- Bookmark
- Share
- CaseIQ
B. Iswarayya (). v. Swarnam Iswarayya (Petitioner).
Opinion Summary — Reilly, J. (Appeals A. S. No. 169 & 201 of 1927; C. M. A. No. 312 of 1927)
Factual and Procedural Background
In 1921 the respondent (wife) obtained a decree for judicial separation from her husband (the appellant) under the Indian Divorce Act. The decree ordered the husband to pay Rs. 120 per month to the wife and Rs. 30 per month for each of their four children.
In 1926 two petitions were presented to the District Judge: O. P. No. 44 of 1926 by the wife seeking an increase of her alimony to Rs. 260 per month, and O. P. No. 43 of 1926 by the children asking that the maintenance allowances payable by their father be increased to Rs. 300 per month in total. The District Judge heard and disposed of both petitions together. He concluded that the children were no longer minors within the meaning of the Act and therefore could not be ordered maintenance under Section 42; nevertheless he raised the wife's alimony to Rs. 310 per month, expressly including amounts calculated for the children's maintenance and education and fixing Rs. 160 per month as the wife's personal requirement.
The husband appealed: A. S. No. 169 of 1927 in respect of the order relating to the wife and A. S. No. 201 of 1927 in respect of the order (as it affected) the children. There was also C. M. A. No. 312 of 1927 concerning an application to record satisfaction relating to payments for two of the children.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether a Court under Section 37 of the Indian Divorce Act has power to increase or enhance the amount of alimony previously fixed for a wife after a decree of judicial separation has been made.
- Whether the District Judge could lawfully include amounts for the maintenance and education of children who were no longer minors under the Act by adding such costs to the wife's alimony (i.e., whether any provision could be made for those children under the Act).
- Whether Section 7 of the Indian Divorce Act permits Indian Courts to adopt statutory rules or statutory provisions in force in England (specifically, whether English statutory rules governing increases of alimony could be imported into Indian practice).
Arguments of the Parties
Appellant's (Husband's) Arguments — Mr. Muthukrishna Aiyar
- Section 37 of the Indian Divorce Act does not expressly provide power to increase alimony once it has been fixed; therefore the District Judge had no authority to raise the alimony originally fixed at Rs. 120 per month.
- By contrast with Section 42 (which expressly allows orders "from time to time" for children), Section 37 contains no such language; this contrast implies that the legislature did not contemplate enhancement of alimony once fixed.
- Comparisons with English statutes and rules were relied upon to support the narrower interpretation of the Indian provisions.
- With respect to the children, the Act permits orders only in respect of minors and the children in question were admitted not to be minors within the meaning of the Act when O. P. No. 43 of 1926 was presented.
Respondent's (Wife's) Arguments — Mr. Mockett
- The power to increase alimony exists in English practice (by statutes or statutory rules) and, by virtue of Section 7 of the Indian Divorce Act, Indian Courts can act on principles and rules conformable to those applied by the English Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes; thus the power to increase may be exercised in India.
- It was suggested that the words in Section 7 might permit adoption of the English statutory rules in force for the time being in England concerning increases of alimony.
- It was apparently argued (or conceded before the District Judge, according to the District Judge's statement) that the wife entrusted with custody and education of the children could claim the cost of their maintenance and education from the husband.
Table of Precedents Cited
No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's legal analysis proceeds in distinct parts dealing with interpretation of Sections 7, 37 and 42 of the Indian Divorce Act and with the factual question of whether the children were minors under the Act.
Interpretation of Section 7: The court rejected the wife's extreme contention that "rules" in Section 7 meant the statutory rules in force in England. The judge held that Section 7 contemplates "principles and rules" of law, evidence, interpretation, practice and procedure — not statutory provisions or statutory rules from England. Those principles and rules must be applied subject to and not contrary to the provisions of the Indian Act; they cannot supply relief not provided by the Act or cut down the Act's provisions.
Interpretation of Section 37 (alimony to wife): Section 37 authorises the Court to order the husband to pay such monthly or weekly sums "as the Court may think reasonable" on a decree of judicial separation. The court asked whether that wording bans variation after an initial order. The reasoning was as follows:
- The nature of cases to which Section 37 applies — where the husband's income (as opposed to secured property) is the source of alimony — makes the income likely to vary over time. A fixed, one-time order might be unreasonable if circumstances change materially (husband's income might be nil at decree time but increase later, or vice versa).
- By ordinary principles of interpretation, a power to fix a continuing sum that is reasonable in the circumstances does not naturally imply a single, immutable order that can never be varied even if circumstances change drastically.
