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Inspector Of Municipal Councils And Local Boards v. Alahari Venkatanarasimham

Madras High Court
Aug 25, 1933
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Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal was brought against an order of Stone J. dated 16 November 1932 which purported to have been made under S. 45 of the Specific Relief Act. The petition before Stone J. named two petitioners: A. Venkatanarsimham and Pera Reddi. The record showed that Pera Reddi did not support the application by affidavit and his interest in the matter was unexplained, making his participation incompetent.

The substantive dispute arose during preparation of an electoral roll for the Kavali Taluk (September–October 1932) under rules made under the Madras Local Boards Act. Under S. 52 of that Act one qualification for voting was holding land on a written lease or demise from certain classes of landholders. The petitioner Venkatanarsimham objected, under R. 11 of the electoral rules, to the admission of certain persons on the roll as lessees on that qualification. The District Election Officer (DEO) heard and overruled those objections. Under R. 12 the petitioner had a right of appeal to an appellate authority (Deputy Inspector).

While those appeals were pending, the petitioner filed a notice of motion in this Court (for hearing 26 October 1932) seeking, under Chap. VIII of the Specific Relief Act, an order restraining the Inspector of Municipal Councils and Local Boards (the Respondent) from interfering with the powers of Election Officers and appellate tribunals by reason of a circular (No.13 dated 2 January 1932). The circular instructed District Election Officers how to treat belated lease-related claims and certificates from village officers.

Stone J. concluded the application succeeded and drew up an injunction restraining the Inspector from "interfering in future" with the Election Officers and appellate tribunals by that circular "in its present directory form." The Inspector appealed from that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an order under S. 45 of the Specific Relief Act could properly be made to prohibit the Inspector from interfering (by circular) with the exercise of judicial functions by District Election Officers and appellate authorities.
  2. Whether the Court had territorial/original civil jurisdiction under S. 45 to grant the relief sought, given that the alleged interference occurred in the mufassal (outside the limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of this Court).
  3. Whether the petitioner had "no other specific and adequate legal remedy" (a statutory prerequisite under S. 45), given his right of appeal under the electoral rules.
  4. Whether the remedy sought by an injunction under S. 45 would be complete and effective as required by the section, in view of the procedural posture (appeals disposed of by the time the order was made).
  5. Whether the character of the circular was merely advisory or a directive that would impermissibly bind or influence Election Officers and appellate authorities.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Appellant's) Arguments

  • The petition alleged that the Inspector's circular (No. 13, dated 2 January 1932) was ultra vires and had influenced the District Election Officer in overruling the petitioner's objections to entries on the electoral roll.
  • Counsel for the petitioner (Mr. Swaminatha Ayyar) argued that the petitioner's real grievance was against the circular itself rather than only against the Election Officer's order; the petitioner feared that the appellate authority would be similarly influenced by the circular, rendering the appeals ineffective.

Respondent's (Inspector's) Arguments

  • The Inspector (through representations accepted by Stone J.) contended that the circular was intended merely as advice to District Election Officers and appellate authorities rather than as a binding order.
  • In an affidavit filed before Stone J. the Inspector described the circular as "in the nature of a general executive direction" to treat a village officer's certificate as prima facie evidence of genuineness of a lease—language suggesting the circular went beyond mere advice.
  • The Advocate-General, appearing for the Inspector on appeal, did not dispute that District Election Officers and appellate authorities were performing judicial functions when disposing of electoral objections and appeals.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Reilly, J. accepted that District Election Officers and the appellate authorities, when disposing of electoral objections and appeals under R. 11 and R. 12, were acting in a judicial capacity. The Court examined the wording and legal effect of the Inspector's circular and the procedural posture of the petition. The judge's analysis rested on at least three independent reasons why Stone J.'s order could not legally stand:

  1. Territorial/original civil jurisdiction (S. 45 scope):

    The jurisdiction conferred by S. 45 of the Specific Relief Act is confined to acts done or to be done within the limits of the Court's ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The alleged interference by the circular affected District Election Officers and three of the four Deputy Inspectors who exercise their functions in the mufassal (i.e., outside the Court's original civil jurisdiction). Therefore the Court could not, under S. 45, lawfully prohibit the Inspector from doing anything in relation to officers whose functions and any interference would occur outside the territorial limits of the Court's ordinary original civil jurisdiction.

