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Lakshmi Ammal And Mother v. Anantharama Ayyangar And Another
Factual and Procedural Background
The question referred to the Full Bench was whether succession to a Hindu male who died before the coming into force of Act II of 1929, but who left a female heir (a limited owner) alive after the Act came into force, is governed by the provisions of that Act. The last male holder, Venkatakrishna, died a minor on 11 July 1927. He was succeeded as immediate heir by his mother, Lakshmi Ammal (the first defendant). The plaintiffs, claiming to be presumptive reversioners, brought an action seeking relief in respect of Venkatakrishna's estate. Their entitlement was challenged by Sundarathammal (the second defendant), Venkatakrishna's sister, and her son, who contended that under Act II of 1929 they have a preferential right to succession; if correct, the plaintiffs would cease to be the nearest or presumptive reversioners.
Act II of 1929 received the assent of the Governor-General on 21 February 1929 and came into force on that date. The narrow legal question identified was whether succession to Venkatakrishna (who died in 1927 but whose immediate heir was a female who survived until after the Act) is governed by the pre-existing law or by Act II of 1929. This turns on the question of when succession to a Hindu male opens.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether succession to a Hindu male who died before the commencement of Act II of 1929 but who left a female heir alive after the Act came into force is governed by the provisions of Act II of 1929.
- When does the succession to a Hindu male open for the purpose of determining which succession law applies — at the male holder's actual death or at the termination (death) of the female heir's limited interest?
- Whether a declaratory suit filed by plaintiffs who were presumptive reversioners at the time of institution of the suit must be dismissed where, by reason of Act II of 1929 coming into force before the succession opened, other persons (here, the sister and her son) became nearer reversioners; and relatedly, whether the court has discretion to allow such a suit to proceed subject to safeguards (for example, adding the nearer reversioner/minor as a party represented by a guardian).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The appellants (challenging the plaintiffs' suit) argued that because, on the Full Bench's answer, Act II of 1929 governs the succession, the plaintiffs are not the nearest reversioners and therefore have no locus standi to institute the suit; the suit should be dismissed.
- Counsel for the appellants relied upon authorities (including Rani Anand Kunwar v. The Court of Wards and related decisions) establishing that a declaratory suit should be brought by the presumptive reversioner (the person who would succeed if the female heir died at that moment) and that the right to sue should generally be limited to the nearest reversioner, except where the nearer reversioner refuses without sufficient cause, colludes, or has precluded himself from suing.
- It was further argued that the plaintiffs failed to make the minor son of the second defendant (who, under the Act, would be a nearer reversioner) a party to the suit despite being pointed out that they should do so after Act II of 1929.
Respondents' Arguments
- The respondents (plaintiffs in the original suit) argued that their suit was representative in character and need not necessarily be dismissed because the court has a discretion to permit remote reversioners to proceed in a proper case.
- They relied on authorities (notably Deoki v. Jwala Prasad and Subba Rao v. Venkayya) to show that courts may in suitable circumstances allow a reversionary declaratory suit to continue even if nearer reversioners exist, provided the interests of the nearer reversioners are safeguarded.