- The contrast with Section 42 (which explicitly provides that orders for children may be made "from time to time") does not logically compel the conclusion that Section 37 was intended to be invariable; the needs and circumstances of children and spouses differ and the legislature's explicit wording in Section 42 does not exclude the possibility of variation under Section 37.
- The presence in Section 37 of a proviso permitting reduction of alimony (but not expressly permitting increase) does not prove that increases were not intended. The court explained the legal distinction between undoing a decree and making an additional decree: a proviso safeguarding reduction addresses modification/unmaking, whereas a wife's application for additional alimony effectively seeks a further decree rather than the reversal of the earlier one; hence no express proviso is needed to enable an enhancement.
- The judge noted English practice historically permitted applications for increase (referring to R. 92 under the English Act of 1857) and that such practice supported the view that power to increase can be implied from the power to fix alimony, but he did not rest his conclusion solely on English rules; his primary analysis was based on the language and purpose of Section 37.
- Conclusion: Section 37, as it stands, gives the Court power to enhance the alimony previously ordered to be paid by a husband to his wife after judicial separation.
Application to the present facts — alimony: The wife had sought Rs. 260 per month. The District Judge had awarded Rs. 310, including an explicit component for the children's maintenance. The appellate court considered the husband's income: at the date of petition he received Rs. 800 per month as District Medical Officer and likely more (private practice), estimating his income at somewhat over Rs. 1,000 per month. Given those circumstances, the Court concluded that Rs. 260 per month was a reasonable allowance to fix as alimony for the wife. The Court exercised its procedural power (R. 33 of O. 41, Civil Procedure Code) to make an order that the husband pay the wife Rs. 260 per month, to take effect from the date of the wife's petition (18 March 1926).
Interpretation of Section 42 and the children's claims: Section 42 deals expressly with orders regarding custody, maintenance and education of minor children of parents judicially separated and contemplates orders "from time to time." The Court emphasised that the Act makes provision only in respect of minor children and gives the statutory ages at which sons and daughters cease to be minors (sons at 16, daughters at 13). It was admitted that none of the children in this case was a minor within the meaning of the Act when O. P. No. 43 of 1926 was presented.
- The District Judge attempted to provide for the children by adding the cost of their maintenance and education into the wife's alimony. The appellate court characterised that approach as an attempt to circumvent the Act rather than to apply it.
- The court found no power under the Act to make provision for these children who were no longer minors and therefore allowed the husband's appeal in A. S. No. 201 of 1927. No provision could be made for the children directly or indirectly under the Act.
Costs and conduct: In assessing costs the Court criticised the husband's failure to give clear evidence of his income and his general lack of straightforward conduct. The Court ordered:
- The husband to pay the wife's costs in A. S. No. 169 of 1927.
- Although A. S. No. 201 of 1927 succeeded for the husband (in that the provision for the children was disallowed), the husband was ordered to pay the respondents' costs throughout because his conduct had not been creditable and he had not made clear whether he had in fact conceded matters before the District Judge.
C. M. A. No. 312 of 1927: This concerned an application to record satisfaction relating to payments for two of the children. The District Judge's order was set aside and the application remanded to him for fresh disposal. Each party was to bear their own costs in that appeal.
Concurring remark by Sir William Phillips, Kt., J.: He agreed with the orders and expressed a view that Sections 3(5) and 42 should be reviewed by the Legislature because the statutory ages (girls 13, boys 16) are outdated relative to contemporary educational and social conditions; he invited legislative attention to that matter.
Holding and Implications
Core Rulings:
- Section 37 authorises the Court to enhance alimony previously fixed: The Court held that the language and purpose of Section 37 permit the Court to make further orders increasing alimony where circumstances justify it.
- No provision could be made for the children who were not minors under the Act: The District Judge's attempt to include the children's maintenance and education costs in the wife's alimony was impermissible; there is no power under the Act to make provision for children who are no longer minors within the statutory definition.
- Specific disposition in this case: By exercising its powers under the Civil Procedure Code (R. 33 of O. 41), the Court ordered the husband to pay the wife Rs. 260 per month in alimony, with effect from 18 March 1926. The husband's appeal concerning provision for the children (A. S. No. 201 of 1927) was allowed; A. S. No. 169 of 1927 was allowed in part (altering the alimony to Rs. 260). The District Judge's order of Rs. 310 that included sums for the children was set aside insofar as it purported to provide for the children.
- C. M. A. No. 312 of 1927: The District Judge's order was set aside and the matter remanded for fresh disposal; each party to bear own costs in that appeal.
Implications:
- Direct effect on the parties: the husband is required to pay Rs. 260 per month to the wife from 18 March 1926; no maintenance may be ordered under the Act for the children in question because they were not minors as defined by the Act at the relevant time.
