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T.S Krishnamoorthi Ayyar v. The Special Deputy Collector Of Land Acquisition, Kumbakonam

Madras High Court
Oct 21, 1935
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from proceedings in the Land Acquisition Court presided over by a Special Judicial Officer appointed under Section 3(d) of the Land Acquisition Act. The Special Judicial Officer was the Subordinate Judge of Kumbakonam. The dispute concerned whether the acquisition should be of the whole or only part of certain houses and grounds. The point in controversy was raised by the land-owner under the second proviso to Section 49 of the Land Acquisition Act, and the resulting proceedings occurred in what is described throughout as the Land Acquisition Court. The Government Pleader raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that the impugned decision was not an "award" and that Section 54 of the Act confers a right of appeal only in cases of awards. The Court ultimately upheld the preliminary objection and dismissed the appeal with costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a decision of a Land Acquisition Court constituted by the appointment of a Special Judicial Officer under Section 3(d) that is not an "award" is appealable under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act.
  2. Whether a decision in proceedings under Section 49 (and similar preliminary matters) before such a specially constituted Court amounts to an award or to a decree appealable as if it were a decree of an ordinary Civil Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Government Pleader / State

  • The Government Pleader raised a preliminary objection that the decision under challenge was not an "award". Section 54, it was argued, gives a right of appeal only in respect of awards.
  • To support that position he cited authorities (for example, Giles Seddon v. Deputy Collector of Madras; Sarat Chandra Ghose v. Secretary of State; Mulraj Khatan v. Collector of Poona) that hold that where a decision is not an award, it is not appealable under the Land Acquisition Act.
  • The underlying rule relied upon was that, absent special statutory authority, no right of appeal exists; and in the Land Acquisition Act the statutory authority for appeal is limited to awards.

