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K. Shanmugasundara Mudaliar v. S. Ratnavelu Mudaliar

Madras High Court
Dec 11, 1928
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners (persons interested in the Sri Karuneeswara-swami temple, Saidapet) sued the respondents, who were trustees of the temple, seeking a general account of their management and a decree directing defendants Nos. 1 to 4 to pay an amount (the plaint claimed Rs. 14,458 or such other sum found due on taking the account). The plaint pleaded a general account and also specified eight particular charges of malversation which were tried in the Subordinate Judge's Court.

The Subordinate Judge did not take a general account; instead he examined the evidence on the eight specific charges and held that two charges were proved and six charges failed. The respondents appealed against the two items allowed by the Subordinate Judge; this Court allowed that appeal (in effect disallowing an amount of Rs. 7,000 that had been allowed by the trial Judge). The petitioners filed a memorandum of cross-objections in respect of the six dismissed items, which this Court dismissed in toto on the ground that the petitioners had no right to demand a general account because accounts had already been furnished and the petitioners had suppressed those accounts so as to prevent further account-taking.

The petitioners sought leave to appeal to the Privy Council in respect of the whole subject-matter of the original suit. The present opinion addresses that application for leave to appeal and whether the procedural and value thresholds for an appeal to the Privy Council are satisfied.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the decree of this Court (comprising the decision on the appeal and on the memorandum of cross-objections) is effectively an affirming decree such that no appeal to the Privy Council lies.
  2. Whether the memorandum of objections is to be treated as a separate cross-appeal (independent proceeding) or as part of the main appeal, with consequences for jurisdiction to appeal to the Privy Council.
  3. Whether the value of the subject-matter for the purpose of Privy Council leave exceeds Rs. 10,000 so as to permit an appeal (including whether the items can be split so as to reduce the value below the threshold).

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments

  • The decree of this Court (as drawn up in respect of both the appeal and the memorandum of objections) is effectively an affirming decree and therefore no substantial question of law arises for a further appeal.
  • The appeal and the memorandum of objections should be treated as separate proceedings. As to the memorandum of objections, the judgment of the lower Court was affirmed and therefore no appeal to the Privy Council would lie on that part. As to the appeal itself, the value of the subject-matter falls below Rs. 10,000 (if the decree can be split), so that no Privy Council appeal would lie.
  • Implicitly, the respondents relied on the view that the eight charges of malversation constituted distinct subject-matters which could be separated for jurisdictional/value purposes.

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The memorandum of cross-objections is so intimately connected with the appeal that both should be treated as one appeal; taken together the subject-matter exceeds Rs. 10,000 and an appeal to the Privy Council is therefore competent.
  • The petitioners contend that the decree of this Court should be regarded as reversing (or not an affirmance) in a way that preserves the right to further appeal.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Alagappa Chettiar v. Chockalingam Chetty, 48 Ind. Cas. 203; 41 M. 904; 35 M.L.J. 236; 8 L.W. 240; 24 M.L.T. 137; (1918) M.W.N. 688 (F.B.) Dealt with the question of limitation. The Court observed this decision does not affect the present point because it only dealt with limitation.
Murugappa Chettiar v. Ponnusami Pillai, 62 Ind. Cas. 757; 44 M. 828; 13 L.W. 705; (1921) M.W.N. 438; 41 M.L.J. 304 Considered in relation to the effect of abatement of an appeal on the death of an appellant and whether subsequent dismissal amounts to dismissal for default within Order XLI, Rule 22(4). The Court considered the decision and treated it as relevant to interpreting Rule 22(4), observing difficulty in holding that abatement and subsequent dismissal should not amount to dismissal for default under Rule 22(4).
Ramanathan Chetti v. Subramanian Chetty, 97 Ind. Cas. 592; 51 M.L.J. 295; 24 L.W. 455; A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 1024; (1927) M.W.N. 65 Illustrates a case where the memorandum of cross-objections related to a matter entirely distinct from the subject matter of the appeal. The Court distinguished that decision on the ground that in Ramanathan the memorandum related to a distinct matter; therefore it did not govern the present facts where the items hang together as particulars of a claim for a general account.
Raja Sree Nath Roy Bahadur v. Secretary of State for India, 8 C.W.N. 291 The opinion cites the case but does not articulate the specific principle from it in the text. The Court stated it did not think this case applied to the present facts.
Narendralal Das Chowdhury v. Gopendralal Das Chowdhury, 103 Ind. Cas. 65; 45 O.L.J. 426; 31 C.W.N. 572; A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 543 The opinion cites the case but does not specify the precise rule invoked in the text. The Court indicated it did not consider this case applicable to the present matter.
Vikrama Deo Garu v. Maharaja of Jaipur, 31 Ind. Cas. 272; (1916) 1 M.W.N. 122; 18 M.L.T. 387 Authority cited for giving the petitioner the benefit of any doubt arising on whether memorandum of objections can be heard where there is doubt about the appeal's competency; also noted that if the appeal is dismissed as out of time the memorandum cannot be heard. The Court said the petitioner should have the benefit of doubt in this case, citing Vikrama Deo Garu, while acknowledging the limitation that a time-barred appeal prevents hearing the memorandum of objections.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in stages to determine whether leave to appeal to the Privy Council should be granted.

