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Rathna Mudali v. Perumal Reddy

Madras High Court
Oct 1, 1912
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Summary of Opinion — Sundara Aiyar, J. & Sadasiva Aiyar, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

One Vedachala executed an usufructuary mortgage (Exhibit II) in favour of Thangavelu on 7 April 1900. The mortgage was subsequently transferred to the 2nd and 3rd defendants; the 1st defendant is the heir of Thangavelu. Vedachala had three sons, each entitled to a one-fourth share. On 2 May 1900 two sons (Singaravelu and Thiruvengada) sold their half-share to the 4th defendant. The mortgagees (2nd and 3rd defendants) received half their debt from the 4th defendant and delivered up possession of a portion of the properties to him.

The plaintiff obtained a transfer of the equity of redemption from Vedachala and his remaining son and instituted a suit for redemption of the mortgage, seeking possession of the whole mortgaged property on payment of the whole mortgage debt. The 4th defendant resisted, asserting he owned half the equity of redemption and should retain possession of the portion he acquired from the transferors.

The District Munsif decreed in favour of the plaintiff for the whole property. On appeal the District Judge modified that decree, holding the plaintiff was not entitled to recover the whole property and ordering that, on payment of half the mortgage amount, plaintiff and 4th defendant be jointly entitled to possession of the mortgaged lands. The plaintiff preferred a second appeal to this Court, contending he had a right to redeem the whole mortgage and recover the whole property.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a person who is entitled only to a share of the equity of redemption can, as a matter of right, redeem the whole mortgage and recover possession of the whole mortgaged property when (a) the mortgage has been partially satisfied by a third party (the 4th defendant), and (b) the 4th defendant has acquired both part of the mortgagee's interest and part of the equity of redemption.
  2. How Sections 60 and 91 of the Transfer of Property Act apply to a situation in which the mortgagee has been paid in part by an assignee of a portion of the equity of redemption and has thereby "split up" the mortgage.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff (Appellant)

  • The plaintiff contended that he was, as a matter of right, entitled to redeem the whole mortgage under Exhibit II and recover possession of the whole mortgaged property on payment of the whole mortgage amount.
  • The plaintiff insisted that on redemption he should be put in possession of the whole property rather than only a proportionate share.

4th Defendant

  • The 4th defendant resisted the plaintiff's attempt to recover the whole property, asserting that he has become the owner of half the equity of redemption (through purchase from two sons) and that the plaintiff is entitled only to the remaining half.
  • The 4th defendant claimed the right to retain possession of the properties in his possession as representing the share of his transferors.

Mortgagees (2nd & 3rd Defendants)

