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Kunhi Kutti Ali v. Mohammad Haji
Structured Summary of the Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
The suit under appeal was instituted as a representative suit by a junior member of a marumakkathayam tarwad. The plaintiff sought a declaration that a pattadharam (a kuzhikanom lease) dated 18 July 1922, granted by defendant 1 (the then karnavan), was not valid or binding on the plaintiff, his tarwad, or the suit properties, and for delivery of the suit properties to the plaintiff on behalf of the tarwad.
The tarwad comprised two branches descended from sisters Alliathe and Birambi. The defendants were members of Birambi's branch; the plaintiff belonged to Alliathe's branch and claimed to be the senior anandravan (a claim disputed). The plaintiff alleged that defendant 1 granted the pattadharam to members of his own branch (tavazhi) to enrich them and to deprive the plaintiff and the tarwad of the benefit of improvements effected by the plaintiff, and that the rent fixed was excessively low.
The trial Court (learned Subordinate Judge) found that the pattadharam was not executed bona fide in the karnavan's exercise of management powers but was made to enrich his own tavazhi at the tarwad's expense, and it granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff as prayed. Defendants 2 and 3 appealed to the Court whose opinion is summarized here.
On appeal, defendants advanced two principal grounds: (1) that the plaintiff had not properly obtained leave to sue as a representative (a point the appellate court refused to permit), and (2) that the pattadharam was an ordinary act of management by the karnavan and, if improper, the appropriate remedy was removal of the karnavan rather than setting aside an ordinary lease by a junior member.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiff had properly obtained leave to sue in a representative capacity (as alleged in the plaint).
- Whether a junior member of a tarwad may, as of right, bring a suit to set aside a pattadharam (a twelve-year kuzhikanom lease) granted by a karnavan who is still in office, or whether such relief is available only in exceptional circumstances.
- If the pattadharam was improperly granted, whether the proper remedy against a serving karnavan is removal from office rather than setting aside an ordinary act of management.
- Whether the findings of the trial Court as to inadequacy of rent (and the supporting commission reports) are sustainable on the evidence and by proper procedure.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' and Defendant 1's Arguments
- The plaintiff had not properly obtained leave to sue as a representative and therefore the suit was not maintainable on that procedural ground.
- The grant of the pattadharam was an ordinary act of management by the karnavan within his legitimate powers; junior members cannot ordinarily bring a suit to set aside such an act while the karnavan remains in office, and if the karnavan's conduct is objectionable the proper remedy is to seek his removal.
Plaintiff's (Respondent 1's) Arguments
- The pattadharam of 18 July 1922 was not bona fide and was granted by defendant 1 to enrich members of his own tavazhi at the expense of the tarwad and the plaintiff's branch.
- The rent fixed under the pattadharam was unreasonably low and prejudiced the tarwad.
- The plaintiff had effected substantial improvements to the suit lands and the pattadharam deprived him (and the tarwad) of the benefits of those improvements.
- The plaintiff asserted that certain suit items had been allotted for the maintenance of his branch by a former karnavan and that this allotment had been continued by successive karnavans (though this point was not strongly established on the evidence).