  1. Was the decree of this Court an affirmance? The judges concluded it was not. The appellate decree disallowed a sum of Rs. 7,000 that the trial Judge had allowed, and the Subordinate Judge had not decided on the broad issue of liability to a general account (the main ground of the petitioners' suit). Therefore the order could not be treated as an affirming decree across the board.
  2. Should the memorandum of cross-objections be treated as a separate, independent proceeding or as part of the main appeal? The Court observed that Order XLI, Rule 22(4) (as amended) indicates that a memorandum of objections may, in certain circumstances, be treated as a separate cross-appeal. The determinative test, as framed by the Court, is whether the appeal and the memorandum of objections are independent proceedings relating to distinct subject-matters (in which case they may be separate) or whether they form parts of a single proceeding dealing with one subject-matter.
  3. Are the eight particular charges independent subject-matters, permitting a split of the decree (and hence undermining Privy Council jurisdiction by reducing the value below the statutory threshold)? The Court found it difficult to treat all eight charges as separate and distinct subject-matters because they were all based on the alleged breach of trust and in substance were particulars of a general claim for an account. The six charges dismissed by the Subordinate Judge had been dismissed on the merits in the trial Court; this Court's dismissal of the petitioners' memorandum rested on a different ground (that accounts had been furnished and suppressed), but the Court nonetheless treated the items as interconnected incidents of the claim for a general account.
  4. Value threshold and inability to split the decree: The Court held that, given the interdependence of the items and the requirements of Section 110 of the Civil Procedure Code, it was not possible simply to split the decree into two parts (one affirming and one reversing) in order to deprive the petitioners of the right to appeal where the combined value exceeded Rs. 10,000. The total amount claimed (approx. Rs. 14,458) satisfied the statutory value requirement for Privy Council leave.
  5. The Court applied relevant precedent selectively: it distinguished decisions where the memorandum related to distinct matters (Ramanathan Chetti) and relied on authorities (including Vikrama Deo Garu) to give the petitioners the benefit of any doubt on procedural questions bearing on leave. The Court also noted that Alagappa Chettiar dealt only with limitation and therefore did not affect the present issues.
  6. Concurring reasons: Odgers, J. (concurring) reiterated the key factual and legal points — that the Subordinate Judge decided on particulars rather than the broad question of liability to a general account; that the eight items were particulars incident to the general account claim and not independent items; and that the combined value satisfied the threshold. He agreed that the certificate under the relevant Civil Procedure Code provisions should issue.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that the petitioners have a right to appeal to the Privy Council and granted leave to appeal. The Court certified that the provisions of Sections 109 and 110 of the Civil Procedure Code had been complied with in this case and issued the certificate permitting appeal.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The petitioners are permitted to proceed with an appeal to the Privy Council in respect of the whole subject-matter of the original suit.
  • The Court rejected the attempt to treat parts of the decree as an affirmance so as to deprive the petitioners of Privy Council jurisdiction by splitting the subject-matter; the Court treated the pleaded particulars as incident to a common claim for a general account.
  • The decision's direct consequence is procedural: it grants leave and issues the required certificate under the Civil Procedure Code. The opinion does not purport to establish a new legal precedent beyond applying and distinguishing existing authorities on whether memoranda of objections stand as independent cross-appeals and on the question of value and appealability to the Privy Council.

Note: This summary is drawn exclusively from the text of the provided opinion and does not add facts or conclusions not present in that opinion.

Show all summary ...