- The judgment clarifies that courts exercising jurisdiction under the Indian Divorce Act may, consistent with the Act's language and purpose, grant increased alimony after an initial order when circumstances warrant such an increase. However, the Court emphasised that this power derives from interpretation of Section 37 and is to be exercised within the limits of the Act; the decision does not import or adopt English statutory rules wholesale.
- The opinion contains no pronouncement importing any new statutory rule from English practice: the Court explicitly rejected the view that Section 7 allows adoption of English statutory provisions, limiting Section 7 to principles and rules of law, practice and procedure.
- No broader precedent beyond the interpretation and application of Sections 7, 37 and 42 in the present facts is expressly claimed by the Court; the immediate consequences are limited to the parties and the orders remitted/varied as set out above.
Prepared from the text of the provided opinion. This summary does not add or infer information beyond what appears in that opinion.
Reilly, J. — In 1921 the respondent in A. S. No. 169 of 1927 obtained a decree under the Indian Divorce Act for judicial separation from her husband, the appellant. The husband was then ordered to pay Rs. 120 a month to the wife for her own maintenance and Rs. 30 a month to her for the maintenance of each of their 4 children. In O. P. No. 44 of 1926 on the District Judge's file, the wife prayed that the amount to be paid for her maintenance by the husband should be increased to Rs. 260 a month, and in O. P. No. 43 of 1926 the children applied for an increase of the maintenance allowances to be paid by their father for them to Rs. 300 a month, in all. The District Judge disposed of both petitions in one judgment. He found that the children were no longer minors under the Indian Divorce Act and that therefore their father could not be ordered to pay maintenance allowances for them under Sect. 42 of the Act. But he made an order raising the alimony to be paid to the wife to Rs. 310 a month, including in his calculation amounts required for the maintenance and education of the children and Rs. 160 a month for the wife herself. The husband appeals in A. S. No. 169 of 1927 against the District Judge's order, so far as it relates to the wife herself and in A. S. No. 201 of 1927 so far as it relates to the children.
Mr. Muthukrishna Aiyar for the husband contends first that, the alimony for the wife having been originally fixed under Sect. 37 of the Act at Rs. 120 a month, the District Judge had no power to raise its amount. Sect. 37 does not in express words provide any power to increase the alimony of a wife once fixed. Mr. Mockett for the wife replies that since 1907 that power has been provided in England by the statutes which govern the Probate and Divorce Division of the High Court in such matters and from 1866 to 1907 it was provided by the Statutory Rules and Regulations of the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial Causes; and that power can be exercised by the Courts in India, because Sect. 7 of the Indian Divorce Act provides that High Courts and District Courts shall act and give relief on principles and rules which in the opinion of the said Courts are as nearly as may be conformable to the principles and rules on which the Court for Divorce and Matrimonial causes in England for the time being, acts and gives reliefs. Mr. Mockett's extreme contention that rules in Sect. 7 of the Indian Divorce Act means the statutory rules in force for the time being in England is in my opinion clearly untenable. If statutory rules in force in England were meant, there would be no question of the Courts in this country acting on rules which in their opinion were as nearly as may be conformable to those rules. The provision would have been either that the statutory rules in force in England were to be observed in this country or that the rules to be made under Sect. 62 of the Indian Divorce Act were to be as nearly as may be conformable to the statutory rules in force in England. In my opinion, the words ‘principles and rules’ in Sect. 7 of the Indian Divorce Act mean principles and rules of law, of evidence, of interpretation, of practice and of procedure, but not statutory provisions, nor statutory rules. The principles and rules to be applied are by the words of the section made subject to the provisions of the Act; they can never run counter to the Act. Mr. Mockett suggests that they may fill up gaps left in the Act. But I am inclined to agree with Mr. Muthukrishna Aiyar that they can neither cut down the provisions of the Act nor supply any form of relief not provided by the Act. However, I do not think it necessary to discuss that question in any detail on this occasion as the present case appears to me to turn on other considerations. Mr. Muthukrishna Aiyar in the course of his argument has also compared the provisions of the Indian Divorce Act with the statutes and the statutory rules in force in England from time to time since 1857. Such a comparison is interesting. But in my opinion it is neither useful nor permissible for the purpose of interpreting the Indian Act unless the provisions of that Act which are in question are of doubtful meaning. If the provisions of the Indian Act are plain, we have no need, and in my opinion, we have no right to look outside the Act for its interpretation.