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Abdulla Koya v. Eacharan Nair [1918] 47 I.C. 945 | That a particular lease cannot be declared invalid merely because it is not proved to be beneficial to the tarwad; fettering the karnavan's discretion by such review would unsettle management. | Used to support the proposition that ordinarily leases granted by a karnavan fall within his management powers and cannot be lightly set aside; also to show that removal is the appropriate remedy where there is habitual improvident leasing. |
| Kishakkumbrath Moidin v. Koyambrath Murkothakandi [1928] 108 I.C. 738 | Where a kanom is executed by a karnavan for the purpose of paying a debt binding on the tarwad, the Court need not investigate with meticulous care whether the transaction was prudent or strictly necessary to raise the amount. | Relied upon to illustrate judicial reluctance to scrutinise ordinary management transactions too closely when they purport to serve tarwad interests (e.g., debt payment). |
| Unni v. Kunchi Amma [1891] 14 Mad. 26 | Dealt with a suit to recover property alleged to have been improperly alienated by a karnavan under a kanom; the point decided in that case related to limitation. | Cited as an example where improper alienation was litigated by members, but distinguished on facts (different issues and limitation point). |
| Anantan v. Sanlcaran [1891] 14 Mad. 101 | Held that junior members could maintain a suit for declaration that a kanom was invalid and for recovery of properties (in that case the kanom was granted by a senior anandaravan to whom management had been delegated). | Noted as supportive of junior members suing in some circumstances, but the Court emphasised that the facts were exceptional (delegation of management, near expiry of limitation, karnavan's failure to sue) and that the broad proposition cannot be generalized. |
| A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 150 | Commentary (as reported in the opinion) that Anantan v. Sanlcaran's broad proposition—that junior members always may sue when karnavan fails—appears opposed to prior and subsequent decisions; the actual facts fit an exception. | Quoted to show that earlier judgments must be read in context and do not establish an unfettered right for junior members to sue in every situation. |
| Vatavatta Nair v. Kanath Puthen Vitiil Kuppasan Menon [1919] 51 I.C. 740 | Suit to set aside a kanom by renewal of an earlier kanom whose term had not expired; renewal was not binding except on proof of necessity or benefit to the tarwad. | Used to show that premature renewals may be set aside if there is no proof of necessity or benefit to the tarwad. |
| Cheria Kunhi Pocker v. Ghowkaran Malikaimal Valia Bappolty [1919] 53 I.C. 771 | Junior member successfully sued to recover properties for which a kanom had been given, but the kanom had been granted by a previous karnavan. | Cited as an instance where relief was granted, but distinguished because the kanom challenged there was executed by a former karnavan. |
| Kenath Achus v. Kalliani Amma. A.I.R. 1923 Mad. 700 | Senior anandravan brought suit to set aside a kanom renewed prematurely by the karnavan and lost because the renewal was held to be proper. | Indicated that the right to sue does not guarantee success; outcomes depend on the circumstances and merits. |
| Ottaparakkal Thazhath Soopi v. Charichal Pallikkal Mariyomma [1920] 48 Mad. 393 | Held that except in very special circumstances (gross misconduct and collusion) junior members cannot sue for redemption of a kanom granted by their karnavan. | Used to support the restrictive rule that junior members' suits to set aside acts of the karnavan are exceptional. |
| Bikkutti v. Kalendan [1891] 14 Mad. 267 | Concerns cancellation of a deed of gift by junior members; held permissible but in exceptional circumstances where the karnavan could not maintain the deed which he himself had granted. | Referred to as another example of exceptional relief against karnavan acts. |
| Kunhamad Hajee v. Kuttiath Hajee [1881] 3 Mad. 169 | Indicates that a course of very improvident leases by a karnavan, pursued over years and persistently disregarding tarwad interests, is sufficient ground for removing the karnavan from management. | Applied to emphasize that removal of a karnavan is the appropriate remedy where there is persistent, grossly improper leasing, rather than setting aside an ordinary lease. |
| Chappan v. Ranu [1914] 37 Mad. 420 | Remarked that tarwad property is vested in its members who, when the karnavan makes an alienation not binding on them, can sue to recover possession and may do so on their title without asking for the alienation to be set aside (case concerned a mortgage). | Distinguished on facts (mortgage) but cited to show that members can sometimes recover property directly; not directly controlling here where lease (kuzhikanom) is in issue. |
| Manavadan v. Sredevi A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 422 | Jackson, J. observed that rights of junior members are confined to suits for maintenance, cancellation of transactions entered into by the karnavan to the detriment of the family, and suits for removal of the karnavan. | Quoted to summarise the limited scope of junior members' remedies and to support the view that cancellation of ordinary leases is not routinely available. |
| Amhi v. Kunhi Kavamma A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 661 | Criticised the practice of issuing multiple commissions on the same subject and treating both reports as evidence; indicates impropriety under O. 26, R. 10(3) CPC. | Relied upon to criticise the trial Court's issuance and use of two separate commission reports and to conclude that doing so was improper. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The appellate court's reasoning proceeded in a sequence of steps, each grounded in the material facts and antecedent authorities cited in the opinion:
- Leave to sue: The court first disposed of the procedural objection that the plaintiff lacked leave to sue in a representative capacity. The plaint contained a clear recital (paragraph 14) that leave had been obtained; no written statement challenged that recital nor was any issue joined on it. On that basis the appellate court presumed the trial court had properly permitted the representative suit and refused to permit the appellants to raise the point.
