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J.D. Italia v. D. Cowasjee
Judgment Summary (Delivered by Sir Lionel Leach, C.J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant (plaintiff) sued in the original side of the Court for a declaration that a partnership between him and the defendant was dissolved on 30th September 1938 and for an order directing that partnership accounts be taken from 1st October 1937 to 30th September 1938. No oral evidence was led because the parties agreed the action should be tried on correspondence and documents. It was common ground that the partnership commenced before 23rd August 1937 (exact agreement date not disclosed). The partnership aimed to acquire licences to carry on retail toddy shops in the City of Madras.
Licences were obtained but were issued in the name of the plaintiff alone. The defendant contended that because the licences stood in the plaintiff's name only the partnership was illegal and the suit was not maintainable. The trial judge, Krishnaswami Ayyangar, J., accepted that plea and non-suited the plaintiff; the plaintiff appealed. During the appeal the respondent died and his legal representatives were substituted.
Key chronological facts established in the record: - Plaintiff submitted a tender on behalf of the partnership but in his own name on 23rd August 1937; revenue authorities were informed of the partnership from the start. - The tender was accepted 31st August 1937 for initially fourteen shops, later increased to sixteen. - The Collector issued temporary licences in the plaintiff's name, renewed fortnightly; on 2nd September the plaintiff formally notified the Commissioner of Excise of the partnership and noted the shops would remain in his name. - The Collector proposed that the partnership be registered under the Partnership Act and that the plaintiff be authorized to act for it; the defendant refused registration and the Collector eventually required fresh security from the plaintiff. - The Defendant controlled management from 1st February 1938 to 19th June 1938 and contributed funds until 13th July 1938 (total contributions recorded as Rs. 1,37,422-10-7). - The Collector returned the defendant's promissory notes on 31st March 1939, six months after the partnership period expired.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the partnership between the plaintiff and the defendant was unlawful (and hence the suit not maintainable) because the licences for the toddy shops were issued in the plaintiff's name alone.
- Whether disclosure to and the conduct of the revenue authorities (Collector and Board of Revenue) meant the partnership was not unlawful ab initio, particularly given that the partnership commenced before the tender/bid.
- If the partnership was partly lawful and partly unlawful, what period (if any) the plaintiff is entitled to an account for — specifically whether he is entitled to accounts for the whole year (1 October 1937 to 30 September 1938) or only up to a specified date.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Plaintiff's) Arguments
- The partnership was formed before 23rd August 1937 and the revenue authorities were fully aware of the arrangement from the outset; therefore the partnership was not unlawful ab initio.
- Because full disclosure had been made to revenue authorities and temporary licences were issued and treated as applying to the partnership, the plaintiff contended he was entitled to an account for the whole year (1 October 1937 to 30 September 1938).
- The plaintiff objected to the Collector's requirement to provide fresh security in place of the defendant's promissory notes, asserting the notes had been deposited under his covering letter and that the defendant could not lawfully repudiate the partnership.
Respondent's (Defendant's) Arguments / Defence
- The defendant argued that because the licences were issued in the plaintiff's name alone a partnership was illegal and the suit was not maintainable.
