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T. Rajagopala Ayyangar v. The Collector Of Salt Revenue (Out Ports), Madras
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This appeal arises from an order of Gentle J. dismissing two applications (Application No. 349 of 1937 included) made under S. 45 of the Specific Relief Act seeking a writ of prohibition to restrain the Collector of Salt Revenue, Madras, from conducting or proceeding with an inquiry into the conduct of the applicants.
The appellant was an Assistant Commissioner of Salt and Customs (Central Division, Madras) appointed on 16 March 1936, previously Inspector of Salt and Customs, Negapatam. Charges had been made against him and an inquiry under Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules was being conducted by the Collector of Salt Revenue, Madras (Mr. H. Greenfield). On 5 November 1936 Mr. Greenfield suspended the appellant pending investigation. An interim injunction had been granted on 8 February but Gentle J. subsequently dissolved the injunction, discharged the rule nisi and dismissed the applications.
The applicants alleged the inquiry was irregular for three reasons:
- (a) The Central Board of Revenue (which appointed the appellant) alone has authority to remove, dismiss or reduce the applicants and therefore should hold the inquiry rather than the Collector;
- (b) The applicants were entitled to be represented at the inquiry by an advocate, which was denied;
- (c) They had not been provided with a statement of the allegations on which each charge was based (this ground was not pressed in the appeal).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether Rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules requires that the authority vested with power to dismiss (here, the Central Board of Revenue) must itself conduct the inquiry into charges, or whether that authority may have the inquiry conducted by another officer (e.g., the Collector).
- Whether a person charged in an inquiry under Rule 55 has a right to be represented by counsel (i.e., to be heard by an advocate) at that inquiry.
- (Raised below but not pressed on appeal) Whether the person charged must be provided with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (as presented by Mr. K. S. Jayarama Ayyar)
- Because the appellant was appointed by the Central Board of Revenue, S. 96-B(1) of the Government of India Act prevents dismissal by an authority subordinate to that which made the appointment; therefore only the Central Board can dismiss and the inquiry under R.55 should be held by that Board, not by the Collector.
- If the charges are of a gravity to justify dismissal, only the Central Board has power to order dismissal and only that authority can properly hold the inquiry under R.55.
- It is fundamentally unjust for one tribunal (a subordinate officer) to take evidence with witnesses and for another tribunal (the dismissing authority) to impose dismissal without having heard witnesses or seen their demeanour; any ambiguity in R.55 should be resolved in favour of the person charged.
- On representation, reliance was placed on S. 14(1)(b) of the Bar Councils Act to argue that an advocate is entitled as of right to appear before any tribunal legally authorised to take evidence (and therefore should be entitled to appear at a R.55 inquiry).
- He also relied on principles in various decisions and on legislation (including the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act) to argue the person charged should be able to place evidence directly before the authority which may impose the penalty.
Respondent's / Advocate-General's Arguments
- The critical question is not the advocate's abstract right of audience but whether the client (the person charged) has a statutory right to be represented by counsel at the inquiry; there is no such general right at common law.
- Where a right to be represented exists it is normally given by statute (examples cited: S. 340 CrPC, Order 3 Rule 1 CPC, certain provisions in the Native Converts Marriage Dissolution Act, Patents and Designs Act, Railways Act 1890, Trade Disputes Act, Workmen's Compensation Act).
- Cases such as In re Prince Blucher and The Queen v. Mansel Jones show that where statutes say a person shall be heard “by himself” or similar words, courts have interpreted those words to exclude being heard by counsel or agent.
