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Kottarathil Puthiyapurayil Pokker v. Balathil Purkum Chandrankandi Kunhamad

Madras High Court
Sep 27, 1918
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns the validity of an assignment / sale-deed referred to as Exhibit V. The plaintiff is an attaching decree-holder who had attached property belonging to his judgment-debtor. The 1st defendant (the transferee under Exhibit V) preferred a claim to the attached property which was allowed under Order 21, Rule 60, Civil Procedure Code. As required by that rule, the plaintiff filed the present suit under Order 21, Rule 63, C.P.C., to establish his right to have the property sold in execution of his decree. The Lower Courts found that Exhibit V had been executed to defeat the vendor's creditors and that the transferee was not a purchaser in good faith; the Subordinate Judge additionally found the sale to be a sham (a finding which one judge considered unnecessary). The Lower Appellate Court took the view that unless Exhibit V were a mere sham the present suit was not maintainable — a conclusion the High Court judges disputed and considered erroneous. The Second Appeal challenged the decrees below and raised, among other points, whether a creditor must sue in a representative capacity under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act to avoid such a transfer.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the present suit brought by an attaching decree-holder under Order 21, Rule 63, C.P.C. is a suit "properly instituted" for the purpose of setting aside the assignment/sale-deed Exhibit V that is alleged to be fraudulent or voidable under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  2. Whether a creditor (and in particular an attaching decree-holder) seeking to avoid a transfer under Section 53 must sue in a representative capacity on behalf of all creditors, or whether an individual creditor may sue in his own name.
  3. Whether an objection to the form of the suit (that it is not representative) can be raised for the first time on appeal so as to defeat the plaintiff's suit and findings of the trial court.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Transferee's) Arguments (as stated in the opinion)

