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Annaya Tantri v. Ammakka Hengsu
Summary of the Full Bench Opinion — Succession to Archaka (Priestly) Office
Factual and Procedural Background
This Second Appeal arose from a suit by a plaintiff widow seeking possession of property that had been enjoyed by her deceased husband and his predecessors in connection with performing the archaka (priestly) service in a temple. The courts below had given the widow a decree for possession. The Single Bench (Seshagiri Ayyar and Napier, JJ.) referred the crucial question to a Full Bench because of conflicting authorities, particularly the decision in Sundarambal Ammal v. Yogavana Gurukkal, which held that only those competent to perform archaka duties could receive the emoluments, and other decisions of this Court and other High Courts which had taken a contrary view allowing female succession and performance by deputy.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiff widow (a Hindu widow) is entitled to recover possession of property granted for performance of archaka (priestly) services, where the property had been enjoyed by her husband and his predecessors.
- Whether a Hindu widow is incompetent by reason of her sex from inheriting the service and emoluments of a priestly office held by her husband (i.e., whether sex-based incompetency prevents succession to an archaka office whose duties she cannot personally perform).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments (B. Sitarama Rao)
- Relied principally on Sundarambal Ammal v. Yogavana Gurukkal to argue that competency to perform archaka duties is essential; therefore a female who is not competent to perform those duties cannot inherit the office or its emoluments.
- Relied on Mohan Lalji v. Gordhan Lalji Maharaj (Privy Council) as supporting the principle that devolution inconsistent with the founder's purpose (i.e., to secure competent officiants) should be set aside; urged that competency for the office and the founder's purpose are the tests.
- Argued the question must be answered in the affirmative (i.e., the widow is incompetent to inherit by reason of sex).
Respondent's Arguments (K. P. Lakshmana Rao)
- Argued contra: that established usage in this Presidency (and decisions from Madras, Bombay, Calcutta High Courts) allows female succession to archaka offices where duties may be discharged by deputies; thus the widow was entitled to possession.
- Relied on a line of cases recognized in the Order of Reference and on Venkatarama Aiyangar v. Venkatarama Aiyangar to support the view that the office descends in ordinary succession and that women may inherit and employ deputies.
- Distinguished Mohan Lalji v. Gordhan Lalji Maharaj on its facts and local usages and argued it did not displace the established practice in this Presidency.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sundarambal Ammal v. Yogavana Gurukkal | Held that duties attaching to the archaka office are paramount; emoluments should go only to those personally competent to perform services. | Treated as the principal conflicting authority. Sadasiva Ayyar, J., adhered to its principle (dissenting view); the majority considered it but declined to overrule entrenched usage that allows female succession with performance by deputy. |
| Ramasundaram Pillai v. Savundrathammal and Kumaraswami Sastriyar | Reportedly dissented from Sundarambal — supporting the practice of female succession and/or performance by deputy. | Cited as part of the line of decisions taking a contrary view to Sundarambal and supporting female succession; relied upon by the majority. |
| Raja Rajeswari Ammal v. Subramania (Sabramania) Archakar | Phillips, JJ., dissented from Sundarambal’s approach (i.e., supported female succession / deputation). | Included among authorities that favour allowing females to inherit and to employ deputies; considered by the majority. |
| Mohan Lalji v. Gordhan Lalji Maharaj (Privy Council) | Principle: devolution in ordinary descent must be subject to the condition that such devolution is not inconsistent with the founder's purpose; competency to officiate is a sine qua non where necessary for the worship established. | Viewed by Sadasiva Ayyar, J., as strong support for excluding incompetent heirs (including by sex). The majority (Wallis, C.J.) distinguished it on its facts and local usage and declined to treat it as overruling the consistent practice in this Presidency. |
| Mohan Lalji v. Madhsudan Lala (High Court) | Descriptive background for the Gossain (Vallabhachariar) sect's practices. | Quoted to explain sectarian practices relevant to Mohan Lalji (Privy Council) facts; used to assess whether female holders had personally officiated. |
| Tangirala Chiranjivi v. Rajamanikya Rao | Holds there was no basis for assuming a minor, female or person unlearned in the Vedas loses the right to temple service. | Relied on as authority supporting the permissibility of female succession and against the assumption that females automatically lose rights to temple offices. |
| Mujavar Ibram Bibi v. Mujavar Hussain Sheriff | Indicates that if a female had gotten the service performed by proxy she would have been entitled; absence of proof of proxy performance was decisive there. | Used to support the proposition that service by deputy/proxy is an accepted practice and may sustain female succession. |
| Sheshu (Seshu) Ammal v. Soundararaja Aiyar | States that certain archaka merassee (hereditary priest offices) may descend to a female and have their functions performed by deputy. | Quoted as evidence of existing user in the Presidency allowing female succession with deputation; relied on by majority opinions. |
| Keshavbhat bin Ganeshbhat v. Bhagirathibai Kom Narayanbhat | Places on the objector the burden of proving a usage contrary to female succession; reserved liberty to reversioner to sue. | Relied on to show that absent proof of contrary usage, female succession and deputation are acceptable. |
| Sitarambhat v. Sitaram Ganesh | Proceeding on assumption that priestly office descends in ordinary succession through a daughter to her son. | Cited among authorities consistent with female descent and inheritance of priestly emoluments. |
| Kashiraj Namabhat | Included with Sitarambhat as supportive of ordinary descent including through females. | Listed as part of the body of decisions favouring female succession; used by the majority to show consistency of practice. |