- Consequently, the wording of R.55—particularly the direction to state whether the person “desires to be heard in person”—should be construed to mean the person must be heard personally and not by counsel or agent.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Chandi Charan Dey | Held that before declaring a person to be a tout the District Magistrate should himself make an inquiry into antecedents and give opportunity to show cause; the case concerned a Sub-Divisional Officer conducting an inquiry and submitting proceedings to the District Magistrate who then declared the person to be a tout; the order was set aside. | The court observed the case was decided under S.36 of the Legal Practitioners Act as then framed and that subsequent amendment altered the statutory language. The Chief Justice held the case was not helpful to the appellant's contention that the dismissing authority must itself conduct the inquiry. |
| Southekal Krishna Rao | Dealt with a charge found by a Subordinate Court and reported to a principal Court which ordered dismissal; held the practitioner could not be dismissed under the section without having been allowed under S.40 an opportunity of defending himself before that Court. | The court treated the decision as not assisting the appellant: it was consistent with one tribunal hearing evidence and a higher tribunal inflicting penalty provided the higher tribunal affords an opportunity to be heard; the irregularity in that case was failure to give an opportunity to be heard before the higher tribunal after evidence had been taken. |
| In re Prince Blucher | Cited as an instance where a court denied the right of a person to appear except by himself (as presented in the opinion). | The opinion references the case briefly as cited by the Advocate-General; no extended reliance was placed on it beyond noting its relevance to the issue of personal appearance. |
| The Queen v. Assessment Committee of Saint Mary Abbotts Kensington | Held that persons aggrieved by a valuation list have the right to appear themselves or by any agent authorised by them; an assessment committee could not lawfully limit that right. | The opinion distinguishes that case on its statutory language: the statute there gave the committee power to hear and determine objections and Lord Esher M.R. emphasized the right to appear by agent. The present court treated that case as an example where different statutory words produced a different result. |
| The Queen v. Mansel Jones | Interpreted words requiring that a person shall be heard “by himself” as excluding representation by counsel or solicitor (decision turned on S.38 of the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act, 1883). | The court relied upon the construction in this case to support the conclusion that R.55’s wording—entitling a person to be “heard in person”—similarly excludes being heard by counsel; both judges adopted this reasoning. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The opinion contains two concurring judgments (the Chief Justice and Cornish, J.) whose reasoning the summary below follows faithfully to the text.
On whether the authority empowered to dismiss must itself hold the inquiry (issue (a))
- The court accepted as common ground that the appellant, appointed by the Central Board of Revenue, could only be dismissed by that Board (S. 96-B(1) Government of India Act) and that the Board cannot delegate the power of dismissal itself. The Board does, however, have by delegation from the Governor-General in Council the power to impose certain penalties under Rule 49 of the Civil Services Rules; only some penalties (censure and suspension) may be imposed by the Collector.
- The focal question was whether Rule 55 contemplates that the authority having power of dismissal must itself conduct the inquiry. The Chief Justice analyzed the text of R.55: it requires that the member be given an adequate opportunity to defend himself, that grounds be reduced to definite charges and communicated, and that the person be required to put in a written defence and state whether he desires to be heard in person. The rule adds: “If he so desires or if the authority concerned so direct, an oral enquiry shall be held.”
- The Chief Justice emphasized the phrasing “direct an oral enquiry” and the later reference to “the officer conducting the enquiry” (including the officer’s power to refuse to call a witness for special and sufficient reason to be recorded). From the combined wording the Chief Justice concluded that R.55 contemplates the authority concerned (the Central Board) may direct that an oral inquiry be held but that the inquiry may be conducted by some other officer (i.e., delegation is contemplated). The use of “officer” rather than “authority concerned” was read as indicating the inquiry may properly be conducted by someone other than the Board itself.
- Practical considerations (the Board sitting in Delhi while the matter arises in Madras) were mentioned as a non-decisive but supporting point (inconvenience of the Board holding local inquiries).
- The Chief Justice also observed that Indian legislation contains instances in which one tribunal conducts an inquiry and another imposes penalties (example: Indian Bar Councils Act S.10), undermining the appellant's assertion that such a separation is fundamentally unjust.
- The Chief Justice and Cornish, J. both rejected reliance on Chandi Charan Dey and Southekal Krishna Rao as supporting the appellant’s position; each case either turned on different statutory language or was concerned with the absence of an opportunity to be heard before the higher authority after evidence had been taken.
On whether the person charged is entitled to be represented by counsel at an inquiry under R.55 (issue (b))
- The Chief Justice and Cornish, J. examined whether S.14(1)(b) of the Bar Councils Act (which gives advocates a right of audience before any tribunal legally authorised to take evidence) necessarily entitles a person charged to be represented by counsel at a R.55 inquiry.
- Both judges distinguished between the advocate’s right of audience and the client's right to be represented. They stressed that there is no general common law right for parties to be represented by an agent or counsel in every forum; where a right exists it is typically provided by statute and depends on the language of the particular statute or rule.
