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Muthuvelu Mudaliar v. Vythilinga Mudaliar

Madras High Court
Feb 13, 1919
Important Paras
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Sadasiva Aiyar, J. — The transaction in question in this case was effected after the Transfer of Property Act came into force and the two documents making up the transaction not only came into existence on the same day but each refers to the other. There can be no question therefore in this case that they form the same and a single transaction. (See Palaniappan v. Subbaraya Gounden and S. A. No. 540 of 1916 where I have tried to collect the Indian cases bearing on the question under what circumstances, two documents formed a single transaction and when they must be deemed to indicate two separate transactions). In this case, therefore, we have not got the difficulties which arise from (a) the dates of the two documents being different or (b) from the second document reciting that out of pure grace and favour, etc. (see Jhanda Singh v. Wahiduddin, the transferee of the first document agrees to reconvey or (c) from the document or documents being dated before Tharabusami Pillai's case or Pattabhirama Aiyar's case or before the Transfer of Property Act came into force. In Palaniappan v. Subbaraya Gounden where the execution of the two documents was divided by an interval of two days (the registration having been, however, on the same day) and where the second deed styled itself expressly as the counterpart of the first deed, I held that the two documents constituted a single transaction of mortgage by conditional sale. In Jhanda Singh v. Wahiduddin, Richards, J. says at pages 599 and 600: “It seems to me that if we held that at the time of the execution of the first deed the parties intended that the second deed also should be executed, we ought to hold that the two deeds constituted a mortgage by conditional sale and that the plaintiff has a right to redeem. On the other hand, if, at the time of the execution of the sale-deed, there was no intention of executing the second deed, the defendants are entitled to have the latter construed strictly and quite independent of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the law of mortgages.” (In that case the documents were of the years 1852 and 1853 respectively). “There can be no doubt in my opinion that if the two deeds were of even date, an almost irresistible presumption would arise in favour of the transaction being a mortgage.” In that case, no doubt on the particular facts (including the fact that the documents were separated by the interval of a year from each other) it was held that they did not constitute a single transaction of mortgage by conditional sale.

As regards the contention that there must be the previous existence of the relation of creditor and debtor in order to constitute a transaction which is an ostensible sale (with a covenant for repurchase or covenant of rescission of the sale on repayment of a certain amount) a mortgage by conditional sale, I see no sufficient reason to change the view expressed in Palaniappan v. Subbaraya Gounden, that such considerations cannot be imported into India where we have got the plain words of Sect. 58 of the Transfer of Property Act to guide us as to what the nature of a transaction is which should be regarded as a mortgage by conditional sale.