| Dhuncooverbai v. Advocate-General | Decision earlier noted but said to be explainable on the ground that the office involved was not purely religious. | Mentioned as distinguishable and not controlling the general question before the Full Bench. |
| Poorun Narain Dutt v. Kasheessuree Dossee | Held that a woman can be a Mootwutullee and profits of a debutter can be received by a female. | Quoted by the Full Bench as supporting female succession to religious offices where custom permits. |
| Joy Deb Surmah v. Huroputty Surmah | An issue was sent down to ascertain whether a female can succeed to a priestly office; report does not state final finding. | Mentioned but the report is noted as inconclusive as to result; therefore of limited weight. |
| Mitta Kunth Audhicarry v. Neerunjan Audhicarry | Sir Richard Couch, C.J.: the right of performing worship follows same line of succession as private property. | Used to show judicial authority that religious office may follow ordinary inheritance rules, including descent through females. |
| Mahamaya Debi v. Haridas Haldar | Holds that a pala in the Kalighat Temple is heritable and it is immaterial whether the heir is male or female. | Cited for the proposition that in some institutions female succession is established beyond doubt; supportive of the majority view. |
| Venkatarama Aiyangar v. Venkatarama Aiyangar | Cited by respondent counsel in support of female succession and ordinary descent. | Relied upon by the respondents and noted by the Bench among the decisions favouring female succession. |
| Palaniappa Chetty v. Sreemath Devasikamony Pandara Sannadhi | Quoted for the general rule from the Privy Council that devolution must not be inconsistent with the founder's purpose. | Used by the Bench to state the established proposition that usages contrary to founders’ purpose are invalid; weighed differently by the judges on this reference. |
| Subraya Kakrannaya v. Subraya Padyaya | Listed among authorities tending to treat females as competent to succeed to archakaship in the Presidency. | Referenced by Spencer, J., as part of the trend of decisions supporting female succession. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Full Bench analyzed the question through multiple lenses: historical-developmental background of temples and archaka offices; principles of succession and usage; the practical realities of temple service (including deputation/proxy); and the weight of judicial precedent.
Historical and functional analysis:
- The Court surveyed the historical origins of temples and the archaka office (Puranic age, Sankara and later developments) to show that archaka offices were endowed with land and emoluments as a means to secure continuous temple service and livelihood for families engaged in worship.
- It observed that founders intended the due discharge of temple service but could not or did not effectively limit succession to heirs personally competent to officiate; they relied on heredity and social mechanisms to secure continuity.
- The Bench emphasized that archakas form distinct hereditary groups (gurukkals, Pancharatras, Vaikhanasas) with narrow fields of choice for officiants, making rigid insistence on personal competency impractical and potentially leading to escheat.
Precedent and usage:
- Majority (Wallis, C.J., and Spencer, J.) placed heavy weight on the established usage in the Presidency and the consistent line of decisions of this Court and other High Courts that allowed female succession and performance of duties by deputies where customary practice so provided.
- They treated user/usage as the best evidence of the founder's intention and observed executive administrative confirmations (Inam Commissioners confirming grants to widows and daughters) as supporting heredity as the accepted rule.
- Whereas Sadasiva Ayyar, J., emphasized shastric (scriptural) principles and the Privy Council decision in Mohan Lalji as supporting the rule that incompetency to perform rites defeats succession — he regarded usage that permits permanently disqualified claimants to appoint deputies as "seriously mischievous" and not to be recognized.
Proxy/deputy practice:
- The Bench examined evidence that in practice widows and daughters often employed deputies (gumastas) to perform services; several decisions and the Privy Council case were analyzed to see whether the female holders actually officiated or had deputies.
- Wallis, C.J., reasoned that deputies can adequately preserve the essential nature of worship and that there is no guarantee that a community-appointed successor would be better than a widow's deputy.
- Sadasiva Ayyar, J., countered that permanent deputation turns the office into a source of livelihood divorced from religious function and that deputation is often arranged on economical terms harmful to temple worship (the "Dutch auction" argument).
Application to the referral question:
- Wallis, C.J., concluded that the settled usage in the Presidency and the weight of consistent judicial decisions required answering the question in the negative (i.e., a widow is not incompetent by reason of sex to inherit where usage permits deputation).
- Sadasiva Ayyar, J., maintained his contrary view: where a person is permanently incompetent to perform rites (including by reason of sex), allowing inheritance defeats the founder's purpose and is legally invalid.
- Spencer, J., supported the majority, refusing to depart from stare decisis given the trend of decisions treating females as competent to succeed (subject to particular local customs to the contrary).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Full Bench answered the referred question in the negative. In other words, the majority held that a Hindu widow is not automatically incompetent by reason of her sex from inheriting the service and emoluments of a priestly (archaka) office where established usage in the relevant locality permits succession with the functions of the office to be discharged by deputy.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: the widow plaintiff's entitlement to possession (and to the emoluments associated with the archaka office) is supported by the majority view where local usage and precedent permit female succession and deputation. The decision upholds the line of prior cases in this Presidency that allowed women to inherit and hold priestly offices, subject to the prevailing usage.