- They contended that dismissal would, in some cases, preclude effective adjudication on substantive issues and work prejudice by defeating the policy of deciding status questions within a reasonable time before evidence is lost.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Moniram Kolita v. Keri Kolitani (1880) L.R. 7 I.A. 115 at 154; I.L.R. 5 Cal. 776 (P.C.) | Principle that "the succession does not open to the heirs of the husband until the termination of the widow's estate" — i.e., succession opens on the death of the female heir. | Relied upon to establish the controlling doctrine of Hindu law that the succession opens only on the death of the female heir and to support the conclusion that the date of succession may be postponed to the death of the limited owner (female heir). |
| Janaki Ammal v. Narayanasami Aiyar (1916) 31 M.L.J. 225; L.R. 43 I.A. 207 at 209; I.L.R. 39 Mad. 634 (P.C.) | That reversionary interests during life of the female holder are contingent and that declarations as to nearest reversionary heir are premature until the life interest ends. | Used to demonstrate that declarations about nearest reversionary heirs must await the termination of the female heir's estate and to show the contingent nature of reversionary rights. |
| Thakurain Jaipal v. Bhaiya Inder (1904) 14 M.L.J. 149; I.R. 31 I.A. 67 at 70; I.L.R. 26 All. 238 (P.C.) | Reinforces that until the widow (female heir) dies, the present decision does not settle who should succeed; succession questions are to be determined on termination of the life estate. | Cited to emphasise that decisions made prior to the death of the female heir do not finally determine succession and to support postponement of the opening of succession to the death of the female heir. |
| Rani Anand Kunwar v. The Court of Wards (1880) L.R. 8 I.A. 14; I.L.R. 6 Cal. 764 (P.C.) | Declaratory suits should be brought by the presumptive (nearest) reversioner; a more distant reversioner may sue only where nearer reversioners refuse without sufficient cause, collude, or are precluded; the court must exercise judicial discretion and may require nearer reversioners to be made parties. | Adopted as the guiding rule on locus standi in declaratory reversionary suits and as authority for the court's exercise of discretion — leading to the requirement that the plaintiffs make the minor son a party before proceeding. |
| Kali Charan Singh v. Bageshra Kunwari (1925) I.L.R. 47 All. 929 | Addressed whether a minor nearest reversioner prevents others from suing; observed that minors can sue through a next friend. | Referred to in considering representation of the minor son and whether the plaintiffs could proceed without making him a party; informed the court's direction that the minor must be made a party and represented by a proper guardian. |
| Shib Das v. Nand Lal (1931) I.L.R. 13 Lah. 178 (and related citations) | Illustrates a situation where the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act (II of 1929) altered the order of succession while the life tenant was still alive; where the Act came into force before the termination of the female heir's interest, the new Act governed succession. | Used as an example where, because the female holder was alive when the Act came into force, the new statutory order applied and claims by earlier reversioners were displaced — supporting the Full Bench's answer that the Act governs where succession opens after the Act. |
| Sita Saran v. Jagaf (1927) I.L.R. 49 All. 815 | Follows Rani Anand Kunwar on limitations to who may sue in declaratory reversionary suits and the court's discretion in such matters. | Relied on for the proposition that where nearer reversioners exist, courts have limited circumstances in which to permit more remote reversioners to maintain a suit; informed discretionary approach. |
| Ram Tawakal Tewari v. Mt. Dulari A.I.R. 1934 All. 469 | Included among authorities addressing reversionary suits and related principles (as cited in the opinion). | Referenced as part of the body of authorities dealing with reversionary declaratory relief; contributed to the court's survey of the law though specific application in the opinion is as part of the list of relevant cases. |
| Chulhan v. Mt. Akli A.I.R. 1934 Pat. 324 | Another decision cited in support of the view that succession opens on termination of the female heir's estate and/or that courts have a discretion in declaratory reversionary suits. | Cited as supporting the majority view adopted by the Full Bench; relied upon to show that several jurisdictions accepted the same doctrine. |
| Krishnan Chettiar v. Manickammal (1933) 66 M.L.J. 70; I.L.R. 57 Mad. 718 | A decision cited in the opinion as an exception — a case where a contrary view was taken. | The Full Bench stated, with respect, that Krishnan Chettiar was wrongly decided and found it unnecessary to discuss it in detail; the court declined to follow it. |
| Bandhan Singh v. Daulata Kuar A.I.R. 1933 All. 152 | Listed among decisions in which the view that succession opens at the death of the female heir prevailed. | Relied upon to demonstrate that the Full Bench's view had support in various provincial decisions. |
| Shakuntla Devi v. Kaushalya Devi A.I.R. 1936 Lah. 124 | Decision in which arguments adopted in Krishnan Chettiar were answered. | Cited to show that contrary arguments had been examined and answered in other decisions, reinforcing the Full Bench's preferred view. |
| Deoki v. Jwala Prasad (1928) I.L.R. 50 All. 678 | Held that the court may in its discretion grant declaratory relief to a reversioner even when a nearer heir exists and is not joined, provided such course is not prejudicial to the nearer heir's interests. | Relied upon by the respondents and adopted by the court as authority for exercising discretion to allow the plaintiffs to proceed provided safeguards (joining the minor) were implemented. |
| Subba Rao v. Venkayya (1936) M.W.N. 1111 | Found no legal bar to maintainability of a declaratory suit where intervening events (such as the passing of Act II of 1929) altered the relative positions of reversioners; emphasized policy of timely resolution of status disputes. | Used to support the proposition that dismissal is not always required and that allowing the suit to proceed can better serve important policy considerations; influenced court's decision to permit continuation subject to adding the nearer reversioner. |
| Baldeo Dube v. Shamdhur Pande (1914) 23 I.C. 809 | Held that granting declaratory relief is a matter of judicial discretion. | Referred to support the court's exercise of discretion in allowing the suit to proceed on conditions protective of the minor's interests. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by identifying the governing legal doctrine under Hindu law: where a female heir (a widow or other female limited owner) intervenes, the succession to the last male holder does not open at the male's actual death but only on the termination (death) of the female heir's estate. The male holder is thus treated as if he had lived up to and died at the moment of the female heir's death — a legal fiction recognised in the Judicial Committee authorities cited.
