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Pallampati Lakshmina... v. Iyanapurapu Suryanar...

Madras High Court
Mar 7, 1934
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Judgment Summary — Executability of Portion of a Compromise Decree

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit was instituted to recover possession of certain godowns (kottus/shops) and for past and future rent or profits. The parties reached a compromise and a decree was entered in terms of their compromise petition. Under that compromise the plaintiff did not obtain possession; instead the defendants agreed to acknowledge the plaintiff as landlord, to pay arrears and to pay specified future ground rent at stated rates. The present controversy concerns whether the portion of the compromise decree requiring future, periodical payments (described as payable "every month in perpetuity") is executable or merely declaratory. The appeal challenges earlier orders that had refused execution; the court was asked to determine whether execution of that portion of the decree may proceed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a portion of a compromise decree that directs certain defendants to make periodical payments "every month in perpetuity" is an executable decree or merely declaratory.
  2. Whether it was within the competence of the Court to pass a decree directing indefinite periodical payments and, if so, whether such a decree can be executed (including enforcement by execution and charging interest and priority of charge).

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lalibai v. Valiram Ghanshamdas (cited in Banu Mal v. Parasram) Statement of the test for executability: whether there is a direct and definite order to a definite person to do or refrain from doing a definite thing. The court applied this test to hold that the decree's language — directing specific persons to pay specific amounts on definite dates — made it executable in form.
Banu Mal v. Parasram Cited as the source where Lalibai v. Valiram Ghanshamdas was referenced for the executability test. Used to support the doctrinal test that the form and definiteness of the decree determine executability.
Sinthayee v. Thanakapudayen Recognises the long-standing practice of Indian courts making decrees for future maintenance to Hindu widows and notes absence of prohibitory provisions in Stamp Act or Civil Procedure Code. The court drew an analogy with maintenance decrees to support the view that courts may pass and execute decrees for future periodical payments.
Ashutosh Bannerjee v. Lukhimoni Debya Full Bench answered in the affirmative that maintenance directed for the future may be recovered in execution; the form had longstanding sanction. The court cited this Full Bench view to show historical acceptance of executable decrees for future payments and to support executability of the decree before it.
Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi v. Satyabhamabai Gives reasons why decrees for future periodical payments (maintenance-style decrees) should be executable. Cited for supporting the desirability and permissibility of executable periodical-payment decrees.
Vishnu Shambhog v. Manjamma Similar reasons as in Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi about executability of such decrees. Referenced to reinforce the argument that such decrees are properly executable.
Maung Sin v. Ma Tok Dealt with an annuity; although executability was in question, no objection was taken to executing such a decree. Used to show that decrees providing for periodic payments (annuity) have been executed and not objected to on executability grounds.
Kishore Bun Mohunt v. Dwarkanath Adhikari (Privy Council) Dealt with a decree for periodical supply to priests (apparently without time limit) and held it could be executed rather than being merely declaratory. Invoked to show precedent at the Privy Council level where open-ended periodic obligations in a decree were held enforceable.
Ramanatham Chettiar v. Balayee Ammal Considered whether terms of a scheme under S.92 CPC incorporated in a decree could be enforced by execution; observed that directions to perform duties including periodic payments may be executable. Quoted to support the proposition that scheme-based clauses ordering periodic payments can be executed and kept alive as necessary.
Chamanlal v. Bapubhai Illustrates a case where liability was contingent upon occurrence of an event, making the decree inappropriate for execution. Distinguished by the court: it shows that a decree must be definite and not contingent to be executable; Chamanlal was not of much assistance in the present case because the present decree was definite.
Vinayak Amrit Deshpande v. Abaji Haibatrav Decided on particular facts including the meaning of "mesne profits". Referred to as another case cited by the District Judge, but the court observed it turned on factual specifics rather than establishing a general rule against executability.
Kashi Ram v. Sahib-un-Nissa Example where no date was fixed for payment and the language of the decree showed it was merely declaratory (thus non-executable). Used to contrast with the present case: absence of fixed dates in Kashi Ram made that decree non-executable, unlike the present decree which fixes amounts and dates.
Taraprasanna Ganguli v. Nareshchandra Chakrabarti Expresses that the tendency should be against deciding that a decree is non-executable in effect. Relied upon to underscore the court's reluctance to construe a decree as non-executable where its form is plainly executable.
Venkanna v. Aitamma Dismissed objections similar to those in maintenance cases as insufficient ground for refusing to pass such decrees. Cited alongside Sinthayee to show that objections based on long-term consequences do not suffice to refuse execution or passage of such decrees.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded primarily from the proposition that the executability of a decree is to be determined chiefly from the form and language of the decree itself. If the form is unambiguously that of an executable decree, it should be treated as executable irrespective of objections unrelated to its form; only where the language is ambiguous should extrinsic considerations (such as the parties' intentions or the Court's presumed intention) be taken into account.

