cited as another case taking similar positions on the effect of partition on attachment/execution. |
| Bathna Naidu v. Aiyanachariar | Case where the father mortgaged his son's share after partition (used to illustrate limits of father's powers). | Mentioned to show that such a mortgage was obviously invalid and therefore not helpful to the appellants' point. |
| Sahu Ram Chandra v. Bhup Singh | Raised a question whether it effected any change in law relating to son's liability. | Referred to as part of the history of authorities; ultimately treated as not effecting the change attributed by some authorities (per later Privy Council authority). |
| Brij Naram v. Mangla Prasad | Privy Council Full Board judgment (Lord Dunedin) settling whether Sahu Ram Chandra effected a change in law. | Used to show that Sahu Ram Chandra did not change the law on son's liability; cited in the discussion of Peda Venkanna and related Full Bench decisions. |
| (Appa v. Ranga) | Mentioned in passing as a decision the Court found doubtful if it meant that family continues joint where there is a relinquishment by the father subject to maintenance. | Not relied upon; its scope was questioned by the Court and described as doubtful. |
| Unreported decision A. S. No. 419 of 1918 (Abdur Rahim & Philips, JJ.) | Purported to follow Peda Venkanna and concurred with Kumaraswami Sastri, J.'s distinction of Ramachandra Padayachi. | The Court noted it but held it did not add to reported cases and did not change their conclusion. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in a structured way:
- On facts, the Court found the partition decree of 1920 to be bona fide in the sense that the parties truly intended to divide their statuses; there was no unequal allotment of properties apparent on the material presented. The Court noted the arrangement gave the father an annuity that was probably more than his indebted share would have allowed if all debts were charged upon the father's share.
- The Court distinguished different senses of "bona fide." It accepted that the partition might not have provided for all of the father's debts out of the whole joint family properties, but observed that the case law's exception for mala fide partition may not use "bona fide" in that technical sense. Because of this uncertainty, the Court examined the correctness of the precedents relied upon.
- The Court reviewed the historical and reported authorities concerning a son's liability for the father's debts, starting with the older principle that under primitive Hindu law a son may have a pious duty to discharge the father's debts, then tracing the reported decisions that limited liability to situations where property (self-acquired or joint property) had devolved on the son.
- The Court analyzed Krishnasami Konan v. Ramasami Ayyar as a case about execution (seizure in execution) where partition preceded the suit and the suit was against the father alone; that case held a son's allotted property could not be seized in execution of a decree obtained against the father alone unless the partition was mala fide. The Court emphasized that Krishnasami Konan turned on the plaintiff's execution rights, not on whether the plaintiff could obtain judgment against the son when the son was impleaded.
- The Court treated Ramachandra Padayachi v. Kondayya Chetty and Kameswaramma v. Venkata Subba Row as authoritative on the proposition that a son in possession of property which had been joint and which fell to his share in partition is liable in a suit brought after partition when he is impleaded, for the father's debts incurred before partition and which are not illegal or immoral. The Court found the reasoning in Kameswaramma conclusive.
- The Court critically examined Peda Venkanna v. Sreenivasa Deekshatulu and related Full Bench and Privy Council material. It accepted Peda Venkanna to the extent that the note sued on there had been renewed by the father after partition, but rejected any wider reading that would overrule Ramachandra Padayachi and Kameswaramma. Consequently, the Court concluded that Karri Venkatareddi, which rested on Peda Venkanna, was not binding.
- On balance, considering the authorities and the facts, the Court held that the son-defendants (2–5), insofar as they had been allotted shares of what was formerly joint family property and were impleaded in the suit, could be held liable for their father's antecedent debts (subject to the limitation that debts be not illegal or immoral).