Respondent / Counsel for the opposing party

  • The respondent (noted in the opinion as relying particularly on Secretary of State v. Narayanaswami Chettiar) urged that decisions other than awards passed by Courts in disputes under the Land Acquisition Act are to be treated as decrees and thus appealable as though they were decrees of ordinary Courts.
  • To this end several cases were cited in support (e.g., Raghunath das Harjirandas v. District Superintendent of Police, Nasik; Venkatareddi v. Adinarayana Rao; Mahalinga Kudumban v. Seethanappa Mudaliar; Paramesioami Ayyangar v. Alamelu Nachier), and it was argued that decisions of the Privy Council (Ramchandra Rao and those relied on in Maung Ba Thaw) justified treating certain adjudications as appealable.
  • A Full Bench decision (Rajagopala Chettiar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board) that doubted Secretary of State v. Narayanaswami Chettiar was also discussed as part of the back-and-forth of authority.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Secretary of State v. Narayanaswami Chettiar (55 M. 391 : 138 Ind. Cas. 426; A.I.R. 1932 Mad. 55) Held (as relied upon by respondent) that decisions other than awards in disputes under the Land Acquisition Act are decrees and appealable as though they were decrees. The Court noted this decision was strongly relied on by the respondent but expressed the view that it and related authorities require revision; the Court did not accept it as controlling on the point that non-award adjudications are appealable.
Ramchandra Rao v. Ramchandra Rao (45 M. 320 : 67 Ind. Cas. 403; A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 80) Privy Council decision concerning the finality of a High Court decree for the purposes of res judicata; relied on in other arguments about appealability. The Court distinguished this authority, stating their Lordships there were dealing with res judicata and finality rather than directly with the appealability of a District Court order; the opinion does not treat it as supporting the proposition that adjudication on an application stands like a decree for definition under the Code.
Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin (P.C., A.I.R. 1931; many reports cited) Privy Council decision concerned with whether an appeal lay to the Privy Council and that such appeals are subject to the Code of Civil Procedure (Sections 109 & 110). The Court held that Maung Ba Thaw does not affect the Court's view on the appealability point under consideration; it dealt with appeals to the Privy Council and was not determinative of appealability to the High Court in the context of the Land Acquisition Act.
Secretary of State v. Chelikani (Chellikani) Rama Rao (39 M. 617 : 35 Ind. Cas. 902; A.I.R. 1916 P.C. 21) When a right of appeal is given to an ordinary Court, the procedure, orders and decrees of that Court will be governed by the ordinary rules of the Civil Procedure Code. The Court cited the principle to explain that where ordinary Courts are the recipients of statutory appeal rights, CPC rules govern; but this does not alter the distinction between ordinary Courts and specially constituted Courts under the Land Acquisition Act.
Mahant Bagavathi Das v. Sarangaraja Iyengar (33 L.W. 528 : 135 Ind. Cas. 460; A.I.R. 1931 Mad. 586) Held that a Court constituted by appointment of a Special Judicial Officer under Section 3(d) is a special Court (not an ordinary Civil Court) established under the Act, and that no appeal lies from such a Court unless statutory right is given. The Court relied on this decision as central: because the Land Acquisition Court in the present case was a specially constituted Court, no appeal lies from it unless the Act provides a statutory right — and the Act provides appeals only in respect of awards.
Giles Seddon v. Deputy Collector of Madras (17 Ind. Cas. 117) Authority cited for the proposition that where the decision is not an award (e.g., decision under Section 49), it is not appealable. Quoted by the Government Pleader to support the preliminary objection; the Court treated this line of authority as consistent with the conclusion that non-award decisions of a specially constituted Land Acquisition Court are not appealable under Section 54.
Sarat Chandra Ghose v. Secretary of State (46 C. 861 : 50 Ind. Cas. 732; A.I.R. 1919 Cal. 86) Cited for the rule that where a decision is not an award, the resulting decision (e.g., under Section 49) is not appealable. Relied upon by Government Pleader; Court treated it as supporting the short ground for dismissal (no appeal unless statute gives it for awards).
Mulraj Khatan v. Collector of Poona (15 Bom. L.R. 802 : 21 Ind. Cas. 179) Cited similarly to show non-appealability of non-award decisions. Relied on by Government Pleader; formed part of the line of authority the Court found persuasive on the short ground.
Raghunath das Harjirandas v. District Superintendent of Police, Nasik (57 B. 314 : 141 Ind. Cas. 710; A.I.R. 1933 Bom. 187) One of the cases cited by respondent in support of the view favouring broader appealability following the Privy Council decision. Not accepted as overcoming the short ground; treated as part of the body of cases urged upon the Court but ultimately not sufficient to negate the statutory limitation on appeals from specially constituted Courts.
Venkatareddi v. Adinarayana Rao (52 M. 142 : 119 Ind. Cas. 42; A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 351) Cited among cases suggesting appealability of certain adjudications. Not adopted as controlling; noted among the respondent's authorities but did not alter the Court's conclusion on the short point.
Mahalinga Kudumban v. Seethanappa Mudaliar (55 M.L.J. 387 : 115 Ind. Cas. 345; A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 223) Cited by respondent to support a broader view of appealability. Not treated as decisive; referenced as part of respondent's supporting authorities but the Court decided the short statutory point in favour of dismissal.
Paramesioami Ayyangar v. Alamelu Nachier (49 M. 954 : 97 Ind. Cas. 836; A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 986) Cited among cases argued to show that certain decisions may be dealt with as appealable. Not dispositive; included in the respondent's list of authorities but the Court found the statutory distinction controlling.
Rajagopala Chettiar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board (57 M. 271 : 117 Ind. Cas. 614; A.I.R. 1934 Mad. 103) (Full Bench) Full Bench decision that doubted the decision in Secretary of State v. Narayanaswami Chettiar and discussed the apparent change introduced by Ramchandra Rao. The opinion noted this Full Bench decision as having doubted Narayanaswami Chettiar; it formed part of the broader debate but did not displace the short statutory conclusion the Court reached.
Kamaraju v. Secretary of State (11 M. 309) Full Bench decision referred to in Privy Council authorities about procedure and appeal rules. Mentioned as a decision approved by Privy Council in related discussion; not applied to overturn the short statutory ground in the present case.
Venkataswami v. Narayanaratnam (11 M. 301) Accepted by the Privy Council in Secretary of State v. Chelikani as correct on procedural points. Referenced in the Court's analysis of Privy Council authorities; did not change the ultimate outcome in the present matter.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court disposed of the appeal by upholding the Government Pleader's preliminary objection on a short statutory point rather than by resolving the broader and more complex precedential arguments. The step-by-step analysis in the opinion is as follows:

