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Abdul Majeeth Khan Sahib v. Krishnamachariar

Madras High Court
Nov 21, 1916
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Factual and Procedural Background

Mahomed Hamid died intestate in September 1909, heavily indebted. In 1912, a creditor initiated a suit for administration of his estate, appointing the plaintiff as receiver to represent creditors and other interested parties. A mortgage decree was passed by the City Civil Court on 9th October 1901 over the suit property and others, with sale proceedings pending in 1910. The widow of the deceased (second defendant) conveyed the suit property to the first defendant for Rs. 8,000, who paid Rs. 3,452 to satisfy the mortgage claim and Rs. 4,500 to the widow. The first defendant was aware of other heirs but was told they disclaimed interest due to insolvency concerns. The main issue was whether the widow, as one heir, could validly convey the entire property without the consent or participation of other heirs, especially given the debts of the deceased.

The suit questioned the validity of the sale deed executed by the widow and whether it bound creditors and co-heirs. The trial court held the sale valid only to the extent of the widow's one-fourth share and granted a charge on the whole property to the first defendant for the mortgage amount paid. The defendants appealed this judgment. The appeal raised complex questions regarding the rights of heirs under Muhammadan law to alienate estate property and the binding effect of such alienations on other heirs and creditors.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether one of the co-heirs of a deceased Muhammadan, in possession of the whole or part of the estate, can sell property forming part of the estate for discharging the debts of the deceased.
  2. If such a sale is made, whether it is binding on the other co-heirs or creditors of the deceased and to what extent.
  3. The extent of the widow’s authority to administer or alienate estate property without the consent or participation of other heirs.
  4. The legal effect of disclaimers by other heirs in relation to the widow’s alienation of the estate property.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The decision of the trial court is opposed to the precedent set in Pathummabi v. Vittil Ummachabi, which allowed a co-heir in possession to sell estate property to satisfy debts.
  • Heirs cannot proceed against a bona fide purchaser for value, whether the purchase is from one heir only or for more than the value of the debts.
  • Reliance on authorities such as Hedaya, Tyabji’s Muhammadan Law, and several case laws including Pathummabi v. Vittil Ummachabi, Assamathem Nessa Bibee v. Roy Lutchmeeput Singh, and others to support the right of one heir to alienate property for debt satisfaction.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Each heir of a deceased Muhammadan is entitled to a definite share of the inheritance, and there is no right of representation in Muhammadan law akin to Hindu law.
  • The matter is essentially one of procedure and convenience, not substantive Muhammadan law.
  • Each co-heir is bound to pay his proportionate share of the debt before his portion of the property can be conveyed without his consent.
  • Reference to authoritative texts and cases such as Jafri Begam v. Amir Muhammad Khan to emphasize that one heir cannot bind others by voluntary alienations.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bazayet Hossein v. Dooli Chund An heir of a deceased Muhammadan can convey his own share and pass good title despite debts. Confirmed that heirs take beneficial interest in their shares and can alienate them; however, the court noted this does not decide the effect on other heirs or creditors.
Jafri Begam v. Amir Muhammad Khan One heir does not represent others; a decree against one heir is not binding on absent heirs unless all are parties. Used to reject the notion that one heir’s alienation binds others; emphasized procedural limits on representation.
Assamathem Nessa Bibee v. Roy Lutchmeeput Singh A decree by consent will not bind absent heirs; a conveyance by one heir will not bind others. Supported the court’s view that one co-heir cannot convey the whole estate without others’ consent.
Hamir Singh v. Musammat Zakia A minor heir not party to suit not bound by decree or sale by co-heirs; entitled to recover share subject to debt contribution. Illustrated limits on binding effect of sales without all heirs’ participation.
Hasan Ali v. Mehdi Husain Co-heirs who do not contribute to debts cannot set aside bonâ fide sales properly administered by other co-heirs. Affirmed that proper administration and application of sale proceeds protects alienations made by co-heirs.
Pathummabi v. Vittil Ummachabi Sale by co-heir in possession of whole estate to satisfy debts is binding on other co-heirs if made bonâ fide. Appellants relied on this case; court noted it as obiter dictum and inconsistent with other authoritative texts.
Khiarajmal v. Daim (Lord Davey) Prima facie, a sale by one heir passes only his share; possession alone does not confer authority to bind others. Supported the court’s conclusion that one heir cannot administer or alienate the entire estate.
Muttyjan v. Ahmed Ally; Bussunteram Marwary v. Kamaluddin Ahmed; Amir Dulhin v. Baij Nath Singh Sales by Court decree involving heirs in possession are binding; based on administration suits. Distinguished from voluntary alienations by one heir; court found these cases not controlling here.
Ayderman Kutti v. Syed Ali Validity of sales by guardian of minor; sales without legal authority are generally manquf but may be upheld if necessary or beneficial. Referenced in discussion on sales by persons without full authority; court applied analogies cautiously.
Land Mortgage Bank, Limited v. Bidyadhari Dasi All heirs concurred in sale; used to clarify proper administration and alienation by heirs. Distinguished from cases where only one heir alienates without others’ consent.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the principles of Muhammadan law regarding inheritance and the rights of co-heirs. It emphasized that on the death of a Muhammadan intestate, the estate devolves immediately upon the heirs in their respective shares, subject to payment of funeral expenses, debts, and legacies. Each heir holds a beneficial interest in severalty, analogous to tenants-in-common, and no heir has authority to bind others by alienating the entire estate.

