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Katikineni Venkata Gopala Narasimha Rama Rao v. Chitluri Venkataramayya
Factual and Procedural Background
These consolidated proceedings arise from two appeals concerning liability on two missing promissory notes:
- A promissory note for Rs. 9,704 dated 16 February 1932 (subject of O.S. No. 14 of 1935; A.S. No. 234). Execution of this note was admitted, but the defendant pleaded that it had been discharged except for a small amount.
- A promissory note for Rs. 24,400 dated 13 February 1933 (subject of O.S. No. 28 of 1936; A.S. No. 235). The appellant denied execution of this note.
The plaintiff (promisee) was a well-to-do Vaisiya money-lender; the defendant/appellant was an influential Mokhasadar. The plaintiff alleged that on 30 March 1934 he took the prior promissory notes to the appellant's house at Pothanur for renewal into a joint promissory note, and that during events that afternoon the notes (including the Rs. 24,400 note) were seized or lost, leading to a criminal complaint the same night (Ex. XIII) and later civil suits. The criminal prosecution failed; subsequently separate civil suits were filed and later clubbed for trial.
During trial, certified copies of the plaintiff's profit and loss statement and the statement supporting his income-tax return (Exs. E and H) were tendered. Their admissibility raised a substantial question of law under S. 74 and S. 65(e) of the Indian Evidence Act, and in view of conflicting Bench decisions the matter was referred to a Full Bench. The Full Bench answered the referred question in the affirmative and the appeals were dismissed with costs.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a profit and loss statement and a statement showing details of net income, filed by an assessee in support of his return of income furnished under S. 22 of the Indian Income-tax Act, are "public documents" within the meaning of S. 74 of the Indian Evidence Act and therefore whether certified copies of such documents are admissible under S. 65(e) of the Evidence Act.
- Whether the existence of the promissory note for Rs. 24,400 prior to 30 March 1934 had been satisfactorily demonstrated (i.e., whether the plaintiff had proved the pre-existence of that note so as to rebut the defendant's contention of fabrication).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's Arguments
- The appellant denied execution of the larger promissory note for Rs. 24,400.
- With respect to the earlier note (Rs. 9,704), the appellant admitted execution but pleaded it had been discharged except for a small amount (described in the opinion as Rs. 500 and odd).
- The defence presented a complete denial of the occurrence at Pothanur on 30 March 1934 and produced witnesses whose testimony contradicted the plaintiff's account (including denials by servants and the cart-driver D.W. 2).
- An objection was taken to the admissibility of certified copies of the Income-tax documents (Exs. E and H), relying on earlier authorities (notably the decision in Mythili Ammal v. Janaki Ammal) that had held income-tax returns/statements not to be public documents under S. 74 and so not admissible as certified copies.
Plaintiff's (Respondent's) Arguments
- The plaintiff asserted that both the smaller and the larger promissory notes existed and that the vakil (P.W. 3) had been shown both notes on 17 February 1934 and had prepared a draft for renewal into a joint promissory note.
- The plaintiff relied on documentary evidence and ledger entries, the vakil's evidence (P.W. 3), and certified copies of the profit & loss statement and the income-tax statement (Exs. E and H) as corroborative proof that the Rs. 24,400 debt had existed prior to 30 March 1934.
- The plaintiff used Exs. E and H to rebut the defence contention that the promissory note for Rs. 24,400 had been fabricated after the alleged incident at Pothanur.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mythili Ammal v. Janaki Ammal | Held that an income-tax return is not a public document within S. 74 of the Evidence Act and that certified copies of such returns could not be admitted in evidence (a decision relied upon to object to Exs. E and H). | The Court treated the decision as a conflicting Bench ruling and referred the admissibility question to a Full Bench. The Full Bench considered and disagreed with aspects of its reasoning (particularly the application of S. 54) and ultimately answered the reference in the affirmative. |
| Venkataramana v. Varahalu | Held that a certified copy of a statement recorded by an Income-tax Officer is admissible as a public document (statement was regarded as record of the Income-tax Officer's act). | Cited by the Court as authority supporting the admissibility of Income-tax statements when recorded by the officer and as precedent that certain Income-tax records may be public documents. |
| Anwar Ali v. Tafozal Ahmed | A single Judge held that income-tax returns, being made confidential by S. 54, could not be lawfully given as certified copies or used in evidence. | The Court criticized this approach as misconceived because S. 54 does not make giving a certified copy to the assessee unlawful; the decision was discussed and its reasoning rejected in part. |
| Devidutt Ramniranjandoss v. Shriram Narayandoss | Bombay High Court held certified copies of Income-tax returns not admissible, reasoning that the assessee had no right to inspect the originals and that such returns were not public documents under S. 74. | The Full Bench reviewed this authority, explaining its reasoning and distinguishing it; the Bench rejected the conclusion that S. 54 prohibits an assessee from putting in evidence certified copies of Income-tax statements when admissible under the Evidence Act. |
| Bhagain Megh Ranee Kooer v. Gooroo Pershad Singh | Authority for the proposition that a petition which is the subject matter of an order is part of the record and thus forms part of the public record. | Relied upon to support the view that documents forming part of a record of proceedings (or called for by the assessing officer) can be part of the record of the act and therefore public documents under S. 74. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court conducted two strands of analysis in parallel: (A) the factual evaluation of the disputed events at Pothanur on 30 March 1934 and (B) the legal question whether Exs. E and H (certified income-tax documents) were admissible evidence.