- The defendant refused to comply with the Collector's suggestion that the partnership be registered under the Partnership Act and the plaintiff be authorised to represent it — the defendant's motive (as found by the Court) was to avoid an unprofitable agreement.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Bensley v. Bignold | Principles distinguishing mala prohibita and mala in se; penalty by legislature equated to prohibition — used to assess when statutory conditions render agreements void. | The Court stated the rules laid down in Bensley v. Bignold have bearing on the present case and applied the distinction to decide when agreements relating to licensed trades are void. |
| Pollock's Principles of Contract (authoritative text cited) | Extracted principles: (a) prohibition by statute makes agreements void irrespective of motive; (b) when statute imposes conditions for a business, breaches may be void if aimed at public order/safety rather than merely administrative/revenue purposes. | The Court relied on the quotations from Pollock to determine whether the partnership arrangement, in light of statutory licensing conditions and the Collector's reactions, was void for purposes of public policy or merely an administrative/regulatory breach. |
| Marudamuthu Pillai v. Rangasami Mooppan | Held a partnership unlawful where partners held differing licences (toddy and arrack) and agreement was void ab initio as opposed to mere revenue protection — concerned public policy regulating liquor traffic. | Used as a principal precedent showing that partnerships formed in contravention of licensing rules may be void on public policy grounds; distinguished on facts where full disclosure was made before tender in current case. |
| Thithi Pakurudasu v. Bheemudu | Held sub-letting a licensed shop without Collector's permission was unlawful; agreement could not be enforced. | Referred to as an example where unauthorized dealing with abkari privileges rendered agreements unenforceable. |
| Nalain Padmanabham v. Bait Badrinadh Sarda | Admission of a third person as partner without Collector's sanction in opium licence context was illegal; admission amounted to prohibited transfer of interest in licence. | Applied to show that partnerships formed without statutory sanction or in contravention of licence-transfer prohibitions have been treated as void; distinguished insofar as the present partnership commenced before the tender. |
| Ramanayudu v. Seetharamayya (Full Bench) | Approved the Marudamuthu and Nalain Padmanabham decisions; held partnership agreements entered into after bid/issue of licence were illegal and suits based on them did not lie. | The Court regarded the Full Bench decision as authority that partnerships entered into after the licence/bid are void; used to contrast with cases where partnership predates the tender. |
| Satyala Sanyasi v. Bhogavalli Sanyasi | Distinguished prior decisions where the partnership commenced before the auction/bid and the licence was obtained in one partner's name on behalf of the partnership; held no transfer of interest in licence in that factual scenario. | Discussed by the Court: Venkatasubba Rao, J. distinguished Nalain Padmanabham because partnership had been formed before auction; Court observed that even if no transfer occurred, public policy considerations still needed evaluation. |
| Rama Moopan… v. Mutha Moopan… | Followed Satyala Sanyasi in some judgments; one judge (Venkataramana Rao, J.) dissented, considering the Full Bench decision to cover partnerships formed before the bid. | Cited to show that the Court's authorities are not uniform on partnerships formed prior to licence issuance and to indicate the existence of judicial disagreement on applicability. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court analysed (a) the timing of the formation of the partnership relative to the tender/acceptance of the bid and (b) the conduct and knowledge of the revenue authorities (Collector and Board of Revenue), applying principles from reported authorities and Pollock's exposition of Bensley v. Bignold.
- Timing and disclosure: The partnership was formed before 23rd August 1937 and the plaintiff had notified the Board of Revenue and the Commissioner of Excise of the partnership before the tender was accepted; therefore the revenue authorities had full knowledge of the partnership at all material times.
- Temporary licences and initial acceptance: For the period up to 18th May 1938, temporary licences issued in the plaintiff's name were treated as intended to apply to the partnership and the revenue authorities did not, until that date, object to the business being carried on in partnership (though they stated on 10th March 1938 that licences could not be issued in joint names).
- Collector's attempts to regularize: The Collector proposed registration of the partnership under the Partnership Act and that the plaintiff be authorized to act for it; the defendant refused registration, seeking to avoid the partnership. The Collector then required fresh security from the plaintiff, returning the defendant's promissory notes only after the relevant period had expired.
- Application of statutory/precedent principles: The Court referred to the principles from Bensley v. Bignold and Pollock regarding when statutory conditions render agreements void, and to the Madras Abkari Act and rules (including recognition that the rules allow bidding on behalf of a firm but prohibit certain transfers without Collector permission). The Court surveyed earlier decisions involving abkari privileges where partnerships or transfers without sanction were held void, especially when made after licence issue or bid acceptance.
- Distinction and conclusion on lawfulness: Because the partnership had been formed and fully disclosed before the tender was accepted, the Court concluded it could not be said to have been unlawful ab initio for the period up to 18th May 1938. However, after the partners failed to comply with the conditions imposed (registration/authorization and fresh security) and the revenue authorities decided not to recognize the partnership, the partnership continued to do business under temporary licences in a manner inconsistent with the statutory/regulatory conditions. Applying the cited principles, the Court held that the partnership became unlawful from 18th May 1938 onward.
- Relief and practical consequence: The Court held that the plaintiff was entitled to an account for the partnership period up to 18th May 1938, but not for the remainder of the year (because the partnership was unlawful from 18th May 1938). The plaintiff, however, had consistently insisted on an account for the whole year or nothing; the Court therefore refused the relief sought for the whole year and dismissed the appeal.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The appellant's appeal fails; the plaintiff cannot obtain an account for the whole year because the partnership became unlawful from 18th May 1938. The plaintiff is, however, in principle entitled to an account up to 18th May 1938, but having refused that limited relief the appeal is dismissed. The respondent is entitled to his costs.