- The Court explicitly stated it did not think a reference to a Full Bench was necessary and dismissed the appeal on this ground. Jackson, J. agreed.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Holding (direct effect): The Court held that where a son is in possession of property that had been joint and that fell to his share in partition, the son is liable in a suit brought after partition (when the son is impleaded) for the father's debts incurred before partition, provided those debts are not illegal or immoral. The Court followed Ramachandra Padayachi v. Kondayya Chetty and Kameswaramma v. Venkata Subba Row, and rejected Karri Venkatareddi v. Sesha Sahi as binding authority on the point.
Broader implications: The decision reaffirms the distinction between (a) execution (attachment/seizure in execution of a decree obtained against the father alone, where Krishnasami Konan applies and a bona fide partition protects a son's allotted share from execution) and (b) substantive liability in a suit brought after partition where the son is made a party (where Ramachandra Padayachi and Kameswaramma support the creditor). The Court clarifies that Peda Venkanna is correctly applied only in relation to renewal of a note by the father after partition and does not overrule the earlier decisions the Court followed.
No new principle of law was laid down beyond following and applying the earlier authorities (Ramachandra Padayachi and Kameswaramma) to the facts; the appeal was dismissed on that basis.
Result: Appeal dismissed. (S. S.)
Ramesam, J. — Suit by the plaintiff to recover (1) a sum of Rs. 2,500, deposited with 1st defendant on 6th July, 1917, and (2) a sum of Rs. 350, payable to plaintiff for money paid for the 1st defendant. The defendants 2 to 5 are the sons of the 1st defendant who formed with him, members of a joint family up to 1918. In that year, a suit was filed by the present 2nd defendant against his father and brothers for partition. No written statement was filed and the suit was compromised and decree was passed in terms of the compromise, on 23rd January, 1920. Under the compromise, provision was made for paying off most of the debts contracted by the 1st defendant, but not the suit debt. No specific properties were allotted to the 1st defendant and it was arranged that a maintenance of Rs. 30 should be paid to him every month. The present suit was filed on 6th July, 1920, and the defendants 2 to 5 are sought to be made liable with reference to the shares in their hands of what had been, prior to 1920, joint family property. The defendants denied the genuineness of the debts The District Judge found that the debts were true. He had doubts about the bona fides of the partition, but on the ground that under the compromise it was agreed that all the debts of the 1st defendant were agreed to be paid by all the defendants, decreed the suit. All the defendants appealed. The 1st defendant died during the pendency of the appeal. With the construction of the terms of the compromise by the District Judge, we are not able to agree.
The other appellants do not question the correctness of the finding that the debts are true. Nor do they say that the debts are illegal or immoral. They contend that the sons are not liable for the father's debt (not charged on the property) after partition and rely on Karri Venkatareddi v. Sesha Sahi, following Peda Venkanna v. Sreenivasa Deekshatulu. The respondent replies that the partition is not bona fide, within the meaning of the exception recognised in these cases and if the partition is held bona fide, he contends that Karri Venkatareddi v. Sesha Sahi is incorrectly decided and as to Peda Venkanna v. Sreenivasa Deekshatulu, while conceding that the actual decision is correct, in so far as it rests on any ground, other than the ground that the promissory note in that case was renewed by the father after partition, such ground is not correctly decided.
We are of opinion that the partition by the decree of 1920 was bona fide, in the sense that the intention was to really divide the status of the parties; it is probably also bona fide, though the matter has not been fully gone into, in the sense that there has been no unequal allotment of properties, if we regard all the debts as debts of 1st defendant only, i.e, that his share minus all the debts would have been much less than what he actually got, viz., an annuity of Rs. 360; and we come to this conclusion, in spite of the fact that there has been no division by metes and bounds and the decision in Appa v. Ranga is doubtful, if it meant to decide that the family continues joint in cases, where there is a relinquishment by the father subject to a maintenance. It is not bona fide only in the sense, that provision was not made for all the debts of 1st defendant not illegal and immoral (Ghose's Hindu Law, Vol. 1, page 438), out of the whole joint family properties, from which they would have been recoverable, if there had been no partition and debts like those of the plaintiff will be defeated, if it is held that the defendants 2 to 5 are not liable. As it is doubtful, whether the exception mentioned in the cases, uses the expression ‘bona fide’ in this sense, we have to consider the question of the correctness of the decisions relied on.