(A) Factual assessment of the Pothanur occurrence and the existence of the Rs. 24,400 promissory note:
- The Court reviewed the plaintiff's narrative of events on 30 March 1934, noting that much of the plaintiff's testimonial support came from persons of his own community or persons evidently amenable to his influence; the complaint to the police (Ex. XIII) contained notable omissions (e.g., no mention of Mallayya or several witnesses later relied upon).
- The criminal proceedings based on the complaint had failed, and revisional proceedings were unsuccessful; the Court acknowledged numerous suspicious circumstances that might explain the failure of the criminal prosecution (delay in complaint, additions to the story, omissions in Ex. XIII, non-committal police statement Ex. XVII).
- Despite these shortcomings, the Court found it improbable that a prosperous money-lender would fabricate a wholly false story to fasten a large liability of approximately Rs. 34,000 on a friend; the Court concluded that some incident did occur at Pothanur and that certain defence evidence was likely false (including wholesale denials and suppression of accounts).
- The Court identified the pivotal factual question: whether the Rs. 24,400 promissory note existed before 30 March 1934. Evidence relied upon for prior existence included: the plaintiff's own accounts (day book and ledger), the vakil's (P.W. 3) recollection of two promissory notes seen on 17 February 1934, and Exs. E and H (certified copies of income-tax documents dated on or before 17 May 1933 showing the debt).
- On the ledger evidence, the Court noted risks (loose-leaf system, unsigned entries, possibility of interpolation) but observed that the day book entry appeared in chronological order and the overall account was not seriously attacked by the lower court.
(B) Legal analysis of admissibility of Exs. E and H — the referred question:
- The Court framed the legal difficulty: if the originals (income-tax statement and profit & loss statement) are public documents within S. 74 of the Evidence Act, then certified copies are admissible under S. 65(e); if not, certified copies could not be admitted by reference to S. 65(e) and other clauses of S. 65 would not justify admission.
- The Court examined S. 74 (definition of public documents), S. 76 and S. 77 (right to certified copies and their proof), and S. 54 of the Income-tax Act (confidentiality of income-tax particulars and prohibition on requiring public servants to produce documents). It analyzed whether S. 54 barred use of an income-tax document by the assessee when the document formed part of the record of an assessment act.
- The Court reviewed prior authorities with conflicting conclusions. It criticized reasoning that treated S. 54 as making issuance of certified copies to the assessee unlawful, noting departmental practice that allows an assessee to obtain copies and that S. 54's confidentiality does not preclude an assessee putting such copies in evidence if the Evidence Act permits admission.
- Drawing on statutory structure and precedent, the Chief Justice reasoned that documents forming part of the record of the Income-tax Officer's act (including documents called for or filed in support of a return) are records of the act of assessment and thus fall within S. 74 as public documents. The court rejected an overly narrow view that only documents personally drawn up by the officer qualify as public documents.
- The Court analogized other procedural records (for example, pleadings and petitions forming part of a court's record) to conclude that documents properly on the record of an Income-tax assessment should be regarded as public documents.
- The Full Bench answered the reference question in the affirmative: certified copies of the profit & loss statement and the statement showing net income filed under S. 22 are public documents within S. 74 and admissible under S. 65(e).
Holding and Implications
Holding: The Full Bench held that the certified copies (Exs. E and H) of the plaintiff's profit & loss statement and the statement supporting his income-tax return are admissible as certified copies of public documents under S. 65(e) of the Indian Evidence Act, S. 74 being applicable. On that basis the Full Bench concluded that these statements were relevant to corroborate the plaintiff and to rebut the defence contention that the Rs. 24,400 promissory note was fabricated. The appeals were dismissed with costs; the petitions under Act IV of 1938 were remitted to the trial Court for disposal.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: The appeals were dismissed and costs awarded (including the costs of the reference to the Full Bench and an advocate's fee of Rs. 150). The trial Court received the petitions under Act IV of 1938 for disposal. The admissibility of Exs. E and H strengthened the plaintiff's evidential position on the existence of the Rs. 24,400 indebtedness, supporting the lower Court's conclusion.
- Legal significance: The Full Bench's affirmative answer to the referred question clarifies that income-tax documents filed in support of a return (such as profit & loss statements and statements showing details of net income), when properly on the record of the assessing officer, are public documents within the meaning of S. 74 of the Evidence Act and their certified copies are admissible under S. 65(e). The opinion addresses the interplay between S. 54 of the Income-tax Act (confidentiality) and the Evidence Act, concluding that S. 54 does not, in itself, prevent the assessee from producing such certified copies when they are admissible under the Evidence Act.