The court rejected the notion that possession of the whole estate by one heir confers authority to administer or alienate the entire property for debt satisfaction. It distinguished between representation in suits (where one heir may represent others for procedural purposes) and substantive authority to dispose of co-heirs' shares. The court found that disclaimers by other heirs did not amount to release or conveyance of their shares under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

The Court examined various precedents and authoritative texts, finding that the view expressed in Pathummabi v. Vittil Ummachabi was obiter dictum and inconsistent with established principles of Muhammadan law. The Court held that voluntary alienations by one heir without consent of others are not binding on co-heirs or creditors beyond the alienor’s own share.

Accordingly, the alienation by the widow was valid only to the extent of her one-fourth share, and the purchaser was entitled to a charge on the whole property for the mortgage amount paid, but not beyond that. The Court also ordered accounting for the mortgage debt and income from the property.

Holding and Implications

The Court held that a sale or alienation by one co-heir of a deceased Muhammadan’s estate is binding only to the extent of that heir’s own share and not beyond.

The widow’s conveyance of the property was valid only to the extent of her one-fourth share, and the purchaser was entitled to a charge on the entire property for the mortgage sum discharged. The alienation did not bind other heirs or creditors beyond that scope. The court rejected the proposition that one heir in possession can administer or alienate the whole estate to satisfy debts without the participation or consent of other heirs.

This decision clarifies the limits of alienation rights under Muhammadan law and distinguishes between procedural representation in suits and substantive authority over co-heirs’ shares. No new precedent was set beyond affirming the established principle that co-heirs hold distinct shares and one cannot bind others by voluntary alienation of the whole estate.

Show all summary ...

The facts of the case appear from the opening paragraph of the Order of Reference to the Full Bench.

The following is the judgment of Bakewell, J., on the Original Side of the High Court in Civil Suit No. 381 of 1913.

JUDGMENT

One Mahomed Hamid died in September 1909 intestate and heavily indebted and in 1912 a creditor brought a suit for the administration of his estate in which the plaintiff in this suit was appointed receiver; and he accordingly represents the creditors and other persons interested in the estate of the deceased.

On the 9th October 1901 a mortgage decree was passed by the City Civil Court in respect of the immoveable property comprised in this suit and other property and in 1910 proceedings were pending for the sale of the property in pursuance of this decree. The second defendant who is the widow of the deceased, by a deed, dated 14th July 1910 (Exhibit I), conveyed the suit property to the first defendant for a sum of Rs. 8,000 and the latter paid Rs. 3,452 in satisfaction of the mortgagee's claim, and Rs. 4,500 to the second defendant. The first defendant in his evidence said that he was aware that there were other heirs of the deceased and consulted the eighth defendant, a nephew of the deceased, and was told that he had nothing to do with the property and that there were debts due by the deceased. This defendant and the other relatives of the deceased who were examined are not reliable witnesses, and I think that they had notice of the proceedings in the City Court and of the agreement for sale to the first defendant, and that they refused to have anything to do with the estate of the deceased because they thought it to be insolvent and that if they interfered in any way they might incur some responsibility for the debts.

These persons have come forward now because they think that the property has gone up in value, and that some advantage may result to them from setting aside the sale to the first defendant.

There is no evidence as to the application of the balance of the sale-proceeds, Rs. 4,500 by the second defendant, the widow. One of the nephews of the deceased was a minor at the date of the sale and it is clear that the second defendant was not in the position of guardian of this minor and could not execute a conveyance of the property on his behalf. The principal question in the case is whether she, as one of the heirs of the deceased and upon the refusal or inability of her co-heirs to join in the administration of the estate, could convey part of the estate to a purchaser for value with notice that there were debts of the deceased.