- Precedential effect and guidance to lower courts: the Full Bench affirmed the settled practice in this Presidency and declined to adopt the narrower rule of Sundarambal Ammal and the Privy Council's narrower construction as a ground to overturn numerous prior decisions. Lower courts are to follow the majority's approach that gives controlling weight to established usage and administrative confirmations unless the usage is manifestly inconsistent with the founder's purpose or is manifestly injurious or opposed to public policy.
- Limitations noted by the Court: the decision does not lay down that females can succeed in every institution without regard to local custom; the Bench recognized that particular institutions may have special customs that exclude female succession and that a usage inconsistent with the founder's purpose is not binding.
- No new radical rule of law was created; the Full Bench primarily reaffirmed and clarified the existing trend of authorities in the Presidency and other High Courts permitting female succession where usage allows deputation, while recording a substantial dissent (Sadasiva Ayyar, J.) that would have held the opposite view.
Note: This summary is prepared strictly from the contents of the provided opinion text. It does not add facts or interpretive material that are not present in the opinion excerpt.
This Second Appeal came on for hearing in the first instance before Seshagiri Ayyar and Napier, JJ., who made the following Order of Reference to a Full Bench
Seshagiri Ayyar, J.:— The question for consideration in this Second Appeal is whether the plaintiff, a widow, is entitled to recover possession of the property which was enjoyed by her husband and his predecessors by doing archaka, service in a temple. The Courts below have given her a decree for possession. Mr. Sitarama Rao relying on Sundarambal Ammal v. Yogavana Gurukkal(1) has argued at some length that as the plaintiff is not competent to perform the archaka service, she is not entitled to the property, Ayling and Hannay, JJ., in Ramasundaram Pillai v. Savundrathammal and Kumaraswami Sastriyar and Phillips, JJ., in Raja Rajeswari Ammal v. Sabramania Archakai(2) have dissented from Sundarambal Ammal v. Yogavana Guruhkal(3).
In these circumstances, it becomes necessary to consider the question in some detail as to which of these conflicting views should be followed.
In Sundarambal Ammal v. Yogavana Gurukkal Sadasiva Ayyar, J., who delivered the leading judgment, lays stress upon the duties attaching to the archaka office as opposed to rights, and says that the emoluments should go only to those who are competent to perform the services. It is true that from the point of view of the worshipper, it is the fitness of the archaka for the discharge of his duties that has to be considered. From the point of view of the archaka, the question of secular rights is more important. In considering the relative importance of the two functions and in endeavouring to reconcile these two conceptions, the historical aspect of the grant for service in temples may be considered.
It is often said that there is nothing in the Hindu Law texts on the question. It may seem strange that in a country where religion plays such an important part in the daily concerns of the people, there should be so little about succession, etc., to religious institutions and offices in the writings of the Rishis or of their commentators. The reason is not far to seek.
In the Vedas and in the ancient Smritis, we do not hear of the founding of temples. It is to the Puranic age that we owe their existence. In Manu's days, the only religious teacher was the ascetic sanyasi. He gave instructions to his disciples, who in their turn spread the light of wisdom among the lay people. There were no places of worship, and no images to worship. It is to Buddha that India owes, the introduction of fixed places of worship and of ordained orders of preachers. In Buddhism there are three essentials: (a) Adoration of Buddha, (b) Observance of his laws and (c) the congregation. Buddha instituted the order of monks and nuns with a view to religious instruction being imparted to the uninitiated. Places of shelter or refuge were founded in order that the world-weary may retire to them and receive religious consolation. From these simple beginnings a disciplined army of Bikshus came into existence, and edifices known as monasteries were erected to afford facilities for prayer, consultation and contemplation. It is to this period that we owe the founding of temples in Southern India. The followers of Buddha pursued a policy which was resented by the orthodox. Temples for the worship of Siva and Vishnu were established mostly by non-Aryans at or about this time to circumvent the Buddhistic influence.
The second period begins with the advent of Sankara. He found that the ancient worship of the elements was losing hold on the popular mind, and that the people were being led by the precepts of Buddhism into the track of atheism. He had to fight blind orthodoxy behind him and materialism ahead of him. He adopted a compromise. He founded Mutts which took the place of monasteries. He founded various orders of sanyasins who were enjoined to land celibate lives and to impart religious instruction. He undoubtedly succeeded in driving Buddhism from the land and he laid the foundation for institutions which cannot be said to have fully served the purpose which he had in mind.
The successors of Sankara did not find it easy to console the religiously-inclined by the doctrines of advaitic philosophy. Sankara was described as the pseudo-Buddha. The common people hankered after something more real than is to be had in the severely logical philosophy of Sankara. Three philosophers who gave prominence to the existence of a personal God diverted public attention from Sankara's teachings. The Vaishnavites, the Madhwas and the Saivites founded independent Mutts where the Dvaitic philosophy was taught. They had to proceed a step further. They accepted control over existing temples and encouraged the construction of new temples in honour of the particular Deity they represented as the Supreme Being.