1. The petitioners brought a suit against the respondents asking for an account in respect of their trusteeship of the plaint temple. Although they asked for a general account in the plaint, eight specific charges of malversation were alleged and these charges formed the subject-matter of the trial in the first Court, Without taking a general account, the Subordinate Judge examined the evidence relating to the eight charges and held that two charges were proved and that the other six failed. The judgment is not altogether satisfactory for it is quite possible that, if a general account had been taken some sums of money might have been found to be due to the respondents which could have been set off against the two claims allowed. The respondents filed an appeal in respect of these two claims and the appeal was allowed in this Court. The petitioners filed a memorandum of cross-objections relating to the other six items and that was dismissed in toto. The ground for dismissing the claim of the petitioners in toto both in appeal and in the memorandum of objections was that the petitioners had no right to claim a general account as accounts had already been furnished and the petitioners themselves had suppressed the accounts and thereby prevented any further account being taken. The petitioners now wish to appeal to the Privy Council in respect of the whole of the subject-matter of the original suit.

2. It is contended for the respondents that the decree of this Court which was drawn up in respect bcth of the appeal and of the memorandum of objections is in effect an affirming decree and that no substantial question of law arises. So far as the appeal is concerned, the decree of this Court can in no circumstances be deemed to be an affirming decree for it disallowed a sum of Rs. 7,000 which had been allowed by the trial Judge. The contention for the respondents is that the appeal and the memorandum of objections must be treated as separate appeals, and that so far as the decree in respect of the memorandum of objections is concerned no appeal would lie to the Privy Council as the judgment of the lower Court was affirmed and that, so far as the decree in the appeal itself is concerned, the value of the subject matter is less than Rs. 10,000 and, therefore, no appeal would lie. The petitioners contend that the memorandum of objections must be deemed to be so intimately connected with the appeal itself as to constitute one appeal and that, therefore, the total value of the subject-matter is over Rs. 10,000 and the decree of this Court is a reversing decree. I am not prepared to hold that in all cases the memorandum of objections must be deemed to be dependent upon the appeal itself. The alteration in law effected by Order XLI, Rule 22 (4) clearly indicates that the memorandum of objections may in certain cases be treated as a separate cross-appeal, The decision in Alagappa Chettiar v. Chockalingam Chetty 48 Ind. Cas. 203 : 41 M. 904 : 35 M.L.J. 236 : 8 L.W. 240 : 24 M.L.T. 137 : (1918) M.W.N. 688 (F.B.) does not affect the point for that only dealt with the question of limitation. The further decision in Murugappa Chettiar v. Ponnusami Pillai 62 Ind. Cas. 757, 44 M. 828 : 13 L.W. 705 : (1921) M.W.N. 438 : 41 M.L.J. 304 which purported to follow Alagappa Chettiar v. Chockalingam Chetty 48 Ind. Cas. 203 : ct, it seems to me difficult to hold that the abatement of an appeal on the death of the appellant and its subsequent dismissal does not amount to a dismissal for default of prosecution within the meaning of Rule 22, Clause (4). What has to be considered in a question of this sort is whether the appeal and the memorandum of objections must be treated as forming two independent proceedings relating to distinct sets of facts, and it is now contended for the respondents that each of the eight charges of malversation formed a separate subject-matter and that inasmuch as this Court affirmed the decrees of the lower Court in respect of six charges, it must be deemed to be an affirming decree and that, therefore, in respect of these six charges, no appeal would lie to the Privy Council. It is, however, difficult to say that all these eight charges are separate and distinct subject matters, for they were all based on the alleged breach Of trust by the respondents and in fact the six charges were dismissed by the trial Court not on the ground taken by this Court, namely that the petitioners had no right to demand an account but on the merits of the evidence which was held not to prove the charges. In these circumstances, the case in Ramanathan Cheiti v. Subramanian Chetti 97 Ind. Cas. 592 : 51 M.L.J; 295 : 24 L.W. 455 : A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 1024; (1927) M.W N. 65 decided by this Bench can be distinguished, far there the memorandum of cross-objections related to a matter entirely distinct from the subject matter of the appeal, nor do 1 think that the cases in Raja Sree Nath Roy Bahadur v. Secretary of State for India 8 C.W.N. 291 and Narendralal Das Chowdhury v. Gopendralal Das Chowdhury 103 Ind. Cas. 65 : 45 O.L.J. 426 : 31 C.W.N. 572 : A.I.R. 1927 Cal. 543 apply. It is unnecessary to refer to the other cases cited for, the question that has to be decided is, whether the decree of this Court in the appeal and memorandum of objections really consists of two separate decrees in respect of separate subject-matters or whether it is really one decree dealing with one subject-matter only. In the former case, it may well be that in respect either of the appeal or of the memorandum of objections, no appeal would lie to the Privy Council, whereas in the latter case, if the subject-matter of the suit in the first Court and the value of the appeal to the Privy Council is over Rs. 10,000 an appeal would lie to the Privy Council. Here, so far as the value of the subject-matter of the suit and the appeal is concerned, the provisionsof s.110, Civil Procedure Code, are complied with and it is not possible to split the decree into two parts and hold that one part is an affirming decree and that the other part is a reversing decree, and that because the latter is below Rs. 10,000 in value, no appeal would lie. In these circumstances I would hold that the petitioners have a right to appeal.

