Login
  • Bookmark
  • PDF
  • Share
  • CaseIQ

Manakkal Kumaran, In Re

Madras High Court
Jan 30, 1942
Important Paras
Please sign up to view Important Paras.
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Delivered by King, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Five appellants were tried for rioting and the murders of two temple uralars (approved as victims Narayanan and Raman) arising from incidents at a village temple in Calicut taluk on the night of 31st March. The sequence, as found by the trial court and summarised in this opinion, is:

  • On 30th March the appellants had created a disturbance at a temple pandal reserved for women, insulting and annoying them by throwing beedi ends; they were ejected by several uralars including the two later-deceased men.
  • On the following night the appellants returned about 10–10:30 p.m., repeated their conduct, were resisted, and a scuffle occurred in which the appellants suffered injuries (including one very large incised wound across a back).
  • About an hour later the appellants returned seeking revenge. The 1st appellant was armed with a pen-knife and the 2nd with a dagger. As they arrived there were shouts that none of the uralars should be left alive, and both deceased received stab wounds: Raman died almost immediately; Narayanan died on 6th April.
  • The learned Sessions Judge convicted the first two appellants of murder and all five of rioting (some under S.148, I.P.C. where weapons were present, others under S.147). The trial judge also held the remaining appellants liable for the murders under S.149, I.P.C. Sentences included transportation for life for the murder convictions and shorter terms for the riot convictions.
  • The matter was appealed to the Court whose opinion is delivered by King, J., and which is summarised below.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the evidence identifying the five appellants and the first two appellants as the direct perpetrators of the fatal injuries is reliable and sufficient to sustain convictions for murder and for rioting under Ss.147–148, I.P.C.
  2. Whether the conviction of the three appellants (3, 4 and 5) for the murders of Raman and Narayanan by application of the first clause of S.149, I.P.C. is justified — i.e., were those murders committed "in prosecution of the common object" of the unlawful assembly?
  3. If the common object was only to cause hurt (and not to commit murder), whether the first clause of S.149 can nonetheless ground the murder convictions of those who neither committed nor contemplated the murders.
  4. How should the phrase "in prosecution of the common object" in the first clause of S.149 be interpreted and applied to the facts of this case?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (as presented by Mr. Rangaswami Aiyangar)

  • The prosecution evidence is unreliable because of several discrepancies and inconsistencies in witness statements; such discrepancies render the witnesses untrustworthy on what actually happened.
  • The prosecution witnesses were the aggressors on the earlier occasion and inflicted serious injuries on the appellants (including a 12-inch incised wound on one appellant), and therefore the appellants acted in self-defence when they later used a knife or dagger.
  • The first and second appellants went to the temple, were attacked and beaten by the uralars, and the 1st appellant used a small pen-knife only in defence and cannot say whom he struck.
  • The 5th appellant denied involvement and claimed false implication because he refused to give evidence for the uralars.
  • Certain alleged discrepancies — for instance the dying declaration not separating the two events — were relied on to challenge the prosecution narrative.

Prosecution's Arguments

  • The prosecution maintained that the five men formed an unlawful assembly with a common object to kill the uralars, their families and supporters, supported by statements that none of the uralars were to be left alive and by the 1st and 2nd appellants' possession of lethal weapons.
  • Even if the common object was only to cause hurt rather than murder, the Public Prosecutor argued that the actual murders were committed "in prosecution of the common object" within the meaning of the first clause of S.149, thereby making the remaining members (3, 4 and 5) criminally responsible for the murders.
  • The Public Prosecutor also referred to a recent Bench decision of this Court (Crl. A. Nos. 283 and 376 of 1941) as relevant precedent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
The Queen v. Sabid Ali Recognition of difficulties/antithesis between the two clauses of S.149 and the need for a sensible construction of "in prosecution of the common object." The court relied on this earlier recognition to support a strict construction of "in prosecution of the common object" in the first clause (equating it to "in order to attain the common object").
Crl. A. Nos. 283 and 376 of 1941 (Bench decision of this Court) Addressed liability under S.149; contained a definitive finding that members of the unlawful assembly must have known that murder was likely; convictions in that case were by application of the second clause of S.149. The court noted that portions of that judgment might be read as supporting the Public Prosecutor's view, but emphasised that the earlier decision involved second-clause knowledge and therefore is not binding as authority for applying the first clause in cases where such knowledge is absent.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeds in two main strands: (A) evaluation of the factual evidence and identification; and (B) legal analysis of S.149 and its application to the facts.