Applying that doctrine to the facts, the court reasoned that because Venkatakrishna's immediate heir was his mother (a female limited owner) who survived until after Act II of 1929 came into force, the succession to Venkatakrishna must be regarded as opening after the passing of the Act. Consequently, the new statutory order (Act II of 1929) applies to the succession.
The court addressed the contention that applying the Act would be retrospective and would interfere with vested rights. It rejected that contention on the ground that the reversioners' rights during the lifetime of the female heir are contingent (a spes successionis) and not vested; hence applying the Act when the succession actually opens does not give the Act retrospective effect nor does it disturb vested rights.
The Full Bench surveyed prior authorities. It observed that the majority of decided cases supported the doctrine that succession opens on the death of the female heir; the court expressly treated Krishnan Chettiar v. Manickammal as wrongly decided and declined to follow it. Provincial decisions from Allahabad, Lahore and Patna and other precedents were cited as consistent with the court's view.
Having answered the reference in favour of application of Act II of 1929, the court turned to the procedural question whether the plaintiffs' suit should be dismissed because they were no longer the nearest reversioners. The court reviewed authorities on locus standi and declaratory relief — notably Rani Anand Kunwar and allied cases which limit a declaratory suit to the presumptive reversioner, while recognising exceptions and judicial discretion. The court also noted decisions (Deoki, Subba Rao, Baldeo Dube) establishing that the grant of declaratory relief is discretionary and that in suitable cases a remote reversioner may be permitted to proceed, subject to safeguarding the interests of nearer reversioners.
Considering the specific circumstances — that the plaintiffs had already led all or much of the evidence, that acts of the defendants were shown to be prejudicial to the plaintiffs' interests (and might prejudice the minor son as well), and that the second defendant sided with the first defendant — the court concluded that the appropriate course was not dismissal but to require the plaintiffs to make the minor son (the nearer reversioner under the Act) a party to the suit, represented by a proper guardian (not his mother). The court therefore set aside the lower court's decision and remanded the case for disposal in accordance with these directions, reserving decision on the merits and findings recorded below.
Holding and Implications
Holding: In a case where a Hindu male died before Act II of 1929 but left a female heir who survived until after the Act came into force, the succession opens after the passing of the Act and is governed by the provisions of Act II of 1929.
Direct consequences and procedural implications (as stated in the opinion):
- Because the succession is governed by Act II of 1929, the sister (the second defendant) and her son are nearer reversioners to Venkatakrishna's estate than the plaintiffs; the plaintiffs are therefore not the presumptive reversioners under the statutory order that governs succession when it opens after the Act.
- The court declined to dismiss the plaintiffs' suit summarily. Instead it ordered that the plaintiffs be permitted to proceed on condition that they make the minor son of the second defendant a party-defendant, represented by a proper guardian (the mother cannot act as his guardian in the suit). The parties may agree on who will act as guardian (the opinion noted possible representatives such as the paternal uncle or paternal grandfather), and the guardian may, if appropriate, transpose himself as a plaintiff later.
- The lower court's decision was set aside and the entire case remanded for proper disposal according to law in light of the Full Bench's observations; the court expressed no opinion on the various factual findings of the lower court.
- Costs: the appellants were entitled to the costs of the appeal; no costs on the memorandum of objections; other costs to be provided for in the decree of the lower court.
- Procedural housekeeping: the court-fee was to be refunded both in the appeal and in the memorandum of objections.