It is clear from the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council Bazayet Hossein v. Dooli Chund(1) that an heir of a deceased Muhammadan has the right to convey his own share of the inheritance, and can pass a good title to his alienee, notwithstanding any debts, which may be due by the deceased (page 220) and a creditor cannot follow the estate into the hands of a bonâ fide purchaser for value to whom it has been alienated by his heir-at-law (page 222) but their Lordships did not decide the questions now before me. It is true that their Lordships compare the position of a purchaser without notice of debts from an heir-at-law to that of a purchaser from an executor or administrator in which case notice is immaterial, but they were careful to confine their actual decisions to the case of a bonâ fide purchaser from the “heir-at-law” which I understand to mean a single heir or the body of co-heirs.

Under the English law of real property prior to 1898 and as regards sui et necessarii heredes under the Roman Civil Law, no acceptance of the inheritance was necessary but upon the death of the predecessor intestate the right of succession at once vested in the person appointed by law.

The rule appears to be the same in the Muhammadan Law (Wilson's Digest of Anglo-Muhammadan Law, fourth edition, 222); Jafri Begam…(Defendant); v. Amir Muhammad Khan…(Plaintiff).* and Amir Dulhin v. Baij Nath Singh(2). In his judgment in Assamathem Nessa Bibee v. Boy Lutchmeeput Singh(3), Markby, J., expressed the opinion, “that strictly speaking there ought, according to the Muhammadan Law, to be in every case of death something very similar to what we should call an administration of the estate by a Court of Justice, that is to say, liquidation of the estate under the superintendence of the kazi followed by a partition of the residue” but that a liquidation and partition out of Court was to some extent recognized even by the strict Muhammadan Law. This opinion appears to be supported by the authorities quoted by Wilson (Digest supra, pages 221, 223) which all refer to administration by the kazi, and the interest of the successors in the residue ascertained by him; and the passages quoted from the Hedaya (page 223) therefore deal with judicial procedure, and the power of Court to treat a member, of a class as representing the whole class [see Jafri Begam…(Defendant); v. Amir Muhammad Khan…(Plaintiff).*], and do not constitute an authority for the proposition that one co-heir has power to convey the whole interest in property which has descended to several heirs.

The decision in Assamathem Nessa Bibee v. Roy Lutchmeeput Singh is indeed an authority to the contrary, because it was there held by the majority of the Judges that a decree by consent will not bind the absent heirs; a fortiori, a conveyance by one heir, will not bind those who are not parties to it.

In Hamir Singh…(Defendant); v. Musammat Zakia…(Plaintiff).(4), a minor heir in possession of property was held not to be bound by a decree in a suit to which she was not a party, nor by a sale effected by her co-hairs in order to satisfy such a decree, and she was held to be entitled to recover her share of the property from the alienees, subject to payment of her share of the debts for which the sale was made. In Hasan Ali v. Mehdi Husain(5) the suit was by co-heirs who did not offer to contribute to the debts of their predecessor, and it was found that the property had been properly administered by their co-heir, and the Court accordingly refused to set aside sales made by the latter.

Similarly in Pathumabi v. Vittil Ummachabi, the suit was by an heir against her co-heirs and alienees from one of the heirs, and the Court refused to set aside sales made bonâ fide for the purpose of discharging debts of the deceased, but held the plaintiff entitled to her share of property not shown to have been sold for that purpose, and of moneys received by her co-heir from debtors of the deceased. The principle upon which these cases may be supported is that, since an heir is only entitled beneficially to a share in the residue after payment of debts, and is bound to contribute towards debts properly paid by the co-heirs to the extent of his interest, the Court will not in a suit by him set aside bonâ fide sales of property of the deceased when the sale-proceeds have been properly applied. In other words the Court will adopt proper administration of the estate and treat alienations by one co-heir as if they had been made under its authority.

It is obvious that different considerations apply to proceedings by creditors of the deceased, who might be highly prejudiced by an informal administration of the assets by one of the heirs. Formerly, in English Law there was not, except in certain cases, any system of administration out of Court, of real estate; neither heir nor devisee was made responsible for his administration out of Court of the property: see Goodeve, Law of Real Property, fifth edition, 121, where property devolved upon co-parceners each of whom could of course only make a good title to her own share of the estate. Courts of Equity struggled for many years to obtain the administration of the real property of debtors and in 1897 the legislature introduced a system of representation in the case of real estate.