Implications: The direct effect is that the plaintiff receives no relief for the period after 18th May 1938 and the appeal is dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent. The opinion does not assert that it establishes any new general precedent beyond applying and distinguishing existing decisions concerning partnerships and abkari (liquor/opium) licence arrangements; the Court relied on prior authorities and statutory rules to resolve the temporal question of lawfulness in this particular factual matrix.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Sir Lionel Leach, C.J:— The appellant sued on the original side of this Court for a declaration that a partnership between him and the defendant was dissolved on 30th September 1938 and for an order directing that the accounts of the partnership be taken from 1st October 1937 to 30th September 1938. No oral evidence was given as the parties had agreed that the action should be tried on the correspondence and certain other documents. It is common ground that the partnership commenced before 23rd August 1937. The record does not disclose the exact date of the agreement, but this is not material. The partnership was formed for the purpose of acquiring licences for the carrying on of a retail business in toddy in shops in the City of Madras. Licences were obtained, but they were only issued in the name of the plaintiff. The defence was that, as the licences stood in the name of the plaintiff alone, the partnership was illegal and therefore the suit was not maintainable. This plea was accepted by Krishnaswami Ayyangar, J., who tried the action, and consequently he non-suited the plaintiff, who has appealed. During the pendency of the appeal the respondent died and his legal representatives have been made parties in his place. The situation disclosed is an unusual one and it is necessary to set out the course of events.
For the year commencing 1st October 1937 the Collector called for tenders in respect of toddy shops in Madras and on 23rd August 1937 the plaintiff submitted a tender on behalf of the partnership, but in his own name. The plaintiff had already informed the Secretary of the Board of Revenue of the partnership and it may be taken that the revenue authorities were fully aware of the arrangement at all material times. On 28th August 1937 the tender was withdrawn but two days later the letter of withdrawal was withdrawn. On 31st August the tender was accepted in respect of fourteen toddy shops, but subsequently two other shops were included. On 2nd September formal notice of the partnership was given by the plaintiff in a letter addressed to the Commissioner of Excise. The plaintiff added that the shops would remain in his name. The defendant took exception to the issue of the licences to the plaintiff alone and consequently on 11th September the plaintiff wrote to the Collector asking that the licences for the shops should be issued in the joint names of “J.D Italia and D, Cowasjee” or in the name “J.D Italia & Co.” whichever the Collector might think fit. On the 24th September, pending the decision on the question of the issue of the licences in the joint names, the Collector issued a temporary licence in the name of the plaintiff. On the 20th October the plaintiff again wrote asking that the licences be issued in the joint names of himself and the defendant. It was not until 10th March 1938 that the Collector replied, and the reply was to the effect that the request could not be granted. As the plaintiff had made a full disclosure of the position before his tender was accepted, he naturally asked for the reconsideration of this decision. On the 11th April the Collector wrote inquiring whether the plaintiff was prepared “to register a company Italia & Co., with himself and Mr. D. Cowasjee as partners, and with himself authorized to act in the name of the company”. Although he used the word “company”, the Collector was obviously inquiring whether the plaintiff was prepared to register the partnership under the Partnership Act. The plaintiff had to communicate with the defendant, who was resident in Bombay, and this occasioned delay. On the 30th April the Collector called for a reply within one week and stated that otherwise the licences would be issued in the plaintiff's name only. The plaintiff asked for time to reply until the 1st June, but this was not granted. On the 18th May the Collector wrote to the plaintiff informing him that the licences of the sixteen toddy shops would be issued in his name only and that he should produce security to the extent of Rs. 15,000 in the place of the Government promissory notes belonging to the defendant which had been deposited as part of the required security. At the outset each partner had furnished half of the security.
The defendant refused to comply with the suggestion of the Collector that the partnership should be registered and the plaintiff be authorized to represent the partnership. His reason for doing so is obvious. The business was being carried on at considerable loss and the defendant wished to avoid his agreement with the plaintiff if he could possibly do so. The plaintiff objected to the requirements of the Collector that he should provide fresh security in the place of that furnished by the defendant, and a number of letters passed between the plaintiff and the Collector and the defendant and the Collector. In a letter, dated 4th August 1938, the plaintiff wrote to the Collector objecting to the promissory notes for Rs. 15,000 which the defendant had deposited being handed over to him. In this letter the plaintiff said:
“The notes have been deposited by me under a covering letter signed by me, and I shall hold you responsible if the notes were handed over to any one without my authority. You have accepted the partnership in the beginning, and on your acceptance the notes were deposited. Mr. D. Cowasjee is trying to get out of this, which in law is impossible.”