Coming to Sect. 58 of the Transfer of Property Act itself, I need not say that I have given respectful and anxious consideration to the views of my learned brother (as reported in the case in Maruthai Goundan v. Dasappa Goundan, as also in the judgment to be just now pronounced by him) as to the intention of the legislature in using the words ‘mortgagor,’ ‘mortgage money’ and ‘mortgagee’ in the definition of mortgage by conditional sale in Cl. (c) of Sect. 58 of the Transfer of Property Act. I regret that I am still of opinion that the legislature used those short words merely to avoid involved phraseology. No doubt, it would have been meticulously accurate if the language of the clause were as follows: “Where the transferor in a transfer transaction ostensibly sells the property, the subject of transfer, on condition that on default of payment of the consideration money for the transfer on a certain date, the sale shall become absolute, etc.” A mortgage by conditional sale is ostensibly a sale. “Mortgages going under various names all over the country assume this form; in fact it is exceedingly doubtful if there are many genuine cases of sales with conditions of repurchase at all” where the documents are of the same date or where there is only a single document of sale and agreement to reconvey. The legislature evidently knew this and therefore in the Transfer of Property Act, they introduced the provision that such transactions must be prima facie regarded as mortgages and “as more likely to effectuate the intention of the parties than the rule to the contrary.” In Madhavrao Keshavrao v. Sahebrao Ganpatrao, the facts were exactly similar to those of the present case, there being a simultaneous execution of a sale-deed and an agreement to reconvey. Beaman, J. says at page 123: “I have no doubt but that the contemporaneous documents of 1892 do constitute what is known in this country as a mortgage by conditional sale. Neither have I the least doubt that that was the intention of the parties executing them. Such mortgages are legislatively recognized, and I have only to observe that in no true mortgage of this class will any debt be apparent. It is idle therefore to criticise mortgages by conditional sale by reference to the essential conditions of a mortgage in the English sense of that word. It only needs to peruse the judgments of the Courts relating to these mortgages to observe how necessary it is to bear this in mind when the question is whether upon an interpretation of documents alone, the result is a mortgage by conditional sale or an out and out sale.” I am aware that in Narayan Ram Krishna v. Vighneshwar a document of conveyance containing an agreement to reconvey was construed differently by Batchelor and Shah, JJ., though Batchelor, J. was a party to the case, Kasturchand Lakhmaji v. Jakhia Padia in which a sale-deed and a contemporaneous deed of agreement to reconvey were treated as a mortgage by conditional sale. Doubtless there were certain other circumstances relied on in Narayan Ramkrishna v. Vighneshwar but in my opinion whenever there is a single transaction (whether contained in one or more documents) and where that transaction is an ostensible sale with a covenant to reconvey in case the consideration money for the transfer is repaid, it directly comes within the definition of mortgage by conditional sale in Sect. 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act; and in such cases it is wholly unnecessary and even irrelevant to consider other circumstances for arriving at a decision on the legal nature of the transaction. I might add that the case in Narayan Ramkrishna v. Vighneshwar does not refer to the earlier decision in Madhav Rao Keshavrao v. Saheb Rao Ganpatrao. In S. A. No. 540 of 1916, Phillips, J. and myself had to decide the question arising on the following facts:—There were two documents Exhibit A and Exhibit I of the same date (27th October 1883) one being a sale-deed and the other an agreement by the vendee that he would enjoy the lands for a fixed period of ten years and that after that period the vendor could get back the lands by repayment of the purchase-money before the commencement of the cultivation season in any year. We held that the two documents ought to be read together and that they were intended to be a mortgage by conditional sale. In that case the Lower Courts had taken into consideration several facts which happened both at the time and after the execution of the documents in arriving at the intention of the parties and decided as a question of fact that the parties intended a mortgage by conditional sale. Hence it was thought unnecessary to decide the neat and simple question whether solely on the definition of “mortgage by conditional sale” found in the Transfer of Property Act, the documents constituted in the eye of the law a mortgage transaction. I therefore said at the end of my judgment in S. A. No. 540 of 1916: “I do not wish to enter into the question whether particular form of expression used in a document (or set of documents to be read together) necessarily imply and have the legal effect of creating a mortgage by conditional sale or of only creating an absolute right in the transferee with an obligation on his part to reconvey. On that question again there is a conflict of authority both in this Court and in the Bombay High Court and it is not absolutely necessary to decide that point for disposing of this Second Appeal” and then, I said that the question might have to be referred to a Full Bench when it directly arises.

As regards the decision in S. A. No. 2180 of 1915, there were indications in the documents themselves in that case that the agreement to resell was merely an act of generosity on the vendee's part and that the option to repurchase was a personal favour granted to the vendor alone and was not intended to extend to strangers deriving title from him.

In the result, I agree in making the order of reference to a Full Bench as proposed by my learned brother.