- The court analyzed the text of R.55: the person charged must state whether he desires to be “heard in person,” may be entitled to cross-examine witnesses, to give evidence in person, and to have witnesses called. The judges treated the phrase “to be heard in person” as plain and to be given its natural meaning. They referred to Queen v. Mansel Jones where the phrase “by himself” was held to exclude representation by counsel. Adopting that approach, the court concluded that R.55’s wording excludes being heard by counsel or agent.
- Consequently, the judges held that the appellant had no statutory right to appear by counsel at a R.55 inquiry and that no mandamus to admit counsel assistance was made out.
Other analytical points
- The court observed R.55 provides the required safeguard that no graver penalty (dismissal, removal, reduction) shall be imposed unless the person charged has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself. The absence of the specific words “before the authority suspending or dismissing him” in R.55 (which appear in other statutes) supported the conclusion that the inquiry need not be held by the dismissing authority itself.
- Both judges noted that the officer conducting the inquiry must record evidence and state findings and grounds, thereby providing the Board with necessary material to decide whether to impose a penalty, and the Board remains free to accept or reject the officer’s findings.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
APPEAL DISMISSED. (The Chief Justice: "In my view, the appeal fails and must be dismissed. No Costs." Cornish, J.: "I am of the same opinion.")
Implications (direct consequences stated in the opinion):
- The inquiry into the appellant's conduct may lawfully be conducted by the Collector of Salt Revenue (or another officer deputed), and it is not necessary under R.55 that the Central Board of Revenue itself conduct the inquiry even though the Board alone may impose the graver penalties.
- Under R.55 a person charged does not have a statutory right to be represented by counsel at the departmental inquiry; the rule’s language requiring that the person be “heard in person” excludes being heard by counsel or agent in such an inquiry.
- The direct effect on the parties: the appellant's application for prohibition was refused, the interim injunction previously granted was dissolved, and the appeal is dismissed (no costs awarded).
This summary is prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion. It does not purport to add or infer facts or legal propositions beyond those expressly stated in the text.
JUDGMENT
The Chief Justice.—This appeal is from an order passed by Gentle J. on two applications under S. 45 of the Specific Relief Act praying for an order restraining the Collector of Salt Revenue, Madras, by a writ of prohibition from conducting or holding or proceeding with an enquiry into the conduct of the two applicants. The appellant was the applicant in Application No. 349 of 1937. The order passed by Gentle J. covered the contentions of both of the applicants which were identical. An interim injunction had been granted on the 8th February. Gentle J. by his order dissolved that injunction, discharged the rule nisi and dismissed the applications.
The appellant is an Assistant Commissioner of Salt and Customs, Central Division, Madras, to which office he was appointed on the 16th March 1936 before which date he was Inspector of Salt and Customs, Negapatam. Certain charges had been made against the appellant and an enquiry under R. 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules was proceeding on the date of the applications, the enquiry being conducted by the Collector of Salt Revenue, Madras, Mr. H. Greenfield. Previously, on the 5th November 1936, Mr. Greenfield ordered the suspension of the appellant pending investigation of his conduct, and that of the other applicant before Gentle J. whilst in charge of Karaikkal frontier, Negapatam circle. The applicant, as already stated, sought to restrain the Collector by writ of prohibition from proceeding with the enquiry. The applicants alleged that the enquiry was irregular and contrary to law in the following respect, viz., (a) the body which has authority to remove, dismiss or reduce the applicants was the Central Board of Revenue and the enquiry should be held by them and not by the Collector of Customs; (b) the applicants are entitled to be represented at the enquiry by an advocate and this having been denied to them the enquiry is not in conformity with the provisions of the law and (c) they have not had communicated to them in respect of the charges made against them a statement of the allegations on which each charge was based. In the appeal ground (c) was not pressed by the appellant.
I do not propose to set out in this judgment in detail all the facts or all the relevant rules of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules because they have been fully set out in the judgment of the learned trial Judge. I will only refer to those which are absolutely necessary for the disposal of the questions before us.