- If the opinion discusses no broader implication beyond the direct effect, note: the decision resolved a Bench conflict in this High Court and determined admissibility for similar future cases where certified income-tax documents are tendered by the assessee or a party entitled to certified copies.
Disposition: Appeals dismissed. Costs (including reference costs and an advocate's fee for the reference of Rs. 150) awarded. Petitions under Act IV of 1938 remitted to the trial Court.
(13-3-1940.)
(Delivered by Wadsworth, J.)
These two appeals raise the question of the liability of the appellant on two missing promissory notes, one for Rs. 9,704 dated 16th February, 1932 and the other for Rs. 24,400 dated 13th February, 1933. The former promissory note formed the subject matter of O.S No. 14 of 1935 against which A.S No. 234 is preferred. The execution of this promissory note was admitted but the defendant (appellant) pleaded that it was discharged except for a small amount. The second promissory note formed the subject matter of O.S No. 28 of 1936 (against which A.S No. 235 is filed) and its execution is totally denied by the appellant. The promisee (plaintiff) was a well-to-do Vaisiya money-lender and it is common ground that upto 28th March, 1934, he and the defendant, an important Mokhasadar, were on very friendly terms and had considerable dealings. On 1st February, 1934, the defendant made over the income from some of his lands to his wife for a term of years and it is said that this transaction made the respondent uneasy about his advances to the appellant. On 17th February, 1934 both the parties were at Ellore and it is alleged that the respondent accompanied by P.W 2 who is admittedly a member of the same community and indebted to the respondent, visited a vakil (P.W 3) who also belongs to the Vaisiya community and who is the legal adviser of P.W 2. That vakil was asked to draft a promissory note in renewal of previous debts due from the appellant to the respondent, the promissory note to be executed by both the appellant and his wife because of the alienation in the wife's favour already referred to. The plaintiff's case was that the vakil was shown both the promissory notes not only the note for Rs. 9,000 and odd but also the note for Rs. 24,400 and that he prepared a draft with reference to those two notes which were to be renewed by the joint promissory note. It is alleged that in the same evening the draft was handed over to the appellant in the shop of P.W 2 and that an arrangement was made that the appellant should send word to the respondent, so that the latter might come to the appellant's house for the execution of the new promissory note. The respondent lives at Chintalapudi, the appellant at Pothanur some five miles away from Chintalapudi.
On 28th March 1934 there was a meeting of the Chintalapudi Taluk Board of which both the plaintiff and the defendant were members. It is alleged that there was on that day some slight misunderstanding between them arising out of a vacancy on the District Educational Council. There is nothing to show, however, that there was any serious quarrel and the incident is only referred to on behalf of the appellant as indicating that the appellant would not be very likely to have to send an invitation on the following day to the respondent. It is by no means clearly established that any real misunderstanding did in fact arise. On 29th March, it is alleged that the appellant sent his servant, G. Sitayya, who has not been examined, to the respondent to ask him to come on the following day with the notes to Pothanur for the execution of the joint promissory note. On the same evening, it is alleged that the appellant himself visited the respondent and told him that he and his wife would execute a fresh promissory note and asked him to bring the prior notes. At the same time he is alleged to have borrowed a further sum of Rs. 300.
On 30th March 1934, the respondent went to Pothanur accompanied by his brother Sitayya, (who has not been examined) and a dependent (P.W 22) in a cart driven by D.W 2. D.W 2 denies that he drove the cart and even denies that he knows how to drive a cart and there is reason to think that he has been won over. The party is said to have met P.W 12 and P.W 17 on the way to Pothanur and to have told them the purpose of their journey. P.W 12 is indebted to the plaintiff and P.W 17's evidence is contradicted by D.W 1 with reference to the object with which he had gone out that day. Little importance can be attached to either of these witnesses. When they arrived at the appellant's house, the respondent and his companions were asked to go and get their food and return afterwards. They are alleged to have had a meal in the house of the village schoolmaster (D.W 10) who has been examined to deny this occurrence. He is, however, obviously subject to the influence of the appellant and no weight can be attached to his denial. When the respondent and his companions returned to the appellant's house shortly afternoon, it is alleged that the proceedings were witnessed by three independent witnesses. One is P.W 4, a Christian employed in a Chintalapudi tannery, who is said to have gone there accidentally when going on his rounds collecting skins. He is mentioned as an eye-witness in the report to the police made the same evening and there is no apparent reason for him to be introduced into the case unless he was actually present. He generally supports the respondent's story. Besides him three other persons belonging to the village of Ganicherla, four miles from Pothanur are said to have been present. They are P.Ws 5 and 6 and another man who has not been examined. Their presence is not mentioned in the complaint to the police. The P.Ws 5 and 6 are both indebted to the plaintiff. They are said to have gone to the respondent's house to buy timber. They support the respondent's version of the occurrence but the fortuitious presence of these persons who are indebted to the respondent at the time of this occurrence must necessarily be suspicious and the suspicion is enhanced by the omission of their names from the complaint to the police. No great weight can therefore be attached to their evidence.