A. Evaluation of Evidence and Identification

  • The court examined the prosecution evidence identifying the five appellants and, in particular, the identification of the 1st and 2nd appellants as the persons who inflicted the fatal injuries. It found the identification evidence to be ample and upheld the learned Sessions Judge's acceptance of that evidence.
  • The court addressed the defence contention that prosecution witnesses were the aggressors and had inflicted serious injuries on the appellants (notably a 12-inch incised wound). It noted:
    • There was evidence the appellants had previously been ejected and that the pandal bamboos, some of which had been pulled out and split, could have caused some injuries; the medical witness admitted the injuries on several appellants could have been caused with split bamboos.
    • However, the court did not regard these facts as sufficient to discredit or overturn the prosecution story identifying the attackers. The prior disturbance (the night before) made it probable the appellants returned the next night to interfere again.
  • Regarding the dying declaration of Narayanan, the court acknowledged some lack of detailed chronology and that Narayanan did not mention other victims in detail, but held that this was explainable by his weak condition and pain and did not justify rejecting the dying declaration in toto.
  • Overall the court found the minor discrepancies cited were insufficient to create reasonable doubt given the nature of the chaotic, multi-person attack where witnesses may notice different details.
  • Conclusion on evidence: Convictions of the first two appellants for the two murders were supported and upheld; convictions under Ss.147 and 148, I.P.C. were also upheld for all appellants.

B. Legal Analysis of S.149 I.P.C. and Its Application

  • The lynchpin issue was whether the murders were committed "in prosecution of the common object" of the unlawful assembly (first clause of S.149), thereby making the remaining members (3, 4 and 5) guilty of murder.
  • The court examined the evidence of threatening words shouted when the appellants arrived. It found ambiguity in eye-witness evidence as to who made the threats:
    • Some witnesses (P.Ws 11 and 16) said the threats were uttered by all appellants;
    • Others limited the threats to the first two appellants.
    The court noted that pronouns in the testimonies, properly read, can refer only to the first two appellants in context, making it doubtful that the other three shared a homicidal intention.
  • The court considered the nature of the weapons: one was a clearly lethal dagger; the other a small pen-knife. Taken with the ambiguous evidence about who made the homicidal threats, the court concluded the proof was insufficient that the common object of all five was murder. Rather, the common object in the assembled group was only to cause hurt.
  • The court then turned to statutory interpretation. It was reluctant to accept an interpretation that would convict persons for an offence they neither committed, nor intended, nor contemplated (i.e., convicting members for murder committed by others where those members lacked the requisite intention or knowledge).
  • On the textual meaning of "in prosecution of" in the first clause, the court construed it strictly as meaning "in order to achieve or attain" the common object (deriving "prosecution" from the Latin root meaning "to follow"). The court reasoned that when an actor pursues a distinct private object (here: the first two appellants' intention to kill), those actions are no longer properly considered part of the continuing prosecution of the assembly's common object (which, the court found, was only to cause hurt).
  • The court observed that if the word "or" and the phrase "in prosecution of" were given identical literal senses in both clauses of S.149, the section would be unintelligible—an observation consistent with The Queen v. Sabid Ali. It therefore adopted a strict construction of "in prosecution of the common object" in the first clause equivalent to "in order to attain the common object."
  • The court noted it was unnecessary for the decision to determine whether appellants 3, 4 and 5 had the knowledge required by the second clause of S.149, because they were not charged under that clause and had no opportunity to rebut such a charge.
  • Having applied this construction, the court concluded that the murders (which involved an additional, private murderous intent of appellants 1 and 2) were not committed in prosecution of the assembly's common object, and therefore the first clause could not be used to convict appellants 3, 4 and 5 of murder.
  • Nevertheless, the court held that the acts committed by appellants 1 and 2 that were in pursuit of the common object amounted to causing hurt (S.324), and therefore appellants 3, 4 and 5 were properly convicted under S.324 read with S.149 for actions "in prosecution of the common object" (as limited to causing hurt).