With regard to ground (a), S. 96-B(1) of the Government of India Act says that no person in the service of the Crown in India may be dismissed by any authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed; and it is common ground that the appellant was appointed by the Central Board of Revenue. Therefore he can only be dismissed by that authority and not by the Collector of Customs and the Central Board of Revenue cannot delegate that power to the Collector of Customs. The Central Board of Revenue has by delegation by the Governor General in Council the power to impose the penalties contained in R. 49 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules. They are seven in number including dismissal and only two of them, viz., (i) and (v)—censure and suspension may be imposed by the Collector of Customs. It follows, therefore, that if charges of a sufficiently grave nature as to justify dismissal are proved, only the Central Board of Revenue has the power to order it and this is the foundation for the argument in support of point (a) which is that it is only the authority having the power to dismiss the servant that can hold the enquiry under R. 55 and upon this point we have had addressed to us a very careful and learned argument by Mr. Jayarama Ayyar. The learned trial Judge has to a large extent based his view upon the words of R. 55, and it is that the rule contemplates an enquiry by some other authority than the Central Board of Revenue (the authority having the power of dismissal, removal or reduction). By rule 55 of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules the member of the services is to be given an adequate opportunity of defending himself and the grounds on which it is proposed to take action are to be reduced to the form of a definite charge or charges which must be communicated to the person charged together with a statement of the allegations on which each charge is based and of any other circumstances which it is proposed to take into consideration in passing orders on the case. The person charged is required within a reasonable time to put in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person. Here follow some words which the learned trial Judge considers have a very material bearing upon the question, viz., “If he so desires or if the authority concerned so direct, an oral enquiry shall be held”. Gentle J. considers “the authority concerned” to be the Central Board of Revenue and lays emphasis upon the fact that this authority can “direct” an oral enquiry to be held and is of the opinion that if the rule contemplated that only the authority concerned should hold the enquiry the wording of the rule would be different and it would have read ‘an oral enquiry shall be held by them’ or ‘by the authority concerned’. In my opinion, the words “direct an oral enquiry” indicate that it is some one else that is to hold the enquiry although of course it may be argued not unreasonably that an authority may issue a direction that something is to be done and itself do it. For instance, a Court may direct an examination of certain witnesses and may and frequently does conduct such an examination. But in my view the words indicate the former rather than the latter intention. They mean, I think, that the Central Board of Revenue may, even in cases where the person charged may not desire an oral enquiry, nevertheless direct that there shall be one. Further light is thrown upon the meaning of the rule by the words which follow later “provided that the officer conducting the enquiry may, for special and sufficient reason to be recorded in writing, refuse to call a witness”. Gentle, J. considers that this indicates that the enquiry is to be held by some person other than the authority concerned. I agree and think that had the latter body been in contemplation the words “authority concerned” would have appeared instead of “the officer”. Mr. K.S Jayarama Ayyar has argued strenuously to the contrary on the ground that it is fundamentally wrong that any person should defend himself with his witnesses before one tribunal and be dismissed by another body or authority which has not had the advantage of hearing the witnesses or observing their demeanour, that when so grave a penalty as dismissal is involved the dismissing authority should not exercise its powers merely on an examination of the record before them and the report of the officer conducting the enquiry, and he also contends that the words of R. 55 are not either expressly or by implication clear enough to support the learned trial Judge's view and that if there is any ambiguity in the words, the benefit should be given rather to the person charged than to the respondent. On the first point it seems to me that there is nothing repugnant to a sense of justice in the procedure objected to by Mr. Jayarama Ayyar. If the Collector with or without an enquiry imposes the penalties which he is empowered to inflict, e.g, suspension or censure, the servant has a right of appeal against such order to the Central Board. If there is an enquiry by him the Board will have the necessary information before them to exercise such powers as are vested in them regarding penalties. They will have the finding upon the evidence of the Officer who conducted the enquiry and from any order which they may pass the person charged has a right of appeal to the Governor-General in Council, and Indian Legislation has recognised that there is no injustice in the procedure so strongly criticised by Mr. Jayarama Ayyar and to give one instance of a statute which empowers one tribunal to conduct the enquiry and another to inflict the penalties we have the Indian Bar Councils Act (S. 