As this is a rough summary of events, I should not be understood as saying that all the temples in India came into existence only in the way I have described. There were apparently some independent institutions.
By this time, the Puranas had gained a hold on the popular mind, and the worship of the avatars of Vishnu and of the manifestations of Siva came to be regarded as the essential feature of religious life among the people. Rich endowments were made for the upkeep of the temples. But the priest capable of rendering services in these institutions had to be found. It has always been the belief in India that the nearer a man is to God, the farther is he from Him. The following slokas from the writings of Vaidyanatha Dikahitar express the ultra orthodox and conservative view of the office of an archaka in a Hindu temple:—
The above slokas (verses) may be translated thus:—
“Saathathapa” says:
“A Vipra (Brahman) who performs pooja for the sake of money for a period of three years is known as the Devalaka: such a person becomes incompetent to participate in the usual Harya and Kavya rites enjoined on Brahmans.”
Again it is laid down in the same work in the Samgraha.
“A Vipra, who, though he may be well-versed in the four Vedas is desirous of getting money, and who performs the worship of the gods for the sake of another will be considered equal to a Chandala.
The Devalakas are classed under three beads: Some as Karmadevalakas: others as Kalpadevalakas, and the rest as Suddhadevalakas.
He who knows the precepts as ordained in the Aagamas and makes a living by performing worship to Rudra and Kali is called Suddhadevalaka, and is excluded from taking part in all rites
A person performing pooja will not become a Devalaka if the worship is conducted in accordance with the sacred injunctions of the Rishis. Therefore great care should be taken to have the pooja conducted according to the precepts of the Vedas. He is called a Karmadevalaka who for the sake of money always performs the worship of the gods for attainment of wordily objects, such a person is unfit to take part in religious rites.
An archaka even if he is an authority on the four Vedas and knows the rites prescribed in Pancharathra is known as Kalpadevalaka if he is devoid of Deeksha, i.e, consecration.”
Then the propitiatory ceremonies for these mercenary acts are prescribed: “A Brahman who sells for another the Nitya Karamas (daily rites) such as Snanam (bathing), Ishtapoortham (performance of pious or charitable deeds, performing sacrifices, and digging wells and doing other acts of charity), Uposhanam (fasting) and other Vrathams (religious acts) of devotion as are ordained in the Vedas and Smritis has to perform by way of penance, Maghasnanam in the month of Maagha, three chandrayanams and fresh Samskaras, should then take in Panchagavya and thus become completely purified.”
The archakas having been looked down upon in the above manner, naturally great inducements had to be offered by liberal grants of land and by the promise of perquisites. That is how the archaka office came to be founded.
I have thus far given a brief outline of the origin and spread of temples and of the manner in which the archaka office was instituted. My survey shows that the founder of the temples looked to the due discharge of the serious in the temple as his primary and sole object. The archaka accepted his position as giving primarily a means of livelihood to him and to his posterity, and as ultimately enabling him to minister to God. The existence of various inams in the names of the archakas is irrefutable evidence that which endowments were granted to them to bind them to the service of the Deity. These endowments were intended, and in most cases expressed to be, from generation to generation. It may be assumed that the donors were not over-anxious to make hereditary grants to the donees' family without regard to the lather's capacity to perform religious worship; but the law would not have permitted them to stipulate that the property shall be enjoyed only by those competent to minister in the temple. They must have trusted to chance to see that the descendants of the donees carried on the good work for which their predecessors were given grants.
Mr. Justice Sadasiva Ayyar asks why, if that must be presumed to have been the intention of the donor, should the inheritance go to persona who by themselves are incapable of discharging the duties. The answer is that Courts and even legislatures must trust to the same chance which the founders calculated upon when they endowed the archaka office. What reason have Courts for holding that a reversioner would be a more welcome minister of religion than the gumasta employed by a widow to perform the services? It would be an ideal to be sought after, if the community interested in temple worship were to be permitted to select on the death of an archika a person competent to fill his place. Even in this view, can we trust to society here or elsewhere to be guided in the selection of an archaka solely by considerations of religious merit and fitness? There is no guarantee that a nominee of the community would be a fitter archaka than the proxy of the widow. No constant he would be worse than a male reversioner of the last archaka. Under such circumstances, there cannot be much room for double, that society would prefer that the secular rights with the obligations to do or to get done the spiritual duties should vest in the line of heirs to whom private property would descend. The confirmation of numerous grants in this Presidency by the Inam Commissioners in the name of the widows and daughters of the deceased archakas indicates that the Government of the country have recognized the principle of heredity as the only safe guide in such matters. I see no reason why Courts should not be guided by the executive action of the Government in these matters.