The authorities which have been cited do not show that any kind of representation or administration out of Court was evolved under Muhammadan Law; on the contrary, I think that they go to show that each heir takes a certain share of the property of the deceased and can only dispose of that share. The Muhammadan Law clearly lays down that each heir takes a beneficial interest only in the residue; and to hold that where a man dies intestate and insolvent, one heir can administer his estate, would be equivalent to holding that a person who has no beneficial interest in the property of a deceased person can of his own motion constitute himself his representative, make a good title to his property and dispose of the proceeds.

I have not dealt with the powers of an executor or administrator, because they are derived from a grant of the estate, and do not follow from the fact of succession to the inheritance. The acts of an executor de-son-tort only bind the rightful caveator and alter the property where he is really acting as executor in due course of administration, and the party with whom he deals has fair reason to suppose that he has authority to act. (Williams on Executors, 10th edition, page 196).

In the present case the alienee of the property of the deceased had full notice that there were heirs of the deceased other than the grantee, and that the estate was probably insolvent and the latter had therefore no beneficial interest.

It has, however, been admitted by the plaintiff that the alienation by the second defendant is valid, to the extent of the amount of the mortgage discharged by the first defendant and to the extent of the one-fourth share of the second defendant and it is not necessary to consider whether the first defendant was bound to see to the proper application of the proceeds of the second defendant's share.

I was at first inclined to think that the disclaimer by the other heirs of all interest in the estate of the deceased might be considered as a release in favour of the widow or the purchaser of their shares in the inheritance, but on further consideration, I think that the intention of the heirs was simply to avoid entering upon a damnosa hereditas, and that there was no act on their part which can be construed as a release to their co-heir or a conveyance to the purchaser of the shares which had already vested in them upon the death of their predecessor. Their disclaimer therefore did not amount to a transfer of property within sections 5 and 9 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

There will be a declaration that the alienation by the second defendant is valid to the extent only of her one-fourth share of the property in suit and that the first defendant and the persons claiming under him are entitled to a charge upon the whole property for the sum of Rs. 3,542 and further interest on the principal sum secured by the mortgage executed by the deceased at the rate thereby reserved from 14th July 1910, and that these parties are liable to account for the income of the property from that date.

An account must be taken of the amount due under the mortgage and of the mesne profits. The case is referred to the Official Referee to take those accounts.

Defendants Will file their accounts in three weeks. One week for objection. Farther consideration and the question of sale of the property is reserved to 20th July 1915.

Defendants must pay costs of the suit.

From this judgment the defendants preferred this appeal.

C. Venkatasubbaramayya for the appellants.

G.P Ramaswami Ayyar for the respondent.

This Original Side Appeal came on for hearing in the first instance before Wallis, C.J and Phillips, J., and the Court made the following Orders of Reference to a Full Bench:—

Wallis, C.J:— This is an appeal from a judgment of Bakewell, J., in a suit brought by the Receiver appointed in a creditor's suit for the administration of the estate of a deceased Muhammadan, for a declaration that a sale-deed executed by the widow of the deceased was void and not binding on the creditors and was in any event inoperative except as to the extant of the widow's one-fourth share and for possession. The learned Judge held that the sale was valid only to the extent of the widow's one-fourth share, but gave the first defendant, her alienee, a charge on the whole property for Rs. 3,452 paid by him in satisfaction of a mortgage decree against the deceased with further interest on the mortgage money till the date of payment. The learned Judge after discussing the authorities came to the conclusion that as against the creditors of the deceased on whose behalf the suit was brought, the widow, even though she was in possession of all the properties of the deceased, had no authority to take upon herself the administration of the estate even to the extant of selling the suit properties to raise money to satisfy the mortgage decree in respect of these very properties which had been passed against the deceased. For the appellant it is contended that this decision is opposed to Pathummabi v. Vittil Ummachabi.

