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C. Govindarajulu Naidu v. Secretary Of State For India In Council
Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The plaintiff, a trader in gold thread, sold 100 marcs of gold thread to customers in Salem and Coimbatore. The goods were dispatched from Nellikuppam (South Arcot). While in transit, the Inspector of Customs of the Cuddalore Circle seized the goods alleging they were smuggled into British India and that duty had not been paid. The plaintiff maintained that he had ultimately purchased the goods (via a sub-purchaser) from Messrs. Parry & Co., who had imported them from France and paid duty.
Procedurally, the local Inspector issued a show-cause notice under Sections 12 and 13 of the Land Customs Act. Because the goods exceeded the local inspector's power to confiscate (their value was above Rs. 250), the matter was referred to the Collector of Customs at Madras. On 30 July 1924 the Collector made an order confiscating the goods and ordering their sale. The plaintiff appealed to the Governor in Council, which rejected his appeal. The plaintiff then instituted a trover suit on the Original Side of the High Court against the Secretary of State for India in Council (referred to as the Secretary of State), seeking return of the goods or their value on the ground of wrongful conversion.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the High Court on its Original Side had territorial jurisdiction to try the suit—specifically, whether the cause of action arose wholly or in part within the local limits of the Madras High Court.
- Whether the defendant (the Secretary of State for India in Council / the Government) could be said to "reside" or to "carry on business or personally work for gain" within the local limits of the Court such that Clause 12 of the Letters Patent or Section 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure would confer jurisdiction.
- Whether Section 106(2) of the Government of India Act (prohibiting High Courts from exercising original jurisdiction in matters concerning revenue or acts done in the collection of revenue) bars the High Court from entertaining this suit on its Original Side because the matter relates to customs/revenue.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's Arguments
- The plaintiff alleged that the goods were not smuggled and that Parry & Co. had imported the goods from France and paid duty; thus the confiscation was illegal.
- He brought a trover claim against the Secretary of State seeking return of the goods or their value, asserting wrongful conversion by the confiscatory orders.
- As to jurisdiction, there was an argument (advanced by or on behalf of the plaintiff) that Section 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure (or the corresponding clause in the Letters Patent) could apply because the headquarters of the Madras Government is situated in Fort St. George, implying the Government carries on "business" there.
- The plaintiff cited authority (Subbaraya Mudali v. The Government and Cunliffe) to support the contention that Government must be considered as carrying on business where its functions are exercised (i.e., Madras).
Defendant's Arguments
- The defendant raised two preliminary objections: (a) want of territorial jurisdiction because the cause of action did not arise wholly or sufficiently within Madras; and (b) that Section 106(2) of the Government of India Act bars the High Court from exercising original jurisdiction in matters concerning revenue, which this case involves.
- The Secretary of State (defendant) contended that the seizure, confiscation and sale of smuggled goods are acts related to the collection of customs revenue, and proceeds of sale go to the customs—therefore the matter concerns revenue and falls within Section 106(2).