Holding and Implications

Core Rulings:

  • Convictions of appellants 1 and 2 for the two murders were confirmed, and their sentences (transportation for life, described in the opinion as the minimum prescribed by law) were upheld.
  • Convictions of all appellants under Ss.147 and 148, I.P.C. were upheld and their sentences under those sections maintained.
  • The application of the first clause of S.149 to convict appellants 3, 4 and 5 of murder was rejected. The court held that the common object of the unlawful assembly was only to cause hurt, not to commit murder; the actual murders were committed by appellants 1 and 2 pursuant to their private murderous intention and not in prosecution of the assembly's common object.
  • Appellants 3, 4 and 5 were found guilty of offences under S.324 read with S.149 (causing hurt in prosecution of the common object) and were each sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for 18 months on each charge; those sentences were ordered to run concurrently with each other and concurrently with sentences imposed under S.147.

Implications and Reasoning on Broader Principles:

  • The court emphasised a principle of criminal responsibility: it is undesirable and inconsistent with fundamental criminal law principles to convict an accused for an offence which he neither committed, intended, nor contemplated would be committed by his associates.
  • Accordingly, the court adopted a strict construction of "in prosecution of the common object" in the first clause of S.149 — interpreting it as referring to acts done in order to attain the assembly's common object — and refused to extend liability under that clause to cover murders committed pursuant to a private intent of some members when the common object was otherwise limited.
  • The opinion thus narrows the circumstances in which the first clause of S.149 can be used to attribute serious offences (such as murder) to other members of an unlawful assembly, reserving such attribution for cases in which the offence was truly committed in order to achieve the shared common object or where the second clause (knowledge that the act was likely) properly applies and has been charged and proved.

Direct effect on the parties: the first two appellants remain convicted and sentenced for murder; all appellants' riot convictions are upheld; appellants 3, 4 and 5 have their murder convictions set aside and are sentenced for causing hurt under S.324 read with S.149 (18 months R.I., concurrent).

N.R.R
Show all summary ...

(Delivered by King, J.)

The five appellants were involved in a case of rioting and murder at a village in the Calicut taluk on the night of 31st March last. All of them were convicted of rioting, two of them being convicted under S. 148, I.P.C, because of their possession of lethal weapons, and the 1st and 2nd appellants were convicted of two murders committed by them in the course of the occurrence. The remaining appellants were also convicted on two counts of constructive liability for these murders.