- Nature of the act: The court analysed whether the pattadharam (a twelve-year kuzhikanom lease) was an ordinary act of management within the karnavan's competence. It noted the undisputed principle from prior decisions (for example Abdulla Koya and Kishakkumbrath Moidin) that particular leases are generally regarded as acts of management and cannot be set aside merely for being insufficiently beneficial to the tarwad; the exceptions are where there is a proven course of gross misconduct or habitual improvident leasing which may justify removal of the karnavan.
- Scope for junior members to sue: The court surveyed authorities showing that junior members may, in exceptional circumstances, bring suits to set aside kanoms or recover property (cases such as Anantan v. Sanlcaran, Vatavatta Nair, Cheria Kunhi Pocker, Ottaparakkal, Bikkutti). These decisions, however, were read as establishing that relief against ordinary management acts is exceptional, and that many of the decisions cited were distinguishable by their facts (e.g., kanoms granted by former karnavans, delegation of management, near expiry of limitation, or proven gross misconduct).
- Appropriate remedy where there is gross improvidence: The court emphasised authorities (Kunhamad Hajee and Abdulla Koya) indicating that where a karnavan pursues a persistent course of improvident leases, removal from karnavasthanam is the appropriate remedy rather than setting aside an individual ordinary lease.
-
Assessment of the present case: The court then turned to the facts and evidence. It found the plaintiff had not made out the requisite exceptional circumstances to justify treating the grant as anything beyond an ordinary act of management. Specific factual points considered included:
- The plaintiff's evidence concerning an alleged prior grant of certain items for maintenance of his branch was not convincing: the alleged grant was said to be oral, limited to the plaintiff's sub-tavazhi rather than the whole branch, and not in writing.
- The competing evidence about a house (Kadinhumoola) on a waste plot did not establish that the plaintiff's residence or maintenance needs were being denied absent the house; other dwelling places were available for his branch per defence evidence.
-
Evaluation of rental evidence and commissions: The court found significant procedural and evidential defects in how the trial Court reached its conclusions on the adequacy of rent:
- The trial Court improperly issued and relied upon two separate commissions on the same subject and balanced the reports against one another rather than treating the second commission as supplanting the first (contrary to O. 26, R. 10(3) CPC and criticised in Amhi v. Kunhi Kavamma).
- Neither commissioner's report was based on independent inquiry; both reports largely compiled statements from third parties (tenants, neighbours, defendant 3) and lacked proper documentation, written records, or independent findings—rendering them of no evidentiary value.
- The Subordinate Judge made particular arithmetical and factual errors (for example, misreading defendant 3's evidence about prior rents and thereby arriving at an incorrect figure of 1,500 paras of paddy for comparison).
- Other calculations in the trial judgment relied on flawed preferences between conflicting oral evidence (e.g., accepting Shanbogue's equivalence of acre to pothipads against D.W.1's contradictory evidence) and on the unreliable second commissioner's findings.
- Sufficiency of overall evidence: Beyond the defective commission reports and the one principal witness for the plaintiff (the Shanbogue) who gave inconclusive evidence about improvements and yields, the court observed that the remaining evidence on yield, rental and the alleged advantage to the plaintiff was insufficient to show that the pattadharam was a gross betrayal of tarwad interests or that exceptional relief was warranted.
- Disposition of suggested further relief: The court rejected the suggestion to order a third commission. It concluded that the proceedings did not require such a commission and that the plaintiff had ample opportunity to adduce local, reliable evidence of yield and rent but failed to do so; therefore, no further chance would be granted.
Holding and Implications
Holding:
APPEAL ALLOWED. The decree of the lower Court is reversed and the suit is dismissed. The appellate court ordered costs to defendants 1, 2 and 3 in this Court and in the Court of first instance.
Implications:
- Direct effect: The plaintiff's decree was set aside; the pattadharam of 18 July 1922 remains operative and the plaintiff's claim for delivery/recovery was dismissed. The defendants (1, 2 and 3) were awarded costs.
- On remedies and precedent: The opinion reaffirms the settled principle reflected in prior authorities that ordinary acts of management by a karnavan (such as a lease of this kind) are not readily subject to cancellation at the suit of junior members, except in exceptional circumstances (for example, proven gross misconduct or habitual improvidence justifying removal). The court explicitly noted that no precedent was shown to justify granting the kind of relief obtained below in similar circumstances and that the proper remedy, where there is a pattern of improvident leasing, is removal of the karnavan rather than routine cancellation of an ordinary lease.