- It was also contended (and supported by earlier authorities cited by the defendant) that the phrases "dwell" and "carry on business or personally work for gain" in the Letters Patent or Section 19 are inapplicable to government entities; hence the Government cannot be treated as "carrying on business" for those jurisdictional provisions.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Best & Co., Ltd. v. The Collector of Madras (1918) 35 MLJ 23 | Interpretation of Section 106(2) of the Government of India Act as an express prohibition against the High Court exercising original jurisdiction in revenue matters. | The court followed the reasoning of that judgment and concluded that Section 106(2) prevents the Original Side from entertaining this suit because it concerns the collection of customs/revenue. |
| Subbaraya Mudali v. The Government and Cunliffe (1863) 1 MHCR 286 | Held that, under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, Government must be considered as carrying on business where its members exercise the functions of Government (i.e., Madras); but held that the word "dwell" is inapplicable to Government. | The court noted this authority but declined to follow it, preferring later decisions from Calcutta; it accepted that "dwell" is inapplicable to Government. |
| Daya Narain Tewary v. The Secretary of State for India (1887) ILR 14 C 256 | Held that the words "carrying on business or personally work for gain" are inapplicable to the Secretary of State for India in Council; "business" was used in a restricted, commercial sense. | The court agreed with this reasoning and followed it: Government cannot be said to "carry on business" for the purposes of conferring jurisdiction under the Letters Patent/Section 19. |
| Rodricks v. The Secretary of State for India (1913) ILR 40 C 308 | Applied/followed the reasoning in Daya Narain Tewary (that Government does not "carry on business" in the relevant sense). | The court cited this as a follow-up authority and adopted the same approach, relying on these Calcutta decisions rather than Subbaraya Mudali. |
| Alcock, Ashdown and Company, Ltd. v. The Chief Revenue Authority of Bombay (1923) ILR 47 B 742 : 45 MLJ 592 (PC) | Dealt with a mandamus to an Income-tax Officer to make an assessment (a matter preliminary to assessment). | The court held this decision inapplicable: the present case involved acts directly related to the collection of customs/revenue (seizure, confiscation and sale), not mere preliminary steps like assessment. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The opinion contains two complementary judgments that converge on the same result. The court's analysis proceeded in discrete steps focusing on jurisdiction and the revenue character of the transactions.
1. Territorial jurisdiction / Cause of action
The court analysed where the cause of action arose. The decisive factual point was that the goods were seized and detained in Salem, Coimbatore or Cuddalore (outside Madras), and, aside from a small portion exhibited in Madras for the suit, the goods never came to Madras. The initial effective wrongful act was the seizure in the mufassal (the local area). Although the Collector of Customs at Madras later made an order confirming confiscation, the court held that the tort (seizure and detention) took place where the goods were physically seized and where the confiscation became effective upon communication to the local inspector. It was not sufficient to treat the Collector's act in Madras as rendering the tort a Madras tort. For territorial jurisdiction under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent (or Section 19 CPC), either the cause of action must arise wholly within the local limits or the plaintiff must have obtained leave to sue in Madras because only part of the cause of action arose there. The plaintiff had not obtained any leave. Therefore the court found the territorial jurisdiction objection well-founded.
2. Whether Government "dwells" or "carries on business" within the jurisdiction
The plaintiff argued that the Government (Secretary of State / Madras Government) should be treated as carrying on business at Fort St. George and thus amenable to suit there. The court undertook textual analysis of the relevant jurisdictional phrase ("resides or carries on business or personally works for gain") and concluded:
- The word "resides" (or "dwell") applies to natural persons and not to corporate or governmental entities; a corporation or government does not "dwell" in the private sense of residing, eating and sleeping in a place.
- "Carries on business" and "personally work for gain" are to be read in a commercial sense; limited companies or private business entities are covered by such language, but not governments whose "business" is governmental/political rather than commercial gain.
- The court relied on earlier decisions (notably Daya Narain Tewary and Rodricks) that restricted the meaning of "business" in this clause and rejected Subbaraya Mudali as not binding; accordingly the Government cannot be treated as carrying on business so as to confer jurisdiction under the clause.
3. Revenue character and Section 106(2) of the Government of India Act
The court examined whether the dispute was a matter "concerning the revenue" or "concerning any act done or ordered to be done in the collection" of revenue within the meaning of Section 106(2). The court found:
- The sale of seized and confiscated goods and the appropriation of proceeds by the customs is part of the collection of customs and therefore part of the revenue of the country.
- The seizure, confiscation and sale are designed both to punish smuggling and to deter evasion of duties, and also to recoup unpaid duties; hence these actions are directly related to revenue collection rather than preliminary administrative steps.
- As a consequence, Section 106(2) operates as an express statutory bar preventing the High Court on its Original Side from exercising jurisdiction in this matter.