I shall briefly refer to one other reason why the principle of heredity should not be departed from in the case of these offices. It is common knowledge that the archakis of a temple form a caste among themselves. They are a select people. In the case of the great temple at Chidambaram, they claim to have come down to earth with the Deity. They do not intermarry with the other Brahman sects. Among these people, the moment that a boy is married, he gets a share in the emoluments of the ??? office. This testifies to the solicitude of this class of people for an early expansion of the sect. In the case of other Siva temples, the archakas are known as gurukkals. Unfortunately they are a diminishing race. They are not permitted to take brides from other Brahman sects and worship in a temple cannot be performed by a Brahman who is not a gurukkal. In the Vaishnava temples, there are two prominent classes of the archakas: the Pancharatras and the Vaikhanasas. I do not believe even these intermarry. A temple whose services are performed according to Pancharatra rituals cannot be served by a Vaikhanasa archaka and vice versa. These limitations show that the field of choice for the archaka service in Hindu temples is very limited. It would often lead to the application of the principle of escheat, if the grants made for their services are not continued in the line of the heirs of the last male archaka.
I have referred to the above considerations out of deference to the views of my learned brother Sadasiva Aiyar, J. No one shows more anxiety than the learned Judge that the true intent of a grant should be strictly enforced. I respectfully share his anxiety, but as I have shown above, the change to which he gives his sanction while upsetting fixity of tenure and disturbing long understood and enforced notions of rights of property, is not calculated to bring the Courts any the carer to the administration of the golden rule that competency to minister and capacity to inherit should go band-in-hand. I am therefore unable to hold that the widow is not entitled to inherit her husband's property granted for the performance of religious services.
I shall now examine the case law on the point to see how far the learned Judge's conclusions are supported by decided cases.
I shall first deal with Mohan Lalji v. Gordhan Lalji Maharaj which apparently has not been considered in any of the three decisions of this Court, and on which Mr. Sitarama Rao naturally laid great stress the facts of the case must be examined in some detail in order to show that while it does not lend support to the contention of the learned vakil, it can be regarded as an authority for the proposition I have suggested. The temple in respect of which the office was claimed belonged to the Gossain sect of Vallabhachariars. The Vallabhachariars as explained in the judgment of the High Court of Allahabad in Mohan Lalji v. Madhsudan Lala from which there was an appeal to the Judicial Committee is Mohan Lalji v. Gordhan Lalji Maharaj are a Vaishnava sect of religious teachers who founded temples. The question before the Judicial Committee was whether the grandson by the daughter of the last male archaka was entitled be succeed to the office and the emoluments in preference to the reversioner of the last sale-holder. It was found in that case that the Gossain seat of Vallabhachariara took daughters from a sect known as the Bhat in marriage. On the marriage of the Bhat daughter into the Gossain family she was initiated into the mantram of the Gossain sect. The ritual in a Gossain temple was essentially different from the ritual observed by the Bhats in their temples. The Gossain daughters ware similarly married by Bhats, and I take it although it is not so mentioned in either the judgment of the High Court or in that of the Privy Council, that the Gossain daughter marrying a Bhat husband would be initiated into the mantram of the Bhat sect. I must not omit to mention a statement in the judgment of the Right Hon'ble Mr. Ammer Ali that the daughters of a Gossain, although married into a Bhat family, generally remained in the Gossain house. In these circumstances the question was whether in a temple whose rituals were of the Gossain sect, a Bhat grandson of the late male Gossain could inherit the office and the emoluments. The Judicial Committee held that he could not. It is stated in the judgment of the Board that after the death of the last male-holder his widow and his daughter were in enjoyment of the office and emoluments. Mr. Sitarama Rao suggested that the widow and the daughter were competent to perform the religious worship in the Gossain temple. There is no express mention of their having officiated in the temples. From my experience of South India I cannot believe that where a large congregation of males assemble for worship, a female would be allowed to perform religious service within the temple. In the north the Goshe system is prevalent and the seclusion of women is more pronounced than in the south; and I would require very strong evidence to hold that the widow and the daughter of the deceased male Gossain ware as a matter of fact officiating as priestesses in the temple. I must take it that they employed deputes to perform their duties. If my surmise is correct, it lends great support to the proposition that so long as the service can be done by a proxy, there can be no objection to women inheriting the office and emoluments of an archaka.
Then it was argued, if a proxy was held competent to perform the duties, why should not a Bhat grandson have been allowed to inherit the office and the emoluments on the understanding that he should employ a Gossain priest to officiate in the temple. Tue position of a widow or daughter and a grandson are not in pari materia. In the case of a grandson, he starts a new line of descendants and to countenance the employment of a perpetual gumastah in the case of males would not be right; therefore the Judicial Committee held that as a grandson suo moto is entitled to minister in the temple and as the grandson was of Bhat origin and incompetent to perform religious worship in, a Gossain temple, he should be discarded in favour of a Gossain reversioner who was competent to perform religious worship by himself. In that judgment, however, it is pointed out that ordinarily the descent of debutter property vesting in an officiating priest would go to the ordinary heirs of the last bolder unless there was some usage of course of devolution or some other circumstance to indicate a different mode of devolution. The conclusion of the Judicial Committee was that in the particular case, the circumstances and the usage pointed to a mode of devolution different from that of the ordinary descent of property. In my opinion, this decision is to authority for the proposition that competency to officiate is a sine qua non of capacity to inherit. On the other hand the fact that the widow and ??? daughter were allowed to inherit the office and the emoluments is a strong indication that service in a temple can be rendered by a proxy so long as the essential nature of the worship is not departed from.