The whole subject is one of considerable difficulty. If a Muhammadan appoints an executor, the executor has no doubt power to sell for the discharge of the debts of the deceased, and in the absence of the executor this could have been done by the kazi. The High Courts, as is well known, have differed as to whether a sale under a decree obtained by a creditor against one of the co-heirs in possession of property of the deceased is binding on the other co-heirs who were not parties to the suit, and the question has been answered in the affirmative both in Calcutta and Bombay. In Davalava v. Bhimaji Dhondo this was limited to the wise where as here one of the co-heirs was in sole de facto possession of the whole estate and this limitation was adopted in Pathummabi v. Vittil Ummachabi, where it was further held that a co-heir in possession of the whole estate could equally sell property belonging to the estate in satisfaction of debts without any suit having been instituted and decree passed against such co-heir. At the same time the Court set aside as regards the other co-heirs the sale of item 11 to the thirteenth defendant in consideration of a debt of Rs. 25 and a further payment of Rs. 50, apparently on the ground that it was unnecessary and improper in the circumstances though this is not expressly stated. This case was cited with approval on another point by Abdur Rahim, J., in Ayderman Kutti v. Syed Ali with reference to the validity of sales by the de facto guardian of a minor. The learned Judge in the course of his judgment referred to the general rule relating to sales by a person professing to deal with another's property but without legal authority so to do, and observed that such sales are generally treated as manquf or dependent, and upheld if made of necessity or if they are manifestly beneficial, and similar considerations may possibly apply in a case like the present. Bakewell, J., was apparently of opinion that the decision in Pathummabi v. Vittil Ummachabi was inapplicable whereas in the present case the alienation is being questioned by the other creditors. If the balance of convenience may be regarded, I am not sure that it is for the benefit of creditors any more than of co-heirs to lay down a rigid rule that alienations can be made only by the whole body of co-heirs or in a suit to which they are parties. The question is one of importance and difficulty, and as the authorities are by no means consistent, we have decided to refer the following question to a Full Bench:—

When one of the co-heirs of a deceased Muhammadan in possession of the whole estate of the deceased or of any part of it sells property in his possession forming part of the estate for the discharge of the, debts of the deceased, is such sale binding on the other co-heirs or creditors of the deceased, and, if so, to what extent?

Phillips, J.:— In this case the plaint property was alienated by a Muhammadan widow, who was in sole possession of the whole property belonging to her late husband in order to discharge debts due by him. No doubt the gale was voluntary, but sit purports to have been made because a creditor was threatening to execute a decree against the property, and the consideration for the sale was not paid until after execution had been taken out against the suit property, the widow and the other heirs being parties to the execution petition. Two of the other heirs admit that they took no interest in the property, because deceased's debts exceeded his assets; but the receiver of the deceased's estate now questions the validity of the alienation. If the sale to the appellant had been effected by Court it would apparently have been upheld both by the Calcutta and Bombay High Courts in accordance with the decisions in Khurshetbibi v. Keso Vinayek, Davalava v. Bhimaji Dhondo Muttyjan v. Ahmed Ally and Amir Dulhin v. Baij Nath Singh. In Allahabad, however, it has been held by the Full Bench that when property of a Muhammadan intestate is sold in execution of a decree passed against the heirs in possession of the estate, the sale is not binding on an heir who was not a party, but in order to recover possession of his share that heir must pay the purchaser a proportionate amount of the decree debt: Jafri Begam…(Defendant); v. Amir Muhammad Khan…(Plaintiff).*. In this Court in Pathummabi v. Vittil Ummachabi(6), it was held that it was immaterial whether the sale was voluntary or effected by Court in execution of a decree, provided that the seller was in possession of all the effects of the deceased and the Bombay cases were followed, but in applying the law as regards sales in which only part of the consideration money was applied in discharge of a debt due by the deceased the principle laid down in Jafri Begam…(Defendant); v. Amir Muhammad Khan…(Plaintiff).* was followed, although that case is not referred to in the judgment. In Jafri Begam…(Defendant); v. Amir Muhammad Khan…(Plaintiff).*, Mahmood, J., discusses fully the Muhammadan Law on the subject and criticizes the rulings of the Calcutta High Court referred to above. The decisions in Bombay and Calcutta are not based on the same grounds and the view taken in Pathummabi v. Vittil Unmachabi appears to be somewhat different to the view of other Courts. In these circumstances I agree in making the proposed reference to a Full Bench.

On this reference:—

C.P Ramaswami Ayyar for the respondent craved leave to begin.—Every heir of a Muhammadan is entitled to a definite share of the inheritance and his right does not depend upon the existence of debts: see Moideensa Rowihen v. Muhammad Kasim Rowthen, Chandu v. Kunhamed and Jafri Begam…(Defendant); v. Amir Muhammad Khan…(Plaintiff).*. There is no right of representation in Muhammadan Law as in Hindu Law: see Azima Bibi v. Shamalanand.

[Abdur Rahim, J.:— That lays down no such general proposition. But that proposition cannot be denied.]

The matter is not one of Muhammadan Law but one of procedure and convenience. See Amir Ali's Muhammadan Law, third edition, volume 2, pages 54 to 59.

[Srinivasa Ayyangar, J.:— That passage was dissented from by Mahmood, J., in Jafri Begam…(Defendant); v. Amir Muhammad Khan…(Plaintiff).*.]

