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Sri Mariamman Koil D... v. Madras Hindu Religio...
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner is the managing trustee of Sri Mariamman Koil Devasthanam. By an order dated 17 July 1934 the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board removed him from office as trustee. The petitioner challenged that removal in C.M.P. No. 3053 of 1934; this Court held the Board's order ultra vires and ordered the Board to pay the petitioner Rs. 200 as costs. The Board appears to have paid that costs amount.
On 1 August 1935 the Board, citing Section 70 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board Act, assessed the costs and expenses incurred by it in connection with the earlier proceedings at Rs. 560-14-0 and made a demand on the petitioner for that amount. The petitioner filed the present application seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the Board's proceedings dated 1 August 1935.
The record further shows that the petitioner availed himself of the statutory procedure under Section 70(2)(d) by filing objections; those objections were heard by the President of the Board and the original demand was confirmed on 10 February 1936. The petitioner sought at hearing to amend his petition to challenge the 10 February 1936 decision, but that application to amend was opposed and not allowed at that stage. The petition under consideration was filed on 23 March 1936.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a writ of certiorari is competent to quash the Board's proceedings dated 1 August 1935 (i.e., whether those proceedings were "judicial" in character or merely administrative/ministerial).
- Whether the petitioner had an alternative statutory remedy under the Act (specifically the provisions identified as Section 70(2) and, as asserted by the Board, Section 72(2)) such that certiorari should not issue.
- Whether, in assessing and demanding the amount under Sections 68 and 70 of the Act, the Board exceeded the jurisdiction conferred upon it by those provisions.
- On the merits, whether Section 68 authorises recovery from the endowment of both the Board's own expenditure and amounts which the Board was ordered to pay to others (for example, the costs awarded to the petitioner).
Arguments of the Parties
Board's Contentions
- The proceedings of 1 August 1935 were purely administrative or ministerial and not judicial; therefore a writ of certiorari is incompetent in respect of them.
- The petitioner has an alternative remedy provided under the Act (the Board initially cited Section 72(2) and the judgment discusses Section 70(2) procedural provisions) to question the correctness of the assessment and demand.
- The Board did not exceed the jurisdiction conferred on it by Sections 68 and 70 when it assessed the amount due and made a demand.
Petitioner's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)
- Counsel for the petitioner (Mr. Viswanatha Aiyar) contended that the statutory remedy under Section 70(2)(d) is "more or less in the nature of a review" and therefore should not be treated as an adequate separate remedy barring certiorari.
- He also argued that, under Section 68, only the amounts which the Board itself had spent could be recovered from the endowment and that amounts the Board was ordered to pay to third parties (specifically the costs ordered to be paid to the petitioner) could not be included in the sum demanded from the endowment.
- The petitioner sought (orally) to amend the writ application to challenge the President's subsequent decision of 10 February 1936, which had confirmed the demand; that application to amend was resisted by the respondent.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Queen v. Corporation of Dublin (1878–79) L.R. (Ireland) Vol. II, pp. 371 | That certiorari does not lie to remove an order that is merely ministerial; certiorari is intended to remove and adjudicate upon the validity of acts that are judicial. | The Court relied on this principle to distinguish ministerial/administrative acts from judicial acts and to deny certiorari where the challenged act was ministerial. |
| King v. London County Council (1931) 2 K.B. 215 | Explanation and analysis of Atkin, L.J.'s conditions (from Rex v. Electricity Commissioners) for when certiorari may issue: (1) body of persons having legal authority; (2) to determine questions affecting rights; (3) having a duty to act judicially; (4) acting in excess of legal authority. | The Court applied these tests to conclude that the Board's assessment did not involve determination of questions affecting rights in a judicial manner and therefore did not attract certiorari jurisdiction. |
| Rex v. Electricity Commissioners (1924) 1 K.B. 171 | Sets out the four conditions (as explained by Atkin, L.J.) under which certiorari may issue against a body exercising legal authority. | The dictum was cited (via King v. LCC) as the test to decide whether the Board's act was judicial; the Court found the conditions were not satisfied here. |
| Scrutton, L.J.'s dictum (quoted in King v. LCC) | The body need not be a court in the strict sense; it is sufficient if, after hearing evidence, it exercises judicial functions deciding on evidence between a proposal and an opposition. | The Court used this principle to analyse whether the Board's act involved "hearing evidence" or deciding between opposing propositions; finding none, it characterised the act as non-judicial. |