  2. Existence of another specific and adequate legal remedy:

    S. 45 bars relief where the applicant has another specific and adequate legal remedy. The petitioner had a statutory right of appeal under R. 12 against the District Election Officer's order—a remedy the petitioner had in fact exercised. Reilly, J. held that the petitioner's grievance was essentially a grievance against a decision made by the Election Officer (that decision being the actionable wrong), and where the law supplies a remedy against that decision (an appeal), the remedy provided is the proper course. The petitioner’s subjective belief that the appeal would be ineffective or biased did not convert the existence of the statutory appeal into an inadequate remedy within the meaning of S. 45.

  3. Requirement that the remedy sought be complete and efficacious:

    An injunction under S. 45 must furnish a complete remedy. Here it was admitted that the order made by Stone J. could not give the petitioner any practical relief: by the time the order was drawn up (16 November 1932) the petitioner's appeals to the Deputy Inspector had already been disposed of. Stone J. himself observed that "now when it is all over I can do them (that is the Petitioners) no good." Because the order could not redress the petitioner's grievance, it was not a complete or effective remedy in relation to the petitioner's situation.

The Court also addressed the character of the circular: while accepting the Inspector's assurance that he did not intend to shut out evidence or tie the hands of judicial officers, Reilly, J. found the wording of the circular (as quoted) to be "singularly unhappy, indeed misleading" and the Inspector's affidavit language ("general executive direction" to treat village certificates as prima facie evidence) went beyond mere advice. The Court noted, however, that the Inspector had withdrawn the circular after Stone J.'s order was made.

For those reasons (territorial jurisdiction, availability of a specific statutory remedy, and ineffectiveness of the injunctive relief), Reilly, J. concluded Stone J.'s order must be set aside. Burn, J. agreed without further comment.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is allowed; the order made by Stone J. on 16 November 1932 (purporting to restrain the Inspector by injunction under S. 45 of the Specific Relief Act) is set aside.

Direct consequences and orders:

  • The Inspector's appeal was allowed with costs throughout.
  • Counsel's fee in the appeal was fixed at Rs. 100.

Implications:

  • This decision reverses Stone J.'s injunctive order in the specific case; it rests on jurisdictional limits of S. 45, the existence of a statutory appeal as a specific and adequate remedy, and the requirement that relief under S. 45 be complete and effective in relation to the applicant's grievance.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a broad new precedent beyond applying S. 45 to the facts before the Court; it addresses the propriety of the particular injunction sought and its incompatibility with the statutory and territorial constraints described in the judgment.

Disposition: Appeal allowed. Counsel fee fixed at Rs. 100. Burn, J. concurred.

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JUDGMENT

Reilly, J. — This is an appeal against an order of Stone J. dated the 16th November 1932, which purports to have been made under S. 45 of the Specific Relief Act. The Petitioners before the learned Judge were one A. Venkatanarsimham and one Pera Reddi. On examination of the records it appears that Pera Reddi never attempted to support the application by any affidavit; nor is there anything in the record to show how he was interested in the matter. So far as he was concerned, the application was clearly incompetent. Venkatanarsimham, whom I shall call the Petitioner, intended to stand for an election to the Taluk Board of Kavali and the District Board of Nellore. Under the rules made by the Government for the preparation of electoral rolls for Local Boards in accordance with the provisions of the Madras Local Boards Act an officer called the District Election Officer was in September and October 1932 engaged in preparing the electoral roll for the Kavali Taluk. Under S. 52 of the Act one of the qualifications for the right of voting at a Taluk Board or a District Board election is holding land on a written lease or demise under a ryotwari pattadar or inamdar or any tenant under such pattadar or inamdar. The Petitioner put in objections before the District Election Officer that certain persons had been admitted to the electoral roll as lessees under that qualification, who really had not that qualification. Such objections may be put in under R. 11 of the Rules for the preparation of Electoral Rolls for Local Boards, and those objections under the rules have to be heard and disposed of by the Election Officer. The District Election Officer in this case heard the Petitioner's objections and overruled them. The Petitioner under R. 12 had then a right of appeal to an appellate authority, and he took advantage of that right and preferred appeals against the orders of the District Election Officer. Before those appeals had been disposed of or even came on for hearing, the Petitioner took out a notice of motion in this Court for hearing on the 26th October 1932, praying for an order under Chap. VIII of the Specific Relief Act that “the Inspector of Municipal Councils and Local Boards be prohibited from interfering with the powers of Election Officers and appellate tribunals therefrom to deal with claims and objections presented before them according to law by his circular No. 13 dated 2nd January 1932.” The ground urged by the Petitioner for that motion was that the District Election Officer in disposing of the Petitioner's objections had felt himself bound by that circular and that the Deputy Inspector of Municipal Councils and Local Boards, who was the authority to dispose of the Petitioner's appeals, would also be influenced by that circular, which the Petitioner alleged was ultra vires. The circular was issued by the Inspector of Municipal Councils and Local Boards, who was made Respondent to the Petitioner's application now under appeal, and was issued from his office in Madras on the 2nd January 1932. It is headed “Subject: Electoral Rolls—Preparation of—admissibility of claims received late—instructions issued,” and runs