10) and others were cited, but Mr. Jayarama Ayyar refers to Chandi Charan Dey. There it was held that before proceeding to declare a person to be a tout the District Magistrate should himself make an enquiry as to the person's antecedents and give him an opportunity to show cause. There a Sub-Divisional Officer called on a person to show cause why he should not be declared a tout and he showed cause and the Sub-Divisional Officer after recording evidence on both sides submitted the proceedings with his report to the District Magistrate and the latter after persuing them passed orders declaring the person to be a tout and it was held that the order should be set aside. It must be observed however that the case was a decision on S. 36 of the Legal Practitioners Act as it then read, but by Act XV of 1926 the words “or to the satisfaction of any Subordinate Court” were added to the words as they stood before the amendment, i.e, “Every High Court, District Judge, Sessions Judge, District Magistrate and Presidency Magistrate, every Revenue Officer, not being below the rank of a Collector of a District and the Chief Judge of every Presidency Small Cause Court (each as regards their or his own Court and the Courts if any subordinate thereto) may frame and publish lists of persons proved to their or his satisfaction.” These are important words because at that date the case had to be proved to the satisfaction of the Court publishing the list of touts. Whereas by reason in the amendment referred to a Court subordinate to the Court inflicting the penalty is empowered to find on the question of proof. In the matter of Southekal Krishna Rao(2) was also cited by Mr. Jayarama Ayyar. There a charge of unprofessional conduct brought against a practitioner holding a certificate under Act XVIII of 1879, having been found to be established by a Subordinate Court which also considered that he in consequence should be dismissed and the same having been reported in conformity with S. 14 of the Act to the principal Court in the province such dismissal was ordered and it was held however that the practitioner could not be dismissed or suspended under that section without his having been allowed under S. 40 an opportunity of defending himself before that Court. What happened there was that the practitioner was fully heard by the Commissioner of Coorg and adduced his evidence which was also heard and their Lordships expressed the opinion that:
“the petitioner had the opportunity of adducing such evidence as he might think fit and his complaint on that head is not well founded. But upon the evidence so obtained being remitted to the Judicial Commissioner, he makes this report or order: ‘I have gone very carefully again through all the papers connected with this case, and I have given them my best consideration. I regret that I am unable to modify the opinion expressed in my previous order or to alter the conclusion arrived at’. He, therefore, concludes, ‘I confirm my former order striking petitioner off the rolls’. This order was made without the petitioner's having had the opportunity of being heard before the Acting Judicial Commissioner after the evidence had been taken and in that respect their Lordships are of opinion that there has been a plain irregularity.”
This case with all respect to Mr. Jayarama Ayyar's argument is not at all helpful on this point. It is quite clear that one tribunal heard the evidence and that the higher tribunal on that evidence inflicted the penalty which is the very procedure objected to by Mr. Jayarama Ayyar. Their Lordships do not criticise that procedure in the least. What they do say is that after the evidence had been taken the practitioner was not given an opportunity of being heard by the higher tribunal and they refer to the words of S. 40 of the Act which reads as follows;
“Notwithstanding anything herein before contained no pleader shall be suspended or dismissed under this Act unless he has been allowed an opportunity of defending himself before the authorities suspending or dismissing him.”
That makes the position quite plain. R. 55 however says that “no order of dismissal, removal or reduction shall be passed on a member of a Service……………unless………he has been afforded an adequate opportunity of defending himself” and the words “before the authority suspending or dismissing him” are significantly absent. Mr. Jayarama Ayyar has also referred to the Public Servants (Inquiries Act XXXVII of 1850). It is conceded of course by him that Act does not apply to the present case. He relies upon that Act however in support of his argument that unless there is an express power to delegate to some other body or person the holding of an enquiry into the conduct of a person or persons such as there is in S. 3 of that Act then it is the right of every person to defend himself before the authority dismissing him and of placing his evidence before that body. There is however no statutory provision to that effect and in none of the authorities cited by him is it laid down that in the absence of an express power of delegation the enquiry must be held by the authority imposing the penalty and as regards the words of R. 55 I think that the learned trial Judge's view is correct. I should also, add although this is not a guiding test, that it has not been the practice for such enquiries to be conducted by the Central Board of Revenue which is in Delhi and the inconvenience of enquiry by such an authority is manifest. In the present case, a member or members of the Board—and we are told that there are only two—would either have to come to Madras in order to hold the enquiry or the appellant would have to go to Delhi with all his witnesses.