Napier, J.—This Second Appeal raises the question whether certain documents constitute a mortgage by conditional sale or a sale with a right of re-purchase. The sale-deed Exhibit B was executed on the 4th October 1883. The consideration recited is Rs. 455 which is arrived at by taking the amounts due on three hypothecation bonds of earlier dates amounting to Rs. 510 and a small amount of Rs. 20 due on a Small Cause Court decree making a total of Rs. 530. Of this amount Rs. 75 is to be received from a third party leaving a balance of Rs. 455. The deed contains the usual words for an absolute sale, but it is to be subject to an agreement executed and given to the vendor on the same day. It continues “After the lapse of the term of three years mentioned in the agreement in respect of the lands of this sale-deed, I shall get the miras entered in your name.” Exhibit A, the agreement, is of the same date. It recites the purchase of the land and provides that “if you pay me in cash the sum of Rs. 455 in the Act season of any year within the third vear from this day, I shall receive and deliver possession of the said land to you on that date……………Besides I shall execute and give you a release deed in respect of that land on the stamp you will give me. If you delay to pay money and receive the sale-deed and the release deed till after the date abovementioned this agreement shall stand cancelled.” It is contended before us that the sale and the re-purchase are obviously part of the same transaction, and I agree that this is so.

It is then contended that where the transaction is all one, it amounts to a mortgage, whatever was the intention of the parties ascertainable from evidence properly admissible. This is a proposition I am unable to accept. If the Transfer of Property Act makes such a document a mortgage, then certainly the intention of the parties is immaterial. I have discussed this point in the case reported in Maruthai Goundan v. Dasappa Goundan and have there expressed the view which had Bakewell, J's co-concurrence that the legislature in Sect. 58 of the Transfer of Property Act did not intend to make transactions mortgages against the will of the parties, but only to provide that where the parties intended to make a mortgage the transaction was none the less a mortgage because it was put in the form of an outright sale and an agreement for repurchase. The opposite contention would necessarily go as far as this, that even if the agreement recited a refusal to grant a further loan the transaction would still be a mortgage. As I have pointed out, this view requires the substitution of the words—‘transferor’ for ‘mortgagor’, ‘transferee’ for ‘mortgagee’ and ‘consideration’ for ‘mortgage money’ in clause (c) of Sect. 58. I am aware that my learned brother takes a diametrically opposite view and that there is other authority to which he has referred which supports his contention, but, with deference to his opinion, I do not think the language of the section supports this view. I quite agree that the Act in several places uses the word ‘vendor’ in relation to contracts prior to sale. But I do not think that this affects the question. To my mind, the word ‘mortgagor’ means a person intending to create a mortgage by the transaction just as ‘vendor’ sometimes means a person who has made a contract intended to be followed by a sale. I know of no provision in the code under which a person is called ‘vendor’ who did not intend eventually to make a sale. If the object of the legislature had been to make such a drastic alteration in the existing law as to make documents inter partes operate both against their form and against the intention of the parties so that all such transactions become mortgages, it seems to me that it could have found words more apt for the purpose than those which we have here. And further, I can see no reason why we should attribute to the legislature an intention to do something with regard to conditional mortgages which it is not doing to other forms of mortgages, namely, to create a mortgage against the will of the parties. Sect. 58 begins by defining a mortgage and says that (in the circumstances set out) the transferor is called a mortgagor and the transferee, a mortgagee and the money of which payment is secured, the mortgage money. It then proceeds to enumerate four forms which a mortgage can take, namely, simple mortgage, mortgage by conditional sale, usufructuary mortgage and English mortgage; and I do not think that it intended to do anything more than enumerate. This is my view on the language of the section, but if it is permissible to go to the law prior to the Act as I must assume that it is in view of the fact that Courts have differed on the construction of the Act, there can be little doubt what the law was. In a recent case decided by the Privy Council reported in Jhanda Singh v. Wahidnddin where the sale and agreement to repurchase were prior to the Transfer of Property Act, their Lordships expressly state that it was not disputed that the test in such cases was the intention of the parties to the instruments. But that intention must be gathered from the language of the documents themselves viewed in the light of the surrounding circumstances. Their Lordships refer with approval to the judgment of Lord Cranworth in Alderson v. White which is as follows:—That prima facie an absolute conveyance containing nothing to show that the relation of debtor and creditor is to exist between the parties does not cease to be an absolute conveyance and become a mortgage, merely because the vendor stipulates that he shall have a right to a repurchase. In the Manchester, Sheffield, Lincolnshire Railway Company v. The North Central Wagon Company, Lord Macnaughten says on page 568: ‘In all these cases the question is what was the real intention of the parties’ and quotes with approval the decision in Alderson v. White. For the present I do not think it necessary to decide what the intention of the parties was, as I think we should get a ruling from the Full Bench on the broad question on which my learned brother and I differ. I would therefore refer to a Full Bench the question whether where in one and the same transaction land is sold absolutely but with a right of repurchase to be exercised before a certain date, the transaction necessarily becomes by virtue of Sect. 58 of the Transfer of Property Act a mortgage by conditional sale, whatever the intention of the parties might have been.

