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Maganti Venkataswami Naidu v. Annapareddi Nagireddi Alias Mutyalureddi.

Madras High Court
Mar 6, 1945
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Factual and Procedural Background

The appeals arise from post-decree proceedings in a mortgage suit originally instituted in 1928. The trial Court dismissed the suit. The first appellate Court, in January 1934, passed a decree for Rs. 3,031-7-0 as on 22 April 1934 (the date fixed for redemption). A second appeal to this Court was filed. While that second appeal was pending the decree-holder took out execution: on 1 February 1936 a portion of the hypotheca belonging to the 8th defendant (who was not one of the mortgagors) was sold for Rs. 1,785 to the decree-holder (who obtained delivery), and on 4 January 1937 items belonging to the mortgagors (defendants 1 to 3) were sold for Rs. 855 to the decree-holder (who obtained delivery).

The second appeal was heard on 1–2 November 1938 (by then Madras Act IV of 1938 had come into force and there was uncertainty as to procedure under it). On the day the appeal came up, the 8th defendant filed C.M.P. No. 4,638 of 1938 seeking relief under that Act. The second appeal judgment (pronounced 2 November 1938) reduced interest and resulted in a decree for Rs. 2,335-10-0 as on the date fixed for redemption (to which interest at 12% for approximately 31 years would be added). The second appeal's judgment made no reference to the petition under Madras Act IV of 1938.

Counter-affidavits were later filed in the petition and on 27 July 1939 it was remanded to the District Munsiff of Tenali for disposal in accordance with the provisions of Act IV of 1938. In the Munsiff's Court an order purportedly scaling down the debt to Rs. 637 (said to be passed on consent) was made; subsequent review and revision proceedings resulted in restoration of the original petition to file. Separately, proceedings for restitution were prosecuted: initially both sales were set aside, then on appeal the sale of the mortgagors' properties was held unassailable while the sale of the 8th defendant's property was set aside. That order was itself the subject of a second appeal which reversed and remanded to the trial Court to hear restitution together with the scaling-down question.

The lower appellate Court ultimately restored the order scaling down the decree to Rs. 637, directed setting aside the sale of the 8th defendant's properties on payment of the scaled-down amount, and ordered ascertainment of mesne profits for the period of possession by the decree-holder. The decree-holder (decree-purchaser) preferred three appeals against these orders: C.M.S.A. No. 79 of 1944 (against the order for restitution), C.M.S.A. No. 80 of 1944 (against the order for mesne profits), and C.M.S.A. No. 81 of 1944 (against the order scaling down the debt).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, after an appellate Court has pronounced judgment, a remand of a petition to the trial Court (for disposal under Madras Act IV of 1938) confers upon the trial Court the power to modify the appellate Court's judgment or decree.
  2. Whether relief under Madras Act IV of 1938 could be granted or incorporated after the appellate judgment had been delivered, and what is the proper procedure for such relief when raised at or shortly after the hearing of an appeal.
  3. Whether sales effected under the trial Court's decree (in particular a sale where the decree-holder is the purchaser) must be set aside as restitution when the decree is varied in appeal, under the present Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  4. Whether, on the facts, restitution (setting aside of the sale of the 8th defendant's property and/or other sales) should be ordered given the reduction in the decree on second appeal and the amounts realised by the sales.

Arguments of the Parties

Argument advanced by Mr. Kotayya

  • Relied on the decision in Syed Nathadu Sahib v. Nallu Muddy (1903) I.L.R. 27 Mad. 98 to contend that whenever a decree is varied in appeal, a sale held under the trial Court's decree must be set aside if the purchaser is the decree-holder.