Applying that approach to the present decree, the court observed that the decree:

  • Specifically states amounts that particular defendants "shall pay" towards liabilities already accrued;
  • Contains explicit directions that, "Hereafter, defendants 2 and 3 shall pay Rs. 1-9-7 ..." and similar precise monthly sums "to the plaintiff" and sums "to the defendants 7 to 9" with the timing specified ("every month in perpetuity on 1st March, 1921 and on the 1st of every month subsequently").
  • Provides for interest at 12% from the date of default and declares the rent payable to be a first charge on the kottus or shops and the site on which they stand.

Using the established test (Lalibai v. Valiram Ghanshamdas as cited), the court concluded that because the decree gives a direct and definite order to definite persons to pay definite sums on definite dates, it is "indisputably executable in form."

The objection to execution raised before the court was that execution would entail enforcing periodical payments without any temporal limit (i.e., "in perpetuity"). The court addressed whether passing such a decree was beyond the Court's competence or whether there was any legal bar to executing it. It distinguished the separate questions of whether (a) the Court was well-advised to pass such a decree in the first place (a discretionary or policy point) and (b) whether, having passed such a decree in executable form, the Court may now refuse to execute it.

To resolve these questions the court relied on analogy to maintenance decrees and several authorities showing long practice and judicial recognition of decrees for future periodic payments. The court cited cases (including Full Bench and Privy Council decisions) supporting that such decrees have been treated as executable and observed that no statute had been identified by counsel that forbids a court from directing payment of periodical sums. The court emphasised that some authorities indicated that a decree must be definite (not contingent) to be executable — distinguishing cases such as Chamanlal v. Bapubhai and Kashi Ram v. Sahib-un-Nissa where contingency or absence of fixed dates made decrees declaratory.

The court further observed practical advantages of allowing execution of fixed periodic-payment decrees: the decree-holder is saved from having to sue afresh on each default and the procedure of the courts should avoid multiplicity of suits and be reasonably adaptable and elastic. Concerns such as possible future changes in amounts or changes in parties liable were characterised as reasons against passing such a decree in the first place rather than reasons for refusing to execute a decree already validly passed; such questions, the court concluded, can be dealt with when they arise.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed. The court set aside the orders of the Courts below and directed the Subordinate Judge to proceed with E. A. No. 697 of 1928 in O. S. No. 22 of 1919. The respondents were ordered to pay the appellant's costs throughout.

Implications (as expressed in the opinion):

  • The court held that a decree which, in form, contains definite directions to definite persons to pay definite sums on definite dates is executable even if the payments are periodical and without an expressed temporal limit.
  • The court did not find any statutory provision cited that would disable a court from passing or executing such a decree; analogies (notably to maintenance decrees and certain Privy Council and Full Bench decisions) support the conclusion that such decrees can be executed.
  • The judgment recognises practical benefits to decree-holders in enforcing fixed periodic obligations by execution, avoiding multiplicity of suits; objections relating to future changes in amount or identity of liable parties are matters to be dealt with if and when they arise, rather than grounds to refuse execution of a decree otherwise valid in form.
  • The direct effect on the parties is that execution of the compromise decree is permitted to proceed as directed and the respondents must pay the appellant's costs; the court did not purport to create any sweeping new legal rule beyond applying established tests and authorities to the facts before it.
N. R. R. — Appeal allowed.