  • Mr. Shenai, for the appellant, argued that a creditor is not entitled to avoid a transfer under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act unless he brings a representative suit on behalf of all creditors and obtains a decree setting aside the deed.
  • He relied on the English rule derived from the statute of Elizabeth (13 Elizabeth Cap. 5) and on English and Indian authorities to contend that suits not brought in a representative capacity are liable to be disregarded or dismissed and that, accordingly, the findings of fraud against Exhibit V should be ignored if the suit is not representative.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The plaintiff, an attaching decree-holder who had his claim defeated in a claim petition under Order 21, Rule 60, C.P.C., relied on his statutory right to sue under Order 21, Rule 63 to establish his right to have the property sold in execution of his decree.
  • The plaintiff contended (as accepted by the Court) that his suit, though not framed in explicit representative terms, directly raised the validity of Exhibit V and should be treated as a suit properly instituted to set aside that transaction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Palaniandi Ghetty v. Appavu Chettiar (1916) 30 M.L.J. 265 / 30 M.L.J. 565 Discussed whether a creditor suing to set aside an alienation under Section 53 must sue on behalf of all creditors; noted an exception for judgment-creditors who had executed attachment. The Court held that this ruling does not support the view that a suit is maintainable only if the sale is a sham; the Full Bench left undecided the exact nature of proceedings; the Court in the present opinion aligns with the view that Palaniandi does not mandate dismissal of non-representative suits brought by attaching decree-holders.
Subramania Iyer v. Muthia Chettiar (1917) I.L.R. 41 M. 612 : 33 / 38 M.L.J. 705 (Full Bench) Considered similar questions about setting aside transfers alleged to be fraudulent under Section 53; contained an observation that transfers should be set aside "in proceedings properly instituted for the purpose." The Court treated this Full Bench decision as not deciding the precise question whether a representative suit is necessary; the observation quoted did not identify "properly constituted" as requiring a representative suit and therefore the decision was not an authority against the respondent.
Hakim Lal v. Mooshahar Sahu (1907) I.L.R. 34 Cal. 999 Previously cited in relation to applicability of the judgment-creditor exception and character of suit to be brought under Section 53. The Court noted that in Hakim Lal the special right of an attaching decree-holder under Rule 63 was not considered; therefore it is not an authority against the respondent in the present case.
15 Halsbury (Vol. XV) p. 89 (Halsbury's Laws of England) Sets out English rule that a creditor should sue on behalf of all creditors under the Elizabethan statute, except where he is a judgment-creditor who has recovered judgment and taken execution, in which case he can obtain relief for himself alone. The Court relied on the English rule and its exception for judgment-creditors to support allowing an attaching decree-holder to sue in his own name; the Court adopted the English rule broadly but limited its practical effect in India.
Bott v. Smith (1857) 52 E.R. 957; Be Mouat (1899) 1 Ch. 831; Cornish v. Clark (1872) L.R. 14 Eq. 184; Ideal Bedding Co. v. Holland (1907) 2 Ch. 157; Reese, River Silver Mining Co. v. Atwell (1869) L.R. 7 Eq. 347 English cases cited in support of the rule that creditors should sue on behalf of all creditors; instances where suits were brought on behalf of all or amended to that effect. The Court examined these authorities and concluded they do not show that suits must be dismissed for want of a representative character; they often involved amendment or suits already framed on behalf of all creditors.
Re, Maddever — Three Towns Banking Co. v. Maddever (1881) 27 Ch. D. 523 An English case where the suit was by a single creditor but the decree was fashioned to declare the conveyance void against the plaintiff and "all other, if any, creditors". The Court relied on this to show that even where the rule applied, courts allowed amendments or shaped decrees to cover other creditors, rather than dismissing suits for lack of representative form.
Ishvar / Iswar Timappa v. Devar Venkappa (1902) I.L.R. 27 B. 146 Indian decision directing that a trial Court may order amendment of a single-creditor suit to make it representative. The Court cited this case as authority for the proposition that the trial court may, of its own motion or on application, direct that a single-creditor suit be amended to make it representative.
Burjorji Dorabji Patel v. Dhunbai (1891) I.L.R. 16 Bom. 1 Indian case discussed in relation to whether a suit must be representative; the judge had expressed that such a suit might be liable to dismissal (obiter). The Court observed that this was not an authority against the present view: the opinion that a suit should be dismissed was obiter and the case facts were not a typical Section 53 creditor case in any event.
Chutterpur / Chatterput Singh v. Maharaj Bahadur (1904) I.L.R. 32 Cal. 193 (P.C.) Privy Council observation that an issue of setting aside a transfer could be raised and a decree made only in a properly constituted suit. The Court held that the Privy Council's observation did not expressly mean a representative suit; it appeared tied to deficiencies of allegations and parties in that case's facts and so was not authoritative for the present point.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining precedent, statutory provisions and the character of the present plaintiff as an attaching decree-holder. The analytical steps in the opinion are:

  1. Clarification of earlier precedents: The Court reviewed Palaniandi Ghetty v. Appavu Chettiar and the Full Bench Subramania Iyer decision and concluded that neither authority supports the proposition that a suit to set aside an alienation is maintainable only if the alienation is a sham. Those decisions, the Court found, established only that an alienation alleged to offend Section 53 must be upheld until set aside in proper proceedings — but they left open what precise form those proceedings must take.
  2. Characterisation of the present suit: The Court emphasized that the present suit directly raises the validity of Exhibit V. Because the plaintiff had been compelled by the Code (Order 21, Rule 63) to sue after his claim in the claim petition had been disallowed under Rule 60, the suit must be treated as one properly instituted for the purpose of setting aside the transaction insofar as it affects the plaintiff's statutory right to have the property sold for his decree.
  3. Statutory and equitable exceptions: The Court drew on the English rule (statute of Elizabeth) and Halsbury to note the general rule that a creditor should sue on behalf of all creditors, but also the well-recognized exception allowing a judgment-creditor (who has recovered judgment and obtained execution or equivalent) to obtain relief for himself. The Court found that an attaching decree-holder occupies an exceptional position and that Order 21, Rule 63 specifically gives him a right to sue to establish his claim to the attached property.
  4. Practical consequences and remedies: The Court considered practical difficulties of forcing a plaintiff to bring two suits (one to preserve limitation and another representative suit) and rejected that approach as unreasonable and contrary to statutory intent. The Court also observed that, where appropriate, the trial Court may direct amendment of a single-creditor suit to make it representative (as per Ishvar Timappa), and that even where a suit proceeded without being representative, appellate courts should not in general permit the form-of-suit objection to be taken for the first time on appeal to defeat findings of fraud.
  5. Assessment of facts and relief: On the concurrent factual findings of the Lower Courts (that Exhibit V was intended to defeat creditors and the transferee was not bona fide), the Court found no reason to disturb those findings or to allow further evidence. One judge noted the subordinate judge's finding that the sale was a sham was unnecessary; nonetheless, the sale was unenforceable against the plaintiff on the other findings.
  6. Conclusion on precedential authority: For cases cited for the proposition that only representative suits are acceptable, the Court examined their facts and reasoning and found they did not support a rule that would require dismissal of non-representative suits in the circumstances of an attaching decree-holder or allow the point to be raised for the first time on appeal.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Second Appeal is dismissed with costs. The Court held that the present suit by the attaching decree-holder was a suit properly instituted to raise and decide the validity of Exhibit V, and that the suit was not liable to be dismissed on the ground that it was not brought in a representative capacity.