  1. Characterisation of the forum: the Court accepted the finding (following Mahant Bagavathi Das v. Sarangaraja Iyengar) that when a Court is constituted by appointment of a Special Judicial Officer under Section 3(d) of the Land Acquisition Act it is a special Court established under the Act and not an ordinary Civil Court.
  2. Statutory scope of appeals: the Act, as interpreted by the Court and earlier authorities, contemplates two distinct forms of procedure — one form for fixing compensation (described as an "award") and another for other preliminary or interlocutory determinations. The statutory right of appeal (Section 54) is confined to awards.
  3. Characterisation of the present decision: the Court concluded that the present decision (a dispute under Section 49 as to whole or part acquisition) is not an award. Because the decision was rendered by a specially constituted Land Acquisition Court (the Special Judicial Officer), and because the Act gives a right of appeal only in respect of awards, no statutory right of appeal exists from the present decision.
  4. Treatment of precedents: the Court reviewed the competing lines of authority (including Secretary of State v. Narayanaswami Chettiar, Ramchandra Rao v. Ramchandra Rao, Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin, Secretary of State v. Chelikani Rama Rao, and the Full Bench Rajagopala Chettiar). The Court expressed the view that Narayanaswami Chettiar (and certain related rulings) may require revision, but it chose not to resolve those large doctrinal questions because the short statutory ground sufficed to dispose of the appeal.
  5. Observations on appeals to higher fora: the Court noted that some Privy Council decisions dealt with whether appeals lay to the Privy Council and the application of Sections 109 and 110 of the Civil Procedure Code; these authorities were distinguished because they addressed the regime for appeals from ordinary Courts and the application of CPC rules rather than the core question whether a specially constituted Land Acquisition Court's non-award decisions are appealable under the Land Acquisition Act.
  6. Practical and policy remark: the Court acknowledged that the result of denying appeals in respects such as Section 49 disputes when the decision comes from a specially constituted Court may be unsatisfactory or anomalous in practice, but stated that any remedy for that anomaly lies with the legislature rather than the court.

Holding and Implications

Holding: THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION IS SUSTAINED; THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED WITH COSTS.

Direct consequences for the parties: The appeal was dismissed and the successful preliminary objector (the Government) was awarded costs. The impugned decision of the Land Acquisition Court (a decision that the Court characterised as not amounting to an award) stands subject to the absence of any statutory right of appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act.

Broader implications and limits of the ruling: The Court emphasised that where a tribunal is a specially constituted Land Acquisition Court under Section 3(d), decisions that do not amount to awards are not the subject of a statutory right of appeal under the Act. The opinion recognises a potential anomaly and unsatisfactory practical consequences (for example, restricting claimants' appellate remedies in certain disputes over the subject-matter of compensation), but the Court stated that any correction of that anomaly must come from legislative amendment. The Court also indicated that certain earlier judicial statements (for example in Secretary of State v. Narayanaswami Chettiar) may require revision, but it did not alter precedent by addressing those larger questions because the short statutory ground resolved the case.

Note: This summary is confined strictly to matters expressly stated in the provided opinion and does not attempt to infer facts or law beyond the opinion's text.

Show all summary ...

1. I agree in upholding the preliminary objection raised by the Government Pleader on the short ground on which my learned brother has upheld it. But I should like to make a few remarks about the decisions in Secretary of State v. Narayanaswami Chettiar 55 M. 391 : 138 Ind. Cas. 426; A.I.R. 1932 Mad. 55; (1931) M.W.N. 1266 : 35 L.W. 831; Ind. Rul. (1932) Mad. 572., Ramchandra Rao v. Ramchandra Rao 45 M. 320 : 67 Ind. Cas. 403; A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 80 : 49 I.A. 129 : 30 M.L.T. 154 : 23 C.W.N. 713 : 35 C.L.J. 515 : 16 L.W. 1; (1922) M.W.N. 359 : 23 A.L.J. 684 : 43 M.L.J. 78 : 24 Bom. L.R. 963 (P.C.)., Rajagopala Chettiar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board 57 M. 271 : 117 Ind. Cas. 614; A.I.R. 1934 Mad. 103 : 66 M.L.J. 43; (1933) M.W.N. 1385 : 39 L.W. 4 : 6 R.M. 362 (F.B.) and Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin 12 Rule 194 : 148 Ind, Cas. 1 A.I.R. 1931; P.C. 81 : 61 I.A. 158 : 11 O.W.N. 418 : 39 L.W. 418 : 38 C.W.N. 449; (1934) A.L.J. 358 : 66 M.L.J. 404 : 38 Bom. L.R. 427; (1934) M.W.N. 284 : 6 R.P.C. 114 (P.C.), least my silence should be misunderstood as meaning that I think that my remarks in the Full Bench decision in Rajagopala Chettiar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board 57 M. 271 : 117 Ind. Cas. 614; A.I.R. 1934 Mad. 103 : 66 M.L.J. 43; (1933) M.W.N. 1385 : 39 L.W. 4 : 6 R.M. 362 (F.B.), regarding Secretary of State v. Narayanaswami Chettiar 55 M. 391 : 138 Ind. Cas. 426; A.I.R. 1932 Mad. 55; (1931) M.W.N. 1266 : 35 L.W. 831; Ind. Rul. (1932) Mad. 572. and Ramchandra Rao v. Ramchandra Rao 45 M. 320 : 67 Ind. Cas. 403; A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 80 : 49 I.A. 129 : 30 M.L.T. 154 : 23 C.W.N. 713 : 35 C.L.J. 515 : 16 L.W. 1; (1922) M.W.N. 359 : 23 A.L.J. 684 : 43 M.L.J. 78 : 24 Bom. L.R. 963 (P.C.), require revision.