Other parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of other parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Srirama Reddi v. Srirama Reddi ((1941) 2 M.L.J. 855; I.L.R. (1942) Mad. 346 (F.B.)) The Full Bench held that, once judgment has been pronounced, the Court has no power to make any order affecting that judgment except on an application for review; it was illegal to add to a judgment a provision for determining relief under Madras Act IV of 1938 and to incorporate such provision in the decree. The practice of directing an enquiry before judgment and making the judgment subject to that enquiry was held inexpedient (but not declared illegal). The Court relied on this decision to hold that the appellate Court, having delivered judgment in the second appeal, had no power thereafter to confer relief under Act IV of 1938; consequently remanding the petition to the trial Court did not empower the trial Court to modify the appellate decree.
Syed Nathadu Sahib v. Nallu Muddy (1903) I.L.R. 27 Mad. 98 Under the old Section 583 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it was held that whenever a decree is varied in appeal, a sale held under the trial Court's decree must be set aside if the purchaser is the decree-holder. The Court distinguished this authority as decided under the old Section 583 and held it was not applicable to the law as it existed under the present Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure; it rejected automatic application of that decision to the present case.
Sundararama Reddi v. Raghava Reddi (1921) 42 M.L.J. 315 The Bench held that the decision in Syed Nathadu Sahib is not an authority for the interpretation of the law as it exists under the present Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court relied on this case to support the view that Section 144 of the present Code must be applied and that the old decision under Section 583 does not control the present question of restitution.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two main strands of analysis.

  1. On the question of power to modify the appellate judgment after it is delivered, the Court relied on the Full Bench decision in Srirama Reddi v. Srirama Reddi to conclude that an appellate Court, once it has pronounced judgment, cannot subsequently make any order affecting that judgment unless it is on an application for review. The Full Bench had held that it was illegal to append to the judgment a provision for determination of relief under Madras Act IV of 1938 and incorporate it in the decree; further, whilst some practice existed of ordering inquiries before judgment and making the judgment subject to the findings, that practice was held to be inexpedient. Applying that principle, the Court held that filing an application for relief under Act IV of 1938 at the time of the hearing of the appeal did not keep the right to that relief in suspense so as to permit subsequent modification of the appellate judgment. Consequently, the earlier remand of the petition to the trial Court did not confer on the trial Court any power to modify this Court's final decree.
  2. On the restitution question, the Court examined the operation of the present Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It distinguished the older decision relied upon by Mr. Kotayya (under old Section 583) as not governing the present statutory regime. Under Section 144 restitution is available only to the extent that a decree has been varied or reversed, and it must, so far as possible, restore parties to the position they would have occupied but for the part of the decree that has been varied or reversed. The Court articulated the practical criterion: consider whether, had the Court of first instance given the decree in the form finally found due in appeal, the sale in question would nevertheless have been held. If the sale would still have been held under a correct decree, there is no legal or equitable basis to set it aside in restitution.

Applying this criterion to the facts, the Court noted the two sales together realised Rs. 2,640 (Rs. 1,785 and Rs. 855). The decree as reduced by second appeal (plus interest) approximated closely to that total. In particular, at the time of the sale of the 8th defendant's property the amount ultimately found due in the second appeal would have been much greater than the sale price of Rs. 1,785. Therefore the sale of the 8th defendant's property could not be said to have resulted from the trial Court's erroneous decree. Even on the aggregate, the sales approximately matched the amount ultimately found due. On that factual basis there was no ground for ordering restitution.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

  • C.M.S.A. No. 81 of 1944: ALLOWED with costs throughout; the application for relief under Madras Act IV of 1938 is dismissed and the decree of this Court in the second appeal (for Rs. 2,335-10-0 as on the date fixed for redemption, with further interest at 12%) governs the parties' rights.
  • C.M.S.A. Nos. 79 and 80 of 1944: ALLOWED with costs throughout (one advocate's fee); the restitution application is dismissed and the order for mesne profits (against which C.M.S.A. No. 80 was preferred) is not sustained in the manner sought below.

Immediate consequences:

  • The trial Court was not empowered to modify the final appellate judgment by conferring relief under Madras Act IV of 1938 after the appellate judgment had been delivered; consequently the scaled-down figure (Rs. 637) found by the lower proceedings cannot affect this Court's second-appeal decree.
  • Sales effected to the decree-holder (including the sale of the 8th defendant's property for Rs. 1,785 and other sales totalling Rs. 2,640) need not be set aside by way of restitution on the basis that the decree was reduced in appeal; the factual comparison showed no justification for restitution.
  • The decree of this Court in the second appeal (Rs. 2,335-10-0 plus interest) will determine the parties' rights; the restitution application is dismissed and the orders below as to scaling down and restitution do not stand as to the decree-holder's rights.

