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Municipal Council v. Bombay Company, Ltd.

Madras High Court
Apr 18, 1928
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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, the Bombay Company, Limited (a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act), carried on business in Madras and elsewhere. The defendant was the Municipal Council of Dindigul, constituted under the District Municipalities Act of 1920. The municipality, purporting to act under Sect. 92 and E.16, Sch. IV of the District Municipalities Act, assessed the plaintiff to a company's tax of Rs. 250 for each of six half‑year periods (ending 30 Sep 1922 through 31 Mar 1925), amounting to Rs. 1,500. The plaintiff paid these taxes under protest and sued for recovery of the sums paid. At trial, Beasley, J. gave a decree for the plaintiff. The municipality appealed. The appeal raises questions about the correct construction of Sect. 92 (whether the company "transacted business" within the municipality) and whether the plaintiff's suit for refund was barred by limitation under Sect. 350 of the District Municipalities Act of 1920.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the defendant (Municipal Council of Dindigul) was entitled to levy the company's tax on the plaintiff under Sect. 92 of the District Municipalities Act (i.e., whether the plaintiff "transacted business" within the municipality for the relevant period).
  2. Whether the plaintiff's suit for recovery of taxes paid was barred by limitation under Sect. 350 (particularly the six‑month limitation and the description "suits for damages or compensation").

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's (Bombay Company) Arguments

  • The company did not "transact business" within the municipality (Dindigul) for profit and therefore the tax under Sect. 92 was not leviable against it.
  • The company paid the tax under protest and sued for recovery; the suit is not one for "damages or compensation" and therefore is not barred by the six‑month limitation in Sect. 350 of the District Municipalities Act.

Defendant's (Municipal Council) Arguments

  • The municipality contended the company had transacted business in Dindigul and so the tax was leviable under Sect. 92 (the municipality relied on the section's language and its explanation regarding agents/servants representing companies).
  • The municipality argued that even if business were not directly carried on there, the company could be treated as transacting business by reason of agency or by acting as managing agents for another company.
  • The municipality also contended that the suit was barred by reason of Sect. 350, Cl. (2) (i.e., the six‑month limitation) and that actions for recovery of wrongly collected sums fall within "suits for damages or compensation."
  • As part of submissions, counsel for the appellant (Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar) argued that (a) "business" has a wider meaning than "trade" and thus the English income‑tax tests should not be applied rigidly, and (b) the explanation to Sect. 92 was intended to make the employment of an agent sufficient to deem the company as transacting business within the municipality.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Clan Line Steamers Ltd. v. Municipal Council of Cocanada Established the interpretation of "carrying on business" for purposes of municipal/company taxation under the earlier District Municipalities Act (1884); review of authorities on where business is deemed to be exercised. Treated as binding precedent on the construction of "transacting business" and as the settled law the Court need not re‑open; the Court held Sect. 92 of 1920 did not alter the law as decided in Clan Line.
Grainger & Son v. William Lane Gough House of Lords: a foreign merchant who solicits orders through agents in the UK does not exercise a trade in the UK when contracts and deliveries occur abroad; soliciting/ancillary activity is insufficient to constitute carrying on trade. Used to support the principle that the place where contracts are habitually made determines where the trade/business is carried on; applied to find contracts were concluded in Madras, not Dindigul.
Enchsen v. Last Affirms similar principles that mere solicitation by agents does not constitute carrying on the trader's business in the place of solicitation. Referenced as supporting authority for treating ancillary solicitation as insufficient to constitute transacting business in the municipality.
Lovell & Christmas Ltd v. Commissioner of Taxes Privy Council observation: trade ordinarily consists in making certain classes of contracts and carrying them into operation; where such contracts are habitually made in a place, business is carried on there. Relied upon to deduce that where contracts habitually arise elsewhere (Madras), the company is not transacting business in Dindigul.
San Paulo (Brazilian) Railway Co. Ltd v. Carter One of the known cases on the point of where business is carried on for tax/jurisdiction purposes. Referred to among cases discussing the contract‑centric test; used as part of the body of authority supporting the Court's approach.
Sinclair v. Brougham House of Lords: discussed nature of action for money had and received and held in English Common Law the cause of action is founded on assumpsit (implied/imputed contract) rather than an independent equitable obligation. Used to explain the English position; the Court contrasted this with the Privy Council view applicable to India/Ceylon and noted that if English Common Law alone applied, the plaintiff might be time‑barred.
John v. Dodwell & Company (Privy Council, Ceylon) Viscount Haldane: in systems where law and equity are administered together (Ceylon, and by analogy India), actions for money had and received may be treated as equitable actions ("where the defendant has received money which ex aequo et bono he ought to refund"). Relied on as binding and directly applicable authority to hold that the action for recovery of wrongly collected taxes in India is equitable in nature and therefore not a "suit for damages or compensation" within Sect. 350; thus limitation in Cl. (2) does not apply.
Moses v. Macferlan Lord Mansfield: action for money had and received is founded on equitable considerations — recovery where money is held which ex aequo et bono ought to be refunded (an equitable basis). Invoked to describe the substantive nature of actions for money had and received (equitable quality); used in the Court's reasoning about the nature of the plaintiff's claim.
Smith v. Anderson Cited by counsel for the appellant to suggest the word "business" has a wider meaning than "trade." Referred to and considered by the Court, but the Court rejected the view that the distinction should lead to a different result; treated "transacting business"/"carrying on business"/"exercising a trade" as substantially equivalent for the present purpose.
Waterhouse v. Keen; Selmes v. Judge; Midland Railway Co. v. Withington Local Board; Cree v. The Vestry of St. Pancras; Lyles v. Southend-on-Sea Corporation; Bradford Corporation v. Myres English decisions under the Public Authorities Protection Act and related provisions: show such recovery actions are either torts or contract claims and thus fall within the class of "actions" subject to short limitation periods under English law. Referred to in discussion of the meaning of "suits for damages or compensation"; the Court noted these English cases but held that the differing language in the Indian statute and the Privy Council authority required a different conclusion for India.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion contains two complementary lines of analysis (as recorded by the Chief Justice and by Madhavan Nair, J.), which converge on the same outcomes.