2. In Secretary of State v. Narayanaswami Chettiar 55 M. 391 : 138 Ind. Cas. 426; A.I.R. 1932 Mad. 55; (1931) M.W.N. 1266 : 35 L.W. 831; Ind. Rul. (1932) Mad. 572., the decision strongly relied on by the respondent, Ramesam, J., held that decision other, than awards passed by Courts in disputes under the Land Acquisition Act are decrees, and as such, appealable as though they were decrees. The learned Judge came to this conclusion because of the amendment of Sections 26 and 54, Land Acquisition Act, by Act X of 1921 and the decision of the Privy Council in Ramchandra Rao v. Ramchandra Rao 45 M. 320 : 67 Ind. Cas. 403; A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 80 : 49 I.A. 129 : 30 M.L.T. 154 : 23 C.W.N. 713 : 35 C.L.J. 515 : 16 L.W. 1; (1922) M.W.N. 359 : 23 A.L.J. 684 : 43 M.L.J. 78 : 24 Bom. L.R. 963 (P.C.). The learned Counsel has not, before us, sought to justify the first ground for the conclusion. As regards the decision of the Privy Council in Ramchandra Rao v. Ramchandra Rao 45 M. 320 : 67 Ind. Cas. 403; A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 80 : 49 I.A. 129 : 30 M.L.T. 154 : 23 C.W.N. 713 : 35 C.L.J. 515 : 16 L.W. 1; (1922) M.W.N. 359 : 23 A.L.J. 684 : 43 M.L.J. 78 : 24 Bom. L.R. 963 (P.C.), I expressed the view that:

their Lordships in that case were dealing with the finality of the High Court's decree for the purposes of res judicata and were not directly concerned about the appealability of the order passed by the District Court and that that decision does not support the argument that an adjudication on an application stands on the same footing as an adjudication in a suit for the purposes of the definition of a decree under the Code.

3. I am still of the same opinion. I also think that the decision in Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin 12 Rule 194 : 148 Ind, Cas. 1 A.I.R. 1931; P.C. 81 : 61 I.A. 158 : 11 O.W.N. 418 : 39 L.W. 418 : 38 C.W.N. 449; (1934) A.L.J. 358 : 66 M.L.J. 404 : 38 Bom. L.R. 427; (1934) M.W.N. 284 : 6 R.P.C. 114 (P.C.), does not affect the opinion that I have expressed in the Full Bench for in the case first mentioned their Lordships of the Privy Council were concerned not with the question of the appealability of an order to the High Court, for the order in that case which was one under the Insolvency Act was appealable to the High Court, but with the question whether an appeal lay to the Privy Council, and their Lordships held that an appeal from a decision of the High Court lies to the Privy Council under and subject to the Code of Civil Procedure (obviously meaning Sections 109 and 110, Civil Procedure Code); and in holding so, their Lordships followed Secretary of State v. Chellikani Rama Rao 39 M. 617 : 35 Ind. Cas. 902; A.I.R. 1916 P.C. 21 : 43 I.A. 192 : 31 M.L.J. 324 : 20 C.W.N. 1311; (1916) 2 M.W.N. 224 : 14 A.L.J. 1114 : 20 M.L.T. 435 : 4 L.W. 486 : 18 Bom. L.R. 1007 : 25 C.L.J. 69 (P.C.), in which, as stated by them, their Lordships held:

When such a right of appeal is given to one of the ordinary Courts of the country, the procedure, orders and decrees of that Court will be governed by the ordinary rules of the Civil Procedure Code.