The opinion applies existing precedent (including the Full Bench in Srirama Reddi) and statutory interpretation of Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure; it does not purport to lay down any new principle of law beyond the application of those authorities to the facts of this case.

Show all summary ...

1. These three appeals are preferred by the decree-holder in a mortgage suit against the orders resulting from proceedings after the decree. The suit was one of 1928. It was dismissed by the trial Court. The first appellate Court passed a decree in January 1934, for payment of Rs. 3,031-7-0 as on 22nd April, 1934, the date fixed for redemption. A second appeal was filed to this Court. While that second appeal was pending, the decree-holder took out execution. On 1st February, 1936, a portion of the hypotheca which belonged to the 8th defendant who was not one of the mortgagors was sold for Rs. 1,785 to the decree-holder, who got delivery. On 4th January, 1937, there was a further sale of items belonging to the mortgagors, defendants 1 to 3, for a sum of Rs. 855 in favour of the decree-holder who also got delivery. The second appeal came up for hearing on 1st November, 1938. By this time Madras Act IV of 1938 had come into force, but the precise effect of its terms was subject to a good deal of legal speculation and there was much uncertainty as to the procedure to be followed in obtaining relief with reference to matters pending in appeal. On the day on which the second appeal came up for hearing, the 8th defendant filed C.M.P. No. 4,638 of 1938 claiming relief under the Act. It seems likely that the decree-holder asked for time to file a counter-affidavit. The hearing of the second appeal was concluded on the 2nd of November and judgment was pronounced that day reducing the amount of interest so that the total decree was for Rs. 2,335-10-0 as on the date fixed for redemption by the first appellate Court. To this decree would have to be added interest at 12 per cent, for approximately 31 years. There is no reference in the judgment or the decree to the petition filed under Madras Act IV of 1938. Counter-affidavits were in due course filed in this petition, which came up for hearing on 27th July 1939 and in a brief order it was remanded to the District Munsiff of Tenali for disposal in accordance with the provisions of Act IV of 1938. In the District Munsiff's Court there was an order scaling down the debt to Rs. 637 which purported to be passed on consent. Against that order there was a review petition which was dismissed and against the dismissal there was a revision petition which was allowed with the result that the review was allowed and the original petition was restored to file. Meanwhile, the 8th defendant had been prosecuting an application for restitution as a result of the scaling down of the decree following the second appellate decision. Originally both the sales were set aside and there was an appeal to the District Court in which the second sale in respect the properties of the mortgagors was held to be unassailable, while the sale of the 8th defendant's property was set aside. A second appeal was filed in respect of this order which was reversed and remanded to the trial Court so that the question of restitution could be heard, along with the question of the scaling down of the decree.

2. The result of all these proceedings is that the lower appellate Court has now restored the original order scaling down the decree to Rs. 637, has directed the setting aside of the sale of the 8th defendant's properties on payment of the amount of the decree as scaled down and has also directed the ascertainment of mesne profits on the lands for the period during which they were in the possession of the decree-holder. Against these orders, the present appeals are preferred. C.M.S.A. No. 79 of 1944 is against the order for restitution. C.M.S.A. No. 80 of 1944 is against the order for mesne profits and C.M.S.A. No. 81 of 1944 is against the order scaling down the debt.

