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P. L. S. P. Palaniappa Chetty v. P. L. P. P. L. Palaniappa Chetty

Madras High Court
Nov 15, 1916
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Summary of Opinion: Appealability of an Order Declaring It Just and Convenient to Appoint a Receiver (Before Naming a Person)

Factual and Procedural Background

The reference before the Court posed a single substantial procedural question: whether an order in which a Subordinate Judge or Court determines that "it is just and convenient" to appoint a receiver — that is, a pronouncement that a receiver should be appointed, made before any particular person is selected or named as receiver — constitutes an appealable order under the Code of Civil Procedure (specifically Order XL, Rule 1 and Order XLIII, Clause S).

The opinion canvasses the construction of the relevant provisions in the Code, compares English practice and Indian practice, examines prior decisions from several High Courts and earlier reported cases, and records divergent views expressed by different members of the Court. The Court was asked to answer two related practical questions framed from the rules: (a) whether the pronouncement that a receiver should be appointed is an "order" under Order 40, Rule 1; and (b) whether such an order is appealable under Order 43, Clause S.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the pronouncement by a Court or Subordinate Judge that it is "just and convenient" to appoint a receiver (but before any particular person is named or appointed) amounts to an "order" under Order 40, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  2. Whether such an order (a determination that a receiver should be appointed, made prior to the appointment of a named person) is appealable under Order XLIII, Clause S (Order 43, Clause S) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court (as stated in the opinion)
Venkatasami v. Stridevamma (1887) I.L.R. 10 Mad. 179 Construction of the corresponding provision in the old code: appealability of an order declining to appoint a receiver. Quoted to show that an order declining to appoint a receiver was held appealable under the old code; used to support the proposition that the right of appeal is not restricted to a particular kind of order under Rule 1.
Cursetji v. Gangaram (1915) 17 Bom. L.R. 680 Similar construction for the provision in the New Code; treatment of orders under Rule 1. Cited to show that the Bombay High Court took a view about the types of orders falling under Rule 1 (including a suggestion the category might be limited), while also emphasizing that appeals lie against orders under Rule 1.
Muni Lal v. Jagan Nath (1916) 33 I.C. 735 Adoption in Allahabad of principles concerning appealability of orders under the relevant rule. Cited as an instance where the Allahabad High Court adopted the view that supports appealability of certain orders; used to show varied High Court practice.
Nothard v. Proctor (1875) L.R. 1 Ch. D. p.4 English authority where an order for appointment of a receiver (not naming a particular person) was treated as an order. Relied on to support the proposition that a pronouncement that a receiver should be appointed can be an order and a proper subject of appeal in English practice.
Narbadashankar v. Kevaldas (1915) 17 Bom. L.R. 510 Pointed to practical difficulty of multiplicity of appeals if interlocutory pronouncements were appealable. Quoted to illustrate that adopting a construction that allows appeals at the pronouncement stage may lead to multiple appeals; the opinion notes this but concludes the multiplicity cannot be avoided in some views.
Perry v. Oriental Hotels Co. (1870) L.R. 5 App. Ch. 420 English case illustrating the sequence: a Court order for appointment followed by a chambers appointment of a named person and the costs consequences. Used to show practical problems (costs of recognizances, timing of appeals) and that English appellate practice allowed appeal from an order appointing a receiver even where a named person was later appointed in chambers.
Ridout v. Fowler (1904) 1 Ch. 662 English practice of not entering the order until security is completed. Cited to contrast English practice (where security completion affects entry of the order) with practice under the Indian procedure code where such a restraint is not customary in the mofussil.
Birajan Koer v. Ramchurn Lall Mahta (1881) I.L.R. 7 Cal. 719 Appeal against a Subordinate Judge's expression of opinion submitting a name under the old code; relation to sections that governed appealability. Referred to show historical distinctions under the old code (sections 503 and 505) and to explain why that case is not analogous to the present question under the new Code.
Mathuria Debi v. Shib Dyal (1909) 3 I.C. 430 Citation of Calcutta High Court authority holding that making a receivership order without nominating the receiver is interlocutory and not appealable. Relied on as a principal authority taking the non-appealable view; the opinion notes that Chitty and Richardson JJ. purported to follow Birajan Koer and that this view influenced later High Court decisions.
Upendra Nath v. Bupendra Nath (1913) 13 C.L.J. 157 Held that an order not appointing a named person as receiver is not appealable; appeal lies only from a final order appointing a receiver. Quoted by the opinion as supporting the non-appealable/interlocutory view; the present opinion explicitly disagrees with parts of its reasoning on the effect of security requirements, but acknowledges the decision.
Srinivas Prosad Singh v. Kesho Prosad Singh (1911) 14 C.L.J. 489 Proposition that the appointment of a receiver is not complete until the receiver furnishes security, and the appointment dates from completion of security. The opinion addresses and rejects the rule, for present Code procedure, that dates appointment from the date on which security is furnished; it treats Srinivas Prasad Singh as laying down too broad a rule under the present Code.
Ramji v. Koman Das (1914) 13 A.L.J. p.79 Another decision adopting the view that a receivership order without nominating the receiver can be interlocutory. Noted as taking the same view; mentioned as part of the body of authority that opposes the view that a pronouncement without naming is appealable.
Subramanya Chetti v. Appasami (1883) I.L.R. 6 M. 355 Earlier case overruled by later authority (Venkatasami); dealt with related questions under the old code. Mentioned as part of the chain of authorities; the opinion cites its overruling by Venkatasami to explain the development of precedent.
Sangappa v. Shibasawa (1900) I.L.R. 24 B. p. 38 Part of the older case law dealing with appealability of orders refusing to appoint a receiver. Referred to as dealing with a different question (appealability of a refusal to appoint) rather than the precise question before the Court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Overview