1. Construction of "transacting business" under Sect. 92

  • Both judges treated the key statutory phrase "transacting business" as substantively equivalent to the established concept of "carrying on business" or "exercising a trade" as developed in a series of English decisions and settled in this Court by the earlier Clan Line decision under the 1884 Act.
  • The Court recognized that the legislature added the phrase "transacting business" (and an explanatory clause about servants/agents) in the 1920 Act and noted the municipality's argument that this was intended to broaden liability (for example, to include companies whose agents merely transact business on their behalf within a municipality).
  • The Court rejected a broad construction that would render liable any company which made an isolated purchase in a municipality (or became taxable wherever a commercial traveller called) — such a construction would be unreasonable and contrary to commercial expectations.
  • The explanation in Sect. 92 (deeming a company to transact business where it employs a servant/agent to represent it) was held insufficient to change the essential test: it still requires that the company (or its agent) actually transact/carry on business in the legal sense within the municipality. Mere employment of agents to perform incidental tasks in the municipality was not enough to shift the place where the business was effectively carried on.
  • Applying the contract‑centric test derived from the authorities (i.e., determine where the contracts constituting the essence of the business are habitually made), the Court found on the evidence that all relevant business contracts and the effective management, administration and remuneration arose and were centered in Madras, not Dindigul.
  • On an alternative factual theory advanced by the municipality (that the Bombay Company acted as managing agents of another company in Dindigul), the Court found that the alleged managing‑agent activities were carried on in Madras (accounts kept and commissions paid in Madras) and that personnel "lent" to the other company were ultimately paid by that company — so the managing agent business was also not carried on in Dindigul.