This summary is confined strictly to the material and statements appearing in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

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JUDGMENT

In this case the question whether a certain portion of a compromise decree is executable arises for consideration. The suit was brought to recover possession of certain godowns and for past and future rent or profits. It was compromised and a decree passed in terms of the compromise petition filed by the parties. The plaintiff was not to get possession but the defendants agreed to acknowledge him as landlord, to pay up the arrears and to pay future ground rent at certain rates. It is this last condition with which we are now concerned and the question is whether it is so expressed as to be executable or whether it remains merely declaratory.

It appears to me that the question whether a decree is execuable has to be settled primarily upon the form or language of the decree itself. If the form is unambiguously that of an executable decree, then it is executable in form whatever objections may appear to its execution. Only if it is ambiguous ought considerations such as the apparent intentions of the parties and the presumed intention of the Court to enter. Now in the present case there seems to me no doubt that the language of the decree is designed to render it executable. So far as the various payments are concerned, it begins by providing what are the amounts which the various defendants “shall pay” towards liabilities already accrued. Then it goes on:—

“Hereafter, defendants 2 and 3 shall pay Rs. 1-9-7, 4th defendant shall pay Rs. 1-11-0, defendants 5 and 6 shall pay Rs. 1-13-8 and the 10th defendant shall pay Rs. 1-8-5, to the plaintiff and defendants 2 and 3 shall pay Rs. 0-12-9, the 4th defendant shall pay Rs. 0-13-6, defendants 5 and 6 shall pay Rs. 0-14-10, and the 10th defendant shall pay Rs. 0-12-3 to the defendants 7 to 9, towards the ground rent of the said kottus or shops every month in perpetuity on 1st March, 1921 and on the 1st of every month subsequently:

That if the money is not paid on the due date, the same shall be paid with interest thereon at 12 per cent from the date of default; the rent payable every month hereafter shall be a 1st charge on the kottus or shops and the site on which they stand.”

………There does not seem the slightest ground in the language used for holding that if the decree is executable as regards past liabilities it is only declaratory as regards future ones. The test to ascertain whether a decree is executable is whether there is a direct and definite order to a definite person to do or refrain from doing a definite thing. See (1) Lalibai v. Valiram Ghanshamdas (1) cited in (2) Banu Mal v. Parasram (2). In the present instance the decree contains directions to certain definite persons to pay certain amounts of money on definite dates. It appears to me that but for criticisms unconnected with its form it would not occur to any one to contend that it was unexecutable.

The objection raised to executing it depends of course upon the fact that execution involves the enforcement of periodical payments without limit as to time. The question is whether it was beyond the competence of the Court to pass such a decree or whether there is any other legal objection to executing it according to its tenor. It is to be noted that this is not the same question as whether the Court was well-advised to pass a decree in this form, which is the point to which some of the arguments used by the Courts below seem rather to be directed. It may well be that, had the Court's attention been drawn to the unusual nature of this part of the compromise decree, it would not have passed it as it stood. But having passed a decree executable in form the question is whether it can now refuse to execute it. It seems to me that the time has gone by when objections based for example on the Court-fees Act could be effectively advanced, and that the decree-holder is entitled to hold the Court to the consequences of making such a decree unless its act in doing so was clearly ultra vires.

There has not been cited to me any provision of law disabling a Court from passing a decree directing payment of periodical sums of money. On the contrary we have a fairly close analogy in the familiar maintenance decree. It would perhaps be improper to attach too much weight to that analogy, because when the question has arisen whether a Court can pass such a decree usage has generally been involved as sanction for such a course. Thus in Sinthayee v. Thanakapudayen it has been observed that the practice of all the Indian Courts has been for very many years to make decrees for payments of future maintenance to Hindu widows and that if the Courts have authority to decree such payments it follows that such decrees must be capable of execution in the same way as decrees for payment of money by instalments may be executed. The learned Judges add that there is nothing which they can discover in the Stamp Act or in the Civil Procedure Code to prevent the execution of such a decree. In Ashutosh Bannerjee v. Lukhimoni Debya the question whether, where a decree directs payment of maintenance in future, such maintenance may be recovered in execution of the decree was referred to a Full Bench which answered it in the affirmative, pointing out that this form of decree had existed for a long time and adding,

“It seems to us impossible to say that a form of decree adopted by all the Courts of this country, sanctioned by the decisions of their Lordships of the Privy Council, and which has never been successfully attacked, can now be considered irregular. Indeed, so far from that being the case, it bears a striking resemblance to the form of decrees for maintenance given by Courts of Equity in England.”