The opinion contains a detailed exchange of reasoning reflecting two competing lines of analysis: (A) a line of reasoning that pronouncements that a receiver should be appointed are "orders" under Order 40, Rule 1 and are appealable under Order 43, Clause S, and (B) a contrary line that such pronouncements are interlocutory and not appealable until a particular person is actually appointed (and, in Indian practice, until the appointment is effectuated by naming and dealing with security as appropriate). The opinion examines textual construction of the Code provisions, English practice, the procedure forms (Seton forms and the Code appendices), and prior Indian authorities.

Reasoning Supporting Appealability (as articulated by one judge)

  • Textual construction: The judge observed that Order 43, Clause S confers a right of appeal from an "order under Rule 1 of Order XL" and that Rule 1 provides that "where it appears to the Court to be just and convenient the Court may by order (a) appoint a receiver." The judge concluded a pronouncement that it is just and convenient to appoint a receiver is itself an order under that rule.
  • English practice: The judge relied on English practice where a court first makes an order in open court that a receiver be appointed and leaves selection of the person to chambers. That practice treats the initial pronouncement as an order, not a mere interlocutory expression of opinion.
  • Practical consequences and protection of parties: It was noted that if appealability were denied until a named receiver gave security, appellants would face the risk of wasted expense (e.g., if security or recognizances were given and later an appellate court discharged the appointment). Perry v. Oriental Hotels Co. was cited to show appellate courts can decide after security costs have been incurred and that appellants should have recourse to appeal earlier.
  • Forms and Code practice: The judge pointed to Seton forms and Code appendices that treated an order "for the appointment of a receiver" as included within the concept of an order "appointing a receiver," and observed that the power in section 94 (as invoked) is exercisable only in accordance with rules, i.e., Order 40, Rule 1.
  • On security and dating: This judge argued the matter of security does not affect the appealability question: forms and Indian practice show appointments are made in open court by naming the receiver and dating that pronouncement; requiring appellants to wait for security would create practical uncertainty.
  • Conclusion of this line: On these bases the judge concluded the pronouncement that a receiver should be appointed is an order under Order 40, Rule 1 and is appealable under Order 43, Clause S.