4. (The reference here is obviously to Sections 109 and 110, Civil Procedure Code). The remarks in Secretary of State v. Chelikani Rama Rao 39 M. 617 : 35 Ind. Cas. 902; A.I.R. 1916 P.C. 21 : 43 I.A. 192 : 31 M.L.J. 324 : 20 C.W.N. 1311; (1916) 2 M.W.N. 224 : 14 A.L.J. 1114 : 20 M.L.T. 435 : 4 L.W. 486 : 18 Bom. L.R. 1007 : 25 C.L.J. 69 (P.C.), clearly relate to the appealability to the High Court of an order passed by the District Court, the latter order being appealable to the High Court under the ordinary rules of the Civil Procedure Code. (The Code applicable in that case was act xiv of 1882). This appears to be clear from the fact that their Lordships in Secretary of State v. Chelikani Rama Rao 39 M. 617 : 35 Ind. Cas. 902; A.I.R. 1916 P.C. 21 : 43 I.A. 192 : 31 M.L.J. 324 : 20 C.W.N. 1311; (1916) 2 M.W.N. 224 : 14 A.L.J. 1114 : 20 M.L.T. 435 : 4 L.W. 486 : 18 Bom. L.R. 1007 : 25 C.L.J. 69 (P.C.), accept as correct the Full Bench decision in Venkataswami v. Narayanaratnam 11 M. 301. Similarly with reference to the order of the High Court sought to be appealed against the Privy Council, their Lordships say in Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin 12 Rule 194 : 148 Ind, Cas. 1 A.I.R. 1931; P.C. 81 : 61 I.A. 158 : 11 O.W.N. 418 : 39 L.W. 418 : 38 C.W.N. 449; (1934) A.L.J. 358 : 66 M.L.J. 404 : 38 Bom. L.R. 427; (1934) M.W.N. 284 : 6 R.P.C. 114 (P.C.), that that order will also be subject to the rules of the Civil Procedure Code, obviously meaning Sections 109 and 110, Civil Procedure Code. I do not think that on the point under consideration the decision in Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin 12 Rule 194 : 148 Ind, Cas. 1 A.I.R. 1931; P.C. 81 : 61 I.A. 158 : 11 O.W.N. 418 : 39 L.W. 418 : 38 C.W.N. 449; (1934) A.L.J. 358 : 66 M.L.J. 404 : 38 Bom. L.R. 427; (1934) M.W.N. 284 : 6 R.P.C. 114 (P.C.), affects my interpretation of the Privy Council decision in Ramchandra Rao v. Ramchandra Rao 45 M. 320 : 67 Ind. Cas. 403; A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 80 : 49 I.A. 129 : 30 M.L.T. 154 : 23 C.W.N. 713 : 35 C.L.J. 515 : 16 L.W. 1; (1922) M.W.N. 359 : 23 A.L.J. 684 : 43 M.L.J. 78 : 24 Bom. L.R. 963 (P.C.). The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Stone, J.

5. This is an appeal from the Land Acquisition Court presided over by the Special Judicial Officer appointed by the Local Government under the provisions of Section 3(d), Land Acquisition Act. The Special Judicial Officer in question is the Subordinate Judge of Kumbakonam. The nature of the dispute is as to whether the acquisition should be of the whole or only part of certain houses and grounds. It was raised by the person from whom the land was sought to be acquired, under the provisions of section 49, second proviso, of the Land Acquisition Act. It should be noted that under that proviso the reference by the Collector is to "the Court," and "the Court" in question means the Court appointed under the Land Acquisition Act and can conveniently be referred to as the Land Acquisition Court. The proceedings in question therefore took place in the Land Acquisition Court. The objections are headed In the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Kumbakonam." The learned Government Pleader took a priliminary objection to the maintainability of this appeal on the ground that the decision arrived at was not an award and that the section of the Act under which the appeal was brought, that is to say, Section 54 only gives a right of appear in the case of awards; and he cited Giles Seddon v. Deputy Collector of Madras, 17 Ind. Cas. 117 17 Ind Cas 117, Sarat Chandra Ghose v. Secretary of State 46 C. 861 : 50 Ind. Cas. 732; A.I.R. 1919 Cal. 86 : 23 C.W.N. 378 and Mulraj Khatan v. Collector of Poona 15 Bom. L.R. 802 : 21 Ind. Cas. 179, which decide that, where the decision, is not an award, the resulting decision, and in particular a decision under Section 49, is not appealable. That line of cases proceeds according to the rule that in the absence of special statutory authority there is no right of appeal, that under the Land Acquisition Act the special statutory authority permitting appeals is limited to awards, and that decisions under Section 49 are not awards.