- No new precedent: The decision does not purport to create a new rule; it applies and reconciles existing authorities to hold that exceptional circumstances are required before junior members may successfully challenge ordinary karnavan management acts while the karnavan remains in office.
Disposition as stated in the opinion: "Appeal allowed." The decree of the lower Court was reversed and the suit dismissed with costs to defendants 1, 2 and 3 in both Courts.
1. The suit under appeal has been brought as a representative suit by a junior member of a marumakkathayam tarwad for a declaration that the pattadharam granted on 18th July 1922 by defendant 1 who is the present karnavan, is not valid and binding on the plaintiff, his tarwad or the suit properties and for delivery of the suit properties to the plaintiff on behalf of the tarwad. The tarwad consists of two branches, the descendants of two women Alliathe and Birambi, who were sisters. The defendants are all of the branch of Birambi, while the plaintiff belongs to that of Alliathe and claims to be the senior anandravan, though this claim is challenged. The plaintiff asserts that the suit pattadharam has been granted by defendant 1 to two members of his own branch with a view to defrauding the plaintiff of the benefit of the great improvements which he has effected to the suit lands, while it prejudices the tarwad, on whose behalf the suit is brought, in that the amount of rental fixed under it is far too low. The Court below has found that the suit pattadharam was not executed by defendant 1 in the bona fide exercise of his powers of management as karnavan of the tarwad, but for the purpose of enriching members of his own tavazhi at the sacrifice of the interests of the entire tarwad; and it has therefore granted a decree to the plaintiff as prayed for. Against this decision defendants 2 and 3 are appealing. It has been urged for the appellants and for defendant 1 as respondent 2 that the suit is not maintainable on two grounds. The former of these grounds is that leave has not been properly obtained by the plaintiff to sue in a representative capacity. This however is a point that we cannot allow to be taken. The plaintiff definitely states in para. 14 of his plaint that he has obtained the leave of the Court to sue on behalf of the tarwad and this recital has not been challenged in any written statement, nor was any issue taken as to it. We have to presume in these circumstances that there was no irregularity in the proceedings in the trial Court and that the plaintiff was properly permitted to bring the suit as a representative one.
2. The other ground is more important. It is that the grant of the pattadharam by defendant 1 was an ordinary act of management by the karnavan, in the exercise of his legitimate powers; and that consequently no suit can be brought by a junior member of the tarwad to have it set aside but that if the view of the learned Subordinate Judge in this particular instance as to the nature of the act of the karnayan that is in question, is correct, then the proper remedy was to bring a suit for the karnavan's removal. There is no dispute as to the correctness of the view expressed in the lower Court's judgment that, on the face of it, the suit pattadharam, which grants a kuzhikanom lease for a period of twelve years, is an ordinary act of management within the karnavan's competence. Stress is laid on Abdulla Koya v. Eacharan Nair . [1918] 47 I.C 945., in which a Bench of this Court has remarked, in the matter of a suit as to a melcharth granted, as it was contended, improperly, by a karnavan:
“No doubt if a karnavan habitually grants improvident leases and thereby renders himself unable to fulfil his obligations towards the other members of the tarwad, this would be a ground for removing him from the karnavasthanam, but we do not think that a particular lease can be declared to be invalid as against the lessee merely because it is not proved to be beneficial to the tarwad. To fetter a karnavan's discretion in this way would be to render his whole management of the tarwad liable to criticizm and reversal at any moment.”
3. Again, in Kishakkumbrath Moidin v. Koyambrath Murkothakandi . [1928] 108 I.C 738., it has been held by a Bench of this Court that “where a kanom is executed by a karnavan of a Malabar tarwad for the purpose of paying off a debt binding on the tarwad, the Court is not required to investigate with meticulous care whether the transaction was a prudent one or whether there was necessity for entering into such a transaction for the purpose of rising the necessary amount.”