The opinion expressly treats Krishnan Chettiar v. Manickammal as an exception that, with respect, was wrongly decided; otherwise the decision aligns with the established Judicial Committee and provincial authorities cited.
1. The question referred to the Full Bench is, whether succession to a Hindu male dying before the passing of Act II of 1929, leaving a female heir (a limited owner under the law) who is alive after the Act has come into force, is governed by the provisions of that Act. The last male holder was one Venkatakrishna, who died a minor on the 11th July, 1927. He was succeeded by his mother, Lakshmi Ammal (the first defendant) against whom the. action has been brought by the plaintiffs claiming to be the presumptive reversioners, with a view to obtain certain reliefs in regard to her deceased son's estate. The plaintiffs' right is challenged by the sister of Venkatakrishna, Sundarathammal (the second defendant in the suit) and her son, who allege that under the Act, they have a preferential right to the succession; and if this contention is well founded, the plaintiffs would cease to be the nearest or presumptive reversioners. Act II of 1929 received the assent of the Governor-General on the 21st February, 1929, on which date it came into force. The short question to be decided is, whether the succession to Venkatakrishna, who died before the Act leaving his mother as his immediate heir, is governed by that Act or by the law in force previously. This in turn depends upon the question, when does the succession to a Hindu male open?
2. This Act, as its preamble shows, has been passed with a view to alter the order of succession to a Hindu male dying intestate. In the present case, if Venkatakrishna, who was succeeded by his mother, is to be deemed as having died in 1927, the provisions of this Act, can have no operation. But the true principle seems to be, that under the Hindu Law, it is the death of the female heir that opens the inheritance to the reversioners, who till then possess an inchoate right, generally termed a spes successionis; in other words, the male holder is regarded by the law as having lived up to and died at the moment of the death of the female heir. When a female heir intervenes therefore, the fictional death of a Hindu male is something different from his actual death, the result being that the date of his death is for this purpose postponed to the death of the limited owner. If this principle is kept in mind, the question presents no difficulty. It would be begging the question to say that to adopt this view would be to give retrospective effect to the Act. If a male intestate succeeded: by a female heir is assumed as dying on the day of his actual' death, which happens to be before the Act, to apply the provisions of this enactment to such a person would undoubtedly amount to giving it retrospective effect. But the true doctrine of the Hindu Law is thus declared by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee:
The succession does not open to the heirs of the husband until the termination of the widow's estate. Upon the termination of that estate the property descends to those who would have been the heirs of the husband, if he had lived up to and died at the moment of her death". (Moniram Kolita v. Keri Kolitani (1880) L.R. 7 I.A. 115 at 154: I.L.R. 5 Cal. 776 (P.C.).)
3. The position of a Hindu widow or other female heirs is an anomalous one, for, although she is said to possess a qualified interest, she can in certain circumstances alienate the entire estate. That she is thus in one sense the heir of the last male holder, cannot be disputed. Referring to the widow, their Lordships say that what she holds is " an estate of inheritance to herself and the heirs of her husband". (Moniram Kolita v. KeriKolitani (1880) L.R. 7 I.A. 115 at 154: I.L.R. 5 Cal. 776 (P.C.).) The persons described here as the heirs of the last male holder are the reversioners, whose interests, so long as the female holder is alive is only contingent, " differentiated little, if at all, from a spes successionis". (Janaki Ammal v. Narayanasami Aiyar (1916) 31 M.L.J. 225: L.R. 43 I.A. 207 at 209: I.L.R. 39 Mad. 634 (P.C.).) The case last cited is an instructive one. There, the Courts in India declared the plaintiffs to be the nearest reversionary heirs of the deceased Ramaswami Aiyar, after the lifetime of defendants Nos. 1 and 2, his widow and mother. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held that such a declaration was both unavailing and premature, for, as they point out:
The question of who is the nearest reversionary heir or what is the class of reversionary heirs, falls to be settled at the date of the expiry of the ownership for life or lives--that is to say, in the present case, at the death of the survivor of the appellant and her late husband's mother.
4. The Hindu Law conception is this:--So long as a female heir is alive, no one can claim any vested interest in the succession; a fortiori there is no vesting at the date of the male holder's death; in other words, the crucial date is that of the death of the female heir, on whose death alone the succession opens.