The revenue authorities insisted on the plaintiff furnishing fresh security, which he eventually did. The defendant's Government promissory notes were returned to him by the Collector on 31st March 1939, six months after the expiry of the period for which the partnership was formed. It is common ground that the defendant controlled the management of the shops from 1st February 1938 until 19th June 1938 and that he was contributing his share of the funds required for the carrying on of the business till 13th July 1938. Altogether he contributed Rs. 1,37,422-10-7.
Throughout the year only temporary licences were issued. These licences throughout stood in the name of the plaintiff and were renewed every fortnight. There can be no doubt that up to 18th May 1938 these temporary licences, although issued in the plaintiff's name alone, were intended to apply to the partnership. Up to that date the revenue authorities appeared to be agreeable to the business being carried on in partnership and it was only when the partners failed to follow the suggestion of the Collector that the partnership should be registered and the plaintiff authorized to represent it that they decided that they would only recognize the plaintiff.
Section 15 of the Madras Abkari Act prohibits the sale of intoxicating liquor without a licence, and section 55 states that whoever sells intoxicating liquor in contravention of the Act shall, on conviction before a Magistrate, be punished for each offence with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with both. There is nothing in the Act or in the rules promulgated thereunder with regard to the sale of abkari privileges to prevent a firm holding a licence. Rule 1 of the conditions with regard to sales by auction expressly recognizes the acceptance of a bid on behalf of a company or firm. The rule prohibits a shop being knocked down in the names of two or more persons, but it provides that in the case of a recognized company or firm an agent duly authorized by a power of attorney, or any office bearer empowered by the articles of association or similar rules, may bid for and act on behalf of the company or firm. Clause (a) of rule 27 states:
“No privilege of supply or vend shall be sold, transferred or sub-rented without the Collector's or, in the case of a supplier under the contract distillery supply system, the Board's previous permission.”
Clause (b) of this rule says that the transfer of a rivilege will take effect from the date of issue of licence to the transferee.
Section 23 of the Contract Act states that the consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless it is forbidden by law, or is of such a nature ??? if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of law, or is fraudulent, or involves or implies injury the person or property of another, or the Court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy, a each of these cases, the consideration or object of ??? agreement is unlawful and the agreement is void.
The rules laid down in Bensley v. Bignold(1) have earing here. They are conveniently stated in Pollock's principles of Contract, Tenth Edition, at page 329 ??? these words:
“(a) When a transaction is forbidden, the grounds of ??? prohibition are immaterial. Courts of Justice cannot take ??? of any difference between mala prohibita (i.e, things ??? if not forbidden by positive law would not be immoral) ??? mala in se (i.e, things which are so forbidden as being ???).
(b) The imposition of a penalty by the Legislature ??? any specific act or omission is prima facie equivalent to an ??? prohibition.”
At page 331 of this authoritative work are these ??? statements of law:
“When conditions are prescribed by statute for the ??? of any particular business or profession, and such ??? are not observed, agreements made in the course such business or profession—
are void if it appears by the context that the object the Legislature in imposing the condition was the ??? of public order or safety or the protection of the ??? dealing with those on whom the condition is imposed;
are valid if no specific penalty is attached to the ??? Transaction, and if it appears that the condition was imposed for merely administrative purposes, e.g, the convenient collection of the revenue.”