- The court distinguished Alcock, Ashdown & Co. (a case about mandamus to an Income-tax Officer) as inapplicable because that involved a preliminary assessment step, whereas the present acts were directly connected to revenue collection (seizure/confiscation/sale).
- The court expressly adopted the reasoning in Best & Co. (1918) that Section 106(2) is an express prohibition against Original Side interference in revenue matters and stated agreement with that judgment.
Overall synthesis
Combining the territorial analysis and the revenue-bar analysis, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish a basis for Original Side jurisdiction: the cause of action did not arise within Madras (and no leave had been sought), the Government could not be treated as carrying on business so as to confer jurisdiction, and even apart from territorial issues the matter was barred by Section 106(2) as a revenue matter.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The court held that the plaintiff's suit is demurrable and must be dismissed (with costs). In the language of the opinion the plaintiff's suit "is demurrable and must be dismissed with costs" and the later judgment concurred, dismissing the suit for the two fatal objections.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff's action for conversion (trover) against the Secretary of State was dismissed and the plaintiff did not obtain return of the goods or their value.
- Jurisdictional consequences: The decision reaffirms that (a) where the wrongful seizure and detention occur outside the local limits of the High Court the cause of action does not arise in that High Court for Original Side purposes unless leave to sue there is obtained; and (b) governmental entities are not to be treated as "dwelling" or "carrying on business" in the sense that would confer jurisdiction under the relevant clauses.
- Revenue limitation: The court applied Section 106(2) of the Government of India Act as an express statutory prohibition on the High Court's Original Side exercising jurisdiction in matters concerning revenue or acts done in the collection thereof; here, confiscation and sale of seized customs goods were held to be such revenue-related acts.
- Precedential posture: The court applied and followed existing authorities (including Best & Co., Daya Narain Tewary and Rodricks) rather than announcing novel legal principles. The opinion itself does not claim to establish a new precedent beyond applying the cited authorities to the facts before it.
Note: This summary is compiled exclusively from the text of the provided opinion. No information has been added beyond what appears in the opinion.
1. The plaintiff brings this suit against the Secretary of State for India in Council in the following circumstances;--He made, sales to customers in Salem and Coimbatore of a quantity amounting in all to 100 marcs of gold thread. The gold thread was despatched to the purchasers from a place called Nellikuppam in South Arcot and in transit it was seized by the Inspector of Customs, Cuddalore Circle, who alleged that the gold thread had been smuggled into British India and had not paid duty. The case for the plaintiff was that he had bought it ultimately through a sub-purchaser from Messrs. Parry & Co., who had imported it from France and paid duty upon it. The Collector of Customs, to whom an appeal lay from the District Officer, or who, rather had to affirm or disaffirm the action of the District Officer, made an order On the 30th July, 1924 whereby he confiscated the goods and ordered their sale. Thereupon there was an appeal to the Governor in Council which was made by the plaintiff and was rejected. He now seeks the assistance of the ordinary Courts of the land to get his goods back or their value, and he has brought this suit which is one of trover against the Secretary of State on the ground that what was done amounted to a wrongful conversion of his goods, his case of course being that the orders made were illegal inasmuch as in truth and in fact his goods never were smuggled at all.
2. It seems to me that there are three difficulties that the plaintiff has not surmounted. In the first place, as he did not ask the Court for leave to bring his suit on the Original Side of this Court, he is faced with this difficulty that he must show that his cause of action arose wholly in Madras. The goods never came to Madras except a very small portion by way of exhibit for the purpose of this case, and if any wrong was done it was done by the seizure and detention of the goods in Salem or Coimbatore or Cuddalore, and the only step in the whole transaction that can be suggested to have been performed within the Madras jurisdiction is the order of the Collector of Customs confirming the seizure and directing the goods to be retained at Cuddalore. It seems to me quite impossible to say that that really was an effective dealing with the goods. If the seizure of the goods was tortious it no doubt made the Collector of Customs a tortfeasor, but that is quite a different proposition from saying that, because owing to something he did in Madras he was a tort-feasor and had allied himself with tort-feasors, in Cuddalore, that makes the tort in any sense committed in Madras. That would be enough to dispose of this case, but two other points were raised and I think it right to deal with them.