4. On the other hand a number of decisions have been quoted to us to show that in the case at any rate of kanoms that have been improperly granted, the Court will interfere, and that at the instance of junior members of a tarwad. One of these is Unni v. Kunchi Amma . [1891] 14 Mad. 26. which dealt with a suit brought to recover property that had been improperly alienated by a karnavan under a kanom. The point however for decision in that case was one of limitation while the kanom had been executed by a previous karnavan who had been removed from office, and the suit was brought by two persons who claimed to have been appointed managers by a decree of Court. In Anantan v. Sanlcaran . [1891] 14 Mad. 101. it was held that junior members of a tarwad could maintain a suit against their karnavan, senior anandravan and others for a declaration that a kanom was invalid and for recovery of properties. In that case however the kanom was granted not by the karnavan but by the senior anandaravan to whom the karnavan had delegated the management under a karar, and emphasis was laid on the fact that the time for filing the suit had almost expired and that the karnavan, who was joined as a defendant had failed to sue. It is got to be observed that in A.I.R 1926 Mad. 150 it has been remarked that this decision in so far as it suggests the broad proposition that in all circumstances the junior members will be entitled to sue when the karnavan has failed to do so, seems to be opposed to all the prior and subsequent decisions, but that on the actual facts the case came within the accepted principle that the anandravan may be permitted to sue when the karnavan has disabled himself from bringing such a suit, that is when the circumstances are exceptional.
5. Vatavatta Nair v. Kanath Puthen Vitiil Kuppasan Menon . [1919] 51 I.C 740. deals with a suit brought by a senior anandravan for having set aside a kanom granted by the karnavan in office who was defendant 2. The suit was allowed on the principle that a kanom granted, as had been in that suit, by way of renewal of an earlier kanom the term of which had not expired, was not binding on the tarwad except on proof of necessity or benefit to the tarwad which proof was lacking. Cheria Kunhi Pocker v. Ghowkaran Malikaimal Valia Bappolty . [1919] 53 I.C 771., is a case in which a junior member of a tarwad successfully sued to recover properties for which a kanom had been given, but it was a case in which the kanom had been granted by a previous karnavan. The plaintiff in that case had obtained permission to sue on behalf of all the members. In Kenath Achus v. Kalliani Amma . A.I.R 1923 Mad. 700 the senior anandravan brought a suit to set aside a kanom that had been renewed prematurely by the karnavan in office who was a defendant, and lost the suit not because he had no right to maintain it but because it was held that in the circumstances the renewal was proper.
6. It would thus appear that a junior member of a tarwad may bring a suit to set aside even a kanom that has been executed by a karnavan who is still in office; but that he can only do so in exceptional circumstances is shown by the decisions in Ottaparakkal Thazhath Soopi v. Charichal Pallikkal Mariyomma . [1920] 48 Mad. 393. There it was held that, except in very special circumstances, where the karnavan is proved to be guilty of gross misconduct and collusion it is not competent to the junior members of the tarwad to sue for redemption of a kanom granted by their karnavan. Bikkutti v. Kalendan . [1891] 14 Mad. 267 deals with a case of a deed of gift and holds that junior members of a tarwad could bring a suit for the cancellation of such a deed, but this was in exceptional circumstances in that the karnavan, who was defendant 1, could not maintain the deed in that it had been granted by himself.
7. Kunhamad Hajee v. Kuttiath Hajee . [1881] 3 Mad. 169. indicates what is an appropriate remedy in the event of grossly improper lease being granted by the karnavan in office, what it finds being that the grant of a very improvident lease, following on a course of conduct pursued for some years, in which the interests of the tarwad were persistently disregarded, is sufficient ground for removing the karnavan from the management of the tarwad property. That this is an appropriate remedy is also indicated in Abdulla Koya v. Eacharan Nair to which reference has been made in para. 3 above. No case has been shown to us in which a suit has been brought successfully by a junior member of a tarwad against his karnavan, praying for such relief as has been granted to the plaintiff in respect of such an ordinary act of management” as the granting of a twelve year kuzhikanom lease. Our attention has been called to Chappan v. Ranu . [1914] 37 Mad. 420 in which it has been remarked that the property of a tarwad is vested in its members who, when the karnavan makes an alienation that is not binding on them, can sue to recover possession and may do so on their title without even asking for the alienation to be set aside, it being for the alienee to prove that the alienation was binding on them. That however was a case in which the alienation by the karnavan was by way of a mortgage. The case for the plaintiff, respondent 1, in this connexion receives most assistance from some remarks of Jackson, J. in Manavadan v. Sredevi . A.I.R 1927 Mad. 422. In his judgment in that case the learned Judge has stated that the rights of the junior members of a tarwad are confined to suing for maintenance, to suing for cancellation of any transaction entered into by the karnavan to the detriment of the family and to suing for his removal.