Now, I shall deal with the other cases bearing on the question. In Tangirala Chiranjivi v. Rajamanikya Rao Benson and Sundara Ayyar, JJ., said:
“The District Judge has assumed that a minor, a female and a person unlearned in the Vedas would lose the right to the service in the temple. There is no basis for the assumption.”
My experience of life is this Presidency is that in enumerable cases services in a temple are performed by proxies employed by women. In Mujavar Ibram Bibi v. Mujavar Hussain Sheriff referring to the competency of a Muhammadan lady to perform the duties of Majuvar of a Durga which was not of a secular nature, Turner, C.J, and Kindersley, J. stated that it was not proved
“that the plaintiff had ever participated in the profits or performed the duties by proxy,”
thereby indicating that if she had got the service done by a proxy she would have been entitled to the office. In Sheshu Ammal v. Soundararaja Aiyar the learned Judges state:
“They further explain that an Archika Meerassee, which is the species of Meerassee involved in Suit No. III of 1846, on the file of the Hindu Sudder Ameen referred to by the Civil Judge, and a Poorohita Meerassee also instanced by the Civil Judge, may descend to a female and the functions thereof be performed by deputy.”
These are all the Madras decisions, and Mr. Ganapati Ayyar in his book on Religious Endowments after reviewing these authorities has come to the conclusion that it has been the uniform practice in Madras to allow females to inherit; the archaka service and the emoluments. In Bombay the same view has been held. In Keshavbhat bin Ganeshbhat v. Bhagirathibai Kom Narayanbhat the learned Judges state the law thus:
“Finally, with respect to the objection, that a Hindu female cannot perform the duties attached to the office for the maintenance of which the allowance was granted it may be observed that the defendant has act proved the existence of any usage in conformity with his allegation.”
So the burden was cast upon the objector to show that the usage was different. At the end of the judgment the learned Judges reserved liberty to the reversioner to bring a suit to support his position that a widow was not competent to inherit the office and the emoluments of archaka. In Sitarambhat v. Sitaram Ganesh and Kashiraj Namabhat the learned Judges of whom Couch, C.J, was one, proceeded on the assumption that the priestly office would descend in the ordinary line of succession through a daughter to her son. The decision in Dhuncooverbai v. Advocate-General may be explained away as Sadasiva Ayyar, J., suggests on the ground that the office inherited by the widow was not a purely religious one.
The decisions of the Calcutta High Court also support this proposition. In Poorun Narain Dutt v. Kasheessuree Dossee(4) the learned Judges say:
“It has been held in this Court that a woman can be a Mootwutullee, and that the profits of a debutter can be revived by a female.”
They held in that case that a woman can succeed to the office. In Joy Deb Surmah v. Huroputty Surmah(5) an issue was sent down to ascertain whether a female can succeed to a priestly office. The report does not say what the result of the finding was. In Mitta Kunth Audhicarry v. Neerunjan Audhicarry(6) Sir Richard Couch, C.J, says that
“the right of performing worship of an idol follows the same line of succession as that; of private property.”
In Mahamaya Debi v. Haridas Haldar Mr. Justice Mukherjee says at page 475:—
“There is no question that a pala in the Kalighat Temple is heritable and it is immaterial whether the heir is a male or female. The custom in this respect is established beyond doubt.”
These are all the authorities available on the question. None earlier than Sundarambal Ammal v. Yogavana Gurukkal has been cited in which it has been laid down that a female is not entitled to inherit a priestly office and the emoluments. The decisions are practically uniform and it would lead to an unnecessary disturbance of rights of property, if we introduce the innovation that a female is not entitled to succeed to an archaka office or emoluments. As regards the quotation from Jagannatha's digest which Mr. Justice Sadasiva Ayyar has extracted in his judgment, I may say that I have read it very carefully and there is no expression in it of any decided view one way or the other. The author quotes the contentions of both sides and leaves the reader to draw his own inference from the two statements. I am rather inclined to think that the weight of argument, if any, is in favour of giving females their right to hold religious office.
Although I have come to this conclusion, having regard to the strong view held by Sadasiva Ayyar, J., and having also regard to the fact that it is necessary that a uniform principle should be enunciated in this matter to guide the Courts below, I think it desirable that the following question should be referred for the opinion of the Full Bench, namely, “whether a Hindu widow is incompetent by reason of her sex from inheriting the service and emoluments of a priestly office held by her husband.”
Napier, J.:— I agree that this question should be referred to a Full Bench in the terms suggested by my learned brother.
On this Reference—
B. Sitarama Rao for appellant.—The question must be answered in the affirmative, as a female is not qualified to the duties of the Archaka office. I rely on Mohan Lalji v. Gordhan Lalji Maharaj which has not been considered in any of the cases before; it lays down that competency for the office and the purpose the founder bad in view in creating the office are the tests; see also Sundarambal Ammal v. Yogavana Gurukkal. Joy Deb Surmah v. Huroputty Surmah and Mahamaya Debi v. Haridas Haldar were distinguished.