3. In the first place, it is said that, apart from any question of the place in which the wrong was committed, this case can be brought within the meaning of Section 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure in its second half which provides a jurisdiction "if the defendant resides or carries on business or personally works for gain within the local limits of the jurisdiction" of the Court in question. It is said here that the Secretary of State for India, which must be taken to be a paraphrase for the Madras Government, carries on business within the limits of the jurisdiction of this Court, as the headquarters of the Madras Government is situated in Fort St. George. Similarly I suppose it would have to be contended that at some time or other jurisdiction would be conferred upon the Subordinate Judge's Court of the Nilgiris, because during certain parts of the year the headquarters of the Madras Government is at Ootacamund. In my opinion the words of the section do not cover the case of Government at all. The only doubt I had was with regard to the word "resides" occurring in the section. I was inclined to the view at one time that Government must be said to "reside" in the place where its official headquarters are located, but on consideration I think that the word "resides" must be taken to refer to natural persons and not to legal entities such as limited companies or Governments. With regard to limited companies, they of course will be covered by the words "carries on business," and it was very strenuously argued that the business of Government being to govern, Government must be deemed, within the meaning of the section, to carry on business at its headquarters. In my opinion the words that follow in the alternative "or personally works for gain" show that the business intended by the section is a commercial business and not a business of State or Government.
4. The result will be one that realty works no hardship. There is always a jurisdiction given within the local area where the wrong was done and it would have been perfectly open to the plaintiff here to sue the Secretary of State either in Salem or in Coimbatore or in Cuddalore--wherever the goods were in fact taken out of his possession. He has not chosen to do so. He has chosen to bring a suit on the Original Side of this Court without even taking the trouble to apply for leave on the ground that part of the cause of action arose within its jurisdiction.
5. Finally the point is taken on behalf of the Secretary of State that this is a matter affecting the revenue and that Section 106(2) of the Government of India Act covers the matter. On that subject I have nothing to add to what I said in my own considered judgment which is reported in Best & Co., Ltd. v. The Collector of Madras (1918) 35 MLJ 23, where I had to consider all the decisions affecting this matter and came to the conclusion that, however antiquated the section is and however useless according to present conditions, so long as it was allowed to stand in the statute book it must be given effect to, and the effect is this, that in matters affecting the revenue the Original Side of this Court and that Side alone is debarred from interfering in revenue matters. The section came to birth, nearly 100 years ago, when there was a conflict of jurisdiction between the Sudder Courts and the High Courts. That conflict has utterly vanished and there is no justification whatever for preserving this antiquated fossil on the statute book; but there it is, and so long as it is there we have to abide by it. I am quite clear that this is a matter affecting the collection of revenue though it be in the nature of a penalty and that therefore this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit on that ground. For all these reasons I am of opinion that the plaintiff's suit is demurrable and must be dismissed with costs.
Beasley, J.
6. The plaintiff who trades in gold thread sold 100 marcs of gold thread to his constituents in Salem and Coimbatore and sent them to those constituents by registered post. When they arrived at their respective destinations they were seized under the orders of the Inspector of the Cuddalore Customs Circle, who also sent a notice to the plaintiff calling upon him to show cause why the goods so seized should not be confiscated under Sections 12 and 13 of the Land Customs Act. I think it would be well to explain what the procedure is. The local Inspector, where the goods seized are of the value of Rs. 250 or under, is empowered either to order those goods to be returned to their owner or to confiscate them if he thinks a good case for confiscation has been made out. Where the goods are of more than the value of Rs. 250 he can order them to be returned. He has full power to do so if he thinks that they are goods which ought never to have been seized, but he cannot make an order of confiscation; he has to refer the matter to the Collector of Customs at Madras, who either confirms the seizure by making an order of confiscation of the goods or orders their return to their owner. From this order of the Collector of Customs in Madras there is an appeal to His Excellency the Governor in Council. The plaintiff having received a notice calling upon him to show cause why his goods already seized should not be confiscated duly appeared before the local inspector but notwithstanding his appearance and his contentions the local Inspector referred the matter to the Collector of Customs, Madras. In view of the procedure 1 have already referred to it is obvious that the action of the local Inspector in referring the matter to the Collector of Madras indicates that, had the value of the goods been Rs. 250 or under, he himself would have made the order confiscating them. The Collector of Customs, Madras, made an order confiscating the goods and this order was duly communicated to the local Inspector who informed the plaintiff of the confiscation of the goods. The plaintiff then preferred an appeal to the Governor in Council who dismissed his appeal. The plaintiff now claims the return of the goods or their value from the defendant.