With regard to point (b), namely, the right of the appellant to be represented by counsel Mr. Jayarama Ayyar relies upon S. 14(1)(b) of the Bar Councils Act which reads as follows:
“An advocate shall be entitled as of right to practise (b) save as otherwise provided by sub-S. (2) or by or under any other law for the time being in force, in any other Court in British India and before any other Tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence.”
Under R. 55 the person holding the enquiry is legally authorised to take evidence and hence he argues that an advocate is entitled as of right to appear at such an enquiry. But, the Advocate-General argues that the real question is not whether an advocate has a right to appear but whether his client has a right to be represented by him, that is to say, is the enquiry one at which the person charged is entitled to appear at all, or to appear in person only, or by himself or by his agent. Mr. Jayarama Ayyar has conceded that there is no right at common law to appear by an agent and the Advocate-General argues that there is no such general right and that the scheme of the Indian Legislature is to confer only a special right to be represented by an advocate or agent such as that given by S. 340 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Such a statutory right is also given under O. 3, R. 1 Civil Procedure Code. Also O. 33, R. 3 enables a person to present an application through an authorised agent if he is exempted from appearing in Court. S. 31 of the Native Converts Marriage Dissolution Act entitles a person to appear by his advocate in cases under that Act. S. 76 of the Patents and Designs Act is another instance in point. So also are S. 30 of the Railways Act of 1890, S. 14 of the Trade Disputes Act and S. 24 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. There is very little authority in the shape of decision but the Advocate-General cites a case where the Court denied the right of a person to appear except by himself, viz., In re Prince Blucher. By S. 16, sub-S. 1 of the Bankruptcy Act 1914, where a debtor intends to make a proposal for a scheme of composition in satisfaction of his debts he shall within the time thereby limited lodge with the Official Receiver a proposal in writing signed by him etc. In that case the debtor was unable through serious illness to sign the proposal which was signed on his behalf by his solicitors and nevertheless it was held that the words “signed by him” were explicit and consequently no proposal for a composition had been lodged within S. 16, sub-S. 1 of the Act. He distinguishes the case of The Queen v. Assessment Committee of Saint Mary Abbotts Kensington cited in the trial Court on the ground that there the statute, namely, the Union Assessment Committee Act of 1862, provides that the assessment committee ought to hear and determine the objections of any person aggrieved by a valuation list, not that they are to hear the objections only. Lord Esher M.R on page 382, speaking of the Assessment Committee says:
“The question here is whether, being such as they are, they have a right to say that a person may not appoint any agent if he pleases to appear in support of an objection made by him to the list. There is, in my opinion, nothing in law which authorises them to limit, as they have done, the rights of persons to whom the legislature has given the right of making objection to the list. I think such persons have a right to appear themselves or by any agent authorised by them.”
Another case referred to by the Advocate-General is The Queen v. Mansel Jones. The decision there turned upon the words of the statute, namely, S. 38 of the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act, 1883. There, before a person not being a party to an election petition nor a candidate on behalf of whom the seat is claimed is reported by an Election Court to have been guilty of any corrupt or illegal practice, the Court shall cause notice to be given to him and if he appears “shall give him an opportunity of being heard by himself, and of calling evidence in his defence to show why he should not be so reported.” It was held that this section excluded the person's right to be heard by his counsel or solicitor. On page 32 Lord Coleridge, C.J says:
“As I have often said in this Court, I prefer that mode of construing a statute by which you look at the words used, and, if they are plain, give effect to them, to the mode of construction by which you first satisfy yourself what Parliament ought to have meant and then interpret the statute by saying that it has so said. Here the Act has said as plainly as possible that the person shall be heard “by himself.” I am of opinion that those words exclude him from being heard either by counsel or solicitor.”