  • By their actions before the suit, the mortgagees accepted half the mortgage debt from the 4th defendant and delivered up possession of a portion of the property to him, effectively splitting the mortgage to the extent possible.
  • They did not claim entitlement to any part of the properties in the present suit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Marana Ammanna v. Pendayala Perubotulu Held that a person entitled to the remainder may claim to redeem his share only of the equity of redemption. Cited as supporting the proposition that one entitled to part only may redeem only that part.
Subramanyan v. Mandayan Held that a person entitled to the remainder may claim to redeem his share only. Used alongside Marana Ammanna to support limited redemption rights.
Hari Kissin Bhagat v. Valiat Hussain Held that a mortgagee may claim to recover the share of the debt due from a person entitled to a portion when the mortgagee has arranged with the owner of the remainder, provided no prejudice to defendant. Relied on to demonstrate permissible arrangements between mortgagee and one co-owner where others are not prejudiced.
Mahadaji Hari Limaye v. Genapat Shet Dhond Shet Similar authority to Hari Kissin Bhagat regarding mortgagee's dealings with one co-owner. Grouped with other cases showing mortgagee can deal with part owners without necessarily impairing others' rights.
Brij Kishore v. Madho Singh Listed with other cases that allow mortgagee to deal with parts of the equity under safeguards. Used to show established practice where mortgagee's arrangements do not prejudice others.
Venkatachala Chetty v. Srinivasa Varadachariar Another case cited for the principle that mortgagee may deal with part shares. Reinforces the same group of authorities permitting partial dealings when not prejudicial.
Lakshman Giriraya Naik v. Madhu Kristian Shervai Held mortgagee entitled to have an account taken between him and owner of part of equity when he had settled his rights against the owner of the remainder. Cited to support accounting and settlement between mortgagee and a part-owner after dealings with others.
Huthasanan Nambudri v. Parameswaran Nambudri Held that a person entitled to part only of the equity of redemption had a right to redeem the whole despite mortgagee's objection. Court distinguished this decision on its facts and scope, expressing doubt that it establishes a universal rule.
Pearce v. Morris (English) English authority followed in Huthasanan Nambudri; concerned redemption questions where co-owners were not parties. Noted as part of English decisions relied upon in Huthasanan; the Court observed differences in factual contexts.
Hall v. Heward (English) Another English authority referenced in Huthasanan Nambudri. Used to show origins of the broader rule in some English cases, but Court treated them as context-specific.
Marakar Akath Kondara Kayil Mamu v. Punjapatath Kutten Held that when plaintiff entitled only to part and defendant to another part, plaintiff could not sue to redeem without first getting partition. Cited as an instance where courts required partition before redemption; the present Court considered that holding too strict.
Thillai Chetti v. Ramanatha Ayyan Held similarly that plaintiff entitled only to part could not sue to redeem without partition; discussed procedure implications. Cited but the Court expressed the view that such cases had gone too far in dismissing suits outright.
Mora Joshi v. Ramachandra Dankar Joshi Bombay decision holding mortgagor could insist on redeeming whole mortgage though mortgagee had become owner of part equity. Noted as a contrasting view from Bombay courts inconsistent with the Court's reading of Section 60.
Narayan v. Ganapat Bombay case aligned with Mora Joshi allowing redemption of whole despite mortgagee owning part. Noted as contrary to the principle the Court derived from the proviso to Section 60.
Nawab Azimat Alikhan v. Jowahir Singh (Privy Council) Held purchasers of equity in one village could not redeem other villages against mortgagee's wish; mortgagee entitled to retain possession of villages not represented by purchasers. Considered binding by one judge (Sadasiva Aiyar, J.) and used as key authority to support the view that limited owners cannot redeem whole against mortgagee's will.
Munshi v. Daulat Held that where proprietors mortgaged together and mortgagee purchased one share, another mortgagor suing to redeem could only redeem his own share. Followed as supporting limited redemption rights where mortgagee has split or acquired part interests.
Kuray Mal v. Puran Mal Authority for the proposition that a mortgagor could only redeem his own share where other shares were treated separately. Followed in support of restricting plaintiff to redeeming only his half-share.
Mir Eusuff Ali Haji v. Panchanan Chatterjee Discusses that release of part of premises by mortgagee does not affect lien on residue as between original parties; mortgagee should not release part to injure others with liens. Quoted to explain limits on mortgagee's power to release parts of security and to justify equitable considerations.
Imam Ali v. Baij Nath Ram Sahu Used to support principle that mortgagee cannot release lien on one property to increase burden on others without privity/consent of affected persons. Referred to when discussing fairness of partial releases and their effect.
Hakim Lal v. Ramlal Analogous authority to Imam Ali regarding release and lien principles. Also relied upon in discussing how release impacts rights among different owners.
Kattlewell v. Watson (English) English authority cited for the proposition restraining mortgagee's release of part of security to prejudice others. Quoted as supporting the Court's equitable reservations about prejudicial releases.
Sheo Prasad v. Behari Lal One of several cases recognising release even to prejudice of others (cited negatively by the Court). Mentioned as part of a group of cases whose view the Court did not fully endorse.
Misri Lal v. Muthu Lal Listed among cases recognising problematic releases; Court did not adopt their full view. Used to illustrate conflicting authorities on release prejudicing others.
Sheo Tahal Ojha v. Sheo Dan Rai Another case in the group recognising releases that the Court declined to follow fully. Noted in discussion of conflicting precedents.
Pirbhu Narain Singh v. Amir Singh Also listed among cases with a view the Court found unacceptable in toto. Referenced to show divergence in authorities.
Ram Ranjan Chakrabutty v. Indra Narain Dass Case in which the Court did not adopt the view that releases may be granted to prejudice prior interest-holders. Noted in contrasting lines of authority.
Krishnayyar v. Muthukumaraswami Pillai Described as laying down a principle similar to Mir Eusuff Ali but criticized by the Court. Indicated as not fully supported by the present Court.
Ponnuswami Mudaliar v. Srinivasa Naiken Followed the contrary view to Krishnayyar and aligned with the Court's position on release issues. Noted as supportive authority.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analysed the dispute predominantly through the lens of Sections 60 and 91 of the Transfer of Property Act and by reference to earlier case law.