Implications (as stated in the opinion):

  • Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff (attaching decree-holder) is entitled to a decree based on the concurrent findings of the Lower Courts that Exhibit V was intended to defeat creditors and that the transferee was not a purchaser in good faith; accordingly Exhibit V was unenforceable against the plaintiff and the plaintiff's right to have the property sold in execution of his decree stands.
  • Procedural consequences: An attaching decree-holder who has had a claim under Order 21, Rule 60 disallowed and who sues under Order 21, Rule 63 is not required to bring a separate representative suit on behalf of all creditors in order to challenge a transfer under Section 53. Trial courts may, and should where appropriate, order amendment of a single-creditor suit to make it representative; they should also take care to adopt the appropriate form of decree. However, the absence of representative form does not automatically justify dismissal, particularly where the objection is first taken on appeal.
  • Precedential scope: The opinion does not purport to set a new broad rule beyond the facts before the Court; it declines to treat earlier authorities as mandating dismissal of single-creditor suits and clarifies that the special statutory right of an attaching decree-holder under Order 21, Rule 63 must be respected.

No information beyond that contained in the provided opinion has been added. All summaries and characterizations reflect only material explicitly present in the opinion.

Show all summary ...

1. In this case the Lower Appellate Court seems to me to have erred in supposing that unless the contested sale-deed, Exhibit V, is merely a sham transaction, the present suit is not maintainable. The ruling quoted, Palaniandi Ghetty v. Appavu Chettiar (1916) 30 M.L.J. 265 if examined, does not support such a view; nor does the later Full Bench ruling Subramania Iyer v. Muthia Chettiar (1917) I.L.R. 41 M. 612 : 33 M.L.J. 705 which considered the same question, and to which I Was a party.

2. What was decided in these cases was this : that, where the validity of an alienation is impugned on the ground that it offends against Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, that alienation must be upheld until it is set aside in proceedings properly instituted for the purpose. The exact nature of the proceedings which should be instituted was not determined. In Palaniandi Chetty v. Appavu Chettiar (1916) 30 M.L.J. 265 Coutts Trotter, J., expressed the opinion that a creditor suing to set aside an alienation on this ground, must do so on behalf of all creditors, unless (as in the case before us) he was a judgment creditor who had taken attachment in execution of his decree. This view was dissented from by the other learned Judge, Seshagiri Aiyar, J., and the Full Bench expressly left the point undecided. No other light is thrown on the nature of the proceedings by either judgment.

3. What we have therefore to consider is whether the present suit should be treated as one properly instituted for the purpose of setting aside the assignment deed, Exhibit V.

4. It was brought by plaintiff under Order 21, Rule 63 Civil Procedure Code. 1st defendant had preferred a claim to the property attached by plaintiff, based on Exhibit V, which had been allowed under Order 21 R, 60. Plaintiff therefore brought this suit, as he was bound to do by Order 21 Rule 63, to establish the right which he claimed of bringing the property to sale, as that of his judgment-debtor's.