The respondent's story of the occurrence at 1 P.M on the 30th of March is briefly this:
He and his party were sitting on the verandah. The appellant went inside to call his wife and came out saying that his wife was behind the door, she being a lady who does not appear in public. The appellant said that he would read the notes to his wife and asked the respondent for them. The respondent handed over the whole bundle of promissory notes. The appellant began reading out the note for Rs. 24,400 and suddenly rushed into the house with the notes in his hand and bolted the door from inside. He then called to his servant Subbayya, whose presence is spoken to by all the respondent's witnesses, and told him to drive the respondent's party away. Then some 25 or 30 of the appellant's servants came with sticks and drove them out. The respondent and his companions returned on foot to Chintalapudi, meeting P.W 12 and another on the way. P.W 12 is significantly another of the plaintiff's debtors and his evidence carried the matter little further.
At 10 P.M on the night of the 30th, the respondent made a complaint to the Chintalapudi police. This complaint (Ex. XIII) states that the appellant was indebted under the two promissory notes the second of which was in respect of the respondent's wife's money, that as a result of the conveyance of the appellant's property to his wife, the respondent pressed for payment and on the invitation of the appellant went to Pothanur with his brother and P.W 22 taking “the aforesaid promissory notes” and it mentions the cart driver D.W 2. The appellant asked them to come back at noon so that all the old promissory notes could be read over to his wife. Ex. XIII then describes briefly the incident in the afternoon mentioning the presence of P.W 4. There are certain significant omissions from Ex. XIII. The most important is that it says nothing about the respondent's brother Mallayya to whom the major portion of the money due under the promissory note for Rs. 24,400 is alleged to have been originally due. It does not mention the presence of P.Ws 5 and 6 nor does it refer to the witnesses who are said to have met the respondent on his way to and from Pothanur.
This complaint was investigated by the police. On 4th April 1934 the respondent made a statement to the police which is Ex. XVII. In that statement he says that the promissory note for Rs. 24,400, was executed in substitution for two debts due under promissory notes by the appellants to the respondent's wife and his brother Mallayya. The respondent was apparently asked if this larger promissory note was mentioned in his ledger and he said that he would search for the ledgers and then say and that he could not say if that amount was entered separately in another book or if it was entered in the usual book and he could not say if he had opened a ledger in his wife's name. He said that he had taken his account books on the first of April to show to his Vakil with reference to a Civil suit, and had handed them over to his younger brother and that he would make a fuller statement after sending for the books from Ellore. It must be conceded that the terms of the statement to the police do not suggest that the respondent at that time was confident that the details regarding this transaction for Rs. 24,400 would be found in his ordinary accounts.
The criminal case against the appellant failed and subsequent revisional proceedings were also unsuccessful. The respondent thereafter filed first a suit on the admitted promissory note for Rs. 9,000 and odd and it was only after this suit had made some progress that the further suit was filed on the promissory note for Rs. 24,400 and the two suits were clubbed together for trial.
There are numerous circumstances in this case which have made it very difficult to come to a confident conclusion. Prima facie, the evidence adduced by the respondent regarding the occurrence at Pothanur is such as to give rise to suspicion. Nearly all the witnesses who speak to this occurrence are his castemen or demonstrably persons amenable to his influence. The delay in filing the criminal complaint was sufficient to permit of some exaggeration if the complainant had been so minded. The omission of reference to Mallayya's debt in Ex. XIII, the addition to the original story of several apparently interested witnesses and the non-committal attitude of the respondent on the 4th of April when questioned about his accounts, were also circumstances which would justify a suspicion that we had to deal with a story which was undergoing developments; and it may well have been that these suspicious factors led to the failure of the criminal case. On the other hand, there are many circumstances which prevent us from rejecting the respondent's story as a completely false story, though no doubt it was supported by a considerable volume of dubious evidence. It cannot be denied that something must have happened at Pothanur on the 30th of March which led to the complaint (Ex. XIII) and we see no reason to doubt that the incident which led to this complaint was witnessed by the tannery employee (P.W 4). Otherwise, there is no apparent reason for including his name in that complaint. It was probably also witnessed by the cart driver, D.W 2, who has been prevailed upon to deny all knowledge of the occurrence. The defence story is a complete denial of the whole occurrence coupled with a denial of the execution of the promissory note for Rs. 24,400 and the prior notes which led up to that transaction and also with a story of discharge of the earlier promissory note except for a sum of Rs. 500 and odd. Now, it seems to us clear that the defence evidence must be to a great extent, if not entirely, false evidence. It is common ground that the respondent and the appellant, both men of influence and position, were on very friendly terms upto the 30th March 1934, the slight incident on the 28th, even if true, was admittedly not of such importance as to affect generally friendly relationship. In such circumstances, it is incredible that the respondent, a rich Vaisiya money-lender, should have invented out of nothing at all a completely false story of an outrageous crime whereby he could fasten upon his friend a liability for approximately Rs. 34,000 which was not true at all. It would of course be quite conceivable, if there had been a violent quarrel