The story of the occurrence is comparatively simple. A festival extending over several days was being celebrated at the temple where the occurrence took place and on 30th March these appellants created a disturbance by going to that part of the pandal reserved for the womenfolk. They insulted them and began to annoy them by throwing discarded beedi ends at them. Several of the uralars or temple managers including the two murdered men, went and ejected them. There was no further trouble that night but the following night about 10 O'clock the appellants arrived at the temple and began to repeat their performance of the night before. On that occasion the prosecution witnesses who were ordered to eject them did not find the task so easy and there was a scuffle and blows were exchanged on both sides before they could be driven out. Several injuries were inflicted on the appellants and one of them received an incised wound twelve inches long across the back. About an hour later the appellants returned in order to have their revenge on the uralars for the rough treatment they had received. The 1st and 2nd appellants were armed with a pen-knife and a dagger respectively and it was the prosecution case that the common object of the unlawful assembly thus formed was to kill the uralars, members of their families and their supporters. As they arrived at the scene they were heard shouting out that none of the uralars were to be left alive. All the appellants went directly to the place where the uralars were conducting the proceedings and the second accused immediately stabbed one Raman in the abdomen and the 1st accused stabbed Narayanan also in the abodmen, followed by another blow as soon as he sat down. The rest of the appellants used their hands in beating off the prosecution witnesses and all then bolted. Raman died almost immediately but Narayanan survived until 6th April. Early information was given at the police station half a mile away and before the learned Sessions Judge there was ample evidence identifying the 1st and 2nd appellants as the authors of the fatal injuries on Narayanan and Raman respectively. The rest of the appellants were also well identified and in the result the first two appellants were convicted under S. 148, I.P.C, while the remainder were convicted under S. 147, I.P.C The 1st appellant was convicted of the murder of Narayanan and the remainder of the accused were convicted of this murder by operation of S. 149, I.P.C The 2nd appellant was convicted of the murder of Raman while his companions were convicted under S. 149, I.P.C All the appellants were sentenced to transportation for life for the offences of murder while the convictions under Ss. 147 and 148, I.P.C were followed by sentences of rigorous imprisonment for six months and one year respectively.

Mr. Rangaswami Aiyangar has strenuously argued that the evidence in the case is not reliable and that on account of several discrepancies in the stories told, the witness cannot be believed regarding what took place. According to the case set out by the appellants before the Committing Magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge, the 1st and 2nd appellants went to the temple about 11 o'clock that night and shortly after getting there, the deceased Narayanan came and told them they were wanted by the uralars. The two of them went to see what was the matter and as soon as the uralars saw them, they attacked and beat them. The 1st appellant saw the 2nd appellant being stabbed by the two deceased and he then took out a small pen-knife and began to brandish it in order to keep off his assailants. As is usually the case in pleas of this kind, the 1st appellant is unable to say whom he struck when he was waving his knife about in this way. The two of them then managed to escape. The 2nd appellant supported his brother in this story while the 3rd and 4th appellants claimed to have gone to the spot on seeing the 2nd appellant being stabbed and to have received injuries in the ensuing fight. The 5th appellant denied all knowledge of the occurrence and claimed that he had been falsely implicated in the case because he refused to give evidence in support of the uralars. If the prosecution witnesses are prepared deliberately to swear away the lives of the five appellants, it necessarily follows that there must be some deep-rooted enmity to account for this but on turning to the statement of the 1st appellant before the committing Magistrate, there is an admission which effectively disposes of this theory of enmity and ill-feeling on the part of the uralars. In answer to a specific question, the 1st appellant denied that there was any ill-feeling between him and the prosecution witnesses. He went on to refer to some slight trouble between Narayanan (P.W 5) and the 3rd appellant but this was so slight that it is no adequate explanation for giving evidence of this kind against the appellants.

In support of the argument, that the prosecution witnesses were the aggressors, considerable reliance has been placed on the injuries suffered by the appellants. The 2nd appellant had an incised wound two inches long on the left arm and a much smaller one on the back of the right arm, but the injury which the prosecution witnesses have not satisfactorily explained was an incised wound twelve inches long and three quarters of an inch broad muscle deep across the back. None of the witnesses admit having caused this although there is no attempt to hide the fact that when the appellants had to be forcibly removed, the prosecution witnesses pulled out of the ground some of the bamboos forming part of the pandal and used them somewhat freely in driving out the appellants. These bamboos were split and having been driven into the ground their ends must have been sharpened. The medical witness, P.W 3, admitted that all the injuries on the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th appellants could have been caused with split bamboos. Although none of the prosecution witnesses are willing to accept responsibility for this long wound on the back of the 2nd appellant, we do not consider this is a sufficient reason for doubting the prosecution story. There is ample evidence of the appellants' visit the night before and their attempt to interfere with the women-folk, and this renders probable the prosecution story that they became aggressive again the following night about the same time and began to interrupt the proceedings.