5. Whether it was the judgment-debtor's property or not depends solely on whether Exhibit V be upheld or set aside. The suit directly raises, and actually turns upon, the validity of the assignment by Exhibit V : and in my opinion, it must be regarded as one properly instituted to set aside that transaction. That the plaint only asks in terms for a declaration that the property is liable to sale in execution of the decree is immaterial. The form the suit has taken is determined by the peculiar position held by plaintiff. The law declares that an attaching decree-holder against whom the claim of a third party is allowed must sue within a year of the date of the order to establish his right; failing which the latter is extinguished. It puts him on a specially unfavourable position as regards limitation as compared with an ordinary creditor; but on the other hand in prescribing the exact nature of his remedy, it frees him from any other restrictions as to the nature of the suit to be brought which the latter may labour under. It seems to me impossible to hold that, as appellant's counsel contends, he is bound to bring two suits, one in his individual capacity under Order 21 Rule 63 to save himself from limitation, and another as a representative of the whole body of creditors impugning the validity of the alienation.

6. Quite apart from the provisions of Order 21 Rule 63, the exceptional position of a judgment-creditor is generally recognized even in English Law : vide 15 Halsbury 89. In Palaniandi Ghetty v. Appavu Chettiar (1916) 30 M.L.J. 565 Coutts Trotter, J., points out the distinction; and although it was ignored by the learned Judges in Hakim Lal v. Mooshahar Sahn (1907) I.L.R. 34 Cal. 999 this may have been because the point was not raised and the decision of the case proceeded on altogether different grounds. Our attention has been drawn to no case in which a suit by an attaching judgment-creditor was dismissed simply because it was not brought in a representative capacity.

7. Whether an ordinary creditor who seeks to set aside an alienation as infringing Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act must sue in a representative capacity we are not called upon to say. I must not be understood to hold that he is under any such obligation.

8. The present suit is, in my opinion, certainly not liable to dismissal on account of any defect of form; and on the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by both the lower Courts, plaintiff is entitled to a decree. I can see no ground for questioning these findings or for holding that defendants should have been allowed further opportunity of adducing evidence.

9. I would therefore dismiss the Second Appeal with costs.

Krishnan, J.

10. I agree with my learned brother that this Second Appeal fails. But as the point raised by the appellant's Advocate, Mr. Shenai, as to the necessity of bringing a representative suit under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act is an important one and has been argued at some length before us, I shall add a few words.

11. Both the Lower Courts found on the evidence in the case that Exhibit V, the sale-deed in favour of the appellant was intended to defeat the vendor's creditors of which plaintiff was one and that the appellant was not a transferee in good faith. The Subordinate Judge went further and found that the sale was a sham or colorable transaction which was void and did not require to be avoided. This last finding has been attacked before us and it is difficult to support it on the facts of the case, But in my view, it is an unnecessary finding and may be ignored, as the sale-deed was properly treated as unenforceable against the plaintiff on the other two findings.

12. It was however argued by Mr. Shenai that a creditor was not entitled to avoid'a transfer under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act unless he had brought a representative suit on behalf of all the creditors and got a decree setting aside the deed. He contended that as this was not such a suit, we must ignore the findings as to the fraudulent character of Exhibit V and treat it as in force and dismiss the plaintiff's suit. The result of his contention if adopted will be that we should be driven to uphold a sale-deed which has been proved to be fraudulent and voidable at plaintiff's option and enforce it against him simply because he has not brought what is called a representative suit. Such a result seems somewhat startling but Mr. Shenai contended that this proposition was supported by decided cases both in this country and in England; we must therefore examine the authorities relied on. It is conceded that there is no statutory rule on the point.

