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A. Lakshmana Reddiar v. The Ellinganaickenpa...
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Second Appeal concerning Temple Land)
Factual and Procedural Background
This second appeal arises from a suit in ejectment instituted by the trustee of Kumara Koil Sri Subramania Swami temple (plaintiff) concerning a parcel of land in Ellinganaickenpatty village, Sattur taluk. The plaintiff's case asserted that the suit land formed part of an inam and that the temple owned both the melwaram and kudiwaram (both "warams"), and that the second defendant occupied the land as a tenant at will. The first defendant had obtained a decree against the second defendant and, in execution proceedings, purchased and came into possession of the property. During those execution proceedings, a claim was made on behalf of the temple that the second defendant had no saleable interest and that the property belonged to the temple; that claim was dismissed. The temple therefore filed the ejectment suit seeking a declaration of its rights and delivery of possession.
The defendants' pleaded position was that the temple owned only the melwaram and that the kudiwaram had always been in the tenant (the second defendant), so the second defendant had occupancy rights and could not be ejected; accordingly the suit, it was contended, would not lie.
At trial, the District Munsiff dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The Subordinate Judge reversed that decision, but this Court found that the Subordinate Judge had misdirected himself on questions of law (particularly by wrongly placing the onus of proof on the defendants) and called for revised findings on specific questions. After the Subordinate Judge returned revised findings, this second appeal proceeded to final hearing and judgment.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the plaintiff (the temple) is the owner of both the melwaram and kudiwaram (both "warams") in respect of the suit land.
- Whether the second defendant has occupancy rights (kudiwaram rights) in the suit property.
- Whether, assuming the temple is owner of both warams, the plaintiff is entitled to eject the second defendant from the land (i.e., whether the tenancy was terminable and the plaintiff's right to eject is established).
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiff's (Temple's) Arguments
- The suit land forms part of an inam and the temple (plaintiff) owns both the warams (melwaram and kudiwaram).
- The second defendant was only a tenant at will and therefore the temple is entitled to a declaration of its rights and delivery of possession.
- The temple asserted that the second defendant had no saleable interest in the land when a claim was made during execution proceedings (that claim was dismissed during execution).
Defendants' Arguments
- The defence asserted that the temple owned only the melwaram; the kudiwaram right had always been with the tenant (second defendant).
- On that basis, the second defendant claimed occupancy (kudiwaram) rights and contended that he could not be ejected, so the plaintiff's suit for ejectment would not lie.
- The first defendant's position included that he had purchased the property in execution of a decree against the second defendant and was in possession of the property.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Aiyanars v. Periakaruppa Thevan (1929) 30 L.W. 583 | Contains observations (Wallace, J.) suggesting that a kudiwaram holder is a co-owner and not a tenant; was relied on by the Subordinate Judge. | The Court observed that although this decision in a way supports the Subordinate Judge, Wallace J.'s observation is not strictly accurate in light of other Privy Council decisions and related authority; the Subordinate Judge had misapplied the decision. |
| Venkata Narasimha Naidu v. Kotayya (1897) 7 M.L.J. 251 : I.L.R. 20 Mad. 299 | Subramania Aiyar, J., states there is no substantial analogy between an English tenant and an Indian ryot; Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act should not be applied; cites Board of Revenue note distinguishing ryot payments from strict 'rent'. | The Court relied on this passage to support the proposition that treating ryot payments as 'rent' (and importing English landlord-tenant presumptions) would be a harmful fiction and to reject an overbroad application of English tenancy concepts. |
| Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhi v. Veerama Reddi (1922) 43 M.L.J. 640 : L.R. 49 I.A. 286 : I.L.R. 45 Mad. 586 (P.C.) | Approved the Board of Revenue view about the status of cultivating ryots and their payments; addresses the place of cultivating ryots in Southern India's agricultural economy. | The Court treated this Privy Council decision as correctly stating the limits of applying English tenancy concepts and used it to dispute Wallace J.'s categorical observation in Aiyanars that kudiwaram holders are co-owners as a matter not approved by the Privy Council. |