It may be that, under the primitive Hindu Law, a son is under a pious duty to discharge his father's debts, irrespective of the devolution on him, of any kind of property. But the decisions have established the principle that a son is not liable, unless the self-acquired property of the father, or property which had been joint between them has devolved upon the son. For the purposes of this case, it is not necessary to go further, behind the case of Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lall. At page 331, their Lordships quote from Knight Bruce, L.J, in (Hunooman Persaud Panday v. Mussumat Babooee Munraj Koonwaree):
“Unless the debt was of such a nature that it was not the duty of the son to pay it, the discharge of it even though it affected ancestral estate, would still be an act of pious duty in the son. By the Hindu Law, the freedom of the son from the obligation to discharge the father's debt has respect to the nature of the debt and not to the nature of the estate, whether ancestral or acquired by the creator of the debt.”
and say:
“That is an authority to show that ancestral property, which descends to a father under the Mitakshara Law is not exempted from liability to pay his debts because a son is born to him. It would be a pious duty, on the part of the son to pay his father's debts, and it being the pious duty of the son to pay his father's debts, the ancestral property, in which the son as the son of his father acquired an interest by birth, is liable to the father's debts.”
At page 334, effect was given to these observations in Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lall, in favour of a creditor in execution. While the Calcutta High Court gave full effect, in a case from Bengal in Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Persad Singh, the Madras High Court at first did not, on the ground that the decision in Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lall cannot apply to Madras, where a member of a joint family has a right to alienate his share (unlike Bengal) and there is no need for the equitable right, recognised in favour of the executing creditor in Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lall. The creditor carried the case to the Privy Council (Mutayan v. Zamindar of Sivagiri. Meanwhile a Full Bench of the the Madras High Court in Ponnappa Pillai v. Pappuvaiyangar (Muthuswami Aiyar, J., who decided the earlier case and Innes, J., dissenting) held that the decision in Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lall applied to Madras equally. The Privy Council in Mutayan v. Zamindar of Sivagiri, while deciding the case on another point, pointed out that there was no ground for not applying the decision in Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lall to Madras. In Ramasami Nadan v. Ulaganatha Goundan, a Full Bench held that the liability of the father and son was co-extensive and the cause of action against the son arose simultaneously with that against the father, though it must be added that the son cannot be sued alone, during the father's life. (PeriasamiMudaliar v. Seetharama Ckettiar). In Krishnasami Konan v. Ramasami Ayyar, the question arose whether in execution of a decree, obtained against the father alone, the share of the son in the joint family property, allotted to him in a partition, can be seized in execution. The District Judge (afterwards Miller, J.) held:
“when the separation is before the suit as in this case, I think the creditor is bound to make parties all those, whose interests he wishes to bind by his decree. The property is, from the date of separation, the son's property, in which the father has no interest, and though the son may be liable to pay the debt, his liability must be enforced in a suit against himself.”
Incidentally, it may be observed that the son's share, even after partition, may and is spoken of, in this and other cases, as ancestral property and even joint property (in the sense that it represents what had been joint property). It is indeed ancestral property in the hands of the son, as against his own sons. The High Court said:
“the principle upon which the son cannot object to ancestral property being seized in execution, for an unsecured personal debt of the father, is that the father, under the Hindu Law, is entitled to sell, on account of such debt the whole of the ancestral estate. This necessarily implies that at the time the property is seized, it remains the undivided estate of the father and son. ********** Ergo, property taken by the son in partition cannot be seized on account of such unsecured personal debt of the father, even though the debt had been incurred before the partition. Of course, if the partition had been made, with a view to defraud or delay creditors, it would be otherwise, but no such case is made out here.”
This is the first case, which considered the effect of a partition.