3. It will be convenient to deal with the last appeal first, in order that we may ascertain what is the amount which the decree-holder was entitled to recover as a result of these proceedings. The Courts below appear to have taken the view that because this Court remanded the petition for disposal by the trial Court there was no longer any question of the power of the trial Court to modify the decree in the light of the provisions of Act IV of 1938. We cannot agree with this view. Though there was, for some time, considerable doubt as to the powers and procedure of an appellate Court dealing with questions under Madras fax IV of 1938 raised, for tile first time at or shortly after the passing of judgment in appeal, those doubts have been set at rest by the decision of the Full Bench in Srirama Reddi v. Srirama Reddi (1941) 2 M.L.J. 855 : I.L.R. (1942) Mad. 346 (F.B.). The Full Bench held that when judgment has been pronounced, the Court has no power to make any order affecting the judgment which has been delivered, unless passed on an application for review; and in the case under consideration of the Full Bench it was held to be illegal to have added to the judgment a provision for the determination of the relief which was due under Madras Act IV of 1938 and its subsequent incorporation in the decree. The Full Bench went on to consider the practice of dealing with an application for relief under the Act made before the delivery of judgment by directing an enquiry and ordering in the judgment that the amount found due should be subject to the finding as a result of that enquiry. This practice was held to be inexpedient, but was not declared to be illegal. It is, however, quite clear from the judgment of the Full Bench that when once the appellate Court, after the passing of Act IV of 1938, has delivered judgment in a case in which relief might have been granted, but has not been granted, in the judgment, it has no power at a subsequent stage to add anything by way of a rider to its judgment which will confer a relief which should have been sought and obtained before the judgment was pronounced.

4. Having regard to this decision, it seems to us impossible to contend that merely because an application for relief was filed at the time of the hearing of the appeal, the right of the party concerned to relief under the appellate judgment must be deemed to be in suspense and capable of being subject to a further adjudication after the appellate Court has disposed of the appeal. Once it is granted that the Court which heard the second appeal had no power, after it had delivered judgment, to modify that judgment by conferring upon one of the parties a relief under the Act which was not obtained at the proper time, it follows clearly that the order of this Court remanding this petition to the trial Court for disposal, would not give to the trial Court any power which it did not already possess to modify this Court's decree. The decree in second appeal being final any finding by the trial Court regarding the relief which might have been obtained had the proper procedure been taken, will not affect that decree. It follows therefore that C.M.S.A. No. 81 of 1944 must be allowed with costs throughout and the application for relief under Act IV of 1938 will be dismissed, with the result that the decree of this Court in second appeal awarding a sum of Rs. 2,335-10-0 with further interest will govern the rights of the parties.

5. There remains the question of restitution. In view of our decision on the "scaling down question, the modification of the decree as a result of the second appeal is merely the reduction of the amount decreed by the lower Court from ' Rs. 3,031-7-0 to Rs. 2,335-10-0 with further interest at 12 per cent. The two sales together realised a sum of Rs. 2,640. The first sale was that in respect of which restitution is sought. It realised a sum of Rs. 1,785. It is contended by Mr. Kotayya, on the authority of the decision in Syed Nathadu Sahib v. Nallu Muddy (1903) I.L.R. 27 Mad. 98 that whenever a decree is varied in appeal, a sale held under the trial Court's decree has necessarily to be set aside if the purchaser is the decree-holder. The decision on which reliance is placed is a decision passed under Section 583 of the old Code of Civil Procedure, the terms of which are entirely different from those of Section 144 of the present Code of Civil Procedure. In Sundararama Reddi v. Raghava Reddi (1921) 42 M.L.J. 315 a Bench of this Court had to consider a question similar to that which is now raised and it held that whatever be the merits of the decision in Syed Nathadu Sahib v. Nallu Mudaly (1903) I.L.R. 27 Mad. 98 with respect to the law as it then stood, that decision is not any authority for the interpretation of the law as it now exists.Under section 144 of the present code the position is plain. It is only where and in so far as a decree is varied or reversed that restitution can be made and the restitution to be made is that which will, so far as may be, place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed. The true criterion seems to be to consider what would be the position had the appellate Court's decree been passed by the Court of first instance. If the sale which has been held is one which would have been held even if the Court of First Instance had decreed the amount eventually found due in appeal, there is no legal or equitable reason for setting aside that sale on ordering restitution. On the facts of the present case, it is clear that at the time when the sale of the 8th defendant's property was held the amount due to the decree-holder on the basis of the eventual decree passed in second appeal would have been very much more than the amount for which the property was sold. It cannot therefore be said that the sale of the 8th defendant's property was the result of the error in the original Court's decree. Even if we take the two sales together, it would appear that the total amount for which both the properties were sold approximates very closely to the amount which had been ultimately found due. In such circumstances, there is no case for restitution at all.

6. In the result, we allow C.M.S.A. Nos. 79 and 80 of 1944 with costs throughout--one advocate's fee--and the restitution application will be dismissed.