The question here is whether the amount of alimony which the husband has been ordered to pay monthly can be raised by the Court after it has once been fixed. The words of Sect. 37 of the Indian Divorce Act are ‘in every such case’—that is on any decree of judicial separation obtained by the wife—“the Court may make an order on the husband for payment to the wife of such monthly or weekly sums for her maintenance and support as the Court may think reasonable.” There is a proviso to that part of the section which I will discuss later. But in it self, as that provision stands, and leaving out of consideration any interpretation, judicial or otherwise, which has been put on similar provisions elsewhere, does it mean that an order for payment by the husband once made can never be varied, that the amount to be paid can never be raised by the Court? Does it mean that one order only can be made in the wife's favour? The Court is to fix the sum which it thinks reasonable. What is reasonable to-day may be unreasonable a few years hence. Where the husband has property on which a gross sum or an annual income can be secured to the wife, the earlier part of the section provides for that being done. The part of the section with which we are dealing appears to apply to other cases, where the husband has no such property, or no sufficient property, but is earning or receiving an income, out of which he can properly be ordered to make payments to the wife. Such an income in very many cases will be variable. A husband who depends on his own earnings may be earning nothing at the time when his wife obtains a decree of judicial separation against him. A year later he may have obtained a good appointment and be earning a large income. If the Court's power is restricted to the time when the decree is made in such a case it would not be reasonable to make any order for payment to the wife at all. Does this part of the section mean that in such a case the wife can never get an order for payment of alimony? If it is suggested that the Court can make an order for payment after the decree but not necessarily at the time of the decree and then its power is exhausted, the result is hardly more reasonable. A husband may at the time when the first order is made be earning a very small income, out of which he cannot make any payment sufficient for the maintenance of his wife, but later on he may be earning thousands a month. Doss the section tie the hands of the Court so as to prevent an order for the payment of proper alimony to the wife when it is obvious that the husband can well afford it? When a Court is given power to make a continuing order reasonable in the circumstances, by what principles of interpretation can we say that that implies power to make only one order applicable to one set of circumstances, which can never be varied, however gravely the circumstances may vary? And when we remember the particular kind of circumstances to which this part of the section applies, that is cases in which a proper provision cannot be made for the wife out of the property of the husband but can be made out of his income, I see nothing in the words used to drive us to the conclusion, unreasonable in itself and not necessarily implied in the words, that the Court can do no more than make once and for all a single order in favour of the wife and then its power is spent.
Mr. Muthukrishna Aiyar has sought to support his interpretation of the section to that effect by comparing it with Sect. 42, which deals with orders regarding the minor children of parents judicially separated and provides explicitly that such orders may be made ‘from time to time.’ He would have us regard it as of importance by contrast that there are no such words in the part of Sect. 37 which I have been discussing. But Sect. 42 deals with orders with respect to the custody, maintenance and education of the children or for placing them under the protection of the Court. It is obvious that in such matters frequent orders differing from time to time, may be required in the interests of the children as they grow up, and the conduct or occupation of the parent to whom the custody of the children has been given may often make a variation of the original or subsequent order necessary in that matter. The fact that the legislature has been careful to state explicitly that varying orders in respect of the children may be made from time to time as is obviously desirable in their interests, is in my opinion no sufficient ground for supposing that, having provided in Sect. 37 that the Court may order the husband to make such monthly payments to the wife as it thinks reasonable, the Legislature intended to make that order invariable. Without provision for variation from time to time it might perhaps be thought that an order for the custody of the children was final. When alimony is to be fixed according to what is reasonable in the circumstances, no such finality is implied.
What at first sight may be thought a stronger argument in support of Mr. Muthukrishna Aiyar's contention is that Sect. 37 contains an explicit proviso for the reduction of the alimony which the husband has been ordered to pay but no proviso for its enhancement. Mr. Muthukrishna Aiyar argues that the very fact that a proviso has been introduced only for the reduction of alimony, once fixed implies that enhancement was never contemplated by the Legislature; if alimony once fixed could be varied according to circumstances under the section without the proviso the proviso regarding reduction would be superfluous. On examination that argument does not appear to me to be sound. When an order for the periodical payment of alimony has been made against a husband, it is of the nature of a decree, and, if he is to be allowed in certain circumstances to get it reversed or modified, it might be thought that explicit provision must be made for that in some way, and it is not made in the section apart from the proviso. But, when the wife applies for additional alimony, she does not want the original order touched in effect; she wants a further decree for additional alimony. The proviso might be thought necessary if the Court was to have power to unmake the order made; no proviso is necessary to give power to make an additional order. My conclusion therefore is that Sect. 37 of the Indian Divorce Act as it stands gives power to the Court to enhance the alimony which a husband has been ordered under the section to pay to a wife judicially separated from him. Returning for a moment to Mr. Muthukrishna Aiyar's comparative examination of the English Statutes and statutory rules on the one side and the Indian Divorce Act on the other I may point out that under the English Act of 1857 the Court had power when pronouncing a decree for dissolution of marriage to fix an amount of alimony for the wife—either a gross sum or an annual sum—but nothing was said in the Act about power to increase the sum; nevertheless R. 92 of the Rules and Regulations made under that Act prescribes procedure for a wife applying for the increase of alimony so fixed, which could not properly have been done unless power to increase the alimony fixed had been held to be implied in the power given by the Act to fix it.