Reasoning Opposing Appealability (as articulated by another judge)

  • Interlocutory character: The opposing view emphasized that a pronouncement that a receiver "should be appointed" but without naming any person is an incomplete, interlocutory order which does not finally dispose of the petition to appoint a receiver. Such pronouncements leave subsequent, essential matters to be settled (who should be receiver; what directions and security should be required), and therefore do not amount to a final, appealable order.
  • Finality and legislation intent: It was argued that when a court refuses to appoint a receiver the application is finally disposed of and thus appealable; the converse pronouncement (that a receiver should be appointed) is not final and was not intended by the legislature to be appealable. The judge considered it implausible that the legislature intended two separate appeals to arise (one from the pronouncement of necessity and another from the eventual naming of a person) in respect of the same underlying petition.
  • Practical and procedural considerations: Allowing appeals at the pronouncement stage would cause multiplicity of proceedings and potential inconvenience; in practice, the interval between pronouncement and the naming of a person is usually short and courts should generally make selection and pronouncement together to avoid such problems.
  • Security and operation of the order: The judge observed that an order that a receiver should be appointed cannot be put into operation until someone is actually appointed; thus it is not an operative final order until the appointment is effectuated by naming a person and following the Indian practice of requiring security where applicable.
  • Practice and forms in India: The judge referred to the Code's Appendix F warrant form (addressed by name) and Indian practice (appointing receivers subject to security) to underline that the practical operation of appointments in India differs from some English procedures and that the appointment remains conditional and incomplete until a named person is appointed and security issues are addressed.
  • Conclusion of this line: On these grounds the judge held that an appeal is premature if preferred before a receiver has been appointed by name and that the pronouncement alone is not appealable.

Court's Treatment of Precedents

The opinion undertakes a survey of reported decisions: some Indian High Courts (Calcutta, Bombay, Allahabad) had taken the view that making a receivership order without nominating the receiver is interlocutory and not appealable; other decisions were cited in support of the appealable view (including some Madras decisions and certain English authorities). The author(s) note that English practice cannot be applied uncritically to Indian procedure because Code forms and Indian practice differ and because the answer must depend on interpretation of the Code's language.

Holding and Implications

The Court's final answer to the reference was that both questions are answered in the negative: a pronouncement that a receiver should be appointed (without naming a particular person) is not an appealable order under Order 40, Rule 1 and Order 43, Clause S.

Direct Effect on the Parties

  • An appellant cannot maintain an appeal from a mere pronouncement by a trial court or Subordinate Judge that a receiver should be appointed if no particular person has been named and the appointment has not been effectuated; the appeal is premature.
  • Parties wishing to challenge a receivership must ordinarily wait until a named appointment is made (and the appointment is operative in accordance with Indian practice and procedural forms) before preferring an appeal against the appointment.

Broader Implications Noted by the Court

  • The decision aligns the Court with reported decisions of several High Courts (Calcutta, Bombay and Allahabad) that have taken the non-appealable view in similar circumstances; the opinion therefore reinforces that established line of authority rather than announcing a novel departure.
  • The Court flagged practical considerations underlying the rule: avoiding multiplicity of appeals, the conditional or incomplete character of pronouncements not naming a receiver, and the distinction between English practice and Indian Code-based procedure.

Disposition

The reference was answered in the negative: the pronouncement that a receiver should be appointed (prior to appointment by name) is not appealable. The opinion records conflicting reasoning among the judges (with a judge articulating reasons why such pronouncements should be appealable), but the Court's ultimate answer was that an immediate appeal is premature.

This summary is strictly based on the language and material contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences not present in the text.

Show all summary ...

1. The substantial question referred to us for determination is whether an order determining that it is just and convenient to appoint a receiver, i.e., an order for the appointment of a receiver, and before a particular person is selected and appointed as such receiver, is appealable.