8. The junior members sued in that case for the removal of the karnavati on allegations of fraud and misappropriation of family funds and it was held that they could not, as a matter of right when suing for such relief, ask for, the karnavati to render general accounts. As a matter of fact the karnavati, a, woman, ceased in the course of the suit to occupy her position as such because by the rule of family succession she moved to a higher sphere. In such circumstances it was found that the plaintiffs had no cause of action. They were entitled to sue for a decree removing defendant 1 from management and to contend that, if she gave no account by way of rebutter of their proved allegations, such a decree should be granted and defendant 1 should be removed. As however the removal was already an accomplished fact such a contention would be idle. The judgment then goes on to remark that the plaintiffs might have brought their suit in a different way, that each proved defalcation might be set aside and defendant 1 held liable. These remarks however as to the kind of suits which junior members of a tarwad are entitled to bring, are by the way and have no bearing on the point which the case actually decided and, in any case they have to be considered along with what has been laid down in the other decisions to which reference has been made already, These make it clear that when the alienation which is attacked as fraudulent, improper or to the detriment of the tarwad does not amount to more than a lease, a suit to set it aside can only be brought in exceptional circumstances. It is unnecessary in this particular case to say more than this, apart from reiterating that no precedent has been shown to us for such a relief as has been granted in this suit, in a suit framed as this has been, as we are satisfied that in this case no circumstances have been shown to exist which would justify its being regarded as one in which the plaintiff is entitled to exceptional treatment.
9. The plaintiff asserts that the suit pattadharam is to the prejudice of the members of the tarwad generally and the main consideration from this point of view is whether the rent fixed under Ex. 21 is a reasonable one or is one, as the Court below has found it to be, that is quite inadequate. The plaintiff asserts that a good many of the suit items have been assigned for the maintenance of his branch by a former karnavan and that the assignment has been continued by subsequent karnavans, but the learned Subordinate Judge does not give any clear finding as to there having been such a grant for maintenance nor is the point one of great importance. Even too if some of these suit lands have been granted to plaintiff's branch for maintenance, their being leased out under the suit document will matter little as long as a proper rental has been obtained for them which can be used for the purpose of such maintenance. We may however, remark that the evidence as to there having been such a grant is not entirely convincing. Plaintiff himself as P.W 2 shows that the grant was not for the whole branch to which he belongs but only to his particular sub-tavazhi, and he admits that there was no such grant to the other two sub-tavazhis of his branch and that the grant which he sets up was made orally only and was not reduced to writing. Further there is the matter of a house. The house does not stand on one of the items which is said to have been allotted for maintenance but on what was a waste plot. On this plot there is a house called Kadinhumoola which the plaintiff says is a tarwad house occupied by himself and the four daughters of his deceased sister. He declares that there was formerly a small house and that he has had this house built, while on the defence side there is evidence that this house was not built by him and that he does not himself live in it. This however is again a matter of no very great importance as it is clear even from the evidence of plaintiff himself that there are other places of residence available for his branch and he has not stated that no provision can be made, or is being made by the karnavan for his residence in the event of his leaving this house. According to D.W 3 there are three other houses available for his branch.
10. We come then to the question of rental in which connexion the learned Subordinate Judge has taken largely into consideration the reports of two commissioners, both of whom harve reported on the probable yield of the suit lands.
11. We have in the first place to remark that the lower Court should not have issued two separate commissions' to deal with one and the same subject, and to treat the reports of both the commissioners as evidence in the case. The exact circumstances in which he came to issue the second commission do not appear from the record that has been placed before us, but the second commission should not have been issued, unless it was thought that the report of the first commissioner was not satisfactory in which case the earlier commission should have been wiped out altogther and attention should have been paid only to what was reported by the second commissioner. Instead of this the learned Subordinate Judge has balanced the report of one commissioner against that of the other and has expressed a preference for the views of the first commissioner. In taking this course he has acted with great impropriety and contrary to what is contemplated by O. 26, R. 10(3) of the CPC. Though the practice which he has adopted may be one that is prevalent in Malabar it is one that should no longer be continued as has been pointed out in clear terms by this Court in Amhi v. Kunhi Kavamma . A.I.R 1929 Mad. 661.