| Nainapillai Marakayar v. Ramanathan Chettiar (1923) 46 M.L.J. 546 : L.R. 51 I.A. 83 : I.L.R. 47 Mad. 337 (P.C.) | Holds (as a later Privy Council decision) that in certain cases the burden of proving occupancy right is on the tenant, particularly where tenants were let into possession under terminable instruments (Muchilikas) which entitled the landlord to eject. | The Court stated this decision is binding where it applies, and used it to explain the circumstances (e.g., tenancy granted by landlord) in which the burden shifts to the tenant; but also clarified that it does not undermine the conceptual distinction between melwaram and kudiwaram where facts differ. |
| Zamindar of Parlakimedi v. Ramayya (1926) 51 M.L.J. 510 | Examined the scope of Nainapillai and understood that the principle throwing the burden of proof on the tenant applies only where the inamdar is proved or admitted to be the owner of the land itself. | The Court cited and preferred the views expressed by Phillips and Madhavan Nair, JJ., in this case, adopting the narrower application of Nainapillai (i.e., burden shifts only when landlord owns the land itself). |
| Periakaruppa Thevan v. Aiyanars and Kaniyalaswamigal Kovil Devasthanam (1925) 49 M.L.J. 602 | Phillips, J., concluded that Nainapillai's rule about burden of proof applies only where the inamdar is proved or admitted to be the owner of the land. | The Court relied on Phillips J.'s reasoning (as stated in this earlier decision) to support the proposition that the burden of proving occupancy rights falls on the tenant only when the landlord's ownership of the land (both warams) is established. |
| Basiruddin Sarkar v. Sahebulla Pramanik (1927) 32 C.W.N. 160 | States the orthodox principle in ejectment actions that the plaintiff must prove title to immediate possession and, when tenancy is admitted, the plaintiff must show how his right to possession arises (i.e., how the tenancy ended). | The Court cited this authority to underline that a plaintiff seeking ejectment must prove not only title but also that the tenancy has been validly terminated or was terminable — reinforcing the requirement on the inamdar to establish a right to eject. |
| Seturatnam Aiyar v. Venkatachala Goundan (1919) 38 M.L.J. 476 : L.R. 47 I.A. 76 : I.L.R. 43 Mad. 567 (P.C.) | One of the Privy Council decisions referred to in the discussion of tenant/occupancy-right principles. | The Court referenced this decision in the broader survey of Privy Council authority to show consistency with the elementary rules about proof of title to possession and tenancy termination. |
| Subbarayudu v. Narasimha Rao (1924) 47 M.L.J. 558 | Holds that when a plaintiff seeks to eject a defendant on the ground of terminated tenancy, the plaintiff must prove tenancy termination and that the tenancy was a terminable one; this onus is unaffected by any defence of permanent occupancy the defendant may fail to prove. | The Court cited this pronouncement as laying down the law that a plaintiff must establish the right to eject by proving the tenancy was terminable and validly terminated. |
| Subramania Aiyar v. Onnappa Goundan (1920) 39 M.L.J. 629 (at 638) | Spencer, J., stated that the principle of Venkatacharlu v. Kandappa is unaffected by Privy Council decisions (i.e., reinforces certain native-tenure principles). | The Court relied on this statement to support the view that older local principles about tenancy and ownership remain operative despite some Privy Council decisions. |
| Venkatacharlu v. Kandappa (1891) I.L.R. 15 Mad. 95 | Early authority on the relationship between landlord and tenant in Indian tenure contexts; invoked as a foundational principle. | The Court cited this case (through subsequent commentary) as a principle that remains applicable and is not displaced by later Privy Council rulings in the specific contexts discussed. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in several steps, closely tied to how the authorities were interpreted:
- The Court first identified error in the Subordinate Judge's approach: the Subordinate Judge effectively assumed that where a person is admitted to be a kudiwaram holder (occupancy tenant) the landlord-tenant relationship is established and the burden of proving fuller occupancy rights is on the defendants. The Court found this approach to be a misdirection and a wrongful shifting of the onus of proof onto defendants 1 and 2 (paras 2–5).
- The Court examined relevant precedents to determine the correct allocation of burden and the conceptual distinction between melwaram and kudiwaram. It accepted authorities that caution against importing English landlord-and-tenant presumptions (e.g., Section 106 Transfer of Property Act) into Indian tenure contexts and relied on Privy Council and High Court authorities that emphasize native tenure distinctions (paras 4–9).