5. The Judicial Committee has repeatedly declared that the succession opens only on the death of the female heir. In Moniram Kolita v. Keri Kolitani (1880) L.R. 7 I.A. 115 at 154: I.L.R. 5 Cal. 776 (P.C.) as already stated, their Lordships observe:
The succession does not open to the heirs of the husband until the termination of the widow's estate.
6. Again in Thakurain Jaipal v. Bhaiya Inder (1904) 14 M.L.J. 149: I.R. 31 I.A. 67 at 70: I.L.R. 26 All. 238 (P.C.) after refusing to interfere with a declaration granted by the lower Courts in favour of certain reversionary heirs, their Lordships, in order to guard against any possible misapprehension, emphasise:
Whenever the inheritance opens by the death of the widow, the present decision will have settled nothing as to who should succeed.
7. The same idea that the succession does not open prior to the death of the female heir, is again expressed in Janaki Ammal v. Narayanasami Aiyar (1916) 31 M.L.J. 225: L.R. 43 I.A. 207 at 209: I.L.R. 39 Mad. 634 (P.C.) already quoted.
8. The plaintiffs' learned counsel has argued that there is what is known as a fixed line of succession, with which the Act could not have intended to interfere. The answer is simple. There is no interference with any vested rights at all. During the lifetime of the female heir it cannot be predicated who would be the reversioner who would succeed. Possibly, none who was alive at the death of the last male holder would eventually survive to succeed to his estate; how can it be then stated that any one's vested rights are interfered with Again, a case may be conceived where a suit is brought for the safe guarding of the estate by the presumptive reversioner on behalf of all the reversionary heirs, but at the death of the female heir, not one of the reversioners existing at the date of the action, may be alive to reap the benefits of the decree. The notion therefore of a fixed line of succession seems opposed to the principles governing this branch of the law.
9. In our opinion, therefore, the plaintiffs are not the presumptive reversioners of Venkatakrishna, and we base that view upon what we consider is the true doctrine of the Hindu Law. As for the authorities, in all the decided cases this view has been "taken excepting Krishnan Chettiar v. Manick-ammal (1933) 66 M.L.J. 70: I.L.R. 57 Mad. 718. In our opinion, that case, with great respect, was wrongly decided and it is unnecessary, having regard to what we have said, to discuss it in any detail. Moreover, in Allahabad, Lahore and Patna the view that we have indicated has prevailed Bandhan Singh v. Daulata Kuar A.I.R. 1933 All. 152 Rajpaliv. Surju Rai A.I.R. 1936 All. 507 (F.B.) Shib Das v. Nand Lat A.I.R. 1932 Lah. 361 Shakuntla Devi v. Kau-shalya Devi A.I.R. 1936 Lah. 124 and Chulhan v. Mt. Akli A.I.R. 1934 Pat. 324 and in some of those cases, especially in Shakuntla Devi v. Kaushalya Devi A.I.R. 1936 Lah. 124 the arguments adopted in Krishnan Chettiar v. Manickammal (1933) 66 M.L.J. 70: I.L.R. 57 Mad. 718 have been fully answered.
10. In the result, we would answer the reference by stating that in a case like the present, the succession opens to the heirs of the last male holder after the passing of the Act and is therefore governed by its provisions.
[This Appeal and Memorandum of Objections came on for final hearing before Madhavan Nair and Stodart, JJ.] The judgment of the Court was delivered by Madhavan Nair, J.
11. The essential facts necessary for the disposal of the appeal have been stated in our order of reference to the Full Bench. The suit was instituted by the plaintiffs who were the nearest reversioners to the estate of the last male holder at the time of the institution of the suit. But the question was raised by the second defendant, having regard to Act II of 1929, that she and her son were nearer reversioners than the plaintiffs and that the latter are therefore not entitled to maintain the suit. The Full Bench has now answered the question that in a case like the present the succession opens to the heirs of the last male owner after the passing of the Act and is therefore governed by its provisions. It would follow from this decision that the second defendant and her son, that is, the sister and her son, are nearer reversioners to the estate of the late Venkatakrishna Aiyangar than the plaintiffs. It may be mentioned here that the son of the second defendant, who is a minor under her protection, is not a party to the suit.