6. On the other hand, a considerable number of cases were cited of which Secretary of State v. Narayanaswawi Chettiar 55 M. 391 : 138 Ind. Cas. 426; A.I.R. 1932 Mad. 55; (1931) M.W.N. 1266 : 35 L.W. 831; Ind. Rul. (1932) Mad. 572. is the most stressed, the other being Raghunath das Harjirandas v. District Superintendent of Police, Nasik 57 B. 314 : 141 Ind. Cas. 710; A.I.R. 1933 Bom. 187 : 35 Bom. L.R. 276 : 6 R.B. 3, Venkatareddi v. Adinarayana Rao 52 M. 142 : 119 Ind. Cas. 42; A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 351 : 56 M.L.J. 357 : 29 L.W. 343; Ind. Rul. (1929) Mad. 874, followed in 40 L.W. 37 (Short Notes), Mahalinga Kudumban v. Seethanappa Mudaliar 55 M.L.J. 387 : 115 Ind. Cas. 345; A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 223; (1929) M.W.N. 62 : 29 L.W. 237 and Paramesioami Ayyangar v. Alamelu Nachier 49 M. 954 : 97 Ind Cas. 836 : 51 M.L.J. 299; A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 986; (1926) M.W.N. 981, which, it is urged, suggest that as a consequence of the Privy Council decision in Ramchandra Rao v. Ramchandra Rao 45 M. 320 : 67 Ind. Cas. 403; A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 80 : 49 I.A. 129 : 30 M.L.T. 154 : 23 C.W.N. 713 : 35 C.L.J. 515 : 16 L.W. 1; (1922) M.W.N. 359 : 23 A.L.J. 684 : 43 M.L.J. 78 : 24 Bom. L.R. 963 (P.C.), (which was relied upon in another Privy Council decision in Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin 12 Rule 194 : 148 Ind, Cas. 1 A.I.R. 1931; P.C. 81 : 61 I.A. 158 : 11 O.W.N. 418 : 39 L.W. 418 : 38 C.W.N. 449; (1934) A.L.J. 358 : 66 M.L.J. 404 : 38 Bom. L.R. 427; (1934) M.W.N. 284 : 6 R.P.C. 114 (P.C.), and the Privy Council decision in Secretary of State v. Chelikani Rama Rao 39 M. 617 : 35 Ind. Cas. 902; A.I.R. 1916 P.C. 21 : 43 I.A. 192 : 31 M.L.J. 324 : 20 C.W.N. 1311; (1916) 2 M.W.N. 224 : 14 A.L.J. 1114 : 20 M.L.T. 435 : 4 L.W. 486 : 18 Bom. L.R. 1007 : 25 C.L.J. 69 (P.C.), which approved of the Full Bench decision in Kamaraju v. Secretary of State 11 M. 309, decisions other than awards passed by Courts in disputes under the Land Acquisition Act are decrees, and as such, appealable as though they were decrees of ordinary Courts. On the other hand, the recent Full Bench decision in Rajagopala Chettiar v. Hindu Religious Endowments Board 57 M. 271 : 117 Ind. Cas. 614; A.I.R. 1934 Mad. 103 : 66 M.L.J. 43; (1933) M.W.N. 1385 : 39 L.W. 4 : 6 R.M. 362 (F.B.), which was directly concerned with the right of appeal, if any, under the Hindu Religious Endowments Act, has doubted the decision in Secretary of State v. Narayanaswami Chettiar 55 M. 391 : 138 Ind. Cas. 426; A.I.R. 1932 Mad. 55; (1931) M.W.N. 1266 : 35 L.W. 831; Ind. Rul. (1932) Mad. 572., and has explained the apparent change introduced by Ramchandra Rao v. Ramchandra Rao 45 M. 320 : 67 Ind. Cas. 403; A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 80 : 49 I.A. 129 : 30 M.L.T. 154 : 23 C.W.N. 713 : 35 C.L.J. 515 : 16 L.W. 1; (1922) M.W.N. 359 : 23 A.L.J. 684 : 43 M.L.J. 78 : 24 Bom. L.R. 963 (P.C.), in a way that suggests that that change is only apparent and not real, turning as it does upon the fact that what was there held to operate as res judicata was a disposal in appeal, and a decision in appeal was, as the Civil Procedure Code then stood, a decree as defined by the Civil Procedure Code whether in a suit or not.