The whole decision and the exception in case of a mala fide partition relate to the seizure, in execution of a decree, to which the son was not a party. In Ramachandra Padayachi v. Kondayya Chetty, the sons were parties to the suit and it was held (Bashyam Iyengar, J., being one of the judges) that the son was liable to the extent of the family property, which had come to him, under the partition. Krishnaswami Konan v. Bamasami Ayyar, was thus distinguished, at page 557:
“In that case, the suit was brought after partition, against the father alone and the point decided was that property taken by a son under a partition, effected before the suit, could not be seized in execution of a decree obtained against the father only, in such suit. The case turned on the plaintiff's rights in execution, not as here, on the question, whether the plaintiff is entitled to judgment as against the son.”
The next case is Kameswaramma v. Venkata Subba Row (Wallis, C.J, and Oldfield, J.). In my opinion, the reasoning in this case is conclusive against the appellants. The learned Judges say:
“I think it is also clear that plaintiff, as a Hindu son, is liable for the debt, to the extent of the joint family property, which came to his hands at partition. Ramachandra Padayachi v. Kondayya Chetty.
They quote the sentence I already quoted from Krishnaswami Konan v. Ramasami Ayyar, and say:
“This necessarily implies that at the time the property is attached, it remains the undivided property of the father and son. The same view has been taken, under very similar circumstanses (Miller and Krishnaswami Aiyar, JJ.) in Lakshmana Chettiar v. Govindarajulu Naidu; see also Rathna Naidu v. Aiyanachariar. At the date of execution, the property now in question had ceased to be joint family property and the cases referred to on the other side are cases in which the property remained joint and so subject to alienation by the father, in satisfaction of the debt.”
Incidentally, it may be mentioned that the case in Bathna Naidu v. Aiyanachariar is one, where the father mortgaged his son's share after partition. Obviously, he has no such power and the case cannot help the point under discussion. Now comes the case in Peda Venkanna v. Sreenivasa Deekshatulu. The point elaborately argued in that case and also elaborately discussed is, whether Sahu Ram Chandra v. Bhup Singh effected any change in the law, relating to the son's liability, a point, which after giving rise to Full Bench decisions in this Court, is set at rest by Lord Dunedin's judgment in Brij Naram v. Mangla Prasad (a judgment of a Full Board of the Privy Council); while deciding that it did not, Wallis, C.J, said:
“This Court has held in a series of cases that as the effect of partition is to put an end to the father's right to sell the son's share for an antecedent debt, it also puts an end to the creditor's right to bring the son's share to sale during his life-time, at any rate, when the partition has not been effected, to defeat and delay creditors: Krishuasami Konan v. Ramasami Ayyar, Kameswaramma v. Venkata Subba Row.
Having regard to the expression, to bring the son's share to sale and to the fact that Kameswaramma v. Venkata Subba Row was cited in support of his Lordship's proposition and without any qualification or disapproval, it is impossible to say, solely beeause lower down the page, his Lordship used the expression “to say nothing of the further ground etc.,” that his Lordship impliedly intended to overrule his opinion in Kameswaramma v. Venkata Subba Row, following Ramachandra Padayachi v. Kondayya Chetty. Kumaraswami Sastri, J., begins, by saying he agrees with the judgment of the Chief Justice on the narrow ground “that a son is not, after partition, liable to be proceeded against, in respect of a personal debt incurred by the father before partition.” If “proceeded against” meant “proceeded against in execution” there is no difficulty in accepting the statement; but if it meant as it was intended to mean “proceeded against in suit” it is not justified I say, with great deference to my learned brother, by Wallis, C.J's expression “to say nothing of the further ground” and by imputing to it a significance inconsistent with the earlier statement of the law, following Kameswaramma v. Venkata Subba Row. His Lordship then reviews the cases at page 143. It is difficult to see how it can be said that Rathna Naidu v. Aiyanachariar, followed Krishnasami Konan v. Ramasami Ayyar. He then distinguishes Ramachandra Padayachi v. Kondayya Chetty, by saying that:
“the debt sued on arose out of a joint family business, carried on by the father and son, before partition, and the liability of the son rested……..on contract entered into, in respect of a joint family trade to the extent of the joint family assets etc.”