13. Mr. Shenai relied in the first instance on the English rule regarding cases under thS statute of Elizabeth, 13 Elizabeth Chap. 5; the provisions of that statute are practically the same as that of Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act on this point. The English rule, as stated in Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. XV, page 89, is as follows:

"In an action to set aside an alienation under the statute a creditor, should sue on behalf of himself and all other creditors of the. grantor except where he has recovered judgment for his debt, in which case he can obtain an order declaring the alienation as void against him and containing consequential directions for the satisfaction of his debt alone, without mention of any other creditors or their debts,"

14. As pointed out by Coutts Trotter, J., in Palaniandi Chetty v. Appavu Chettiar (1916) 30 M.L.J. 555 the equity Courts used to insist that after getting a judgment in his favour, the creditor should sue out a writ of Fi fa or elegit before seeking their help to set aside a deed of transfer in equitable execution of his decree. If we adopt the rule in the restricted manner with the exception as above stated, the present suit will be a validly constituted one as it is by a judgment-creditor who has attached immoveable property, which corresponds in a general way to suing out the writ of elegit. Apart from that, it has not been shown that the rule itself was ever used for the purpose of dismissing a suit by a single creditor. No authority has been cited where such a procedure was followed in England. The cases cited in support of the rule, viz., Bott v. Smith (1857) 52 English Reports, 957 Be Mouat (1899) 1 Ch. 831 Cornish v. Clark (1872) L.R. 14 Eq. 184 Ideal Bedding Go. v. Holland (1907) 2 Ch. 157 and Reese, River Silver Mining Go. v. Atwell (1869) L.R. 7 Eq. 347 when examined, show either that the suit was brought by the plaintiff himself on behalf of all the creditors or as happened in the last case cited, the suit was allowed to be amended for the purpose in the trial Court. On the contrary in the case of Re, Maddever--Three Towns Banking Go v. Maddever (1881) 27 Ch. D. 523 though the suit was by a single creditor, no objection was apparently taken as to its form but the decree gave as a matter of form a declaration that the conveyance in question was void against the plaintiff and all other, if any creditors of the debtor. It seems to me therefore that even in cases of ordinary creditors, where the rule applied and not the exception, suits were not dismissed for not being Brought on behalf of all the creditors, but were allowed to be amended in the trial Court or wfyere the transfer was to be set aside, a decree was passed setting it aside on behalf of all the creditors.

15. As the provisions in the statute of Elizabeth and Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act are practically the same, we may well adopt the English rule as a whole, but without giving any further scope to it either by allowing objections to the form of the suit being taken in appeal for the first time or by dismissing the suit because it is not in a representative character. As pointed out by Coutts Trotter, J., in the case in Palaniandi Chetty v. Appavu Chetty (1916) 30 M.L.J. 565 already cited, the rule has already been, to some extent, adopted in India.

16. There are indications in the Indian Law to show that a creditor may bring a suit under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act in his individual character without joining the other creditors or suing on their behalf. The wording of Section 53 itself gives the right to each individual creditor who has been defeated or delayed, a right to treat as voidable at his option, a transfer that falls within it. He has not got to exercise his option in conjunction with his co-creditors. He thus gets a cause of action for himself and there is nothing in the Code of Civil Procedure to prevent him from seeking relief by himself.

17. Again it would seem from the wording of the form of the decree under the Civil Procedure Code in a suit to set aside a transfer in fraud of creditors, see form No. 13, first schedule of Appendix D, a suit to which all the creditors are not parties either personally or otherwise is contemplated; for the form of the decree in Be Maddever's case above cited, is adopted. The use of the words " if any" shows that all the creditors are not before the Court.

18. I am therefore of opinion that there is no rule either in the English or in the Indian Law, justifying the dismissal of a suit-brought under Section 53, Transfer of Property Act, because it is not brought in a representative capacity. To avoid the difficulty of multiplicity of suits pointed out by Coutts Trotter, J., in Palaniandi Chetty v. Appavu Chetty (1916) 30 M.L.J. 565. I think the trial Court may, of its own motion, and should if moved by the transferee defendant, direct that a suit by a single creditor under Section 53, Transfer of Property Act should be amended so as to make it a suit on behalf of all the creditors, as was directed to be done in Ishvar Timappa v. Devar Venkappa (1902) I.L.R. 27 B. 146. The Court should also take care when passing a decree setting aside a transfer, even in a single creditor's suit, to adopt the form No. 13 in Appendix U above referred to. But if a suit had been proceeded with, without any objection being taken to its form on the ground of its not being on behalf of all the creditors and a decree had been passed setting aside a transfer as fraudulent, it seems to me that there is no justification for allowing such an objection to be raised for the first time in appeal or for ignoring the findings arrived at by the Lower Court and dismissing the suit as not being of a representative character. Such a course will make the Court really an instrument for the support of a proved fraud.