between the parties connected with the admittedly genuine promissory note for Rs. 9,000 and odd, and resulting in the destruction or appropriation of this promissory note, that the respondent might have utilised the interval between this incident and his complaint to exaggerate the story and add to it a false claim for Rs. 24,400 and in such circumstances it is conceivable that the appellant might have retaliated by putting forward a false story of discharge of the admitted promissory note and have denied the whole occurrence in order to support his false story of discharge. Such a theory would explain the delay in the complaint and its omissions, the hestitations of the respondent in his first statement to the police and the anxiety of the respondent to add to his witnesses a number of persons subject to his control who would support the details of his story. It would also explain the anxiety of the appellant to repudiate the whole occurrence, his unwillingness to produce his own accounts and the not very convincing evidence adduced by him of the discharge of the earlier promissory note. But such a theory can only be entertained in the absence of reliable evidence that this promissory note for Rs. 24,400 was in existence before the 30th March. If the respondent can prove that this large debt was evidenced by a promissory note which had been in his possession long before this alleged occurrence on the 30th March 1934, it is incredible that he would have concocted a false story of the loss of the promissory note instead of simply filing a suit upon it. We are unable to accept the theory that there was no occurrence at Pothanur on the 30th March 1934 and unless it is possible to show that the respondent's story of what happened that day has been exaggerated probably by the inclusion of a promissory note for Rs. 24,400 which did not exist amongst the documents lost on that day, the only possible inference from the appellant's denials, from the false evidence which he has adduced, from the suppression of his accounts and from the failure to examine his two servants Sitayya and Subbayya who are alleged to have taken part in this occurrence, is that the respondent's story must be substantially true. The main question in this case therefore becomes the question whether the existence of this promissory note for Rs. 24,400 before 30th March 1934 has been satisfactorily demonstrated.
Now, the evidence of the earlier existence of this debt apart from the statements of the plaintiff and witnesses interested in him, on which much reliance cannot be placed, consists of (1) the respondent's own accounts (2) the evidence of the vakil (P.W 3) regarding what he saw on 17th February 1934 and (3) Exs. H and E, certified copies of the profit and loss statement attached to the respondent's Income-tax return and the statement on which it was based, which were apparently filed on or before 17th May 1933 before the Income-tax Officer (4) the accounts show entries corroborating the story of the execution of the promissory note for Rs. 24,400 on 13th February 1933, with corresponding credits in favour of the plaintiff's brother and wife relating to liabilities originally due from the appellant to them which the respondent had taken over in return for the execution of this note. The ledger entries are not signed and a good deal of attention has been devoted to the question whether the respondent always took in his ledger the signatures of persons executing promissory notes at his house. It seems to have been his usual practice to do so, but not his invariable practice. It has been pointed out that the adjustment entries relating to the credits to respondent's wife and brother are in isolated pages of the ledger and that all these ledger entries might well have been interpolated an allegation which receives some confirmation from the respondent's own non-committal statement to the police (Ex. XVII). The entry in the day book finds its place in chronological order and is prima facie good evidence of the transaction, more especially as the general truth of the respondent's account does not appear to have been seriously attacked by the lower Court. But it is to be noted that the respondent maintains his day book in a loose leaf system similar to that ordinarily adopted by Marwaries; and any account maintained in loose leaf form must necessarily be less convincing than a similar account maintained in a bound book.
The evidence of the Vakil (P.W 3) was not seriously attacked in cross-examination except to the extent that this memory of the details of what he saw was challenged. He definitely says that he saw two promissory notes, one for more than Rs. 20,000 and the other for Rs. 10,000 and odd executed by some Mokhasadar of Pothanur. His evidence is not very precise or accurate. The Vakil in question belongs to the same community as the respondent, but he does not appear to have had any previous connection with the respondent though respondent's debtor, P.W 2, was his client. There is no apparent reason to conclude that P.W 3 was not trying to speak the truth. He may however, have honestly thought that he remembered details about which he had been subsequently told.
The most conclusive piece of evidence on this question of the previous existence of the promissory note for Rs. 24,400 is provided by Exs. E and H which are certified copies of the income statement and profit and loss statement, the latter purporting to have been signed by the plaintiff on 17th May 1933, the former of which sets forth this debt of Rs. 24,400 as due to the respondent. There is, however, a serious difficulty with reference to the admissibility of this evidence. Objection was taken to it at the time when it was tendered and we deem it necessary to refer to a Full Bench the question of its admissibility in view of the decision of our learned brothers Burn and Stodart JJ. in the case of Mythili Ammal v. Janaki Ammal (1). In our opinion the evidential value of these Income-tax documents is such that if they are admitted, the correctness of the lower Court's conclusion is clear. If they are to be rejected, we shall have to decide hereafter whether the remaining evidence is sufficient to establish the pre-existence of this note for Rs. 24,400, which, if established, seems to us, in view of the defendant's denials and suppressions, to warrant the decree which has been given.