| Venkataratnam v. The Secretary of State for India (1929) 60 M.L.J. 25 : I.L.R. 53 Mad. 979 | Illustrative of decisions applying the tests of what constitutes a judicial act for purposes of certiorari in this Court. | The Court cited this as one of the local authorities that followed the tests and applied similar reasoning when assessing whether the present act was judicial. |
| Muniswami Chetty v. The Board of Revenue, Land Revenue and Settlement, Madras and the Collector of Chittoor (1931) 66 M.L.J. 468 : I.L.R. 57 Mad. 791 | Another local precedent applying tests for distinguishing judicial from ministerial acts for writ jurisdiction. | Cited as part of the corpus of local authorities that inform the Court's application of the judicial/ministerial distinction in this case. |
| Thirumala Chettiar v. Chellam Pillai (1933) 66 M.L.J. 468 : I.L.R. 57 Mad. 791 | Local decision following the tests for certiorari and the judicial/ministerial distinction. | Cited as further supporting authority for applying the established tests to the facts before the Court. |
| Besant v. Advocate-General of Madras (1919) 37 M.L.J. 139 : L.R. 46 I.A. 176 : I.L.R. 43 Mad. 146 at 160 (P.C.) | The principle that certiorari should normally be granted only when no other suitable remedy exists. | The Court invoked this authority to support the conclusion that the existence and availability of an alternative statutory remedy (Section 70(2) procedure) precludes grant of certiorari in the present case. |
| Govindaswami Pillai v. Ramalingaswami (1913) 62 M.L.J. 644 | Authority for the proposition that writ jurisdiction is not to be exercised where another adequate remedy exists. | Applied to reinforce the conclusion that the statutory procedure available to the petitioner made certiorari inappropriate. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court began by framing the established principle that certiorari does not lie to remove an order that is merely ministerial and that the writ is intended to challenge acts that are judicial in character. The Court examined authorities (both English and local) that define 'judicial' in this context and set out the tests by which a body’s action may be characterised as judicial: whether the body has legal authority to determine questions affecting rights, has a duty to act judicially, and whether it acts on considerations of facts and evidence between competing proposals and oppositions.
The Court then considered Sections 68 and 70 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board Act. Section 68 makes costs and expenses in respect of legal proceedings to which a Board is a party payable out of the endowment funds. Section 70 provides that those costs, expenses and contributions shall be assessed on and notified to the trustee in the prescribed manner.
Applying the tests from the precedents to the facts of the case, the Court concluded that the Board's act of assessing and notifying the amount on 1 August 1935 did not amount to a determination of a question affecting the rights of subjects in the requisite judicial sense. The Court observed that there were no facts to be inquired into, no proposal and opposition to be weighed, and that even notice to the petitioner was not required before the Board made the assessment. Consequently, the assessment was characterised as administrative/ministerial rather than judicial.
The Court also held that, given the explicit statutory provisions (Sections 70(2)(b), (d) and (e) as set out in the opinion), the petitioner had a statutory remedy: upon requisition the collector must give notice to the trustee to pay or state objections; objections, if any, sent to the President of the Board who must consider and communicate his decision confirming, withdrawing or modifying the demand. The Court treated the President who considers objections as a person distinct from the Board and therefore concluded that this was a different and available remedy. The petitioner in fact availed himself of this remedy and the President confirmed the demand on 10 February 1936.
The Court rejected the petitioner's submission that the statutory remedy was merely a "review" and therefore not a separate remedy: the Court held the President's function under the statute is a distinct opportunity to have objections heard by a different decision-maker.
Finally, on the merits the Court addressed the petitioner's contention that Section 68 should be read as permitting recovery only of the Board's own expenditure and not amounts the Board was ordered to pay to others (such as the costs awarded to the petitioner). The Court read the phrase "All costs and expenses incurred in connection with legal proceedings..." as wide enough to include both sums the Board themselves spent and sums which the Board had to pay to others. Therefore there was no substance in the petitioner's construction.
Because the proceedings of 1 August 1935 were administrative/ministerial, because the petitioner had a statutory remedy which he used (and which resulted in confirmation of the demand), and because the Board did not exceed its statutory authority in assessing the amount due, the Court concluded that certiorari was not appropriate and the petition should fail.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The petition for a writ of certiorari to quash the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board's proceedings dated 1 August 1935 is dismissed. The Court held that the proceedings in question were administrative/ministerial (not judicial), the petitioner had an adequate statutory remedy under the Act (which he had availed himself of), and the Board did not exceed its jurisdiction under Sections 68 and 70.