12. Apart too from this consideration, the report of neither commissioner deserves any attention as neither of them has come to any independent conclusion of his own, but each of them has only made a collection of statements of what he had learned on enquiry from others. The first commissioner made his enquiries as to the rent from some tenants who happened to be present and as to the yield from some neighbours. The second commissioner got most of his information from defendant 3, though he also questioned the tenants, but without reducing their answers to writing. In these circumstances their reports are not of the slightest value.
13. The remaining evidence is by no means sufficient to make out a case for the plaintiff. There is only one witness on his side apart from himself. This man is the Shanbogue who gives no assistance as to what the yield or proper rent should be, but makes some general observations as to the nature of the lands and as to the effect of the opening of a new bar some 15 years or so ago. The lands lie near the sea as well as to a river which surrounds them on three sides, and the bar has been opened as a new outlet for the river into the sea. The Shanbogue says that within the last 20 years three crops have been raised on certain of the fields, without specifying which these fields are, and that before the opening of the bar only one crop was being raised on these fields as they used to be flooded with water during the rainy season, but at the same time he is rather lukewarm as to the benefit that has been derived from the bar, as he says that after the opening of the new bar there is not so much damage to the first crops as before, and that there is no special damage to the second and third crops by reason of its opening, thereby implying that there still may be some damage, caused to all these crops. On the other hand, D.W 5 who is a Taluk Board member and against whose credibility nothing has been advanced, says that the new bar has caused the suit property to deteriorate. It cannot be assumed as has been done by the learned Subordinate Judge that the opening of the bar must have been beneficial because it was a work undertaken by Government. On this oral evidence, then, it is impossible to say that the suit lands have become specially valuable during the last 15 years or so, or that they have become considerably more valuable than they were 85 years ago, even if we had, as we have not, information as to their yield or rental at that earlier period.
14. In one of his calculations the learned Subordinate Judge has been guilty of an inaccuracy. He has said that according to defendant 3 (D.W 7) the tenants paid a rent of not less than 1,000 paras of paddy before the date of the suit document Ex. 11. But defendant 3 has said nothing of the kind. What he said was that prior to Ex. 11 the total varam was below 1,000 paras of paddy and the total patom was below Rs. 700 without stating the actual figures in either case. The learned Subordinate Judge is therefore wrong in adding to 1,000 paras the 500 paras by which the paddy that must have been admittedly raised since Ex. 11 and saying that the rent at the time of the second commissioner's inspection was at least 1,500 paras.
15. The rent actually reserved under Ex. 11 is 1500 paras of paddy and Rs. 800 cash. In considering whether the rental in grain is proper the lower Court has gone into another calculation in para. 41 of its judgment, but here again we cannot follow it. As part of its basis of calculation it accepts what the Shanbogue says as to the one acre being equivalent to 5 pothipads without saying anything as to why it prefers this evidence to that of D.W 1, who says that an acre is divided into two pothipods. As a further basis of its calculation it takes the yield of one item as found by the second commissioner, whose report we have found to be worthy of no consideration. This calculation then is not of the slightest use.
16. Nor can we accede to the suggestion of the learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent 1 that, as the defendants stated no objection to what the first commissioner found as to the yield from certain items, the excess as between what he found to be their yield and what has been found to be their yield by the second commissioner, should be added to the total yield as found by the second commissioner and the result taken as the proper yield from the suit lands. We cannot consider the figures of either commissioner in any way.
17. Some lease deeds have been filed fou the defence to show that the rent fixed under Ex. 11 is not excessive. Some of these the lower Court has brushed aside and others it has not considered at all. We do not however propose to discuss these documents as they would only require consideration if the plaintiff had made out an exceptional case of the gross betrayal of the interests of the tarwad as a whole. This however he has quite failed to do. A suggestion has been made that a third commission should be ordered to be issued but it is one that does not appeal to us. This is really not a case in which a commission such as was ordered was necessary. What was required was evidence as to the yield of the lands from persons with local knowledge of the conditions. The plaintiff has made ample opportunity of letting in such evidence and has not availed himself of it. There is no reason for giving him any further chance of adducing any kind of evidence. The result then is that the appeal succeeds. The decree of the lower Court is reversed and the suit is dismissed with costs to defendants 1, 2 and 3 in this Court and in the Court of first instance.
P.R.S/P.N
18. Appeal allowed.
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