2. The right of appeal is conferred by Clause S of Order XLIII which provides inter alia that an appeal shall lie from an order under Rule 1 of Order XL; and that rule, omitting the portions not material for the present purpose, is in these terms

"where it appears to the Court to be just and convenient the Court may by order (a) appoint a receiver."
The question is whether the order referred to above is an order under this rule.

3. When an application is made for the appointment of a receiver, the most important question for determination is whether it is just and convenient to appoint a receiver in the circumstances, and if the Court comes to the conclusion, that it is not shewn to be just and convenient to appoint a receiver, it must dismiss the application. This determination is made under rule I, and there can be no doubt that that order is appealable. It was so decided in Venkatasami v. Stridevamma (1887) I.L.R. 10 Mad. 179 on the construction of the corresponding provision of the old code and as pointed out in Cursetji v. Gangaram (1915) 17 Bom. L.R. page 680, the same construction must be placed on the similar provision in the New Code. The same view has been adopted in Allahabad in the recent case of Muni Lal v. Jagan Nath (1916) 33 I.C. 735, But these decisions do not throw much light on the present question for it can easily be contended that orders declining to appoint a receiver and orders appointing a receiver are exhaustive of the category of orders contemplated by Rule 1, as the discretionary power to appoint a receiver, conferred by that rule, includes the power to reject an application for such appointment and nothing more. This was apparently the view taken by the learned judges of the Bombay High Court in Cursetji v. Gangaram (1915) 17 Bom. L.R. page 680. The above rulings however emphasize the fact that the right of the appeal is not restricted to any particular kind of order under Rule 1 and an appeal lies against all orders under that rule.

4. That an order determining, that it is just and convenient to appoint a receiver, is an order, can I think scarcely admit of doubt; and the practice of the English Courts by which first an order is made for the appointment of a receiver in Court leaving the selection of the person to be appointed to be settled in chambers, is conclusive of the question. The determination is I think more than 'a mere interlocutory statement' if that phrase means, an expression of opinion, for there can be no doubt that the Court which determined that it was necessary to appoint a receiver cannot change it of its own accord without a review or other proper proceeding. I also think that the Subordinate Judge in this case on his', 'determination that a receiver should be appointed was entitled to issue an order. In Nothard v. Proctor (1875) L.R. 1 Ch. D. p. 4, the order appealed against appears to be an order for the appointment of a receiver and not an order appointing a particular person as receiver and no question was raised that it was not a judgment or order. If it is an order, the order is certainly one under Order 40, Rule 1 as the Court determines the question of the necessity for the appointment of a receiver under this order. Reference was made to section 94 of the code as conferring the power to appoint a receiver, but it is to be observed that that power can be exercised only if rules provide for such exercise and in accordance with those rules.

5. Even if I am wrong in this, and if the orders under Order 40, Rule 1, can only be of 2 classes, one rejecting applications for receivers, and the other, orders appointing receivers, I agree with the contention of the learned Advocate General that an order for the appointment of a receiver is as much an order 'appointing a receiver,' as an order naming a particular person as receiver. In England an appeal is allowed without leave from an order appointing a receiver and I can find no restriction of the right, in the decided cases, to cases where a receiver is named in the order of the Court, or to orders passed in chambers appointing a particular person. In a majority of cases, the appeal will be directed against the determination that it is necessary to appoint a receiver rather than against the particular person appointed, as the person to be appointed is very often a matter of agreement between the parties. This construction may no doubt lead to a multiplicity of appeals as was pointed out in Narbadashankar v. Kevaldas (1915) 17 Bom. L.R. 510, but I do not see how that can be avoided in any view; for instance one man may be appointed receiver, and after appeal filed, he may resign and another appointed. In fact the learned pleader who argued that the order was not appealable said that if after an appeal, the person appointed as receiver resigned or ceased to be receiver, the appeal abated, though the grounds of appeal may have been solely directed to challenging the necessity for the appointment of any receiver. On the other hand I do not see any purpose in compelling a party to wait till the receiver is appointed and if as held in Srinivas Prosad Singh v. Kesho Prosad Singh that the appointment is not complete till the receiver has completed the security, till such completion. If the order of appointment is discharged by the Appellate Court all the expense incurred in giving security will be thrown away. In Perry v. Oriental Hotels Co. (1870) L.R. 5 App. Ch. 420, where there was first an order by the Vice Chancellor ordering the appointment of a receiver and an order in chambers appointing a particular person, L.J. Gifford in appeal, though he discharged the order appointing the particular person directed the successful appellant to pay the costs of the recognizances, remarking that the appellant should have come to the court of appeal before the recognizances were entered into.