- The Court reconciled the line of Privy Council decisions including Nainapillai Marakayar. It recognized that Nainapillai is a binding later decision that places the onus on the tenant in cases where it is established that the landlord is the owner of the land and the tenant was let into possession under terminable instruments (Muchilikas) giving the landlord the right to eject (paras 5–7, 10–13). However, the Court emphasized that this principle is contextual: it applies where the landlord's ownership of the land (i.e., both warams) is proved or admitted.
- The Court accepted the analysis of Phillips and Madhavan Nair, JJ., in Zamindar of Parlakimedi v. Ramayya and of Phillips, J., in Periakaruppa Thevan v. Aiyanars that the burden-shifting rule in Nainapillai is applicable only when the inamdar is proved or admitted to be the owner of the land itself (paras 14–17). Thus the allocation of onus depends on whether ownership of both warams by the plaintiff is established.
- The Court reiterated the elementary principle in ejectment cases (citing Basiruddin Sarkar and others): a plaintiff must prove title to immediate possession and, where tenancy is admitted, must also show how the tenancy ended or that it was a terminable tenancy (paras 18–23). The onus on the plaintiff to prove his right to eject is not negated by a defendant's unproven claim to permanent occupancy.
- Concluding that the Subordinate Judge had approached the questions wrongly—by misplacing the burden and misapplying authority—the Court directed that revised findings be called for on three specific factual/legal questions: (1) whether the plaintiff is owner of both warams; (2) whether the second defendant has occupancy rights; and (3) whether the plaintiff is entitled to eject the second defendant (paras 14–15, 25–28). The Court set procedural time-limits for return of findings (six weeks) and for objections (ten days) (para 15).
- After the Subordinate Judge submitted findings in pursuance of those directions, on final hearing the Court accepted the returned findings, set aside the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge and restored the decree of the District Munsiff, awarding costs throughout (paras 16–18).
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The Court accepted the revised findings returned by the Subordinate Judge, set aside the decree of the Subordinate Judge and restored the decree of the District Munsiff, with costs awarded throughout (para 18).
Direct consequences for the parties:
- The Subordinate Judge's judgment in favour of the plaintiff (as earlier reversed from the District Munsiff) was set aside.
- The District Munsiff's original decree (which had dismissed the plaintiff's suit) was restored.
- Costs were awarded in favour of the successful party throughout.
- Procedurally, the Subordinate Judge had earlier been directed to return revised findings on three discrete questions (ownership of both warams; existence of occupancy rights; entitlement to eject), with time-limits for return and objections (six weeks and ten days respectively) (paras 14–15, 25–29). Those findings were returned and accepted by this Court (paras 16–18).
Broader legal implications: The Court expressed a preference for and adopted an interpretive approach to prior authorities (particularly Zamindar of Parlakimedi, Periakaruppa Thevan, and other High Court and Privy Council decisions) that construes the burden of proof as context-dependent — i.e., the burden shifts to the tenant only where the landlord (inamdar) is proved or admitted to be owner of the land. The opinion did not announce a novel legal doctrine beyond its application of existing authorities to the facts of this case.
1. This second appeal arises out of a suit in ejectment instituted by the trustee of Kumara Koil Sri Subramania Swami temple in Ellinganaickenpatty village, Sattur taluk. The case for the plaiatiff is that the suit land forms part of an inam wherein the temple owns both the warams, that the second defendant was in occupation thereof as a tenant at will, that in execution of a decree obtained by the first defendant against the second defendant the first defendant purchased the said property and was in possession of the same. During the pendency of the execution proceedings a claim was preferred on behalf of the temple alleging that the second defendant had no saleable interest therein and the property belonged to the temple but the claim was dismissed. Hence the present suit was filed for a declaration of the temple's right to the land and for delivery of possession thereof. The defence is that the temple owned only the melwaram right and the kudiwaram right had always been in the tenant of the inam lands and therefore was in the second defendant and that in any event the plaintiff was not entitled to eject the second defendant and therefore the suit would not lie.