There are numerous decisions of this Court relating to partnerships entered into with regard to the exploitation of abkari previleges and it will now be convenient to refer to those which have been most stressed in the course of the arguments. In Marudamuthu Pillai v. Rangasami Mooppan the Court held that a partnership was unlawful in these circumstances. One of the partners held a licence for the sale of toddy while the other held a licence for the sale of arrack. They formed the partnership to carry on the business of selling both arrack and toddy. A rule had been framed under the Abkari Act prohibiting a person having a licence for the sale of toddy from being interested in the sale of arrack, or a person having a licence for the sale of arrack from being interested in the sale of toddy. The holder of the toddy licence sued for a decree for the dissolution of the partnership and for the recovery of money due to him from the partnership. The Court considered that the agreement was void ab initio on the ground that it was opposed to public policy. The rule prohibiting a person selling both arrack and toddy had not been framed merely for the protection of the revenue. It had also been framed for the regulation of the liquor traffic in the interests of the public. In Thithi Pakurudasu v. Bheemudu(2) the plaintiff, who was the holder of a licence to tell arrack, sub-let his shop to the defendant without the Collector's permission. It was held that this agreement was unlawful and therefore the plaintiff could not sue upon it. In Nalain Padmanabham v. Bait Badrinadh Sarda(3) two persons, who held a licence for the sale of opium, without the sanction of the Collector admitted a third person as a partner. The third person brought a suit for the dissolution and winding up of the business. It was held that the suit did not lie, because the agreement was void. The Court considered that the agreement was illegal for the same reasons as those given in Marudamuthu Pillai v. Rangasami Mooppan and also because the admission of the plaintiff to the partnership amounted to a transfer to him of an interest in the licence, which was prohibited by law.
The decisions in Marudamuthu Pillai v. Rangasami Mooppan and Nalain Padmanabham v. Sait Badrinadh Sarda were approved of in Ramanayudu v. Seetharamayya which was decided by a Full Bench of this Court. In that case a successful bidder at an auction held for the sale of a toddy shop licence agreed with another to carry on the business in partnership. When this agreement was entered into, the licence had not been issued. The successful bidder executed a promissory note in favour of his partner in respect of money advanced by him for the carrying on of the business. The Collector's permission to this arrangement was not sought. The holder of the promissory note sued on it; but it was held that as the partnership was illegal the suit did not lie. In all these cases the partnership had commenced after the bid had been accepted or after the licence had been issued.
After the decision of the Full Bench a case came before the Court where the partnership commenced before the auction, Satyala Sanyasi v. Bhogavalli Sanyasi(4). There, five persons agreed to carry on business in partnership in respect of a toddy shop and the partners arranged that the plaintiff should bid on behalf of all and obtain a licence in his name, which he did. On the date of the partnership agreement one, of the partners executed a promissory note in favour of the plaintiff for his share of the capital. The appeal was heard by Venkatasubba Rao, J. who distinguished the case from Nalain Padmanabham v. Sait Badrinadh Sarda on the ground that the partnership had been formed before the auction and therefore there was no transfer of an interest in the licence. The wider question of public policy—the necessity of controlling all those who hold liquor licences in the interests of the public—was not discussed by Venkatasubba Rao, J. Where a partnership is entered into before the auction and one of the partners is deputed to bid for and obtain the licence in his own name on behalf of the partnership, it may be that in law there is no transfer of an interest in the licence, but it does not follow that the partnership would be a lawful one. There are other factors to be considered. The judgment of Venkatasubba Rao, J. was followed by Venkataramana Rao, J. in Rama Moopan… v. Mutha Moopan…., J. expressed strong dissent. He considered that the Full Bench decision covered even the case of a partnership agreement anterior to the bid.
There can be no doubt that, on the decisions of this Court, the partnership between the plaintiff and the defendant would have to be declared unlawful ab initio if a full disclosure of the position had not been made to the revenue authorities, but that is not the case. The partnership was entered into before the plaintiff submitted his first tender. The revenue authorities had full knowledge of the situation from the very beginning, and until 18th May 1938 had indicated no objection to the business being carried on in partnership, although they had on 10th March 1938 said that the licences could not be issued in the joint names. They were, however, prepared to reconsider that decision, as the Collector's letter of 11th April 1938 shows. In these circumstances it cannot, in our judgment, be said, that the partnership before 18th May 1938 was an unlawful one. But then there was a material change in the Situation. The partners had failed to comply with the conditions which the revenue authorities required to be fulfilled for the issue of permanent licences to the partnership and consequently they decided that they would not recognize the partnership at all. Nevertheless it continued to do business under the temporary licences issued to the plaintiff, but in doing so it offended against the principles which we have quoted from Pollock's Principles of Contracts which have received full recognition from this Court.
The plaintiff is entitled to an account up to 18th May 1938, but be refused an account on this basis in the trial Court and he has refused it in this Court. He has made it perfectly clear that he wants an account for the whole year or not at all, the reason being, of course, that an account up to 18th May 1938 will not help him. He cannot have an account until the end of the year, because the partnership was an unlawful one from 18th May 1938 and therefore his appeal fails. The respondent is entitled to his costs.
G.R
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