Key reasoning steps:

  1. Interpretation of Section 91: The Court accepted that Section 91 permits "any person having an interest in the right to redeem the property" to institute a suit for redemption, but rejected the view that this language entitles a person owning only a fractional share invariably to redeem the whole mortgage against the will of other co-owners or the mortgagee.
  2. Interpretation of Section 60 (and its proviso): The Court emphasised that Section 60 contemplates that a person entitled to a share only is not ordinarily entitled to redeem only his share by paying a proportionate part of the mortgage amount, and that a mortgagee generally has a right to insist on the indivisibility of the mortgage. However, the proviso and the realities where the mortgagee has acquired part of the equity of redemption or been otherwise dealt with require a case-by-case approach.
  3. Effect of "splitting" the mortgage: The Court found that the mortgage had effectively been split: the mortgagees received half their debt from the 4th defendant and gave him possession of part of the properties; the 4th defendant thereby holds rights both as assignee of part of the mortgage and as owner of part of the equity of redemption. Because the mortgagee had dealt with one of the co-owners and accepted consideration from the 4th defendant, the mortgage could not be treated as indivisible to the prejudice of the 4th defendant.
  4. Assessment of precedents: The Court surveyed conflicting authorities from Madras and Bombay and some English decisions. It rejected any categorical rule (derived from some English authorities and some Indian decisions) that a part-owner must always be allowed to redeem the whole. It held that the question depends on circumstances and whether rights of other owners or mortgagee have been acquired or altered in the interim.
  5. Practical solution in this case: Given the facts — admission that the 4th defendant is entitled to what the plaintiff cannot claim and that the mortgagees have been paid half by the 4th defendant — the Court found no justification for allowing the plaintiff to redeem the whole. Instead, the Court concluded that a partition and redemption of the plaintiff's half was the appropriate remedy.
  6. Costs and partition directions: The Court ordered that after payment of half the mortgage amount (Rs. 187-5-0), the plaintiff be put in possession of half the properties following a fair partition between him and the 4th defendant, and that the parties bear their own costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The plaintiff is not entitled as a matter of right to redeem the whole mortgage and recover possession of the whole mortgaged property; instead the plaintiff may redeem only his undivided half-share on payment of half the mortgage amount (Rs. 187-5-0) and shall be put in possession of half the properties after a fair partition, while the 4th defendant shall be put in possession of the remainder.

Implications:

  • The decision limits the right of a fractional owner of the equity of redemption to redeem the entire mortgage where the mortgagee has already dealt with another co-owner and accepted payment, thereby "splitting" the mortgage to the extent practicable.
  • The Court emphasised a fact-sensitive approach: whether a part-owner can redeem the whole depends on circumstances and on rights acquired by the mortgagee or third parties subsequent to the mortgage; there is no universal rule permitting full redemption by a fractional owner against the will of others.
  • Direct consequence for the parties: plaintiff may redeem only half on payment of half the debt, partition to be effected, and parties to bear their own costs. The Court did not purport to lay down an all-embracing new rule of precedent beyond these holdings and relied on existing statutory provisions and the surveyed authorities to resolve the present dispute.