The prosecution story was supported by P.Ws 10 to 18. Information was first given to the police by P.W 10 shortly after mid-night. The occurrence took place according to this report at 10-30 P.M and having regard to the time probably occupied in giving first aid to the victims and recovering from the shock of the attack, there was no delay to be accounted for. The five appellants were clearly mentioned by name in this report, Ex. N, and in referring to the incident the previous night, there was no attempt to conceal the fact that when the appellants made their second visit the next night, the prosecution witnesses came to blows with them. Within a few hours of the occurrence a dying declaration, Ex. B, was taken by the local Magistrate from the deceased Narayanan and because of his weak state, the Sub Inspector of Police did not attempt to examine him himself. In this statement Narayanan made a brief accusation that the 1st two appellants and three companions not mentioned by name had attacked him and that the 1st appellant stabbed him with a dagger. He also referred to the attack on his brothers and others and briefly mentioned his attempt to dissuade the appellants from interfering with the women-folk as the cause of this attack. He made no attempt to separate the interference with the women-folk from the attack an hour or so later and this has been relied upon by Mr. Rangaswami Aiyangar as an important discrepancy in the evidence. We are unable to accept this as an adequate reason for rejecting the whole of this dying declaration. Although the deceased did not die for several days, he was then suffering from severe injuries and must have been in considerable bodily pain, which probably explains why he confined himself to his own injuries without attempting to mention what happened to Raman or to describe in clear detail the chronological sequence of events. Admittedly several of the prosecution witnesses are temple uralars but we are unable to see how they can be described as interested witnesses merely because they were prepared to use defensive measures against rowdies and freely give evidence regarding the death of two of their companions. If this constitutes interest, then every witness who gives evidence against accused persons who commit crimes of violence either against him or in his presence must be described as an interested witness. The learned Advocate for the appellants has drawn our attention to a number of minor discrepancies and inconsistencies in the evidence but they are insufficient to throw any real doubt on the prosecution story. In an occurrence of this kind where an attack is made by a number of persons without warning in a crowded place, the accounts given by the witnesses must necessarily vary in details and what may have been noticed by one may not have been seen by another. We can see no sufficient reason for disagreeing with the learned Sessions Judge in the acceptance of the prosecution evidence identifying the five appellants as having taken part in the attack and the first two appellants as the authors of the fatal injuries on the two victims. So far as the convictions of the latter for the two murders are concerned, there is no difficulty. Their convictions are confirmed and their sentences, which are the minimum prescribed by law, are upheld.

The convictions of all the appellants under Ss. 147 and 148, I.P.C are also upheld and their sentences maintained. It is regarding the application of S. 149, I.P.C, that we find ourselves unable to agree with the learned Judge. The prosecution evidence was that the five appellants came running towards their victims shouting out that none of the uralars were to be left alive and it was largely on the use of these words and the lethal weapons with the 1st two appellants that the common object of the unlawful assembly was held to be the murder of the uralars and their families. On examining the evidence of the prosecution witnesses who speak to the use of these threatening words, we find there is considerable ambiguity. P.Ws 11 and 16 say that the threats were uttered by all the appellants but the rest of the eye-witnesses implicate only the 1st two appellants as having shouted out these ominous words. If the personal pronouns occurring in the relevant sentences have been correctly used, they can refer, according to the context, only to the 1st two appellants and not to the rest of the assailants. Boastful and threatening expressions of this kind are frequently used by villagers and we consider it doubtful whether the use of these threatening words by the 1st two appellants is sufficient evidence to show that the rest of the appellants shared a homicidal intention with them. There is no doubt the possession of the two weapons by the 1st two appellants is to be considered. One of them is a dagger about the lethal nature of which there can be no doubt but the other is only a small pen-knife and we consider that in all the circumstances of the case the evidence is insufficient to show that the common object of the appellants was murder. We consider their common object was only to cause hurt.