6. There may again be a difficulty in ascertaining the date of appointment of a receiver and the date may become important for calculating the period of limitation, for appeal. The order appointing a named person as receiver may appoint him receiver and direct him to give security within a limited time, or may make the appointment conditional on giving security (Seton Form No. 5, page 727, No. 1, p. 657). In the former case if the person appointed does not give the security he my cease to be receiver and any appeal presented in the meantime would become useless. In the latter case on security being completed no further order may be passed, except the issuing of a warrant of appointment. The English practice appears to be, not to pass or enter the order till the security is completed Ridout v. Fowler (1904) 1 Ch. 662 but under the procedure code in the mofussil there is no such practice. In such a case what is the date of the order appointing a receiver? In some cases and for some purposes on the completion of the security, the appointment relates back to the date when it was made. Kerr on Receivers p. 163.

7. From the forms printed in Seton, it will be seen that an order appointing a receiver' includes an order directing that a proper person be appointed receiver, as well as an order appointing a named person (cf. Form Nos. 13 and 19 with Nos. 16, 20, 21, Section 1, Ch. XXXII). It is not therefore improper to speak of an order for the appointment of a receiver' as an order 'appointing a receiver' within the meaning of Order 40, Rule 1.

8. It has been the practice of this Court to allow appeals from these orders and I see no sufficient reason to hold that on the construction of the relevant rules and orders this practice is illegal.

9. A different view has been taken in Calcutta first by Chitty and Richardson, JJ. in Mathuria Debi v. Shib Dyal (1909) 3 I.C. 430, where the learned Judges purported to follow the decision in Birajan Koer v. Ramchurn Lall Mahta (1881) I.L.R. 7 Cal. 719 which was an appeal against an order or expression of opinion by a Subordinate Judge submitting the name of a person to be appointed as receiver under section 505 of the old code. The order appointing a receiver had to be made under Section 503 and under Section 588 an appeal was allowed only against orders under Section 503.

10. section 505 of the old code is now repealed and with all respect, the order appealed against in Birajan v. Ram Churn (1881) I.L.R. 7 Cal. 719, has nothing in common with the order in the present case. In Upendra Nath v. Bupendra Nath (1913) 13 C.L.J. 157, Mookerjee and Teunon, JJ. held that an order not appointing a named person as receiver is not appealable and the leraned Judges came to that conclusion on the ground that an appeal lies only from a final order appointing a receiver; and in the later case of Srinivas Prosad v. Kesho Prosad (1911) 14 C.L.J. 489 at 499 Mookerjee, J. delivering the judgment of the Court explained that there is no final or appealable order in cases where security is required from the receiver, before the completion of the security. With all respect I am unable to accept this interpretation of the rule, for the reasons which I have already given. In Bombay the view of the Calcutta High Court has been adopted, Narbadashanker v. Kevaldas (1915) 17 Bom. L.R. p. 510. Though the learned Judges came to the conclusion that an order for the appointment of a receiver is a order and also an order under Order XL, Rule 1, yet for the purpose of appeal, only an order appointing a particular person is an order under Rule 1. As an order rejecting an application for receiver would also be appealable as an order under Rule 1, the Bombay High Court as I have already said apparently holds that only 2 kinds of orders fall within the category of orders under Order XL, Rule 1, I am not sure this is right and in any event I am not able to adopt the construction placed on the words 'order appointing a receiver.'