2. The main questions in dispute between the parties therefore are whether the plaint temple is the owner of both the warams and even assuming it is, is the second defendant liable to be ejected therefrom. The learned District Munsiff dismissed the plaintiff's suit holding against the temple on both the questions but the learned Subordinate Judge reversed his decision. In my opinion, the learned Subordinate Judge misdirected himself on questions of law bearing on the said issues in arriving at his conclusion and threw wrongly the onus on defendants 1 and 2. The learned Subordinate Judge in paragraph 6 of his judgment states thus:
When once it is conceded that a tenant is a kudiwaramdar paying rent or melwaram to the melwaramdar, the relationship of landlord and tenant is established between them and the burden of proving full occupancy rights will be upon the defendant.
3. Again in paragraph 7 of the judgment he remarks:
When once it is conceded that they are occupancy tenants, according to their view, the relationship of landlord and tenant is established and the burden of proof is heavily upon the second defendant, and, after him, upon the first defendant, to prove such rights, second defendant and his father, therefore, would have come into possession of the land only under a right derived from these trustees or their predecessors-in-title. They are only tenants at will liable to be ejected at any moment by the trustees.
4. The learned Subordinate Judge purported to follow the decision in Aiyanars v. Periakaruppa Thevan (1929) 30 L.W. 583 which in a way supports him. It seems to me the view of law enunciated above is fundamentally opposed to the conception underlying the system of tenure which recognises kudiwaram and melwaram as distinct interests in land and is based on a misapprehension of some of the decisions of the Privy Council referred to by both the learned Subordinate Judge and the, learned Judges in Aiyanars v. Periakaruppa Thevan (1929) 30 L.W. 583. In Venkata Narasimha Naidu v. Kotayya (1897) 7 M.L.J. 251 : I.L.R. 20 Mad. 299, Subramania Aiyar, J., points out that there is no substantial analogy between an English tenant and an Indian ryot and that the English rule embodied in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act should not be applied, and after citing the following passage from the. proceedings of the Board of Revenue dated 5th January, 1818, regarding the nature of the rights of the ryots in the various parts of the Presidency, namely,
" whether rendered in service, in money or in kind and whether paid to rajas, jagirdars, zamindars, poligars, mittadars, shrotriemdars, inamdars or to Government officers, such as tahsildars, amildars, amins or thanadars, the payments which have always been made are universely deemed the dues of Government", observed thus:
To treat such a payment by cultivators to zamindars as 'rent' in the strict sense of the term and to imply therefrom the relation of landlord and tenant so as to let in the presumption of law that a tenancy in general is one from year to year, would be to introduce a mischievous fiction destructive of the rights of great numbers of the cultivating classes in this province who, have held possession of their lands from generation to generation.
5. Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhi v. Veerama Reddi (1922) 43 M.L.J. 640 : L.R. 49 I.A. 286 : I.L.R. 45 Mad. 586 (P.C.) approved this view and cited the above passage from the Board of Revenue proceedings at page 602 as laying down correctly the place of the cultivating ryots in the agricultural economy of Southern India. Therefore the observations of Wallace, J., in Aiyanars v. Periakaruppa Thevan (1929) 30 L.W. 583
"that a kudiwaram holder is a co-owner with his landlord and is not a tenant is not one that has been advanced or approved by any decision of the Privy Council"is not strictly accurate in view of the observations of the Judicial Committee in Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhi v. Veerama Reddi ( 1922) 43 M.L.J. 640 : L.R. 49 I.A. 286 : I.L.R. 45 Mad. 586 (P.C.). When an inamdar comes to Court alleging that he is the owner of both the warams, no presumption can be made that the grant was of both the warams and it is incumbent upon him to prove the affirmative of the issue. Even assuming that he establishes that he is the owner of both the warams in order to sustain an action in ejectment, he must prove that, the defendant was let in under a terminable tenancy which entitled him to eject him from the land. There is nothing in the decisions of the Privy Council laying down a different view. In Aiyanars v. Periakaruppa Thevan ( 1929) 30 L.W. 583 at 589, Wallace, J., referring to Nainapillai Marakayar v. Ramanathan Chettiar ( 1923) 46 M.L.J. 546 : L.R. 51 I.A. 83 : I.L.R. 47 Mad. 337 (P.C.) and Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhi v. Veerama Reddi ( 1922) 43 M.L.J. 640 : L.R. 49 I.A. 286 : I.L.R. 45 Mad. 586 (P.C.) observed thus:
It must be admitted that there is a difficulty in reconciling the two decisions which appear, if we may say so with respect, to speak also with diverse voice on the question whether occupancy right can be obtained by adverse possession and prescription. But Nainapillai Marakayar v. Ramanathan Chettiar (1923) 46 M.L.J. 546 : L.R. 51 I.A. 83 : I.L.R. 47 Mad. 337 (P.C.) is the latest decision and is binding on us and we cannot refuse to follow where it leads.