12. On the answer of the Full Bench it is argued by the appellants that the plaintiffs not being the nearest reversioners, are not entitled to institute the suit and it must therefore be dismissed. On the other hand the respondents argue that the suit of the plaintiffs being of a representative character, need not necessarily be dismissed and that the merits of the appeal should be gone into. On these arguments the first question for our decision is whether the appellants' contention should be accepted and the suit should be dismissed.
13. The appellants' learned counsel referred to various cases. In the leading case of Rani Anand Kunwar v. The Court of Wards (1880) L.R. 8 I.A. 14: I.L.R. 6 Cal. 764 (P.C.) to which reference is usually made in all the decisions dealing with this question, their Lordships of the Privy Council laid down the general rule that a declaratory suit must be brought by the presumptive reversioner, that is to say, by the person who would succeed if the widow were to die at that moment. Such a suit may be brought by a more distant reversioner if those nearer in succession are in collusion with the widow or have precluded themselves from interfering The right to sue must, in their Lordships' opinion, be limited. If the nearest reversionary heir refuses, without sufficient cause, to institute proceedings, or if he has precluded himself by his own act or conduct from suing or has colluded with the widow, or concurred in the act alleged to be wrongful, the next presumable reversioner would be entitled to sue... In such a case the Court must exercise a judicial discretionin determining whether the remote reversioner is entitled to sue, and would probably require the nearer reversioner to be made a party to the suit.
14. In Kali Char an Singh v. Bageshra Kunwari (1925) I.L.R. 47 All. 929 it was held that there is no ground for the proposition that it is competent to persons who are not in fact the nearest reversioners to sue where the actual nearest reversioner is a minor. In that decision it was pointed out by the learned Judges:
Indeed, so far as we are aware, there is nothing to prevent the minor suing through a next friend at this stage.
15. In Shib Das v. Nand Lal (1931) I.L.R. 13 Lah. 178 Mst. R., having succeeded to the property of her deceased son, made a gift of the same to her daughter's son. The reversioners in the fourth degree were in April, 1925, granted a decree declaring that the gift would not affect their rights after the death of Mst. R., but while the appeal from this decision was pending and while Mst. R. was still alive, the Hindu Law of Inheritance (Amendment) Act(II of 1929)came into force. This altered the order of succession so as to make the donee (sister's son), rank before the plaintiff-reversioners. It was held that as Mst. R. was still alive at the date of the coming into force of the new Act, the appeal must be accepted and the suit must be dismissed. (See the head-note.) In Sita Saran v. Jagaf (1927) I.L.R. 49 All. 815 it was held, following the Privy Council decision in Rani Anand Kunwar v. The Court of Wards (1880) L.R. 8 I.A. 14; I.L.R. 6 Cal. 764 (P.C.) that if the nearest reversionary heir refuses, without sufficient cause, to institute proceedings, or if he has precluded himself by his own act or conduct from suing, or has colluded with the widow, or concurred in the act alleged to be wrongful, the next presumable reversioner would be entitled to sue. In such a case, upon a plaint stating the circumstance under which the more distant reversionary heir claims to sue, the Court must exercise a judicial discretion in determining whether the remote reversioner is entitled to sue, and would probably require the nearer reversioner to be made a party to the suit. Amongst the other cases cited, reference may be made to Ram Tawakal Tewari v. Mt. Dulari A.I.R. 1934 All. 469 and Chulhan v. Mt. Akli A.I.R. 1934 Pat. 324.
16. Relying on these cases the appellants' learned counsel argues that the plaintiffs had no justification to proceed with the suit seeing that they are not the nearest reversioners, especially so since they did not make the minor son of the second defendant a party, even though it was pointed out to them that they should do so having regard to Act II of 1929.