K.P Lakshmana Rao for respondent argued contra and relied on the arguments in the Order of Reference and quoted Venkatarama Aiyangar v. Venkatarama Aiyangar in addition to the cases therein noted and distinguished Mohan Lalji v. Gordhan Lalji Maharaj.
The Court expressed the following Opinions:—
Wallis, C.J:— It is well settled that the succession to temple offices is governed by user which is taken to represent the intentions of the founder, and it is not disputed that in this part of India the user in the case of temple archakas is that the office is hereditary and descends in the ordinary course of succession to women who are not themselves competent to perform the duties of the office by ministering in the temple and perform them by deputy. The opinion of the pandits in 1853 in Seshu Ammal v. Soundararaja Ayyar shows that this was then the recognized usage. The question appears to have first come before the Court in 1910, but since that time there have been numerous decisions where the user has been recognized and enforced, and all the Hindu members of the Court with one-exception have been parties to these decisions which also are conformable with the decisions of other High Courts. The only authority the other way is the judgment of Sadasiva Ayyar, J., in Sundarambal Ammal v. Yogavana Gurukkal who considered that on principle a personally disqualified heir could not inherit the office and delegate the duties to others. In the argument before us it was again contended that the decision of the Privy Council in Mohan Lalji v. Gordhan Lalji Maharaj was in accordance with this view and must be taken to have overruled the other cases. In that case the office of archaka had descended to the widow and daughter of the last male archaka, and the question was whether the daughter was to be succeeded by her son or by the raversioner of the last male holder. The archakas were gossains and there was a usage among them that females continued to belong to their father's kul or family after marriage. On this ground apparently the daughter had been allowed to fill the office even though married to a member of the Bhat community who was incapable of filling it. No question arose in that case as to the right of the widow and her daughter after her to fill the office; and it does not appear whether while they held it they performed the duties in person or by deputy. What their Lordships had to consider we, whether on the daughter's death the office should go to her son and her descendants, a line of heirs who, as Bhats, would be incapable of performing its duties, or should revert to the male heirs of the last male holder. Their Lordships at p. 288 observe:
“The rule as to the shebaitship being vested in the heir of the founder must from the very nature of the right, be subject to the condition that the devolution in the ordinary line of descent is not inconsistent with or opposed to the purpose the founder had in view in establishing the worship”
and they say later on at page 239 that
“to allow the plaintiff's claim to an admittedly Ballav temple where the rights are performed according to Ballav ritual, which it is clearly established they cannot perform, would in their Lordships' judgment, defeat the purpose for which the worship was established.”
A contrary decision would have involved the devolution of the office to a line of heirs incompetent to perform its duties. Moreover, the plaintiff's claim in that case was not shown to be in accordance with any well recognized user which is the best evidence of the founder's intentions. I do not consider that this decision of their Lordships warrants us in overruling the numerous decisions of this Court in conformity with the decisions of other Courts by which the widow and daughter of the last male archaka are held entitled in accordance with the established user to succeed to the office of archaka discharging its duties by deputy and to transmit it to their heirs, who, as male heirs are preferred to female, will generally be competent to perform the duties in person. Sadasiva Ayyar, J., for whose opinion I have a great respect, considers, if I rightly understand him, that the established custom of female succession to this office is of so mischievous and objectionable a character that it cannot have been intended by the founder. That view is not shared by Seshagiri Ayyar, J., who has considered this aspect of the case in the Order of Reference, or by the other Hindu members of the Court who have considered the question. We should not in my opinion be justified in overruling on this ground the numerous decisions of this Court in which the usage has been recognized and enforced, unless its mischievous character had been established beyond all doubt or controversy. This has not been done and I feel bound to answer the question in the negative.
Sadasiva Ayyar, J.:— I have carefully reconsidered my decision in Sundarambal Ammal v. Yogavana Gurukkal in the light of the later decisions of this Court quoted by my learned brother Mr. Justice Seshagiri Ayyar in his Order of Reference, also of his own keen and yet considerate criticisms (if I may be permitted to say so) of my said decision and also of the opinions of my Lord and of Mr. Justice Spencer on this reference. I am, notwithstanding, unable to convince myself that my opinion was erroneous. On the other hand, the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Mohan Lalji v. Gordhan Lalji Maharaj lends, in my opinion, strong support to my conclusion. With respect, I am unable to agree with Mr. Justice Seshagiri Ayyar that the widow and daughter of the last male Shebait of the Ballavacharya Gossain sect in the Privy Council case must have been not competent to perform the duties of the office and must have “employed deputies to perform the duty” and that their enjoyment of the emoluments of the office during their lifetime must be due to their having performed the duties through such deputies and not directly. On the contrary, it seems to me clear from the report that the out-of-date unshastraic custom obtaining in the South by which Dharmapathnies (who are Sahadharmacharinees of their husbands) are considered incompetent to pronounce mantrams and do religious duties along with (and even solely in the absence of) their husbands does not obtain among the Ballavacharya Gossains, one of the Vaishnavite sects which are in several respects much more liberal in the treatment of women and birth-sudras than other sects though many Vaishnavite sects might have become very degenerate in other respects.