11. In Ramji v. Koman Das (1914) 13 A.L.J. p. 79, Chamier and Piggott, JJ. appear to take the same view, though as pointed out in the judgment, the order under appeal there was peculiarly worded.

12. In the face of such weighty authority against my construction of the section, I venture to express my opinion with great diffidence; but having come to a clear conclusion in the matter, and seeing that the question involved is really a question of practice which can be changed if necessary by the High Courts by rules, I would answer the questions referred to us as follows:

(a) The pronouncement of the Subordinate Judge that a Receiver should be appointed is an order under Order 40, Rule 1 and

(b) is appealable under Order 43, Clause S.

Abdur Rahim,.

13. I agree in the conclusion arrived at by Srinivasa Aiyangar, J.

Spencer, J.

14. I am of opinion that an appeal is premature if preferred before a receiver has been appointed by name, for the reason that until that is done the order is merely interlocutory and does not completely dispose of the petition to appoint. At first sight it would appear impossible to contend that when a Court decides that a Receiver should be appointed but does not appoint, the order of the Court is one appointing a Receiver. It is however argued that if an order refusing to appoint which is passed without naming a person is appealable, an order directing a Receiver to be appointed without naming any one for the appointment must also be appealable. I cannot see that this is a logical consequence. The difficulty seems to have arisen out of the rulings which have decided that a refusal to appoint is appealable as an Order made under Order XL Rule (1)(a). This declares

"where it appears to the Court to be just and convenient the Court may by order appoint a Receiver of any property whether before or after decree."
When a Court altogether refuses to appoint a Receiver, there is no question of the person to be selected as Receiver and the proceedings have reached a further stage of finality than they have when a pronouncement is made that a Receiver must be appointed without appointing any one. A refusal to appoint necessarily disposes of the application to appoint but the other order does not do so, this may be seen from the instance out of which this reference has arisen. The Subordinate Judge after recording his opinion that a Receiver should be appointed adjourned the petition for a week to consider the questions (1) who should be appointed Receiver and (2) what instructions ought to be given him. It is easily conceivable that in certain circumstances there might be no objection to the appointment of a Receiver and yet there might be strong objections to the particular person selected for the office as when one of the parties to the suit is made a Receiver. In other cases the opposing party may be indifferent to the personality of the nominee and may take his stand entirely on the question whether the occasion is a fit one for taking the control of the property out of the hands of the person in possession. I doubt whether it can have been the intention of the Legislature to allow two appeals, one from the first decision as to the need of a receiver and another from the final order appointing a definite person by name to the office. It seems to me that such a procedure would involve a multiplicity of proceedings, a result which it is always desirable to avoid where possible. No one who wishes to appeal can complain of having to wait till a Receiver is actually selected, as the interval between the decision to appoint and the selection of an individual is unlikely to be long and in practice the Courts should generally be able to make them both simultaneous. If there is an interval, nobody's interests are prejudiced by waiting, as possession of property cannot be transferred until it is known who is to take it ove

15. An order that a Receiver should be appointed is in fact not an order that can be put into operation until someone is actually appointed.

16. I should therefore hesitate before attributing to the Legislature an intention to provide rights of appeal against incomplete and ineffective orders, even if the literal wording of the Code were not also against such a construction.

17. I am not much impressed by the next argument which is based on the tentative character that an order of appointment bears until security is actually furnished by the person appointed.

18. Whatever may be the practice in English Courts, the practice in India is to appoint a Receiver subject to his giving security to the satisfaction of the Court. Not only is there nothing forbidding this practice but the form of the warrant prescribed in Appendix F, Form 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure shows the practice to be correct. This warrant cannot be issued until an individual has been selected as it is to be addressed by name to the person appointed in these words :

"you are hereby (subject to your giving security to the satisfaction of the Court) appointed Receiver"
etc.