I am not able to follow the distinction. If the son was a party to the contract, he is liable not only as to the joint family property, but even as to his self-acquired property and unless he is a minor, he is liable to be arrested. In other words, he is personally liable and there is no question of Hindu Law in the case. If he was not a party, this liability rests only on the Hindu Law, relating to son's liability on the contracts of a father or manager. Suppose the family trade is not ancestral trade, but a new trade, started by the father and cannot therefore be said to be for justifiable necessity. Can it be said that Ramachandra Padayachi v. Kondayya Chetty, does not apply to such a case. No such distinction was made in Kameswaramma v. Venkata Subba Row, which is not the case of a family trade. He then refers to the renewal of the note by the father. In my opinion, the case in Peda Venkanna v. Sreenivasa Deekshatulu, is correctly decided, so far as it rests on the ground that the note sued on was renewed by the father after partition. Wallis, C.J, did not intend to overrule Kameswaramma v. Venkata Svbba Row and Ramachandra Padayachi v. Kondayya Chetty, or even distinguished Krishansami Konan v. Ramasami Ayyar, in the manner suggested by Kumaraswami Sastri, J. In these circumstances we cannot accept the decision in Karri Venkatareddi v. Sesha Sahi, as binding on us, as it rests solely on the ground that the matter was concluded by Peda Venkanna v. Sreenivasa Deekshatulu. Our brother Oldfield, J., who was also a party to Kameswaramma v. Venkata Subba Row, made no reference to it, in the later case and gave no additional reasons. Abdur Rahim, J., simply said that all the cases were considered in Peda Venkanna v. Sreenivasa Deekshatulu. We are also referred to an unreported decision, in A. S. No. 419 of 1918, by Abdur Rahim and Philips, JJ. It purports to follow Peda Venkanna v. Sreenivasa Deekshatulu and concurs with Kumaraswami Sastri, J., in his distinction of Ramachandra Padayachi v. Kondayya Ohetty. I have already dealt with this. This case does not add to the other cases. We are of opinion that Ramachandra Padayachi v. Kondayya Chetty and Kameswaramma v. Venkata Subba Row were not overruled and following them, we hold that a son in possession of property, which had been joint and which fell to his share in partition, is liable in a suit, brought after partition, (impleading the son also) for the father's debts incurred before the partition and not illegal and immoral: (see also Strange's Hindu Law, Vol. 1, page 191).
We do not think it necessary to refer the question to a Full Bench. On this ground, the appeal is dismissed with
Jackson, J.—I agree.
The point is correctly appreciated in Dr. Gour's Hindu Code, Sect. 118, paragraph 311, with reference to Ramachandra Padayachi v. Kondayya Chetty and Kameswaramma v. Venkata Suhba Row:
“On separation, the son……is liable for debts incurred before partition.”
But in Trevelyan's Hindu Law, Edn. 2, page 308, the point is not stated so clearly:
“A creditor cannot enforce the payment of the debt of the father against property, which has been allotted on partition to the son.”
This would be correct, if “enforce in execution”, is meant and not correct if it also includes “enforce by suit”.
In Mayne's Hindu Law, 9th Ed., page 411, it is stated:
“Where the son is joined in a suit against the father, this is for the purpose of enabling the Court to exercise the power of the father to sell family property, in discharge of his debts, not being illegal or immoral, and to prevent the son from questioning the nature of the debt, in execution proceedings against the property. After partition, of course, the son holds the share, which is allotted to him, free from any such liability”.
If ‘any such liability’ be taken to mean attachment in execution proceedings, the passage presents no difficulty; but if the words mean free from any liability for such debts, the statement seems to go too far.
S. S.Appeal dismissed.
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