Yes. Each co-heir is bound to pay his proportionate shara of the debt before getting his portion of the property conveyed without his consent.

[Abdur Rahim, J.:— In a suit one co-heir may be made to represent others when all are parties.]

Reference was made to Tyabji's Muhammadan Law, pages 516 and 517, and Maenaghten, page 171. Hedaya in Chapter IV, pages 341 and 349, deals with processual law: see also Abdul Khader v. Chidambaram Chettiyar. Pathummabi v. Vittil Ummachabi was referred to and explained: see Hamir Singh…(Defendant); v. Musammat Zakia…(Plaintiff).(7) and Dallu Mal v. Hart Dasi(8)

[Srinivasa Aiyangar, J., referred to Madavarayudu v. Sub-bamma and Khiarajmal v. Daim.]

The latter case is not based on any principle of Muhammadan Law: see also Hendry v. Mutty Lall Dhur and Bazayet Hossein v. Dooli Chund. The last case decides that one of the heirs can alienate his share for discharging the debts. The view taken in Wilson's Anglo-Muhammadan Law in page 215, paragraph 159, is wrong as he misunderstands this last Privy Council decision and Land Mortgage Bank, Limited v. Bidyadhari Dasi where all the heirs concurred in the sale. The Calcutta cases which uphold an involuntary sale in its entirety where one co-heir in possession of the whole property is sued by a creditor, are based upon the theory of an administration suit. That is not the correct view, for if in law one cannot represent another, the former's possession alone is of no avail. The Calcutta decisions, viz., Muttyjan v. Ahmed Ally, Bussunteram Marwary v. Kamaluddin Ahmed, Amir Dulhin v. Baij Nath Singh and Ram Charan Sanyal v. Anukul Chandra Acharjya(9), even if correct, are all cases of sales through Court and not of voluntary alienations by one co-heir. In Bombay the analogy of Mitakshara Lal of representation is applied as the Muhammadan Law is stricter as to payment of debts than the Hindu Law. See Davalava v. Bhimaji Dhondo(10) and Moosabhai v. Yacoobbhai(11). The other cases in Allahabad are Pinthi Pal Singh v. Husaini Jan(12) and Muhammad Allahadad Khan v. Ahthammad Ismail Khan(13). The case of a guardian's sale is Ayderman Kutti v. Syed Ali(14).

C. Venkatasubbramayya for the appellant.

Heirs cannot proceed against a bonâ fide purchaser for value whether he buys from one heir only or whether he purchases for more than the value of the debts. Hedaya's pronouncement is taken not as a law of procedure but as part of the substantive Muhammadan Law: see Amir Ali, volume II, page 698, I rely on Tyabji's Muhammadan Law, page 519, section 573, Pathummabi v. Vittil Ummachabi, Assamathem Nessa Bibee v. Roy Lutchmeeput Singh, Bussunteram Marwary v. Kamaluddin Ahmed, Malkarjun v. Narhari and Williams on Executors, tenth edition, volume I, page 195.

The Court delivered the following Opinions:—

Abdur Rahim, J.:— The question referred to us is in these words: “When one of the co-heirs of a deceased Mahammadan, in possession of the whole estate of the deceased or of any part of it, sells property in his possession forming part of the estate for discharging the debts of the deceased, is such sale binding on the other co-heirs or creditors of the deceased and, if so, to what extent?” The answer must be in the negative.

On the death of a Muhammadan, the inheritance vests in his heirs according to their respective shares, although in the administration of the estate the funeral expenses, debts and legacies must be paid first and it is only the residue that is available for distribution among the heirs. It is not correct to say that the devolution of the estate on the heirs does not take place or is postponed until the funeral expenses and the debts and legacies have been paid. This is evident from the following facts: if an heir designated by the law dies after the death of the propositus, his share descends on his own heirs and does not lapse to the general estate. Each heir is entitled to the income that has accrued since the testator's death, in proportion to his share and he can transfer his share by sale or gift, subject, it may be, as to the latter form of disposition to such restrictions as are imposed by the doctrine of Musha.

The theory of Muhammadan jurisprudence, on which the right of succession and inheritance is based, is that even after death, the deceased a rights is his properties still inhere in him, to the extent; necessary for meeting the funeral charges and the legal obligations and liabilities incurred in his life time and also for carrying out his wishes, as expressed in his last will and testament, within the limits laid down by the law. A deceased person is classed among persons of defective capacity and his rights and obligations are considered not merely with reference to matters pertaining to this world but also with respect to his spiritual concerns. The payment of his funeral expenses and debts is described as his last need. And as for testamentary bequests, it is stated that, according to strict juristic theory, they should not be lawful at all but have been sanctioned in order that the testator might make up for his shortcomings in life by making gifts to deserving objects.