Note: This summary is based exclusively on the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

Sundara Aiyar, J.:— The facts of this case, so far as they are necessary for the decision of this second appeal, are briefly as follows:—One Vedachala executed an usufructuary mortgage to one Thangavelu, on the 7th April, 1900, Exhibit II. This mortgage was subsequently transferred to the 2nd and 3rd defendants in the suit. The 1st defendant is the heir of Thangavelu. Vedachala had three sons. He and each of the sons was, therefore, entitled to a fourth share in the property. On the 2nd May, 1900, two of the sons, Singaravelu and Thiruvengada, sold their half share of the property to the 4th defendant. The mortgagees, the 2nd and 3rd defendants, received half of their debts from the 4th defendant and gave up possession of a portion of the properties to him. The plaintiff obtained a transfer of the equity of redemption from Vedachala and his remaining son and he has instituted this suit for redemption of the mortgage. He claims to be entitled to be put in possession of the whole property mortgaged by Vedachala on payment of the whole amount and is not content with a decree for possession of half the property on payment of half the mortgage amount. The 4th defendant resists the plaintiff's attempt to recover the whole of the property and contends that as he has become the owner of half of the equity of redemption and the plaintiffs entitled only to the remaning half, he should not be allowed to recover possession of more than half of the properties and he claims to be entitled to retain possession of the property in his possession as representing the share of his transferors. The District Munsif gave the plaintiff a decree for the whole property. On appeal, the District Judge modified the Munsif's decree holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover the whole of the property and held that on payment by the plaintiff of half of the mortgage amount, the plaintiff and 4th defendant should be held to be jointly entitled to the possession of the mortgaged lands. The second appeal to this Court is preferred by the plaintiff and he contends that he is as a matter of right entitled to recover the whole of the property mortgaged under Exhibit II. The question for decision is whether the plaintiff is entitled as a matter of right to redeem the whole of that mortgage and to recover possession of the whole of the property in the circumstances of the case. It will be noticed that the mortgagees have split up the mortgage so far as they could by receiving a portion of the mortgage amount from the 4th defendant the assignee of half of the equity of redemption and the 4th defendant has now become the owner of a share both in the equity of redemption and in the mortgage. Section 91 of the Transfer of Property Act lays down that any person having an interest in the right to redeem the property may redeem or institute a suit for redemption of the mortgaged property but I do not think that it lays down that a person who is entitled to a share only of the equity of redemption has, under all circumstances, the right to insist on redeeming the whole of the mortgage and recovering possession of the whole of the mortgaged property. S. 60 enacts that a person entitled to a share only of the mortgaged property is not entitled to redeem his share only on payment of a proportionate part of the amount remaining due on the mortgage, and lays down an exception where a mortgagee has acquired in whole or in part a share of the mortgagor. The mortgagee under this section has ordinarily a right to insist on treating the mortgage as indivisible and on the redemption of the whole mortgage. But he cannot do so where he has split up the equity of redemption by becoming the owner of a part of it himself. I do not think that there is any principle of justice which requires that a person who is entitled only to a part of the equity of redemption should necessarily be held to have a right to redeem the whole of the mortgage. If there are several persons in whom the equity of redemption is vested, there is no reason why one of them and the mortgagee acting together should not be held to be entitled to deal with his interest in the equity of redemption and the mortgagee's right as against him provided the rights of the other owners in the equity of redemption are not thereby injuriously affected. Of course, nothing done either by a mortgagor or a mortgagee behind the back of the other, can affect the right of that other so as to injure him in any way. Where the mortgagee has dealt with one of those entitled to the equity of redemption, it has been held that a person entitled to the remainder may claim to redeem his share only of the equity of redemption. See Marana Ammanna v. Pendayala Perubotulu(1) and Subramanyan v. Mandayan(2). It has also been held that a mortgagee may claim to recover the share of the debt due from a person entitled to a portion of the equity of redemption when he has already entered into an arrangement with the owner of the remainder provided the right of the defendant is not prejudiced by the arrangement entered into between the mortgagee and the defendants' co-owners of the equity of redemption. See Hari Kissin Bhagat v. Valiat Hussain(3), Mahadaji Hari Limaye v. Genapat Shet Dhond Shet(4), Brij Kishore v. Madho Singh(5) and Venkatachala Chetty v. Srinivasa Varadachariar(6). In Lakshman Giriraya Naik v. Madhu Kristian Shervai(7), it was held that the mortgagee was entitled to have an account taken between him and the owner of a part of the equity of redemption when he had already settled his rights as against the owner of the remainder of the equity. The objection, to a mortgagee splitting up a mortgage is entitled to weight only where the owner of a part of the equity of redemption is