19. I shall now refer to the Indian cases relied on by Mr. Shenai. To start with, he relied on the Madras cases reported in Palaniandi Chetty v. Appavu Cketty (1916) 30 M.L.J. 565 and in Subramania Ayyar v. Muthia Chettiar (1917) I.L.R. 41 M. 612 : 38 M.L.J. 705. The latter case is a Full Bench decision. The point decided in both these cases was that a defendant to an action cannot plead in defence, his right to avoid a transfer under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act; and that if he wishes to exercise his option under that section he can do so only as a plaintiff and not as a defendant. If this question were res-integra I should find some difficulty in adopting this view. But it is not necessary to discuss it as the question before us now is quite different. The creditor here is not seeking to set up his right as a plea in defence but he has come to Court as a plaintiff and the question raised is whether he should do so in a representative suit only. On that question I consider that neither case is an authority. In the judgment in the Full Bench case, this question has been expressly excluded from consideration. No doubt there is an observation in it that the sale should be set aside " in proceedings properly instituted for the purpose". There is, however, no indication in the judgment what these proceedings are and as my learned brother who made the observation considers that the present suit is such a proceeding, it cannot be relied on as an authority against the respondent.

20. If the 30 Mad. L.J. case is examined it will be found that Seshagiri Aiyar, J., definitely ruled that no representative suit was necessary. The view of Coutts Trotter, J., on the point is not quite clear; but it seems to be that a representative suit is necessary except in the case of attaching decree-holders. The difficulty in understanding his view arises from the fact that he apparently overlooked that the case before him was that of a decree-holder who had not only attached property but had obtained an order in his favour in the claim petition. From his judgment it would appear that he would have supported the decree in the case if he had not treated it as one of a mere decree-holder. However that may be, if the learned Judge is to be taken as holding that a creditor's suit should be dismissed in second appeal if it is not brought in a representative capacity, with all respect, I am unable to follow him. I am inclined to agree with the view of Seshagiri Aiyar, J., on this point though I am doubtful about his view as to the applicability of Section 11, Expl. VI of the Civil Procedure Code; for in a case which ends in favour of the transferee, it may be difficult to hold that the creditors who were no parties to the suit are also barred from disputing the validity of the transfer.

21. The other cases relied on by Mr. Shenai are Burjorji Dorabji Patel v. Dhunbai (1891) I.L.R. 16 Bom. 1 Ishioar Timappa v. Devar Venkappa (1902) I.L.R. 27 Bom. 146 Hakim Lal v.Mooshahar Sahu (1907) I.L.R. 34 Cal, 999 and Chatterput Singh v. Maharaj Bahadur (1904) I.L.R. 32 Cal. 193 (P.C.). The last one is a Privy Council ruling and the observation relied on is on page 217:

" such an issue could be raised and such a decree could be made only in a suit properly constituted for that purpose and this suit was not so constituted either as to parties or otherwise."
There is nothing to show that their Lordships meant by a properly constituted suit a representative suit; they do not say so. The facts of the case show that proper allegations had not been made and proper parties, viz., the transferors, had not been joined to enable the Court to set aside Chutterpur's private purchase as fraudulent The observation referred to is apparently connected with these circumstances. I am there fire not able to treat it as an authority on the point before us.