2. Nature of the plaintiff's action and limitation under Sect. 350

  • The Court first cleared two preliminary points: payment "under protest" does not itself impose an obligation on the recipient to return the payment; whether there is an obligation to refund must be determined independently of the fact of protest.
  • The Court analysed the nature of actions for recovery of wrongly collected public moneys, recognizing English authorities (including Lord Mansfield's statement in Moses v. Macferlan and Lord Sumner's exposition in Sinclair v. Brougham) that in English Common Law the action for money had and received is treated as founded on assumpsit (implied contract).
  • However, the Court relied on the Privy Council decision in John v. Dodwell & Co. (a Ceylon case) where Viscount Haldane observed that in jurisdictions where law and equity are administered together (as in Ceylon and India), actions analogous to money had and received may be treated on equitable principles — i.e., as enforceable where "the defendant has received money which ex aequo et bono he ought to refund."
  • On that basis the Court held that in India such an action may be regarded as equitable (a remedy binding on the conscience of the recipient) rather than a conventional action for damages or compensation as understood in the English Public Authorities Protection Act context.
  • The Court noted the difference in statutory language: the Indian Sect. 350 refers specifically to "suits for damages or compensation" and therefore, given (a) the special equitable character of a money‑had‑and‑received claim in Indian practice and (b) the Privy Council authority, the Court concluded that Sect. 350's six‑month bar did not apply to the present suit for refund of wrongly collected taxes.
  • Consequently, the plaintiff's claims for earlier instalments paid more than six months before the suit were not time‑barred under Sect. 350.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED with costs.

Direct consequences for the parties (as stated in the opinion):

  • The assessments levied by the Municipal Council of Dindigul under Sect. 92 for the periods in question were wrongful: the plaintiff company was not "transacting business" in Dindigul during the relevant period and therefore the tax should not have been levied.
  • The plaintiff's suit to recover the amounts paid under protest was not barred by the limitation provision of Sect. 350, Cl. (2) of the District Municipalities Act; the action is of an equitable character (money had and received) and thus outside the scope of "suits for damages or compensation" as used in that section.
  • The trial judge's decree in favor of the plaintiff is affirmed; the municipality must refund the wrongly collected sums and the appeal by the municipality is dismissed with costs (the opinion records dismissal by both the Chief Justice and Madhavan Nair, J.).

Broader legal implications noted by the Court:

  • The Court observed that a tax levied solely on paid‑up capital without inquiry into actual business done in the area is of a character courts should watch carefully because of potential injustice. The opinion emphasized caution in construing statutory words so as to impose liability where that would be unreasonable or contrary to settled commercial expectations.
  • The Court did not purport to overrule or unsettle the law laid down in prior authorities; rather it held that Sect. 92 (1920) did not effect the change in law allegedly intended by the legislature and that prior principles (as in Clan Line and the English authorities) remain applicable in substance.
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The Chief Justice. — The facts relating to this case are clearly set out in the judgment of the learned trial Judge and it is unnecessary to repeat them. I considered the whole position as it stood under the Act of 1884 in the case of Clan Line Steamers Ltd.…Plaintiffs; v. Municipal Council Of Cocanada…Defendants.(1), in which I reviewed all the authorities. That judgment was affirmed on appeal and I do not propose to go over the same ground again.

The only question I have to consider is whether Sect. 92 of the new Madras District Municipalities Act of 1920 has altered the law as it stood at the date of the Clan Line Case. In my opinion it has not, though I have no doubt that it was intended to do so. Two parts of the section are called in aid by the municipality. The first is the body of the section itself which uses the phrase “transacting business” instead of the words of the old Act “exercising…any one…of the trades or callings specified in the schedule.” It is quite obvious that if “transacting business” is not to be controlled in some way, it would render liable to the tax any company situate in Madras who made an isolated purchase for the purpose of re-sale or shipment abroad in any one of the municipalities in the Presidency. No one can suppose that any such construction could reasonably be put upon the words. Stress is also laid upon the explanation to Sect. 92 which says “Whenever a company employs a servant or agent to represent it for the purpose of transacting business in a municipality, such company shall be deemed to transact businesss within the municipality and such servant or agent shall be liable for the tax in respect of the company's business whether or not he has power to make binding contracts on behalf of the company.” In my view that carries the matter no further. I feel myself constrained to construe “transacting business” as meaning no more than the phrase “carrying on business” which has been defined by a series of decisions of the highest Courts in England and settled for this Court by the decision in the Clan Line Case. The English decisions I have reviewed in my judgment in the last named case. It may be quite true that if the company does carry on business in the municipality, the fact that it does so by an agent who has no power to make binding contracts is no longer one of the tests to be applied. The question still remains “does the company either itself or by its agent transact, i. e., carry on business in the accepted legal meaning of the term ‘within the municipality”? In my opinion it would be no more reasonable so to hold than to hold that a company who sends a commercial traveller all over India to make purchases for them can be said to carry on business in all the various places at which he calls to fulfil the purpose of his employment.