7. Two preliminary objections are taken by the defendant to the jurisdiction of this Court to try the plaintiff's suit. One is to the territorial jurisdiction and the other is, by reason of Section 106(2) of the Government of India Act, 1915 the High Courts may not exercise any original jurisdiction in any matter concerning the revenue or concerning any act done or ordered to be done in the collection thereof according to the usage and practice of the country or the law for the time being in force; and it is contended that this is a matter concerning the revenue or is an act done or ordered to be done in the collection of it. With regard to the first objection the point is whether the cause of action arose wholly within the local limits of this High Court or in part. Clearly if no part of the cause of action arose within the local limits of the High Court the objection founded on the earlier part of Clause 12 of the amended Letters Patent is well founded and even if part of the cause of action arose within the local limits it is equally well founded because the leave of the Court to sue here must first have been obtained and no such leave has been obtained. The plaintiff's contention here is that the suit is for conversion of his goods and that the act of conversion was the order for the confiscation of his goods made here in Madras by the Collector of Customs. He could have sued for damages for the wrongful seizure of his goods. In such a case he must have preferred his suit in the mufassal Court in the place where the goods were seized; or he could have sued for damages both for wrongful seizure and for conversion, or, as here, sued for conversion only; but in the latter case to allege that the tort was wholly committed in Madras seems to me to be opposed to obvious facts. The goods were seized outside the local limits of this Court. Without such seizure no order for confiscation could have been made by the Collector of Customs, Madras. The first essential was this seizure. What was it that was required to make that seizure effective? The confiscation order of the Collector of Customs, Madras, and even that seizure was not made effective until the order of confiscation of the goods was received by the local Inspector in the mufassal. The confiscation then became complete in the place where the seizure was carried out originally and not in Madras. The goods were never at any time in Madras except for a small portion of them which have been brought here for the purpose of being exhibited in this suit. The plaintiff cannot be heard to say that the seizure was lawful because in his plaint he describes it as unlawful and the whole basis of his claim must be wrongful seizure. The seizure here cannot be right and the confiscation wrong. Either the seizure and the order for confiscation were right or both were wrong. For the purpose of upholding the objection on this part of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent it is only necessary to hold that only a part of the cause of action arose outside the local limits of this High Court. For the reasons I have already stated I have no difficulty whatever in so holding.
8. The next contention is that even so he can sue by reason of the latter part of Clause 12 of the Letters Patent, which is:
or if the defendant shall dwell or carry on business or personally work for gain within those limits.
9. It is contended that the defendant both dwelt and carried on business here at the commencement of the suit and in support of this contention the plaintiff has cited the decision of a Bench of this Court in Subbaraya Mudali v. The Government and Cunliffe (1863) 1 MHCR 286. In that case it was held that under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent the Government must be considered as carrying on business at the place where its members exercise all the functions of Government, that is, in Madras. But even in that case the word "dwell' was considered inapplicable to the Government. On the other hand in Daya Narain Ternary v. The Secretary of State for India (1887) ILR 14 C 256 it was held by a Bench that the words "carrying on business or personally work for gain" are inapplicable to the Secretary of State for India in Council. At page 273 in the course of this judgment Mitter, J., says:
that the word 'business' in Clause 12 of the Letters Patent was used in a restricted sense is also indicated by the words 'personally work for gain' to be found in the same section. The latter words would be unnecessary if the word 'business' had been intended to be used in an unrestricted sense.