22. The observations in the next Calcutta case on page 1006 is no doubt in point in appellant's favour; but as the decision in the case was that the conveyance was a valid one and not liable to be set aside under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act they are in the nature of obiter dicta. It was also pointed out to us that the learned Judges had not noticed the exception recognized in the English Law to the general rule in favour of the attaching decree holder, though the case before them was one of such a decree-holder. With every respect I am unable to follow their view that a suit under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act is liable to be dismissed if not brought in a representative capacity. They have also not, expressed a definite opinion whether the objection should be allowed to be raised for the first time in appeal, though they were apparently inclined to hold that it should not. As I have already stated 1 am also of the same opinion that it should not be allowed.

23. I have already referred to the case in Iswar Timappa v. Devar Venkappa (1902) I.L.R. 27 B. 146 and I am in agreement with the learned Judges there that suitable amendments may be directed by the trial Court to make a suit brought by a single creditor under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, a representative suit. The actual decision in that case was that a creditor who has not obtained a decree in his favour is nevertheless entitled to sue under that section. In the case in Burjorji Dorabii Patel v. Dhunbai (1891) I.L.R. 16 B. 1 the suit was not dismissed on the ground of its not being a representative suit, though no doubt the learned Judge was of opinion, that the suit was liable to be dismissed on that ground. This opinion however was really only an obiter dictum, for it was found by him that plaintiffs were claiming under the transferor himself and could not therefore impeach his transfer. It was not a case of creditors at all and was not under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act as the act did not then apply to Bombay. As already pointed out, the English authorities the learned Judge follows, do not show that the suit should be dismissed if not brought in a representative character. I do not therefore consider that this case which, it will be noted, is the decision of a single Judge is an authority against the view I am taking and which I should follow.

24. I have thus for the reasons, above stated come to the conclusion that even looking upon plaintiff as no more than an ordinary creditor of the vendor, the appellant's contention that we should now dismiss his suit should be overruled. In my view the Subordinate Judge was wrong in allowing the point to be raised for the first time in appeal.

25. In this case however the decree of the Lower Court can be supported on a much narrower ground as well; for the plaintiff here is not merely a creditor but an attaching decree-holder who was the defeated party in a claim petition filed by the transferee defendant under Order 21, Rule 60, C.P.C., I have already pointed out that adopting the English rule he will have as attaching decree-holder, a personal right to sue by himself to avoid the transfer. Again as the defeated party in a claim petition, he has a statutory right of suit given to him under R, 63 and that suit must necessarily be one brought by himself alone and is not a representative suit. Under that rule he can sue to establish the right which he claims to the property in dispute and that right is that it can be attached and sold for his decree. The present suit is exactly that suit and it cannot therefore be defeated by any rule of practice which has no statutory basis. Asit is necessary to find whether Exhibit V is valid against him to give him the relief claimed, the Court, I think, was bound to decide that question and he could not be referred to another suit for the purpose. In fact the suggestion of the appellant's counsel that after bringing this suit plaintiff should have at once launched another suit of a representative character to set aside Exhibit V and get a stay of this suit pending that suit if he wanted to save it from dismissal does not seem to me to be at all reasonable nor the course proposed necessary; it is perhaps even impracticable; I do not see why plaintiff should be driven to bring 2 suits for the same purpose. To hold that plaintiff cannot get the deed set aside except in a representative suit, will be a practical denial of his statutory right of suit; a suit which he has to bring as pointed out by my learned brother, within one year at the risk of losing his right to attach the property if he does not do so.

26. The only case cited to us which was a case of an attaching decree-holder defeated in a claim petition suing, is the one in Hakim Lal v. Mooshahar Sahu (1907) I.L.R. 34 Cal. 999 already referred to. But in that case the learned Judges did not consider his special and peculiar right to sue in his own name under Rule 63. I have already stated that I am unable to follow their view as to the character of the suit to be brought, under Section 53. It is therefore no authority against the respondent.

27. I agree with my learned brother that the appellant's contention that the present suit should be dismissed because it was not a representative suit on behalf of all the creditors, fails, and that the Lower Courts were right on their findings in holding that Exhibit V was not valid against the plaintiff and in giving relief on that footing.

28. I agree the Second Appeal should be dismissed with costs.