The husband is on much firmer ground in his appeal against the District Judge's order so far as it makes provision for the children. The Act makes provision only in respect of minor children; and under the Act the sons of native fathers are no longer minors when they reach 16 years of age and the daughters when they reach 13. It is admitted that none of the children concerned in this case was a minor within the meaning of the Act when 0. P. No. 43 of 1926 was presented to the District Court. But the District Judge has tried to provide for them by adding the cost of their maintenance and education temporarily to the alimony of the wife, which he has raised for that explicit purpose. That is not to apply but to circumvent the provisions of the Act. In my opinion there is no power under the Act to make any provision for these children who are no longer minors under the Act. The learned District Judge says in his judgment that it was conceded that “the wife who is entrusted with their custody and education, is entitled to claim from the husband the cost of their maintenance and education.” I do not understand exactly what that means. The “entrustment” of the children to the wife appears to have been made under an order for their custody which is no longer in force. The legality of providing for the children in that way is contesed by the husband in A. S. No. 201 of 1927, and Mr. Mockett has not suggested before us that any such ‘concassion’ was really made by the husband before the District Judge. In my opinion A. S. No. 201 of 1927 must be allowed and no provision can be made for the children directly or indirectly.
The wife claimed in O. P. No. 44 of 1926 Rs. 260 a month for her own maintenance. The learned District Judge, though taking into consideration the expenses of the children he made an order for the payment to the wife of Rs. 310 a month, calculating what was needed by her at Rs. 160 a month. In my opinion he might well have fixed her alimony at Rs. 260 a month. The husband at the date of the petition was receiving a salary of Rs. 800 a month. As District Medical Officer there is no noubt that he has opportunities of adding considerably to that income by private practice. He did not go into the witness box; nor did he explain to the Court clearly what his income was. It is indeed not at all creditable that an officer in his position should not have been open with the Court and should have left the amount of his income to speculation. It will, I think, be quite safe to estimate his income at something over Rs. 1,000 a month. Out of that it is in my opinion, reasonable that he should pay Rs. 260 a month to his wife in alimony. Though she has not put in any appeal or memorandum of objections against the District Judge's order the reason of that appears to have been that in one sense the alimony fixed by the Judge was more than she had claimed. In the circumstances I think we may properly make an order under R. 33 of O. 41, Civil Procedure Code that the husband do pay alimony to the wife at the rate of Rs. 260 a month. The learned District Judge has made his order to take effect from the date of the wife's petition viz., 18th March 1926. The husband objects to that; but I see no sufficient reason why it should not be done, and I would make our order have effect from that date.
As to costs I would order the husband to pay the wife's costs in A. S. No. 169 of 1927. And, although A. S. No. 201 of 1927 must be allowed in his favour, I would order him to pay the respondents' costs throughout, both because his conduct in the case does not appear to me to have been at all creditable or straightforward and because, though he has objected successfully to the District Judge's order, he did not bring to the notice of the learned Judge, either when his judgment was pronounced or afterwards, the fact that he had not made the supposed concession upon which the judgment partly proceeds.
C. M. A. No. 312 of 1927.—This appeal relates to an application (E. A. No. 253 of 1926) to record satisfaction in the matter of payments for two of the children concerned in A. S. No. 201 of 1927. The order of the District Judge must be set aside and the application remanded to him for fresh disposal. In this appeal each party will bear his own costs.
Sir William Phillips, Kt., J.—I agree with the orders proposed and will only add one word about Sects. 3 (5) and 42 of the Act. It seems to me most improper that a Court of Matrimonial jurisdiction should not have power to pass orders as to the custody and maintenance of unmarried girls above the age of 13, or of boys over 16 Since 1869 great strides have been made in education and it cannot now be said that education always ceases in the case of girls at 13 and in the case of boys at 16 nor are they usually in a position to fend for themselves at that age. In my opinion the definition of minor children in Sect. 3 (5) requires amendment and I would invite the attention of the Legislature to the same.
N. R. R.
Alert