17. The respondents contend that though suits by reversioners when nearer reversioners are in existence had been dismissed, it does not necessarily follow that they should in all cases be dismissed, that the Court has a discretion in such cases and that the plaintiffs may be allowed to go on with the suit. In Deoki v. Jwala Prasad (1928) I.L.R. 50 All. 678 the plaintiff alleging himself to be the nearest reversioner of her husband brought a suit against a Hindu widow. At the time of the suit there was in existence a nearer heir, a minor daughter of the defendant who lived with her, but she was not made a party to the suit. The learned Judges pointed out that although it is not correct to say that the existence of a nearer female heir can always be ignored by the next male heir, yet even without any express proof of refusal, concurrence or collusion on her part the Court may exercise its discretion and grant declaratory relief to the male reversioner and without insisting upon the female heir being joined in the suit provided such a course is not prejudicial to her interests. This case is strongly relied upon by the respondents to show that cases may arise where even when a nearer reversioner is not made a party relief may be given in a suit by a remote reversioner. In Subba Rao v. Venkayya (1936) M.W.N. 1111:
Plaintiffs as reversioners brought this suit in 1927 for a declaration that an adoption alleged to have taken place in June, 1921, was neither true nor valid. By the time the suit came on for trial Act II of 1929 had been passed, with the result that defendants 5 to 7 became nearer heirs than the plaintiffs, and got themselves impleaded as parties. Defendants S to 7 did not support the adoption but asked for a declaration in terms of the plaint. It was contended that the plaintiffs ceased to be the nearest reversioners as soon as Act II of 1929 came into force and that they had no locus standi to maintain the suit. The learned Judges held that there was no legal bar to the maintainability of the suit and that the declaration could be granted. A dismissal of the suit in the circumstances would practically amount to the preclusion of the possibility of the declaratory suit in this case and defeat the policy of the law underlying the principle that suits relating to the status of a person should as far as possible be tried within a reasonable time and, before evidence bearing upon the question is lost by lapse of time. (See the headnote.)
18. Reference was also made to the decision in Baldeo Dube v. Shamdhur Pande (1914) 23 I.C. 809 to show that declaratory reliefs are always matters of discretion for the Court.
19. An examination of the above decisions reveals that though the law does not generally encourage declaratory suits by remote reversioners when nearer reversioners are in existence, still it is not always necessary that such suits should be dismissed, for Courts in a proper case may well allow the suit to go on, taking care to safeguard the interests of the nearer reversioners in existence. In this connection attention may be drawn to the following passage in Rani Anand Kunwar v. The Court of Wards (1880) L.R. 8 I.A. 14: I.L.R. 6 Cal. 764 (P.C.) already quoted:
In such a case the Court must exercise a judicial discretion in determining whether the remote reversioner is entitled to sue and would probably require the nearest reversioner to be made a party to the suit.
20. In the present case the entire evidence with respect to the relief asked for has been given by the plaintiffs and Ex. G has been declared by the lower Court to be valid only during the lifetime of the first defendant. The acts of the first and second defendants have been shown to be prejudicial to the interest of the plaintiffs. They may be prejudicial to the interest of the minor son of the second defendant also. Of course the second defendant sided with the first defendant, her mother. What the attitude of the minor son in this matter may be, cannot be stated at the present moment because he is not a party to the suit. As pointed out in Rani Anand Kunwar v. The Court of Wards (1880) L.R. 8 I.A. 14: I.L.R. 6 Cal. 764 (P.C.) and in Kali Charan Singh v. Bageshra Kunwari (1925) I.L.R. 47 All. 929 it appears to us that the proper action to be taken in this case should be to ask the plaintiffs-respondents to make the minor son of the second defendant a party-defendant to the suit, so that the case on behalf of the reversioners may once for all be tried and disposed of. At present the second defendant's son is a minor and under the protection of his mother. He being a minor his interest will have to be represented by a guardian. In the circumstances of this case it will not be proper to make the mother his guardian. We would therefore set aside the decision of the lower Court and give permission to the plaintiffs to proceed with the suit making the second defendant's minor son a party to the suit represented by a proper guardian. We are told that his paternal uncle and paternal grandfather could well represent his interests; but who his proper guardian should be, must be left for the decision of the parties and of the Court. After the minor son is made a party-defendant, if his guardian wishes he may transpose himself as a plaintiff if necessary. We asked the counsel whether they would be in a position to agree, after making the second defendant's son a party to the suit, to accept the evidence already recorded as evidence for the purpose of the continuance of the case, but they have not been able to give us any assurance on the point. If the guardian insists that the case must go on afresh, he may file his statement and the case will have to be heard and tried de novo. We set aside the decision of the lower Court and remand the entire case for proper disposal according to law in the light of our observations. Having regard to the course the case has taken we express no opinion on the various findings recorded by the lower Court. The appellants are entitled to get the costs of this appeal. No costs on the memorandum of objections. The other costs will be provided for in the decree of the lower Court.
21. The court-fee will be refunded both in the appeal and in the memo, of objections.
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