Direct consequences: The petition is dismissed with costs; the Court awarded an advocate's fee of Rs. 100. The Board's assessment and demand as contested in this petition were upheld by the Court's decision.
Implications for precedent and broader law: The opinion applies established distinctions between judicial and ministerial acts for the purpose of certiorari and reinforces the principle that where an adequate statutory remedy exists (and has been used), certiorari is inappropriate. The opinion itself does not claim to set a new precedent beyond applying existing authorities; it confines its ruling to the statutory interpretation and factual application in this case.
1. This is an application to issue a writ of certiorari to the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board, to call for the records in connection with their proceedings dated 1st August, 1935, and to quash the same. The petitioner is the managing trustee of Sri Mariamman Koil Devasthanam. By an order dated 17th July, 1934, he was removed from the office of trustee by the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board. The petitioner questioned the correctness of the order and applied for the issue of a writ of certiorari to quash the said order in C.M.P. No. 3053 of 1934, and this Court held that that order of the Board was ultra vires and directed the Board to pay the petitioner Rs. 200 for his costs. The Board appears to have paid the amount of costs. On 1st August, 1935, the Board, acting under Section 70 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Board Act, assessed the amount of costs and expenses incurred by them in connection with the said proceedings at Rs. 560-14-0 and made a demand of the petitioner for that amount. It is those proceedings of 1st August, 1935K that the petitioner wants to get quashed by this application.
2. The contention of the Board is that a writ of certiorari is incompetent in this matter, firstly, because the proceedings of 1st August, 1935, were purely administrative or ministerial, and not judicial, and secondly, because the petitioner has a remedy provided by Section 72(2) of the Act for questioning the correctness of these proceedings. It is also contended that the Board did not exceed the jurisdiction conferred on it by Sections 68 and 70 of the Act in assessing the amount due by the petitioner and making a demand for it.
3. It has been held in numerous cases that a writ of certiorari does not lie to quash an order, merely ministerial, and that it is intended for the purpose of adjudicating on the validity of acts judicial. And what are included in the term 'judicial' has again been the subject of numerous decisions. In the case Queen v. Corporation of Dublin (1878-1879) L.R. (Ireland) Vol. II, pp. 371 at 376, May, C.J., observed as follows:
It is established that the writ of certiorari does not lie to remove an order merely ministerial, such as warrant, but it lies to remove and adjudicate upon the validity of acts judicial.
4. In this connection, the term ' judicial' does not necessarily mean acts of a Judge or legal tribunal sitting for the determination of matters of law, but for the purpose of this question judicial act seems to be an act done by competent authority, upon consideration of facts and circumstances, and imposing a liability or affecting the rights of others. And if there be a body empowered by law to enquire into facts, make estimates to impose a rate on a District it would seem to me that the acts of such a body involving such consequence would be judicial acts. In King v. London County Council (1931) 2 K.B. 215, Slesser, L.J., analysing and explaining the dictum of Atkin, L.J., observed:
Atkin, L.J. (as he then was) in Rex v. Electricity Commissioners (1924) 1 K.B. 171, lays down four conditions under which a rule for a certiorari may issue. He says : 'Wherever any body of persons' (first) 'having legal authority' (secondly) 'to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects, and' (thirdly) 'having the duty to act judicially,' (fourthly) 'act in excess of their legal authority' - the sub-divisions are my own - 'they are subject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King's Bench Division exercised in these writs'.
5. In the same case Scrutton, L.J., put it as follows:
It is not necessary that it should be a Court in the sense in which this Court is a Court; it is enough if it is exercising, after hearing evidence, judicial functions in the sense that it has to decide on evidence between a proposal and an opposition.
6. These decisions have been followed in this Court in numerous cases Venkataratnam v. The Secretary of State for India (1929) 60 M.L.J. 25 : I.L.R. 53 Mad. 979, Muniswami Chetty v. The Board of Revenue, Land Revenue and Settlement, Madras and the Collector of Chittoor (1931) 66 M.L.J. 468 : I.L.R. 57 Mad. 791 and Thirumala Chettiar v. Chellam Pillai (1933) 66 M.L.J. 468 : I.L.R. 57 Mad. 791, etc. Applying these tests to the facts of this case, it has to be seen whether this is a case in which a writ can be issued. Section 68 of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act provides that:
All costs and expenses incurred in connection with legal proceedings in respect of any religious endowment to which a Board or Committee is a party shall, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 74, be payable out of the funds of such endowment.