The legal difficulty may be briefly stated. Exs. E and H are both certified copies. If the original is a public document within the meaning of S. 74 of the Evidence Act, then the certified copies are good secondary evidence of that original under S. 65(e). If these statements are not public documents, we are unable to see how the certified copies can be admitted into evidence under any other clause of S. 65 of the Evidence Act. S. 74 defines public documents as documents forming the acts or records of the acts (1) of the sovereign authority (2) of official bodies and tribunals and (3) of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, and the term includes also public records kept in British India of private documents. The question is whether an Income-tax return and the statements accompanying it form part of the record of the act of the Income-tax Officer who makes the assessment. In the case just referred to the learned Judges decided, without quoting any authority other than the statutory provisions, that it was the policy of the law that statements made in Income-tax returns should not be used in evidence against the person making them or against any one else, that Income returns could not be proved secondary evidence and that the Income-tax return was not part of the record of the act of assessment and not a public document as defined in S. 74 of the Evidence Act. In coming to this conclusion, the learned Judges appear to have been greatly influenced by the provisions of S. 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act which prohibits the disclosure by any public servant of particulars contained in an Income-tax return or statement. Now quite clearly this Section applies only to disclosures and does not prohibit the Income-tax officer from giving to the person who made the return a copy of that return. In fact, we are informed that the departmental orders expressly provide for the giving of such a copy to the assessee on application. It seems to us that there is no ground of public policy which would prevent such an assessee from using in evidence such a copy when it has been granted to him. Nor are we convinced that the ground of public policy is a sufficient reason for excluding from evidence any document which is legally admissible under the Evidence Act and is not excluded by any statutory prohibition. This view has been adopted in the case of Venkataramana v. Varahalu a decision of Varadachariar and Pandrang Row JJ. anterior to the decision of Burn and Stodart JJ. but apparently not brought to their notice. Varadachariar and Pandrang Row JJ. were actually dealing with a copy of a statement recorded by the Income-tax Officer which clearly was a public document and they held that certified copies of such a statement were admissible notwithstanding the provisions of S. 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act. The learned Judges refer to a decision in Anwar Ali v. Tafozal Ahmed (2) wherein a single Judge held that Income-tax returns being made confidential by S. 54 of the Income-tax Act, certified copies of such a return could not lawfully be given and if given could not be used in evidence. In Devidutt v. Shriram Narayandoss (3) a Bench of the Bombay High Court held that certified copies of an Income-tax return could not be given in evidence, because the return is not a public document within the meaning of S. 74 of the Evidence Act and that the prohibition in S. 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act was sufficient to warrant the view that a certified copy could not be lawfully obtained and would not be admissible in evidence if obtained. It seems to us that these decisions raise a question of far-reaching importance. With all respect to the learned Judges who have held otherwise, we do not consider that the prohibition against the disclosure of the contents of an income-tax return can have any bearing on the admissibility of the contents of that return filed at the instance of the person who made it. If the Income-tax return is a part of the record of the act of the Income-tax Officer making the assessment, a certified copy of the document can lawfully be given, subject to the prohibition against disclosure in S. 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act. If it has been so given, then by the terms of S. 65 of the Evidence Act it is, no matter who produces it, good evidence of the original, provided that the original is a public document; and we do not think that considerations of public policy can warrant its exclusion from evidence. If an Income-tax return is not a public document, as being part of the record of the Act of the assessing officer, it is difficult to see how a plaint or written statement in a civil suit or a complaint in a criminal case can be deemed to be public documents such as can be proved by the production of certified copies. It is the almost universal practice of the Courts to grant certified copies of such documents and to admit them in evidence, though the admissibility of a certified copy of a plaint appears to have been successfully challenged in one or two cases, not of this High Court. We are inclined to the view that an Income-tax return being the basis of the Income-tax Officer's assessment, must be treated as part of the record of the act of assessment and must therefore be regarded as a public document of which a certified copy can be given in evidence. The matter, however, being the subject of somewhat conflicting rulings of Benches of this High Court, we refer to a Full Bench the following question:
“Whether a profit and loss statement and a statement showing the details of net income, filed by an assessee in support of his return of income furnished under S. 22 of the Indian Income-tax Act, are public documents with reference to S. 74 of the Evidence Act of which certified copies would be admissible under S. 65(e) of the Evidence Act.”
(These Appeal and petitions coming on for hearing in pursuance of the aforesaid Order of Reference, the Court, The Honourable Sir Alfred Henry Lionel Leach, Chief Justice, The Honourable Mr. Justice King, and The Honourable Mr. Justice Somayya, expressed the following):
OPINION
The Chief Justice.—Before proceeding to examine the provisions of the sections of the Indian Evidence Act mentioned in the question under reference it is desirable to state the effect of S. 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, as in some cases where certified copies of the income-tax documents have been tendered in evidence its provisions have been misunderstood and misapplied. Sub-S. (1) of S. 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act states that all particulars contained in a statement made, return furnished or accounts or documents produced under the provisions of the Act, or in evidence given in the Court of proceedings under the Act other than proceedings under Chap. VIII (which relates to offences and penalties) or in a record of an assessment proceeding, or a proceeding relating to the recovery of a demand shall be treated as confidential, and, notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, no Court shall be entitled to require a public servant to produce a document referred to in the section or to give evidence thereon. Sub-S. (2) provides for the punishment of a public servant who unlawfully discloses particulars of an income-tax matter. Sub-S. (3) sets out the occasions on which disclosure can lawfully be made. It is not necessary to set them out as the provisions of Sub-S. (3) have no application here and have no bearing on the reported decisions which have relation to the application of S. 54.