[This Second Appeal came on for hearing on the 3rd and 4th days of February 1919, in pursuance of the above order of reference before the Full Bench as constituted above.]

Mr. S. Muthiah Mudaliar for the Appellant.

Mr. A. Krishnaswami Aiyar for Mr. B. Sitarama Row for the Respondents.

OPINION

Sir John Wallis, C. J.—it is in my opinion not open to us to answer the question referred to us in the affirmative consistently with the decisions of the Privy Council in Pattabhiramier v. Vencatarow Naicken, Thumbusawmy Moodelly v. Hossain Rowthen, Situl Purshad v. Luchmi Purshad, Bhagwan Sahai v. Bhagwan Din, Balkishen Das v. W. F. Legge, and Jhanda Singh v. Wahiduddin. All these decisions lay down that in cases in India not governed by Bengal Regulation XVI of lb06 instruments of this kind are to take effect according to their tenor, unless it appears from the terms of the instrument or the surrounding circumstances, excluding oral evidence of intention as inadmissible, that the intention was to effect a mortgage. In Thumbusawmy Moodelly v. Hossain Rowthen, the Privy Council refused to disturb a decision of this Court which took a different view, because it considered that the parties might have been misled by a course of decisions in this Court which their Lordships held to be erroneous, but they also indicated with sufficient clearness that there was no room for any such misconception in future,

In Balkishen Das v. W. F. Legge, there were held to be sufficient indications that the transaction was intended to be a mortgage, and this decision was explained as proceeding on this ground in the subsequent decision in Jhanda Singh v. Wahiduddin.

It is true that all these cases dealt with transactions before the passing of the Transfer of Property Act, but I do not think that Act made any difference in the law on this subject in this part of India. In Balkishen Das v. W. F. Legge, their Lordships observed that it might be assumed that the framers of the Transfer of Property Act intended in Sect. 58 to state the existing law and practice in India. The section begins with a definition of the terms “mortgage” “mortgagor” and “mortgagee,” and proceeds, as pointed out by Napier, J. to describe or define the different sorts of mortgages which are met with in India. Sub-Sect. (c) deals with mortgages by conditional sale, in which the transaction is ostensibly a sale or transfer of ownership in exchange for a price, (Sect. 54), but is really intended to be a mortgage or transfer of an interest in specific immoveable property for the purpose of securing the payment of money, Sect. 55 (a). As the transaction is really a mortgage and only ostensibly a sale, Sub-Sect. (c) refers to the transferor as the mortgagor, and speaks of the ostensible sale of the mortgaged property subject to certain conditions as to the payment of the mortgage money. Whether a particular transaction is really a tale, or ostensibly a sale and really a mortgage, must still be decided in accordance with the decisions of the Privy Council in the cases already cited. There is in my opinion nothing in the definition in Sect. 58 (c) which favours the view that, wherever the sale-deed and the agreement to reconvey form one transaction, it must necessarily be a mortgage and not a sale. On the other hand, both in Situl Purshad v. Luchmi Purshad and Bhagwan Sahai v. Bhagwan Din there was clearly only one transaction, and it was none the less held by the Privy Council to be a sale and not a mortgage. For these reasons, I am of opinion that the decision in Palaniappan v. Subbaraya Gounden should be overruled and the question answered in the negative.

Oldfield, J.—I agree.