There being no common law right to be represented by counsel, and if there are statutes directing how a person is to be heard as in the case referred to, then the words of the statute alone afford a solution of the question. Are there any words in R. 55 which sufficiently clearly show how the person charged may appear at the enquiry? The rule provides that the person charged shall be required within a reasonable time to put in a written statement of his defence and to state whether he desires to be heard in person and that he is entitled to cross-examine the witnesses, to give evidence in person and to have such witnesses called as he may wish. In my view, the words “to be heard in person” must be given their natural and ordinary meaning; and the other provisions already referred to appear to me to be consistent with an appearance in person and not by agent or counsel, and, adopting the method of construing a statute preferred by Lord Coleridge, C.J in The Queen v. Mansel Jones. I look at the words used which appear to me to be sufficiently plain to give effect to them. That being so, in my view, they exclude the appellant from being heard by counsel or otherwise than in person. I agree with the Advocate-General's contention and the view of the learned trial Judge that this question has to be determined not by counsel's right of audience in inferior Courts but by the right of the client to be represented by him and any argument based on S. 14(1)(b) of the Bar Councils Act, therefore, does not assist the appellant. If there is any hardship caused to the appellant by his being deprived of the assistance of counsel, though I do not think that there is in the present case, the construction of a statute is not to be governed by any such consideration. In my view, the appeal fails and must be dismissed. No Costs.
Cornish, J: I am of the same opinion. R. 55 of the Civil Services Rules provides for the case of a departmental inquiry into charges against a Government servant, who is subject to the rule, independently of the formal and public inquiry which might be held under the Public Servants Inquiry Act. The Rule contains a safeguard. None of the graver penalties—dismissal, removal or reduction—which the Central Board of Revenue in this instance is alone empowered to inflict, can be imposed upon the person charged unless he has been given an adequate opportunity of defending himself. He may be content to put in a written statement by way of defence to the charges; or, if he so desires or if the authority concerned, which must mean the Central Board, so directs, there is to be an oral inquiry at which evidence can be called and witnesses examined and cross-examined. But the Rule does not state that the Central Board shall conduct the inquiry. Neither is there to be found in the Rule any provision, similar to that contained in S. 36(1) of the Legal Practitioners' Act, from which it is to be implied that the Board must itself have held the inquiry to enable it to inflict one of the penalties referred to. On the contrary, the allusion in the Rule to “the officer conducting the inquiry” denotes that the Board is competent to depute some subordinate officer, such as the present respondent, the Collector of Salt Revenue, to hold the inquiry. In short, the purpose of the Rule is to enable a Government servant to defend himself when his conduct is the subject of a charge which can be departmentally investigated; and so long as the conditions of the Rule are followed there seems to be nothing prejudicial to the Government servant in the circumstance that the inquiry is held not by the Board itself, or by one of its members, but by some subordinate officer deputed by the Board for that purpose. The Officer conducting the inquiry is required by the Rule to record the evidence and to state his findings and grounds thereof. The Board has, therefore, all the necessary material before it to come to a decision regarding the penalty to be imposed, if it is satisfied that the charge against the Government servant is established, though the Board is not bound to accept the findings of the Officer who conducted the inquiry.
With regard to the only other subject of this appeal I agree that the Government servant in an enquiry under R. 55 has no right to appear by counsel, and, having no such right, no case for mandamus to the respondent to admit the appellant to have the assistance of counsel at the inquiry has been made out. There is in British India no common law right in a party to a proceeding to be represented by counsel. The right, wherever it exists, will be found to be given by enactment. The advocate's right of audience since the Bar Councils Act depends on S. 14 of the Act. This right, “save as otherwise provided by any other law for the time being in force”, includes the right of audience before any tribunal or person legally authorised to take evidence. The Officer conducting an inquiry under R. 55 is clearly a person legally authorised to take evidence. The statutory Rule confers on him this authority. But the advocate's right of audience is necessarily inseparable from his client's right to appear by advocate before a particular tribunal. If the client is expressly denied the privilege of being heard by counsel, it is obvious that the Bar Councils Act will not save him from the disability. R. 55 limits the Government Servants right to be heard “in person”. In Queen v. Mansel Jones it was held that a right given by staute to a person to be heard “by himself” meant that he had no right to be heard by anybody but himself; and I cannot but think that the right given by R. 55 to be heard “in person” is similarly restricted to the person of the Government servant. It may be that there is no apparent reason in justice or expediency why a Government servant, who has undoubtedly the right to appear by counsel in an inquiry into his conduct under the Public Servants Inquiry Act, should be deprived of this privilege in an inquiry under R. 55 when the consequences may be equally serious to him. But this is a consideration which cannot be allowed to affect the plain language of the Rule.
Appeal dismissed.
N.R.R
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