While S. 54 prohibits the disclosure, except on specified occasions, of matters connected with an assessment to income-tax and prohibits a Court from requiring a public servant to produce the documents mentioned in the section or to give evidence in respect of them, it does not follow that the Court may not admit in evidence a document which falls within S. 54(1). This will depend on whether the document is admissible under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. Paragraph 85 of the notes and instructions compiled by the income-tax department for the guidance of its officers states that the following persons shall, in practice, be allowed to inspect or to receive copies:—(1) In any case the person who actually made the return; (2) any partner (known to be such) in a firm registered or unregistered to whose income the return relates and (3) the manager of a Hindu undivided family to whose income the return relates, or any other adult member of the family who has been treated as representing it. There is nothing in S. 54 to prohibit this practice and it is only right that a person who is concerned with an assessment should be allowed to obtain copies of the documents relating to his assessment to income-tax should he so desire, and if copies are supplied he may put them in evidence in a suit if the Evidence Act allows it.
I will now turn to the relevant provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. S. 74 says that the following documents are public documents:
(1) documents forming the acts or records of the acts,—
(i) of the sovereign authority,
(ii) of official bodies and tribunals and
(iii) of public officers, legislative, judicial and executive, whether of British India, or of any other part of His Majesty's dominion or of a foreign country;
(2) public records kept in British India of private documents.
Section 75 states that all other documents are private. S. 76 provides that every public officer having the custody of a public document, which any person has a right to inspect, shall give that person on demand a copy of it on payment of the legal fees therefor together with a certificate written at the foot of the copy that it is a true copy. S. 77 says that certified copies may be produced in proof of the contents of the public documents or parts of the public documents of which they purport to be copies. Therefore, if a document is a public document, it may be proved by means of the production of a certified copy. Private documents must be proved by primary evidence, except in such cases where secondary evidence is permitted under the provisions of S. 65. Cl. (e) of that section allows secondary evidence to be given when the original is a public document within the meaning of S. 74. If an income-tax return or a statement filed in support of it is a public document within the meaning of S. 74, certified copies will be admissible under S. 65(e). The answer to the question whether a document of this nature is a public document depends on whether it is a document forming an act or the record of an act or acts of an Income-tax Officer. Before stating opinion on the question I will first refer to certain of the cases which have been quoted in argument.
In Anwar Ali v. Tafozal Ahmed a single Judge of the Rangoon High Count held that Income-tax returns being made confidential by reason of S. 54 of the Income-tax Act, and the disclosure of their contents being a punishable offence, certified copies cannot be admitted in evidence. The Court did not consider the effect of S. 74 of the Indian Evidence Act and decided against the admissibility of the certified copies submitted on the ground that S. 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act made the issue of copies unlawful and made the disclosure of the particular contents in the return an offence punishable with imprisonment. In my opinion there is here a misconception. S. 54 does not make the issue of a certified copy of an Income-tax return to an assessee unlawful. The return is a confidential document and cannot be disclosed to a third party, but there can be no objection to the maker of the return having a copy for his own purposes if he so desires. So far as the assessee is concerned he is not bound to treat the document as confidential.
A Bench of the Bombay High Court considered the question of the admission of certified copies of Income-tax returns in Devidutt Ramniranjandoss v. Shriram Narayandoss and held that they were not admissible, but the decision was based on a different ground from that given by the Rangoon High Court in Anwar Ali v. Tafozal Ahmed . The reason given here was that the assessee had no right to inspect the original documents in the custody of the Income-tax Officer and the latter was not bound to give certified copies to the assessee on demand. It was considered that the words “right to inspect” in S. 76 of the Evidence Act exclude all such documents as a Government Officer has a right to refuse to show “on the ground of state policy or privilege, etc.” But an Income-tax Officer would not be fulfilling his duty if he refused to allow an assessee to inspect his own return. If he did so he might be placing an assessee at a disadvantage when the assessee was objecting to an improper assessment. The Bombay High Court, however, considered that there was nothing in the terms of S. 54 of the Income-tax Act and the intention of the Legislature underlying it, prohibiting an assessee from giving secondary evidence of the contents of the return made by him or on his behalf or of the assessment order made upon him or his firm on that return, where such secondary evidence would be admissible under the Indian Evidence Act. Where the original cannot be produced the best secondary evidence must be a true copy.
A Bench of this Court (Varadachariar and Pandrang Row JJ.) held in Venkataramana v. Varahalu that a certified copy granted to an assessee of a statement made by him on oath before an Income-tax Officer is admissible in evidence and there is nothing in S. 54 of the Income-tax Act or any of the provisions of the Evidence Act which precludes its admissibility. The statement was regarded as being a public document because it was a statement recorded by the Income-tax Officer and therefore a document forming a record of his act. Though they did not accept the Bombay interpretation of S. 76 of the Evidence Act the learned Judges concurred in the opinion expressed by the Bombay High Court in Devidutt Ramniranjandoss v. Shriram Narayandas that an Income-tax return is not a public document. They did not say so, but it is to be gathered from their judgment that they did not regard an Income-tax return as a public document because it is prepared by the assessee.