It is argued that, as soon as a man is seized with “death illness” (i.e, illness which results in his death), the right of succession of his relatives comes into existence, although it remains in an inchoate state, that is, in the nature of a spes successionis until death actually takes place, and the heirs entitled to succession are not ascertained until then. It is upon this theory that the right to bequeath by will is treated as a concession to the deceased and is limited to one-third of his possessions. The result is, on the death of a person his estate is to be divided in this way, one portion for the deceased himself equivalent to so much of the estate as is necessary and sufficient for meeting his funeral expenses, debts, obligations and bequests, the last not exceeding one-third of the estate and what remains is to be distributed among the heirs according to their respective shares. Funeral expenses, debts and legacies are given preference because they are allowed by virtue of the rights of the deceased.

As far back as 1878, the Judicial Committee in Bazayet Hossein v. Dooli Chund, held that an heir-at-law was entitled to alienate his share in spite of the fact that there were debts of the deceased still outstanding and it would not have been possible to hold this if the inheritance did not devolve on the heir on the death of the propositus. Mr. Justice Mahmood in Jafri Begam…(Defendant); v. Amir Muhammad Khan…(Plaintiff).* has fully discussed the question and I do not think it would be of any use to add anything more to his reasoning. As regards the nature of the tenure of the co-heirs' shares, the heirs of a deceased Muhammadan take their shares in severalty, their rights being analogous, to those of tenants-in-common, and not of members of a joint Hindu family: see Abdul Khader v. Chidambaram Chettiyar.

There cannot be the slightest doubt therefore upon the principles of Muhammadan Law and also upon the authorities that one heir has no right to deal with the shares of the other heirs. In the Muhammadan system such a tenure of property is, called Shirkat which literally means “participation” and, in Law, “joint rights,” and which is translated as “partnership” by Mr. Hamilton in his translation of the Hedaya.

The definition of Shirkat as given by him is “Shirkat, in its primitive sense, signifies the conjunction of two or more estates in such a manner, that one of them is not distinguishable from the other. The term Shirkat, however, is extended to contracts, although there be no actual conjunction of estates, because a contract is the cause of such conjunction. In the language of the law it signifies the union of two or more persons in one concern”: see Grady, Book XIV, page 217. This definition, however, must be read with what follows and, so reading, it will be clear that Shirkat is a generic term of law and applies both to joint ownership and to contracts of partnership. The former he called Shirkat ul-Milk, which is translated by Mr. Hamilton as “partnership by the right of property”; and the latter, which is partnership proper in the sense of the English law is called Shirkat-ul-Akd. In Shirkat ul-Milk, the ownership acquired is either “optional” or “compulsive,” to use the terms of Mr. Hamilton, and in the latter category are included the rights of co-heirs. With respect to such rights it is laid down: “In this species of partnership (i.e, the rights of two persons inheriting one property), therefore, it is not lawful for one partner to perform any act with respect to the other's share, without his permission each being a stranger with respect to the other's share. It is, however, lawful for either partner (i.e, one of the heirs) to sell his own share to the other partner (i.e, the co-heir) in all the cases here stated and he may also sell his share to others, without his partners' consent,” excepting in certain cases with which we are not concerned.

This is absolutely clear authority in proof of the position that one heir has no authority, in law to deal with the shares of his co-heirs. In the face of it, it is not necessary to refer to other original text-books. It is stated, however, in Pathummabi v. Vittil Ummachabi that, “if the creditor of the deceased can seek his relief against one of several co-heirs in a case where all the effects of the deceased are in the hands of that heir, it can make no difference whether the heir meets the demand by a bonâ fide voluntary sale, or the property is brought to sale in execution of a decree obtained against him.” To the same effect is a decision of the Allahabad High Court in Hasan Ali v. Mehdi Husain. The statement in Pathummabi v. Vittil Ummachabi was purely by way of obiter dictum and, with all respect to the learned Judges, they failed to bear in mind that, the provision of the Muhammadan law, that a decree against one heir in possession of all the effects of the deceased, is binding on all if obtained after contest, is part of the processual law of that system and is not based on the ground that a single heir, if he happens to be in possession of the estate of the deceased, represents the rest of the heirs for the purposes of administration generally. The ground on which a decree against one of the heirs, in such circumstances, is treated as res judicata is, as stated in the books, that the decree in such cases is, in law, against the deceased and not against the particular heir who is made defendant in the suit.