6. With great respect to the learned Judge Nainapillai Marakayar v. Ramanathan Chettiar (1923) 46 M.L.J. 546 : L.R. 51 I.A. 83 : I.L.R. 47 Mad. 337 (P.C.) does not enunciate any rule which is opposed to the conception which underlies the relationship between a melwaramdar and a kudiwaramdar. In that case it will be seen that the tenants were let into possession under Muchilikas which entitled the landlord to eject the tenants (p. 354). That the case proceeded upon this view is clear from the following passage in the judgment of Sir John Edge:
In 1870, Sir C.H. Scotland, C.J., held that when a tenancy in the Presidency of Madras commenced under a terminable contract there was nothing to prevent the landlord from ejecting the tenant at the end of the term from the lands which had been let to him (p. 354).
7. It was in relation to this conception of landlord and tenant that the learned Judge made the following observation a little lower down:
No tenant of lands in India can obtain any right to a permanent tenancy by prescription in them against his landlord from whom he holds the lands.
8. The observations to a similar effect on p. 344 must be understood likewise and in the earlier part of the judgment, it was pointed out that it was not disputed that the defendants-were tenants of the temple, the landlord in that case. In Zamindar of Parlakimedi v. Ramayya (1926) 51 M.L.J. 510, Phillips and Madhavan Nair, JJ., examined the scope of the Privy Council decision in Nainapillai Marakayar v. Ramanathan Chettiar (1923) 46 M.L.J. 546 : L.R. 51 I.A. 83 : I.L.R. 47 Mad. 337 (P.C.) and understood the said decision as not laying down any rule which is inconsistent with that laid down in Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhi v. Veerama Reddi (1922) 43 M.L.J. 640 : L.R. 49 I.A. 286 : I.L.R. 45 Mad. 586 (P.C.). At page 514 Phillips, J., observed thus:
I had to consider this point, sitting as a single Judge, in Periakaruppa Thevan v. Aiyanars and Kaniyalaswamigal Kovil Devasthanam (1925) 49 M.L.J. 602 and there I came to the conclusion that the decision in Nainapillai Marakayar v. Ramanathan Chettiar (1923) 46 M.L.J. 546 : L.R. 51 I.A. 83 : I.L.R. 47 Mad. 337 (P.C.) by which the burden of proving occupancy right is thrown on the tenant is only applicable in cases where the inamdar is proved or admitted to be the owner of the land itself. A closer scrutiny of the judgment in Nainapillai Marakayar v. Ramanathan Chettiar (1923) 46 M.L.J. 546 : L.R. 51 I.A. 83 : I.L.R. 47 Mad. 337 (P.C.) confirms me in this view.... The words 'tenant of lands' must mean 'tenant of lands belonging to his landlord', that is to say, that the landlord has a right not merely to the melwaram but to the land itself.
9. Madhavan Nair, J., at pages 523 at 524 observes thus:
The dictum of the Privy Council as regards the burden of proof is based upon two decisions referred two by their Lordships.... The facts of these cases and observations show that in both of them, as pointed out by my learned brother, it was either admitted or found as a fact that the tenants had been let into possession by the landlord who was the absolute owner and that consequently when the tenant claimed to possess occupancy right it was incumbent on him to prove it. When similar circumstances arose in Nainapillai Marakayar v. Ramanathan Chettiar (1923) 46 M.L.J. 546 : L.R. 51 I.A. 83 : I.L.R. 47 Mad. 337 (P.C.), their Lordships affirmed the same principle.... When the landlord owns both the melwaram and the kudiwaram interests in the land and the tenant sets up occupancy rights in such land, the burden of proving that he has such rights is on him. If the dictum referred to in Nainapillai Marakayar v. Ramanathan Chettiar (1923) 46 M.L.J. 546 : L.R. 51 I.A. 83 : I.L.R. 47 Mad. 337 (P.C.) is thus understood it is not inconsistent with the decision in Sivaprakasa Pandara Sannadhi v. Veerama Reddi (1922) 43 M.L.J. 640 : L.R. 49 I.A. 286 : I.L.R. 45 Mad. 586 (P.C.).