The question whether an Income-tax return is a public document was discussed at some length by the Bench of this Court (Burn and Stodart, JJ.) in Mythili Ammal v. Janaki Ammal and the conclusion arrived at was that it is not a public document within the meaning of S. 74 of the Indian Evidence Act. The learned Judges considered that it was impossible to infer from the wording of the Act that a return made by an assessee is either part of the Act of the Income-tax Officer or part of the record of the act of that Officer. In their opinion to allow a person who comes into possession of a certified copy of a return to produce it in Court and so prove the contents of the return would be defeating the express provisions of S. 54. I have said sufficient to indicate that in my opinion there is nothing in S. 54 which prohibits a party from putting in evidence a certified copy of an Income-tax return if that return is a public document and that the learned Judges misunderstood the effect of that section. It only remains to be considered whether the opinion that an Income-tax return is outside S. 74 of the Evidence Act is correct.
The judgment in Venkataramana v. Vardhalu and Mythili Ammal v. Janaki Ammal indicate that in the opinion of the learned Judges who decided those cases a document on the record of an assessment proceeding cannot be deemed to be a public document within the meaning of S. 74 of the Evidence Act, unless it be a statement recorded by the Income-tax Officer himself or an order passed by him, and therefore does not include a document drawn up by the assessee or under the assessee's directions. In my opinion this interpretation of S. 74 of the Evidence Act is too limited. S. 22 of the Income-tax Act empowers the Income-tax Officer to call upon a person to submit a return of his income. S. 23 states that if the Income-tax Officer is satisfied that a return made under S. 22 is correct and complete he shall assess the total income of the assessee and shall determine the sum payable by him on the basis of the return. The submission of the return constitutes the fulfilment of a requirement of the Income-tax Officer; in other words, it is a document which he has caused to be prepared. Can it then be dissociated from his action in calling for the return? If the Income-tax Officer is not satisfied with the return he can call upon the assessee to produce evidence in support of it. If the assessee produces evidence the Income-tax Officer must consider it in determining the sum to be paid by the assessee. A profit and loss statement filed by the assessee is evidence in the matter and the Income-tax Officer may draw it up himself, if he thinks it expedient to do so. It is common ground, that an order of assessment is a public document within the meaning of S. 74 and the decision in Venkataramana v. Varahalu that a statement recorded by an Income-tax Officer falls in the same category has not been questioned. Now, if a statement recorded by an Income-tax Officer in the course of his examination of the assessee is a public document it is difficult to see why a statement handed in by the assessee disclosing the basis of the return called for should not be similarly regarded. Surely the test cannot be whether the profit and loss statement is actually drawn up by the Income-tax Officer.
As the learned Judges who have made this reference have pointed out, a plaint or a written statement has always been regarded by this Court as forming part of the record of a case and a public document of which an interested party may obtain a certified copy. If the argument, that an Income-tax return is not a public document but that the order passed thereon is, were carried to its logical conclusion, it would mean that no part of the record of a civil suit could be regarded as constituting a public document except evidence recorded by the Court or summonses or notices or interlocutory orders of the judgment in the case. In Bhagain Megh Ranee Kooer v. Gooroo Pershad Singh , Garth C.J and Birch J. expressly held that a petition which was the subject matter of an order passed was part of the record in the suit, and I do not think that this can reasonably be doubted. In my judgment it would be putting an unwarranted restriction on the words “documents forming the acts or records of the acts” to say that they should be confined to those parts of an Income-tax record which the Income-tax Officer has himself prepared and to exclude documents which he has himself called for or which have been admitted to the record for the purposes of the assessment. I consider that the record of an Income-tax case must be regarded as the record of the acts of the Income-tax Officer in making his assessment and therefore that any document properly on the record is just as much a public document as the final order of assessment. For these reasons I would answer the question propounded in the affirmative.
I would make the costs of this eference costs in the cause.
King, J:—I agree.
Somayya, J:—I agree.
(These appeals and these petitions coming on for final hearing after the expression of the opinion of the Full Bench on the question referred to, the Court delivered the following):—
JUDGMENT
(30-4-1940).
(Delivered by Wadsworth, J.)
The Full Bench have decided that the certified copies Exs. E and H are admissible in evidence of the contents of the original statements. These statements are relevant both as corroborating the evidence of the plaintiff himself and as rebutting the contention that the promissory note was fabricated at a date subsequent to that on which the statements were made. They are not being used to impose a liability on the defendant but to rebut a contention of fabrication which is inconsistent with the existence of these statements. The appeals are therefore dismissed with costs, including costs of the reference to the Full Bench—Advocate's fee for the reference Rs. 150. The petitions under Act IV of 1938 are remitted to the trial Court for disposal.
Appeals dismissed.
N.R.RS. 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act.
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