In Hedaya the matter is discussed in the chapter relating to the duties of the kazi and in some other text-books in the chapter dealing with claims, in which chapters the rules of procedure of the Muhammadan system are mostly laid down. In dealing with the question whether when one of the heirs obtains a decree for the recovery of the property of the deceased in possession of a third person more than his share in that property should be made over to him in execution of the decree, it is stated that all the three doctors, that is, Abu Haneefa and his two disciples, agree that the decree enures not only in favour of the heir who actually is the plaintiff but also of the heir who did not join on account of absence from the country though there is a difference of opinion as to whether the decree-holder shall be given possession of more than his share. This is how the principle is enunciated in the Hedaya (Grady, page 349) “for anyone of the heirs of a deceased person stands as litigant on the part of all the others wish respect to anything due to, or by the deceased, whether it be debt or substance; since the decree of the kazi, in such case, is in reality either in favour of or against a deceased; and any one of the hairs may stand as his representative with respect to such decree.” The qualifying words ‘with respect to such decree” which I have italicised are a material part of the proposition and, negative, by implication, the suggestion that, apart from a decree of Court, a single heir represents the entire estate of the deceased and can deal with the shares of the co-heirs without their consent. In other text books of Muhammadan Law, such as Bahrurraiq and Alimajullab, the same proposition is laid down under the heading of “Claims.” Nowhere have I found any general statement that, apart from representation in suits, one heir is entitled by his acts to bind the shares of the others. The dictum to the contrary, therefore, in Pathummabi v. Vittil Ummachabi and the decision in Hasan Ali v. Mehdi Husain seem to be without sufficient authority and inconsistent with clear statements of the law in books of authority.

There are a number of rulings, especially of the Calcutta High Court in which the rule of Muhammadan Law as to one heir representing the other co-heirs in suits, has been adopted, (See Assamathem Nessa Bibee v. Roy Lutchmeeput Singh followed by Muttyjan v. Ahmed Ally, Bussenteram Marwary v. Kamaluddin Ahmed and Amir Dulhin v. Baij Nath Singh. In the Allahabad High Court, on the other hand, the decision of the Full Bench in Jafri Begam…(Defendant); v. Amir Muhammad Khan…(Plaintiff).*, where it was held, dissenting from Assamathem Nessa Bibee v. Roy Lutchmeeput Singh, than this question is not governed by the Muhammadan Law, but by the Civil Procedure Code, has been followed in the later rulings of that Court: see Dallu Mal v. Rari Dos. In Bombay [Khurshetbibi v. Keso Vinayek] the view taken by the Calcutta High Court on this point has been adopted by the learned Judges, though proceeding to a considerable extent on the analogy of the Hindu Law.

It is not necessary for us to pronounce any definite opinion upon this class of cases which deal with the question how far a decree against one of the heirs of a deceased Muhammadan binds the others and under what circumstances.

So far as voluntary alienations are concerned, which alone form the subject matter of reference, the Muhammadan Law is clear that one of the heirs of a deceased person is not competent to bind the other heirs by his acts.

Spencer, J.:— I agree with the judgment of Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim just now pronounced.

Srinivasa Ayyangar, J.:— I agree. In the absence of any right in one of the heirs to represent the co-heirs, one of several co-heirs can only deal with his or her interest in the ancestor's property inherited by them. My learned brother has shown that there is nothing in the Muhammadan Law giving such a right to one of the co-heirs who may happen to be in actual possession of the whole of the ancestor's estate; such possession, it must be remembered, is presumably on behalf of all the coheirs. He is not constituted the representative of the deceased and cannot administer his property even for the limited purpose of paying off his debts. In Khiarajmal v. Daim Lord Davey referring to a sale by one of the heirs of a Muhammadan for discharging the debt due by the ancestor said “prima facie his conveyance would pass only his share” see page 37. Representation in a suit may conceivably stand on a different footing for as stated by their Lordships in the same judgment at page 35, “The Indian Courts have exercised a wide discretion in allowing the estate of a deceased debtor to be represented by one member of the family, and in refusing to disturb judicial sales on the mere ground that some members of the family, who were minors, were not made parties to the proceedings, if it appears that there was a debt justly due from the deceased, and no prejudice is shown to the absent minors. But these are usually cases where the person named as defendant is, de facto, manager of a Hindu family property, or has the assets out of which the decree is to be satisfied under his control;” and they applied this principle in that very case to the estate of Nabibaksh. However, that is not the question here.

N.R