7. Section 70 provides that:
The costs, expenses and contributions payable under Sections 68 and 69 shall be assessed on and notified to the trustee of every math and temple in the prescribed manner.
8. It is under these sections that the Board purported to act when it assessed the amount due by the petitioner and made a demand on 1st August, 1935. This cannot be said to be a determination of any question affecting the rights of subjects, much less can it be said that in doing so they were acting judicially or they had a duty to act judicially. There were no facts to be enquired into, there was no question of any "proposal" on one side or of "opposition" on the other, and not even a notice was necessary to be given to the petitioner before the amount was assessed or a demand made. Further in view of Sections 68 and 70 of the Act, it cannot at all be contended that the Board had in any way exceeded the authority given to them by law in assessing the amount and making a demand for it. The proceedings of 1st August, 1935, cannot therefore be said to be such that a writ of certiorari can be issued in respect of it.
9. Another contention raised by Mr. Subba Rao is that, as the petitioner has another remedy provided for by the statute itself, a writ cannot be issued. Section 70(2)(b) provides:
On receipt of a requisition under Clause (a), the collector shall issue a notice to the trustee concerned requiring him, within 15 days from the service of such notice, either to pay the amount mentioned in the requisition and specified in the notice or to state in writing his objections, if any, thereof.
10. Clause (d) provides:
If, within the said period, an objection in writing is received by the collector from the trustee with regard either to his liability or to the amount specified in the notice, the collector shall transmit such objection to the President of the Board.
11. And Clause (e) provides:
The President of the Board shall consider the objection so transmitted and communicate to the collector his decision confirming, withdrawing or modifying the original demand.
12. If therefore the petitioner had any valid objection to the assessment and demand made by the Board, he had a right to object to it, and such objections would have been heard and determined by the President of the Board. Mr. Viswanatha Aiyar for the petitioner contends that this remedy, being more or less in the nature of a review, cannot be said to be a separate remedy. I am unable to agree with him. It is not the Board but only the President of the Board who, under the statute, has the right to hear and determine the objections to the assessment and the demand, and he is entirely a different person from the Board.
13. It would also appear that the petitioner availed himself of the remedy provided by the Act under Section 70(2)(d) and filed an objection petition and that it had been heard and decided by the President of the Board and the original demand confirmed on a subsequent date, namely, 10th February, 1936. Mr. Subba Rao pointed out that, if at all, it is that order alone that could be the subject of a writ. Mr. Viswanatha Aiyar therefore made an oral application that he should be allowed to amend this application so as to make it refer to the proceedings of the Board dated 10th February, 1936. That was opposed by the respondent. As the petitioner was fully aware of the proceedings of 10th February, 1936, before he filed this application on 23rd March, 1936, and he chose to call into question the proceedings of 1st August, 1935 only and not those of the later date, I do not think he is entitled at this stage to convert this petition into one for quashing the proceedings of 10th February, 1936, even if an amendment could be allowed in petitions of this kind. It is thus clear that the petitioner had another remedy provided for by the statute itself and that he availed himself of it. It is well settled that a writ of certiorari should only be granted when no other suitable remedy exists. Vide Besant v. Advocate-General of Madras (1919) 37 M.L.J. 139 : L.R. 46 I.A. 176 : I.L.R. 43 Mad. 146 at 160 (P.C.) and Govindaswami Pillai v. Ramalingaswami (1913) 62 M.L.J. 644. For this reason also, it must be held that this is not a case in which a writ should be issued.
14. Even assuming that the proceedings of 1st August, 1935, should be considered to be judicial and that the petitioner had no other remedy, the question is whether the petitioner has a good case on the merits. The amount for which demand was made included not only the expenses incurred by the Board but also the amount of costs ordered to be paid by the Board to the petitioner. Mr. Viswanatha Aiyar contends that under Section 68 it is only the amount which the Board had spent and not what they had to pay to others that they could get from the endowment concerned. There would have been some force in this contention if Section 68 referred only to the costs incurred in connection with legal proceedings to which the Board was a party, but the wording of Section 68 is "All costs and expenses incurred in connection with legal proceedings...." These words are wide enough to cover the amounts which the Board had to spend and also which they had to pay to others. There is therefore no substance in this contention also. It is clear from what has been said above that the Board did not exceed its jurisdiction in assessing and making a demand for the amount and that the proceedings which the petitioner wants to get quashed in this petition are not judicial at all but only ministerial or administrative, and that the petitioner had a remedy provided by the same statute to have his objections heard and decided and that he availed himself of it. It follows that no writ should be issued. The petition is therefore dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 100.
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