10. The learned Judges in Aiyanars v. Periakaruppa Thevan (1929) 30 L.W. 583 do not notice this decision at all. In Basiruddin Sarkar v. Sahebulla Pramanik (1927) 32 C.W.N. 160, Mukerji, J. and Mallik, J., observed thus:
In an action in ejectment one of the things that the plaintiff must prove is his title to immediate possession. This is a proposition as old as the hills. In a case where the defendants' tenancy is admitted - an admission that involves the admission of the defendants' right to be in possession - the plaintiff must necessarily establish as to how he is entitled to possession; in other words, how the tenancy has come to an end.
11. After referring to the Privy Council decisions in Seturatnam Aiyar v. Venkatachala Goundan (1919) 38 M.L.J. 476 : L.R. 47 I.A. 76 : I.L.R. 43 Mad. 567 (P.C.) and to Nainapillai Marakayar v. Ramanathan Chettiar (1923) 46 M.L.J. 546 : L.R. 51 I.A. 83 : I.L.R. 47 Mad. 337 (P.C.) they remarked thus:
In my opinion, the decisions of the Judicial Committee do not indicate that their Lordships ever intended to depart from these elementary rules. In both the cases the plaintiff's title to the lands was conceded, and notices by which the defendants' tenancies were terminated were not disputed. In neither case had any grant been alleged, asserted, or admitted on behalf of the plaintiff, but inasmuch as the defendants had been in occupation on payment of rent, a tenancy from year to year terminable on notice was all that was conceded.
12. In Subbarayudu v. Narasimha Rao (1924) 47 M.L.J. 558, their Lordships Spencer and Kumaraswami Sastri, JJ., after referring to the Privy Council decision in Nainapillai Marakayar v. Ramanathan Chettiar (1923) 46 M.L.J. 546 : L.R. 51 I.A. 83 : I.L.R. 47 Mad. 337 (P.C.) laid down the law thus:
When a plaintiff seeks to eject a defendant from possession on the ground that the latter is his tenant whose tenancy has been terminated, he must prove not only that the defendant is his tenant as alleged, if that is denied, but also his right to eject. In order to prove a right to eject, he must necessarily show that the tenancy is a terminable one and has been validly terminated. This onus is unaffected by any defence of permanent rights of occupancy that the defendant may set up but fails to prove.
13. The same view was enunciated by Spencer, J., in Subramania Aiyar v. Onnappa Goundan (1920) 39 M.L.J. 629 at 638, when he stated that the principle of the decision in Venkatacharlu v. Kandappa (1891) I.L.R. 15 Mad. 95 is unaffected by any decision of the Privy Council. The learned Judges in Aiyanars v. Periakaruppa Thevan (1929) 30 L.W. 583 do not advert to either of the above cases. I respectfully agree with the views expressed in these decisions, in regard to the inamdar's right to eject and that of Phillips and Madhavan Nair, JJ., in regard to the scope of the Privy Council decision in Zamindar of Parlakimedi v. Ramayya (1926) 51 M.L.J. 510 and prefer to follow them.
14. The judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge is therefore considerably vitiated by his wrong approach of the questions which he had to decide. I have to set aside his findings and call for revised findings in the light of the remarks made in my judgment. The learned Subordinate Judge is therefore directed to submit his revised findings on the evidence on record on the following questions:
(1) Whether the plaintiff is the owner of both the warams.
(2) Whether the second defendant has occupancy rights in the suit property.
(3) Whether the plaintiff h entitled to eject the second defendant from the land.
15. Time for the return of the findings is six weeks from the date of receipt of this order and objections ten days.
16. [In pursuance of the directions contained in the above order the Subordinate Judge of Ramnad submitted Findings.]
17. This second appeal coming on for final hearing after the return of the findings of the lower appellate Court upon the questions referred by this Court for trial, the Court delivered the following JUDGMRNT
18. I accept the finding, set aside the decree of the learned Subordinate Judge and restore that of the District Munsiff with costs throughout.
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