10. And with that statement 1 am in entire agreement. In my view the Government cannot be said to be carrying on business within the meaning of the word in that clause of the Letters Patent. This decision in Daya Narain Tewary v. The Secretary of State for India (1887) ILR 14 C 256 was followed in Rodricks v. The Secretary of State for India (1913) ILR 40 C 308. We arc not here bound by the decision in Subbaraya Mudali v. The Government and Cunliffe (1863) 1 MHCR 286 and as I am in agreement with the Calcutta decisions I have no hesitation in following them. Nor do I think that Government can be said to dwell anywhere. Whereas the words "carrying on business" apply to a corporate body and to limited companies and "personally work for gain" to an individual or individuals, the word "dwell" can only apply to an individual in a private sense and not to an entity. A corporation cannot be said to dwell anywhere. it may have an office where it carries on business but it does not dwell there. A dwelling denotes a place where a person resides, eats and sleeps. In my view therefore this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to try this suit.
11. The only remaining objection is that this High Court on its Original Side cannot try this case by reason of Section 106(2) of the Government of India Act.
12. That sub-section reads as follows:
The High Courts have not and may not exercise any original jurisdiction in any matter concerning the revenue or concerning any act done or ordered to be done in the collection thereof according to the usage and practice of the country or the law for the time being in force.
13. It is contended by the defendant that this is a matter concerning the revenue or concerning an act done in the collection thereof; and it is not out of place in this connection to mention what is done with goods seized and confiscated. They are sold and the proceeds go to the customs. Part of the revenue of the country is derived from the customs and the collection of the customs is a collection of part of the revenue of the country and I am prepared to hold that the sale of seized and confiscated goods and the taking by the customs authorities of those proceeds is the collection of customs and therefore of revenue. It is admitted by Mr. Narasimha Aiyar that penalties in the shape of double or treble duties imposed on smuggled goods would be revenue. Yet he contends that the money derived from the sale of seized or confiscated goods is not. I cannot myself see any distinction whatever. I may conjecture that one of the objects of the sale is to recoup the customs for the unpaid duty which, had it been paid, would have been revenue. But there is another obvious reason for this penalty and it is this : persons who bring dutiable goods into the country are required to declare their possession of them and to pay the proper duty which is then collected from them and becomes part of the revenue of the country. That is clearly the collection of revenue. If, however, persons smuggle dutiable goods into the country they prevent the collection of the duties and so the revenue. The object of the seizure and confiscation is two-fold, to punish the offender and to deter others from preventing or hindering the collection of revenue; and it seems to me impossible to hold that the seizure and confiscation of smuggled goods is not an act ordered or done in the collection of revenue, as it is obviously designed to facilitate the collection of customs and therefore the revenue.
14. The decision in Alcock, Ashdown and Company, Ltd. v. The Chief Revenue Authority of Bombay (1923) ILR 47 B 742 : 45 MLJ 592 (PC) has in my opinion no application to this case. That case dealt with a mandamus to the Income-tax Officer to make an assessment and was a matter which was merely a preliminary towards the assessment of the assessee. The acts complained of in this case were not in any sense preliminary but in my view directly related to the collection of customs. I may add that the question as to whether or not Section 106(2) of the Government of India Act does prohibit the exercise by this Court of its original jurisdiction in revenue matters has been decided by the learned Chief Justice in Best & Co., Ltd. v. The Collector of Madras (1918) 35 MLJ 23 and he there decided that the section was an express prohibition against the exercise of such powers. I need not say more than that I entirely agree with his judgment and with the reasons he gave therein. I agree with the learned Chief Justice that both the objections are fatal to the plaintiff's suit and that it must therefore be dismissed.
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