3. It is perhaps unfortunate that in this particular case this litigation which is undoubtedly prejudicial to the interests of the suit temple should have been instigated by a factious feeling prevailing between two parties. This, however, cannot affect the right of appeal of the parties.The petitioners have been prejudiced by the judgment of this Court and, therefore, they must be allowed to appeal to the Privy Council.

4. I certify that the provisions of Sections 109 and 110 of the Civil Procedure Code have been complied with in this case and grant leave to the petitioners to appeal.

5. Odgers, J.--This is an application for leave to appeal to the Privy Oouncil from a judgment of Phillips, J, and myself The suit was brought by certain persons interested in the temple of Sri Karuneeswara-swami, Saidapet, against the defendants for a general account of their management of the shrine and for a decree that defendants Nos. 1 to 4 be directed to pay Rs. 14, 458 or such other sum as may be found due on such account being taken. The learned Judge decided the case on the eight points of particulars of claim lodged with the plaint and decided as to points A and B that the 1st defendant waa liable to account but that as to the other items he was not liable. It was held by us that the 1st defendant could not be held liable to a general account and accordingly he was not even liable on the two items found by the Subordinate Judge. Now the first question is, is this a decree of affirmance? The Subordinate Judge, as stated did not find on the broad question of liability to general account at all which was the main ground for our decision here.

6. As regards the particulars there is no doubt that it was not a decree of affirmance and I think, therefore, that it cannot be said that our decree was in affirmance of the decree of the lower Court.

7. Then the question is whether the appeal is worth Rs. 10,000. The total amount claimed is about Rs. 14,500 I think there is no doubt that this is the amount in question on appeal to the Privy Oouncil. The question is complicated by a memorandum of objections in which the respondents took objection to the finding of the Subordinate Judge with regard to the six other particulars of claim.

8. It is contended that all the eight items of particulars are independent and that, therefore, the value of the subject-matter must be under Rs. 10,000. I do not think that these items can be considered as being separate. They are really particulars of the claim for a general account, i.e., they are incidents of the alleged misuse of trust moneys, so that they really all depend on a finding as to whether the 1st defendant was liable to a general account or not I, therefore, agree with my learned brother that they are not independent items.

9. The question is further as to whether the Court's order below as to the six items can be separated from the appeal as to the two allowed by the Subordinate Judge. Of course, if the memorandum of objections relates to an entirely different matter as in Ramanathan Chetti v. Subramanian Chetty 97 Ind. Cas. 592 : 51 M.L.J; 295 : 24 L.W. 455 : A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 1024 : (1927) M.W N. 65, it may be that the memorandum of objections must be considered as a separate cross appeal quite distinct from the main appeal. In any case, the petitioner is to have the benefit of any doubt that may arise, Vikrama Deo Garu v. Maharaja of Jaipor 31 Ind. Cas. 272 : (1916) 1 M.W.N. 122 : 18 M.L.T. 387., though there is no doubt that, if an appeal is dismissed as being out of time, the memorandum of objections cannot be heard as it is dependent to that extent on the appeal. Alagappa Chettiar v. Chockalingam Chetty 48 Ind. Cas. 203 : 41 M. 904 : 35 M.L.J. 236 : 8 L.W. 240 : 24 M.L.T. 137 : (1918) M.W.N. 688 (F.B.). But as I;have held that all these items are not independent items but really hang together and are collectively dependent on and form particulars of the claim for a general account, I think this objection must be overruled. I, therefore, agree that this is a fit case for appeal to the Privy Oouncil and that the certificate may issue.