prejudicially affected by the splitting. In Huthasanan Nambudri v. Parameswaran Nambudri(8), it was, no doubt, held by this Court that a person entitled to a part only of the equity of redemption had a right to redeem the whole notwithstanding the mortgagee's objection that he should not be permitted to redeem more than his share of the equity. In that case the persons who were entitled to the remainder of the equity were parties to the suit and also seem to have resisted the plaintiff's attempt to redeem the whole. It does not appear whether they claimed to continue the mortgage in so far as their shares were concerned. The decision proceeded on the principle that a mortgage contract was indivisible and that it was the right equally of the mortgagor and mortgagee to keep it indivisible. The judgment was based on some decisions of the English Courts, Pearce v. Morris(9) and Hall v. Heward(10); but in those English cases, the plaintiff's co-owners of the equity of redemption were not parties and it does not appear that they objected to the redemption of the whole of the mortgage by the plaintiff. I cannot see any principle on which it should be held that even if some of the co-owners of the equity of redemption should desire to continue the mortgage of their shares, one of the co-owners should be held to be entitled to redeem the whole of the mortgage. I do not think that Huthasanan Nambudri v. Parameswaran Nambudri was intended to go the length of laying down such a general rule and certainly the English cases, which were followed there did not propound any such rule. The question whether the Court will allow redemption of the whole of the mortgage at the instance of a person entitled to a part only of the equity of redemption must depend on the circumstances of each case and the rights acquired by the mortgagee or by third persons, subsequent to the mortgage. In this case, there is no reason why the plaintiff should first be allowed to redeem the whole of the mortgage and 4th defendant who has a right both of a mortgagee and mortgagor be left to bring a fresh suit for recovering his share of the equity of redemption from the plaintiff. In two cases, Marakar Akath Kondara Kayil Mamu v. Punjapatath Kutten(11) and Thillai Chetti v. Ramanatha Ayyan(12), it was held that when the plaintiff was entitled only to part of the equity of redemption and the defendant entitled to another part, the plaintiff could not sue to redeem at all without first getting a partition of the equity of redemption. With all respect, it seems to me that those cases have gone too far in holding that the plaintiff's suit should be altogether dismissed. It may be noted that in those cases it was the mortgagee himself who had acquired a share of the equity of redemption and there was, in my opinion, the less reason for holding that a partition should be first effected between the parties to the suit before a suit for redemption could be maintained. In Bombay, on the other hand, it was held that notwithstanding that the mortgagee had become owner of a part of the equity of redemption, the mortgagor was entitled to insist on redeeming the whole mortgage. See Mora Joshi v. Ramachandra Dankar Joshi(13), Narayan v. Ganapat(14). In my opinion, both the Madras cases and the Bombay cases mentioned above are contrary to the principle of the proviso to Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act. I can see no reason why on the facts found there should not be a decree for partition in this case so as to allow plaintiff to recover half the properties included in the mortgage. The 2nd and 3rd defendants did not claim to be entitled to any part of the properties now. The 4th defendant, according to their admission, is entitled to all that the plaintiff cannot claim. I ought to notice a contention that Vedachala was himself entitled to the whole of the property and that the 4th defendant acquired no right by the conveyance he obtained from two of the sons of Vedachala. I am unable to see that this contention was put forward in either of the Courts below. It has not been raised even in the momorandum of second appeal. It was held in Original Suit No. 261 of 1901, which was instituted by the original mortgagee, Thangavelu, against Vedachala and his sons and the 4th defendant that the latter was entitled to the shares of the two sons that were conveyed to him subject to the mortgage in Thangavelu's favour. The plaintiff in this suit did not, as I have already observed, contend in the lower Courts that Vedachala was solely entitled to the property. No doubt, the plaintiff's object in insisting on recovering possession of the whole property is to make an attempt to set up a claim to the whole in case the 4th defendant be driven to another suit for recovering the shares of his transferors. I do not think that this course should be followed. The learned Vakil for the appellant consents to a decree for partition if we hold that he ought not to be allowed to redeem the whole mortgage. I have already held that the plaintiff was in no way prejudicially affected by the mortgagee's splitting up the mortgage and receiving half the amount due to them from the 4th defendant and I am, therefore, of opinion that the decree of the lower Appellate Court should be modified by the plaintiff being allowed to redeem only half the properties on payment of half the mortgage amount, i.e, Rs. 187-5-0. The plaintiff will be put in possession of half the properties included in the mortgage-deed after a fair partition between him and the 4th defendant. The 4th defendant must be put in possession of the remainder. It would be desirable to allot the lands in 4th defendant's pessession to him in partition in so far as that can be done without injustice to the plaintiff. In the circumstances, we think the parties should bear their own costs throughout.