“The District Election Officers, Chingleput, Kistna, and West Godavari have raised the following question for orders;

(1) Whether any inquiry should be held in Villages in connection with the plethora of printed and other kind of leases that are being presented to them.”

Then follow two other questions with which we are not concerned. Then comes paragraph 2 of the circular:

“No fresh inquiry in the villages concerned is necessary in respect of belated applications for registering as lessees. Such leases as to whose genuineness there is no question should be simply accepted. Others about which there is ground for suspicion should be returned to the claimants to resubmit them with a certificate from the village headman or karnam concerned stating that the lease is genuine. Where leases are produced along with the certificate (referred to above) they should be accepted.”

With the rest of the circular we are not concerned; but it may be noted that it was addressed to all District Election Officers and Deputy Inspectors of Local Boards. I understand that the Deputy Inspectors, of whom there were then four, had been empowered to exercise the functions of the appellate authority under R. 12, of the rules for the preparation of electoral rolls for Local Boards. Referring to that circular Stone J. said in his judgment “………must prohibit its future issue in its present directory form”. With respect I do not understand that statement in the judgment. So far as I understand the matter, there was no question of any future issue of the circular. The circular had already been issued ten months earlier. However, the conclusion of the learned Judge's judgment was “The application accordingly succeeds” and on that judgment an order was drawn up and issued from this Court to the following effect:—

“It is ordered as follows:—

(1) That the Inspector of Municipal Councils and Local Boards, Mount Road, Madras, the Respondent herein, his servants and agents be restrained by an injunction from interfering in future with the powers of Election Officers and appellate Tribunals therefrom to deal with claims and objections presented before them according to law, by his circular No. 13, dated the 2nd day of January 1932, in its present directory form.”

Against that order the Inspector has appealed.

It is not disputed before us by the learned Advocate-General, who appears for the Inspector, that the District Election Officers in disposing of objections under R. 11 to entries in the electoral rolls and the appellate authorities who hear appeals from their decisions are in performing those functions, acting judicially. For the Inspector of Municipal Councils and Local Boards or any one else to attempt to interfere with the exercise by those officers of their judicial functions would be obviously and very seriously improper. But before the learned Judge it appears to have been represented for the Inspector that in issuing the circular and in the part of it which I have quoted the Inspector meant only to give advice to District Election Officers and to the appellate authorities; and Stone J., I understand from his judgment, accepted that explanation. About that all I need say perhaps is that the wording of the Inspector's circular in the paragraph I have quoted, if intended as a vehicle merely of advice, was singularly unhappy, indeed misleading. And I may add that in the Inspector's affidavit, which was filed in the proceedings before the learned Judge, he said that “the said circular was in the nature of a general executive direction to District Election Officers and Deputy Inspectors of Local Boards to treat the certificate of a village officer that a lease is genuine as prima facie evidence of the genuineness of a lease.” That appears to go distinctly beyond mere advice. But I am quite ready to accept the assurance of the Inspector that by his circular he had no intention whatever of doing anything so outrageous as to shut out any evidence, which any party interested might wish to lay before the District Election Officers, or to tie the hands of the District Election Officers or the appellate authorities in the exercise of their judicial functions. And we have been informed by the learned Advocate-General that since Stone, J's order was made the Inspector has withdrawn the circular in question. In that I may say that in my opinion the Inspector was well-advised.