It is however argued by the learned Public Prosecutor that even though the common object of the unlawful assembly may not have been to commit murder as asserted in the charges but only to cause hurt, two persons were in fact murdered by two of the appellants in prosecution of that common object and therefore under the first clause of S. 149, I.P.C, the remaining three appellants must also be found guilty of those murders. The crucial question which we have now to decide is whether the murders of Raman and Narayanan were committed ‘in prosecution of the common object’ of the unlawful assembly. The learned Public Prosecutor argues, very plausibly, that the injuries which caused the deaths of Raman and Narayanan were inflicted by the two appellants in prosecution of the common object and therefore that the murders were committed in such prosecution.

We feel, on general grounds, the greatest reluctance to accept any such interpretation, which involves the conviction of an offender for an offence which he neither committed himself, nor intended should be committed, nor even contemplated as likely to be committed by his associates. This, we feel, is contrary to all principles of criminal responsibility, and cannot have been the intention of the Legislature.

Nor do we think, if we confine ourselves to the first clause of S. 149, that the language used presents any difficulty. The plain literal meaning of ‘in prosecution of” would seem to be ‘in order to achieve or attain.’ ‘Prosecution’ is derived from Latin, and the root meaning of the word is “to follow.” When a person has already attained or caught up with his objects and passes beyond it he can no longer be said to be pursuing or prosecuting it. We think that the actions of the two appellants cannot be considered as indivisible but must be analysed into two parts. In so far as they were prosecuting the common object of the assembly these appellants intended to cause hurt and did cause hurt to Raman and Narayanan. But they also intended to kill Raman and Narayanan or cause them such bodily injuries as would be sufficient to cause their deaths. In conceiving and carrying out that intention they were not acting in prosecution of the common object, but in prosecution of private objects of their own.

Difficulties, however, undoubtedly arise from the fact that the phrase ‘in prosecution of that object’ occurs in the second clause of the section. It is not necessary for us in disposing of this appeal to find specifically whether appellants 3, 4 and 5 had or had not the knowledge required by that clause because, as the learned Public Prosecutor himself pointed out, they were not charged with having that knowledge, and had no direct opportunity therefore of establishing their want of it. All we need say now on this point is this—that if the word ‘or’ in S. 149 is given its literal meaning, and if the expression ‘in prosecution of’ in both clauses is given exactly the same interpretation, then it seems to us that the section is unintelligible. This was recognised nearly seventy years ago in The Queen v. Sabid Ali(1). We do not find therefore that a consideration of the section as a whole presents any impediment to our holding that ‘in prosecution of the common object’ in the first clause must be strictly construed as equivalent to ‘in order to attain the common object.’

There appear to be no reported authorities in favour of the proposition of the learned Public Prosecutor. He has however referred us to a recent decision of a Bench of this Court (in Crl. A. Nos. 283 and 376 of 1941) of which one of us was a member. It may perhaps be possible to read portions of that judgment as impliedly accepting the view which the learned Public Prosecutor is now pressing upon us, but there is also the most definite finding in that judgment that the members of the unlawful assembly must have known that murder was likely. The accused in that case were convicted therefore by the application of the second clause of S. 149. The question of any antithesis between the two clauses was not raised, nor were the learned Judges considering facts in which knowledge of the likelihood of murder was absent. We do not consider therefore that the decision in Crl. A. Nos. 283 and 376 of 1941 is binding upon us when considering the particular facts and circumstances of the present case.

There is, of course, no doubt that the first clause of S. 149 must be resorted to in this case to convict appellants 3, 4 and 5 of some offences. We hold however, for the reasons which we have given that the offences which appellants 1 and 2 committed in prosecution of the common object were not murder but hurt under S. 324. We find appellants 3, 4 and 5 guilty on both charges of offences under S. 324 read with S. 149 and sentence them each to R.I for 18 months on each of the charges, these sentences to run concurrently with each other and concurrently with those imposed under S. 147.

N.R.R