Sadasiva Aiyar, J.:— do not think it necessary to set out the facts which have been mentioned in some detail in the judgment just now pronounced by my learned brother. I shall content myself with making some observations on the principal question of law involved in this case.

2. It is unnecessary for the purpose of deciding on that question of law to consider the cases where the objection of the mortgagee to partial partition by the owner of a fraction of the equity of redemption was allowed as a valid objection or the cases where a similar objection of the mortgagee who had himself split up the mortgage was disallowed. Such cases have very little relevancy to the question in dispute before us.

3. In the Privy Council case, Nawab Azimat Alikhan v. Jowahir Singh(15), their Lordships say at page 416 that co-mortgagors who were entitled only to a portion of the mortgaged property could not redeem against the will of the mortgagee any portion of the mortgaged property except the one village in which those co-owners (the plaintiffs) were interested. That suit was brought by the purchasers of the equity of redemption in one of the four mortgaged villages for redemption of all the four villages and their Lordships say that the mortgagee, “if desirous of retaining possession” of the other three villages as mortgagee was entitled to do so against the plaintiffs, “whose rights in that case were limited to the redemption and recovery of their village of Hissanipur, upon payment of so much sum deposited in Court as represents the portion of the mortgage-debt chargeable on that village.” I think that this opinion of the Privy Council is binding on us and I, therefore, do not propose to deal in detail with the Indian and English cases decided before and after the Privy Council decision, and I shall make reference only to a few of the latest cases. In Munshi v. Daulat(16), it was held, following Kuray Mal v. Puran Mal(17), that where all the proprietors of an estate joined in mortgaging it and the mortgagee subsequently purchased the share of one of the mortgagors and when another mortgagor sued to redeem his own share and also the share of yet another mortgagor, the plaintiff could only redeem his own share. In Mir Eusuff Ali Haji v. Panchanan Chatterjee(18), the following observations occur:— “Now what was the true position of the mortgagors when they transferred a portion of the property to Henasatulla, who obtained a release from the mortgagee by payment of a sum of money”? It is firmly settled doctrine that as between the original parties, the release of a part of the premises does not affect the lien of the mortgagee upon the residue, which is bound for the whole debt. No doubt, as against others who have liens upon the remainder of the mortgaged premises, a mortgagee, with notice of such lien, has no right to release any portion of the mortgaged premises to the injury of the owners of such liens. To put the matter in another way, as between the mortgagor and mortgagee, the latter is not entitled to release a portion of the hypothecated property and diminish his Own security to that extent. While, therefore, we adhere to the view taken in the cases of Imam Ali v. Baij Nath Ram Sahu(19) and Hakim Lal v. Ramlal(20) that the mortgagee, who has security upon two or more properties which he knows belongs to different persons, cannot release his lien upon one so as to increase the burden upon the others without the privity and consent of the persons affected [Kattlewell v. Watson(21)], we are of opinion that this doctrine has no application to the present case where the release took place at a time when the appellant had not purchased any interest in the mortgagaged premises, and the mortgagors alone were the persons affected by the release. We must not, however, be assumed to adopt the rule laid down by the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court that such a release may be granted even to the prejudice of persons who had previously acquired an interest in the mortgaged properties. That view is clearly opposed to the principles of equity, justice and good conscience, and though recognised in Sheo Prasad v. Behari Lal(22), Misri Lal v. Muthu Lal(23), Sheo Tahal Ojha v. Sheo Dan Rai(24) and Pirbhu Narain Singh v. Amir Singh(25), was not adopted in Ram Ranjan Chakrabutty v. Indra Narain Dass(26).