Seshagiri Aiyar, J.—I entirely agree with the learned Chief Justice. But out of deference to the opinion of Mr. Justice Sadasiva Aiyar from whom we are differing, I wish to say a few words. In Pattabhiramier v. Vencatarow Naicken the Judicial Committee laid down that a contract between the parties should be interpreted according to its tenor and that the practice of reading into it preconceived legal principles should be discouraged. All the subsequent judgments of the Privy Council seem to me to emphasise this cardinal principle. In Thumbusawmy Moodelly v. Hossain Rowthen, the Judicial Committee construed the document in that case as a mortgage because they held that the parties to that contract must be deemed to have contracted with reference to the wrong view of law enunciated by the Sudder Court at Madras before Pattabhiramier v. Vencatarow Naicken was decided. They further said that the legislature should intervene to correct the impression which the decisions of the Sudder Court had left in the minds of the litigant public. In Situl Purshad v. Luchmi Purshad Singh, which related to a contract before the passing of the Transfer of Property Act, although the documents were of the same date, the Privy Council held that the transaction was a sale and not a mortgage. They stated that evidence can be looked into to ascertain the intention of the parties. In Bhagwau Sahai v. Bhagwau Din, where also the documents were of the same date, the transaction was construed as a sale. In Balkishen Das v. Legge it was held that the transaction amounted to a mortgage. But it was pointed out that in the documents themselves there were “indications that the parties intended to effect a mortgage by conditional sale.” It was further said that the Transfer of Property Act was framed in accordance with the existing law and practice regarding mortgages. The next case before the Board was Jhanda Singh v. Wahiduddin, Here again their Lordships held that the transaction was an out and out sale. Their Lordships said that the intention of the parties which was the test in such cases must be gathered from the language of the documents themselves viewed in the light of the surrounding circumstances. This is a distinct direction to Courts in India that in such matters the intention of the parties and the surrounding circumstances are the proper guide and not the fact that the documents were of the same date or that they were expressed in any particular form. After this statement of the law it is not open to Courts in India to lay down any inflexible rule from the bare fact that the documents were of even date or were interdependent upon a single settlement. Mr. Muthiah Mudaliar, referred in support of the view taken by Mr. Justice Sadasiva Aryar to the use of the expression ‘one transaction’ in page 288 of this judgment. Their Lordships said:—“If no such agreement was made before the deed of sale was executed and the latter deed was an after-thought, only suggesting itself after the sale-deed had been executed and delivered, it would not suffice. The execution of the deed of sale and of the contract of repurchase would then form two separate and independent transactions, not two connected and interdependent parts of one and the same transaction.” I do not understand their Lordships to lay down that if there was a single settlement and the two documents are connected and are interdependent it must necessarily lead to the inference that there was a mortgage and not a sale. All that was said was that an essential requisite for construing such documents as a mortgage is that they should be dependent upon a single arrangement, and not that such a test is a conclusive criterion of the transaction being a mortgage. I do not propose to consider the decisions of the various High Courts. In Madras, after Thumbusawmy Moodelly v. Hossain Rowthen there have been some cases which are not quite reconcilable with each other. But these cases do not help us much. It is in Palaniappan v. Subbaraya Gounden that Mr. Justice Sadasiva Aiyar enunciated the proposition which has led to this reference. If I may say so with respect, the learned Judge does not attach sufficient importance to the language of Sect. 58, cl. (c) of the Transfer of Property Act. I agree with Mr. Justice Napier that the use of the word mortgage is not per incuriam. Cl. (c) speaks of a “mortgagor ostensibly selling the mortgaged property.” That language implies that there must be in reality a mortgage and that the sale must be merely a cloak. A party who wishes the document to be understood as being different from what the words suggest should show that the form in which the language is clothed does not express the real intention of the parties and that in substance the parties intended that there should be a transaction different from what the language imports. In other words, there must be evidence to show that the parties intended a mortgage although they used expressions which prima facie connote a sale. I am therefore of opinion that the question referred to us must be answered in the negative.

S. S.Question answered in the negative