19. Of necessity the order of appointment must precede the giving of security, for till then it is not known who must give it and what is its extent. But an order is not the less a final order because it is conditional. Of course if a person appointed does not furnish security as directed, it may be necessary for the party applying for a Receivership order to put in a fresh petition nominating another person. The Court will not act in the matter without being moved. On the fresh application being admitted, the Court will consider it and pass orders, and this will naturally give risti to a fresh right of appeal. The costs incurred in giving security will usually be trifling in this country in the mofussil and at any rate they are incidental to the proceedings.

20. I am thus of opinion that the matter of furnishing security. has no bearing on the questions before us, and with due respect I consider that the case of Srinivas Singh Prosad v. Kesho Prosad Singh (1911) 14 C.L.J. 489 which decided that the order of appointment of a Receiver must date, from the date of the person appointed giving the required security is not good law under the present Code of Civil Procedure. If the date of appointing a Receiver by name subject to his giving security be taken as the date from which to calculate the time for preferring an appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(s), then there will be no difficulty in ascertaining the date, as my learned brother Srinivasa Aiyangar, J., apprehends, for such appointments are made in open Court by the Courts in India and are dated on their pronouncement.

21. I may also observe that the Code contains another indication that such matters are intended to be subsidiary to the main order, in that no appeal is provided against directions under order xl, rules 2 and 3 relative to the remuneration to be paid to and the security to be furnished by a Receiver appointed under Rule 1 of the same order.

22. I will now proceed to consider the reported cases. On the point we have to decide, they are all one way. In this High Court alone there is hitherto no reported case directly on the point.

23. It has been decided in Upendra Nath Nag Chowdry v. Bhupendra Nath Nag Chowdhry (1910) 13 Cal. L.J. 157 and in Mathuria Debi v. Shib Dyal Singh Hazari (1909) 3 I.C. 430 that the making of a Receivership order without nominating the Receiver is an interlocutory order and not appealable.

24. In Bombay and Allahabad the same conclusion has been reached in Narbada Shankar v. Kevaldas (1915) 17 Bom. L.R. 510 and Ramji v. Koman Das (1914) 13 All. L.J. 79

25. The cases in Venkatasami v. Stridavamma (1887) I.L.R. 10 M. 179 (F.B.) which overruled Subramanya Chetti v. Appasami (1883) I.L.R. 6 M. 355 and in Sangappa v. Shibasawa (1900) I.L.R. 24 B. p. 38 and in Cursetji v. Gangaram (1915) 17 Bom. L.R. 680 deal with a different, question viz., whether an order refusing to appoint a Receiver is appealable. The learned Judges considered the effect of a decision come to by a Subordinate Court under section 505 of the old code which finds no place in the present Code. So far as they involve the principle that a mere determination to appoint a Receiver is not appealable, these cases support the view taken by me.

26. As regards the non-appealable nature of interlocutory orders Srinivas Prasad Singh v. Kesho Prosad Singh (1911) 14 C.L.J. 489 is also to the same effect, but as already observed, it goes too far in treating conditional appointments as inoperative and therefore not final orders.

27. As the practice in England of first making an order in Court for the appointment of a receiver and afterwards settling in Chambers who is to be appointed differs from the practice of Indian Courts of appointing Receivers by name in open Court, we cannot get much assistance from English Cases or from English books of reference. In India in matters of procedure Courts are governed by the Code. The answer to the reference must therefore simply depend on the interpretation to be placed on the language of the order in the Code of Civil Procedure.

28. Instances have been cited in which this Court has heard appeals in cases where no Receiver had at the time of appeal been appointed by name; but when no objection was raised to the maintainability of the appeal, these can be no guide as to what the law is on the subject.

29. I agree with the opinion expressed by the two learned Judges who made the reference and with the decisions of the Calcutta, Allahabad and Bombay High Courts, and I would answer both questions referred to us in the negative.