4. The case in Krishnayyar v. Muthukumaraswami Pillai(27), which lays down a similar principle, cannot, to that extent, be supported. The contrary view, which accords with the rule adopted by this Court, was followed in Ponnuswami Mudaliar v. Srinivasa Naiken(28). It is again unnecessary for the purpose of deciding this case to express a final opinion on the question whether the mortgagee himself as plaintiff can sue for sale of a portion alone of the mortgaged property after releasing the other portions at this, pleasure. As at present advised, and notwithstanding the great respect I have for the opinions to the contrary including that of Asutosh Mukerjee, J., I do not see any objection on principle to the mortgagee doing so.

5. A mortgagee can sue for a personal decree alone against his mortgagor giving tip all claims to bring any portion of the mortgaged properties to sale if he so desires; why should he not, therefore, be allowed to sue for the sale of a portion of the mortgaged property for the whole (or the portion remaining due and unpaid) of his mortgage money, leaving the owners of the equity of redemption in the mortgaged properties to settle their claims as between themselves either in the same suit (if convenient) or in another suit? He would, of course, be barred afterwards from attaching other portions of the mortgaged properties and bringing them to sale in execution of the money decree he obtained. He might also perhaps be barred from again suing for a mortgage decree for sale of the other portions left out in his first suit for sale. But these considerations have nothing to do with his rights to release any portion or to sue for the sale of a portion only of the mortgaged property though such release or abstention would not affect the rights and liabilities as between themselves of the owners of the different portions of the equity of redemption in the mortgaged properties. If he has himself purchased any portion, he must, of course, make proportionate abatement of the mortgage amount when bringing a suit for sale. In the present case, the plaintiff claims only an undivided, half share in the mortgaged property, therefore, it seems to me that against the will of the mortgagee and of the 4th defendant, who has obtained half the mortgagee's interest by paying half the mortgage money to the mortgagee and half share in the equity of redemption by purchase of same from two out of four owners of the equity of redemption, the plaintiff cannot claim to redeem more than plaintiff's half share of the mortgaged properties. As I said before, I hold this view, following Kuray Mal v. Puran Mal, Munshi v. Daulat and Nawab Azimat Ali Khan v. Jowahir Singh. There are, no doubt, some comparatively old cases and some English cases in which it was said that a mortgagee could not compel even the owner of only a portion of the equity of redemption to redeem only that portion. But in most of these cases, it does not appear that the owners of the other portions of the equity of redemption were parties to the suit or objected to the plaintiff's redeeming the whole. Any such case, like Huthasanan Nambudri v. Parameswaram Nambudri, which decided that even in that state of circumstances, the plaintiff is entitled to redeem the whole against the will of the mortgagee and against the wishes of the other owners of the equity of redemption, I respectfully dissent from. I am also against making any distinction between cases where the mortgage is split up (a) by the mortgagee releasing certain of the properties (or certain share of the properties) comprised in the mortgage, (b) by himself purchasing a portion of the mortgaged property, and (c) by the joint owners of the equity of redemption effecting a partition of their properties either by metes and bounds or by agreeing to hold the property in common in definite shares instead of jointly. I hold generally that against the mortgagee's consent, the owner of a definite share of the equity of redemption should not be entitled to redeem more than his share unless the owners of the other shares consent, or do not object to plaintiff's redeeming their shares also. The very general words of Section 91 of the Transfer of Property Act, “any person, having an interest in or charge on a property, can institute a suit for the redemption of the mortgaged property” cannot be construed to mean that a plaintiff, who owned only a fractional share, can redeem other shares than his own when the owners of those other shares object to his redeeming their fractions or contend that their shares have already been redeemed by them. In the above view, the decree of the lower Appellate Court allowing the plaintiff to redeem the plaintiff's half share alone on payment of half the mortgage amount (which half of the mortgage amount alone remains due to the mortgagee) and allowing the plaintiff in execution to be put in possession of the half share by permitting him to take possession of the whole land as common owner with the 4th defendant, seems to me to be correct. Strictly speaking, this second appeal should be dismissed as plaintiff and 4th defendant did not express their consent in the lower Court to have a partition effected between them; see Thillai Chetti v. Ramanath Ayyan. But as before us, the plaintiff and the 4th defendant have so consented to an order allowing partition on redemption, I concur in the decree proposed by my learned brother.

S.N/R.K