In Lakshman Ramchandra Joshi v. Satyabhamabai and Vishnu Shambhog v. Manjamma reasons are given why it is desirable that such decrees should be executable. The decree which was before the Privy Council in Maung Sin v. Ma Tok (3) concerned an annuity and although the question related to its executability, no exception was taken on the score that a decree of that kind should not be executed. It does not of course follow that because the making and execution of maintenance decrees providing for future payments of maintenance has been recognised as permissible, all kinds of other decrees providing for periodical payments should also be recognised and acted upon. Apart from these maintenance cases one or two judicial decisions or dicta appear to have some bearing upon the question. The Privy Council case, Kishore Bun Mohunt v. Dwarkanath Adhikari (4), dealt with a decree which provided for the periodical supply to the plaintiffs, who were officiating priests in a temple, of certain articles necessary for the performance of worship. So far as appears, the provision in the decree was without limit as to time. It was urged that the decree was merely a declaratory one but their Lordships said that they had no doubt that it could be executed. In Ramanatham Chettiar v. Balayee Ammal (5) the question arose whether certain terms of a scheme settled by suit under S. 92 Civil Procedure Code could be enforced by executing the decree embodying the scheme. Ramesam J. has discussed the general question of the executability of such decrees and incidentally of other decrees which for this purpose would have to be kept alive indefinitely. He points out that a decree awarding maintenance to a widow may be executable for nearly a hundred years and that a decree giving an injunction in respect of a lease for 999 years may be executable for a very long period. He says,

“I do not see any reason why there may not be some clause in the scheme which amounts to a direction to the defendants to perform some duty such as the payment of money either at a point of time or periodically, and why such a direction should not be executable.”

Of course the decree must be definite in form, and liability to make the payment should not be contingent upon the occurrence of some event, as was the case for instance in Chamanlal v. Bapubhai . This last case is one of those relied upon by the learned District Judge; but I do not think that it is of much assistance. Vinayak Amrit Deshpande v. Abaji Haibatrav another case which he cites, was decided upon particular facts including the meaning of “mesne profits.” In Kashi Ram v. Sahib-un-Nissa , a case of the Oudh Judicial Commissioner's Court, it appears that no date was fixed for payment and that the language of the decree showed that it was merely declaratory.

My conclusions are that the decree is indisputably executable in form and that the mere fact that doubt may exist whether it ought to be executed is no proper ground for attempting to strain the language to a contrary effect. Indeed the tendency should be against deciding that a decree is non-executable in effect: Taraprasanna Ganguli v. Nareshchandra Chakrabarti . As regards the legality of such a decree I cannot find that it is beyond the competence of the Court to pass a decree in these terms; indeed such a decree even carries with it certain advantages, inasmuch as for the recovery of fixed sums periodically payable the decree-holder will not be driven to sue afresh upon the occasion of each default. It need scarcely be said that for the avoidance of multiplicity of suits the procedure of the Courts should be as adaptable and elastic as is reasonably possible. Objection has been made that a decree requiring payment of ground rent in perpetuity does not take into account possible changes in amount or in the party liable. This again would be a ground rather against the passing of such a decree than of executing it, and such questions may be left until they arise. Considerations such as these arise also in maintenance cases, and in Sinthayee v. Thanakapudayen and Venkanna v. Aitamma (6) have been dismissed as no sufficient ground for refusing to pass such decrees. It may be that decrees like the present should not be passed, but once passed I cannot find sufficient ground why execution should be refused. I accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the orders of the Courts below and direct the Subordinate Judge to proceed with E. A. No. 697 of 1928 in O. S. No. 22 of 1919. The respondents will pay the appellant's costs throughout.

N. R. R. Appeal allowed.