I am farther unable to see that my conclusion as to Jagannatha's opinion and the weight of the authority of the texts quoted by him being in my favour is wrong.
A general rule has been laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council that where a person is incompetent to perform the rites of a religious office, it would defeat the very purpose for which the worship was established if he (including of course ‘she’) is allowed to inherit the office. Any usage inconsistent with such purpose is clearly invalid in law. [See Palaniappa Chetty v. Sreemath Devasikamony Pandara Sannadhi].
I am unable to appreciate any distinction in principle between the incompetency of the claimant to the office by reason of sex and the incompetency due to any other cause. I do not think that the pronouncement of their Lordships of the Privy Council can be got round through any such distinction.
Though ‘law’ is not always logical and though the narrow point referred to us relates to inheritance by a person incompetent by reason of sex alone for performing the duties of a religious office, I do not think that considerations of the difficulties which are aggressively prominent when we take the four analogous cases(1) of a male heir being incompetent by reason of conversion to another faith when the inheritance opens, (2) of his becoming incompetent after the inheritance opens, (3) of a female heir being incompetent by reason of conversion before the inheritance opens and (4) becoming incompetent after the inheritance opens, can be kept out of mind in deciding the present reference, especially having regard to the provisions of Act XXI of 1850.
Coming to the weight to be given to practice and usage many pernicious and unshastraic usages have crept into the Hindu religious and social systems during dark mediaeval days and through efflux of time. Most of them entered gradually and insidiously through the tendency of that subtle materialism which sometimes parades as strict orthodox spirituality. The letter is exalted over the spirit, the so-called hereditary rights are given more importance than the performance of the religious duties, instead of the rights being kept as a very subordinate adjunct and appurtenance of the duties, and religious offices and caste status are looked upon more as intended for the means of livelihood and for the enjoyment of worldly power and material possessions than as things bestowed upon one for helping all humanity in its evolutionary progress towards the common goal.
I respectfully agree with my Lord that the law as at present settled by the decisions of the Privy Council is that unless the usages in connexion with religious institutions and offices are manifestly immoral or opposed to public policy or opposed to the intentions of the founders of a religious trust or manifestly injurious to the trust, the Courts are not entitled to go back for the law to the purer, more liberal and more ancient shastraic fountain heads. The question therefore narrows itself to this: Whether the usage relied on by the respondents is manifestly injurious (both in its material and moral aspects) to the religious institution, and whether it could have been in conformity with the intention of the founder of the trust. It is on this question that I feel that there is real and substantial difference of opinion between myself and the learned Judges who have considered this question in this Court since 1910. My angle of vision in respect of these questions might have been affected by my longstanding interest and sensitiveness in the cause of Hindu religious and social reform on shastraic lines. I find, however, that after making sincere attempts to allow as much discount as possible to the above factor, any view of the seriousness of the evils of usage in question has not been materially affected. While the incumbent of a religious office must be allowed to employ a temporary deputy when a temporary disqualification or inability occurs, such as birth and death pollutions, absence from home owing to urgent private affairs, etc., I am clear in my mind that a usage permitting a permanently disqualified claimant to receive the emoluments of a religious office aid to appoint his or her own deputy to do the duties is of such a seriously mischievous character that it ought not to be recognized. I regret I am unable to agree with Mr. Justice Seshagiri Ayyar that the performance of the duties through the deputy of a female disqualified heir is not less beneficial to the religious institution than the performance of the next qualified male heir. It is notorious that the deputy is usually chosen on the principle of a Dutch auction. The man who agrees be allow the widow to retain the largest portion of the emoluments of the office and to receive the least as his own remuneration is given the place of deputy. Thus when the usually small remuneration in rice and cash attached to the archaka office does not go to the deputy who does duties, the deputy cannot be expected to perform the duties at all satisfactorily. I do not see why a religious office should be considered less important than any other kind of office. To allow even the office of a peon to be held by a permanently disqualified man because he undertakes to appoint a deputy, out of the remuneration of the office is, in my opinion, entirely mischievous and it ought not to be allowed even if it is sanctioned by usage.
In the result, my answer to the question referred is that so long as a Hindu widow is held incompetent by reason of her sex from doing the duty of a priestly office, she is also incompetent to inherit the service and emoluments of the office.
Spencer, J.:— Without laying down any rule as to particular institutions, in which there may be a special custom that females cannot succeed to the office and emoluments, the trend of decisions in this Court has certainly been to treat females as competent to succeed to the archakaship of Hindu temples in this Presidency. See Subraya Kakrannaya v. Subraya Padyaya, Tangirala Chiranjivi v. Rajamanikya Rao, Ramasundaram Pillai v. Savundrathammal, Raja Rajeswari Ammal v. Subramania Archakar and Venkatarama Aiyangar v. Venkatarama Aiyangar.
The judgment of Sadasiva Ayyar, J., in Sundarambal Ammal v. Yogavana Gurukkal was an exception to the course of decided cases and was not adopted by Tyabji, J., who sat with him. Ido not think it contains reasons of such weight as to justify a departure from the principle of stare decisis. I would answer the question referred to us in the negative.
N.R
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