7. The discussion of the above cases has resulted in a number of very nice points being argued, and we are much obliged to the learned Counsel for the help they have given us in the consideration of those cases, which we should have deemed it our duty very carefully to have analysed, had it not appeared that this preliminary objection can be upheld on a much shorter and simpler point. In Mahant Bagavathi Das v. Sarangaraja Iyengar 33 L.W. 528 : 135 Ind. Cas. 460; A.I.R. 1931 Mad 586 : 61 M.L.J. 312 : 54 M. 722; (1931) M.W.N. 290; Ind. Rul. (1932) Mad. 140, it was decided by a Bench of this High Court that the Court, at least when it was constituted by the appointment of a Special Judicial Officer under the provisions of Section 3(d), was a special Court, that is to say it was not an ordinary Civil Court but a Court established under the provisions of the Act. From which it follows, and it was there so decided, that no appeal lies from such a Court unless by statute the right to appeal is given. In this statute a right of appeal is given in one class of cases, and in one class of cases only, that is to say, where the Court arrives at the decision that amounts to an award. As was pointed out by the Privy Council in Ramchandra Rao v. Ramchandra Rao 45 M. 320 : 67 Ind. Cas. 403; A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 80 : 49 I.A. 129 : 30 M.L.T. 154 : 23 C.W.N. 713 : 35 C.L.J. 515 : 16 L.W. 1; (1922) M.W.N. 359 : 23 A.L.J. 684 : 43 M.L.J. 78 : 24 Bom. L.R. 963 (P.C.), at p. 329 Page of 45 M.--[Ed.]:

There are two perfectly separate and distinct forms of procedure contemplated by the Land Acquisition Act. The first is that necessary for fixing the amount of the compensation and this is described as being an award.

8. The present decision is clearly not an award and it appears to us that whatever you call it, it is a decision of a Court specially constituted under statutory authority and unless from that decision the right to appeal is given, no right to appeal lies. It might well be that it would be otherwise if the Court in question were an ordinary Civil Court to which this matter, the matter in dispute--had been under powers conferred by the statute, referred for decision by the proper authority. That, however, is not the scheme of the Act. The scheme of the Act contemplates that sometimes the Court shall be an ordinary Civil Court and sometimes a special Court specially constituted. In the latter case, except where the Court makes an award, the Act does not make any statutory provision for appeals from that Court. And on this short ground we are of the opinion that the objection succeeds. We desire, however, to observe that the results is unsatisfactory in our opinion. Although it might well be in the contemplation of the legislature that preliminary points, such as those falling under Section 49, that is to say, those that are the subject-matter of this present appeal, should not be appealable, it is difficult to believe that it was the intention of the legislature to prevent persons disputing as to the of the property, as might well be the case where an award having been made and money due under that award paid into Court, various claimants some forward claiming that money as their and endeavouring to establish, in support of that claim, title to the subject-matter in respect of which the compensation was paid into Court, it is difficult to imagine that it was intended to shut out all such claimants from all rights of appeal, where the Court in question was a Court specially constituted and not an ordinary Court though this result appears to follow when the Court is a special Court from which no appeal lies unless there be a statutory provision to that effect. This, however, as was pointed out in Mahant Bagavthi Das v. Sarangaraja Iyenger 33 L.W. 528 : 135 Ind. Cas. 460; A.I.R. 1931 Mad 586 : 61 M.L.J. 312 : 54 M. 722; (1931) M.W.N. 290; Ind. Rul. (1932) Mad. 140, may result in an anomaly, but one that can only be put right by the legislature if the legislature thinks fit so to do.

9. On this short point, therefore, we are of the opinion that the preliminary objection succeeds and the appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.