However that does not dispose of the Inspector's appeal against the learned Judge's order. In my opinion, without discussing every possible aspect of the matter, there are at least three reasons why the learned Judge's order could not legally be made. Apart from the question whether future interference with Election Officers and appellate authorities in general in the language used by the order could be regarded as a “specific act,” from which the Inspector could be directed to forbear within the meaning of S. 45 of the Specific Relief Act, which appears to me very doubtful, it has to be noticed that the jurisdiction of this Court under that section of the Specific Relief Act is confined to acts done or to be done within the limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of the Court. It appears that the Inspector has his office in Madras, and we may infer that his circular was issued from his office in Madras. But the interference by that circular with the functions of District Election Officers, which the order purported to prohibit, could never take place within the limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of this Court, because, as is admitted, District Election Officers perform their functions in the mufassal, outside the limits of the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of this Court; and of the four appellate authorities, the Deputy Inspectors of Municipal Councils and Local Boards, we are informed that three of them exercise their functions in the mufassal. To attempt to prohibit the Inspector from doing anything to interfere with the functions of the District Election Officers or of those three appellate officers who exercise their functions in the mufassal, however laudable, would obviously be to transgress the jurisdiction given to this Court under S. 45 of the Specific Relief Act.

Secondly, no order can be made under that section if the applicant has other specific and adequate legal remedy. The Petitioner, as I understand the position, was aggrieved because his objections to entries in the electoral roll had been overruled by the District Election Officer, and against that grievance the law had provided him with a specific remedy. Mr. Swaminatha Ayyar, who appears for the Petitioner, has suggested before us that that was not the Petitioner's grievance, that his grievance was, not that his objections had been overruled by the District Election Officer, but that the Election Officer had overruled them by reason of, and being influenced by, the Inspector's circular. His grievance, he urges, was against the circular and not against the Election Officer's order and therefore he came to this Court to relieve him of his grievance against the circular. But that circular touched him, if it touched him at all, only because, as he alleged, it had influenced the Election Officer in his decision. If in spite of that circular the Election Officer had decided to uphold the Petitioner's objections, obviously the Petitioner would have had no grievance at all. It would not have mattered to him if there had been fifty such circulars. Surely the only reasonable view of the position is that the Petitioner's grievance, if he had a grievance, was that a decision had been made against him. If a decision is made against a litigant, his grievance lies in that decision, not in the reasons which may have led the Judge to make that decision, If the law gives him a remedy against his grievance, the remedy is against the decision, not against the eloquence or the arguments of his opponent's counsel, which may have led to that decision, nor against the text-books which the Judge may have consulted, even if they are obsolete and inaccurate. In this case the Petitioner's grievance clearly was that a decision had been given against him by the Election Officer. Against that decision the law had provided him with a specific remedy, a right of appeal, and that right of appeal he had exercised. Mr. Swaminatha Ayyar suggests that on account of this circular, which had been issued by the Inspector, he was afraid that that right of appeal might not be of any use to him: in fact the Petitioner was quite sure that his appeals were going to be decided against him. But the words of Cl. (d) of S. 45 of the Specific Relief Act are “provided that the applicant has no other specific and adequate legal remedy.” There is nothing about a remedy which the applicant believes will be efficacious or a remedy by which the applicant expects to get what he wants. If the remedy is there, as the right of appeal was there in this case, an application under S. 45 of the Act is barred. The Petitioner's estimate of his chances of getting what he wants by that remedy is wholly irrelevant. In my opinion the right of appeal, which the Petitioner had against the District Election Officer's order and which indeed he was exercising, was a complete bar to his application to this Court under S. 45 of the Specific Relief Act.

Thirdly, no order can be made by the Court under that section unless the remedy given by the order applied for will be complete. It is one of the most curious features of this case that it is admitted on all sides that the remedy given by the order made in this case could not be complete. The learned Judge in his judgment says

“The trouble I feel is that now when it is all over I can do them (that is the Petitioners) no good.”

By the time the learned Judge made his order on the 16th November 1932 the Petitioner's appeals to the Deputy Inspector had been disposed of. The Deputy Inspector, so far as those appeals were concerned, could never be affected again by the Inspector's circular. If he ever was affected in disposing of those appeals, that was all over and was past history. As the learned Judge himself says, the order which was made could do the Petitioner no good. Not only would it not be a completely effective remedy, so far as he was concerned: in respect of his grievance it could be of no use to him whatever.

For these reasons without discussing other aspects of the case, in my opinion it is clear that the learned Judge's order must be set aside. In my opinion this appeal should be allowed with costs throughout and the order should be set aside, Counsel's fee in this appeal being fixed at Rs. 100.

Burn, J.—I agree and have nothing to add

N. R. R.Appeal allowed.