An alternative case was put forward, namely, that even if it could not be said that the Bombay Company carried on the business of purchasing cotton and groundnuts in Dindigul they still could be said to be carrying on the business of managing agents of the Tinnevelly Cotton Press Company in Dindigul. On the facts in appears to me absolutely plain that the business they undoubtedly carried on as managing agents of the Tinnevelly Cotton Press Company was entirely carried on in Madras and the fact that the Bombay Company lent certain persons to the Tinnevelly Cotton Press Company to help them in their business of ginning and pressing cotton and decorticating groundnuts does not affect the matter. The salaries of the persons so lent are in every case ultimately paid by the Tinnevelly Cotton Press Company and not by the Bombay Company though the Bombay Company made themselves responsible for the amount in the first instance. In these circumstances, it appears to me impossible to contend that their business as managing agents is carried on anywhere except in Madras where the whole of the accounts are kept and adjusted, and where the remuneration by way of commission for managing the Tinnevelly Cotton Press Company is paid.

The second point in the case raises a question of very considerable interest. The plaintiff Company here sued for a return inter alia of moneys that they had paid under protest more than six months before the action was brought, and it is contended that the recovery of such payments is time-barred by reason of Sect. 350 of the Act of 1920. The industry of counsel put before us practically every decided case both English and Indian. I may clear the ground of two points at once. In the first place it cannot be contended, as was at one time suggested, that payment under protest can affect the position of the person who is being paid. Its value is to safeguard the position of the person who makes the payment and to ensure that it cannot be said that the payment he made was a voluntary one; but it does not raise any obligation on the part of the person who accepts the payment to return it if it turns out ultimately that the money was not due. The question whether there is an obligation to return it has to be determined on grounds altogether independent of whether the payment was made with or without protest.

It is clear that actions such as the present are in the nature of English actions for money had and received and we were taken through a long series of authorities as to what the real nature of this action in the English Common Law Courts was, culminating in the judgment of the House of Lords in the well-known case of Sinclair v. Brougham. The history of the matter will be found in the judgment of Lord Sumner in that case. There the suggestion was made that it was erroneous to suppose that the cause of action was really in assumpsit which would rest upon an implied or imputed contract to return the money to the person to whom it was proved properly to belong but that Lord Mansfield in Moses v. Macferlan(2), had rested it on an equitable doctrine independent of assumpsit which made the return of the money obligatory ex aequo et bono. That doctrine was demolished by Lord Sumner and it may be regarded as definitely established that in the English Common Law Courts, the cause of action is exclusively founded on an assumpsit or its modern equivalent. It would be a barren display of learning to enquire how far it is true to say that an action in assumpsit in its origin really sounded in tort, for the simple reason that I am quite prepared to concede that if an action for money had and received sounds either in tort or implied contract in this country, it would be within the words of Sect. 350 of Act V of 1920 and that the plaintiff Company would be time-barred; because either form of such an action would obviously be a suit for damages or compensation within the meaning of the section. These words are peculiar to the Indian Statute. They are not found either in Sect. 21 of the Public Health Act of 1875 or Sect. 1 of the Public Authorities Protection Act of 1893 whose language is very much more general; and I am quite prepared to think that if the draftman of the Indian Act had reproduced the words of the English Statute and not added the qualification “for damages or compensation,” which has caused all the trouble in this case, these arrears could not be recovered. But there are the words which I have to deal with and the question which I have to consider is whether the Courts in India are compelled to regard a suit of this nature as confined within the limits of a suit for money had and received as known to the English Common Law. I find the highest authority for taking the contrary view, the authority of a Privy Council case binding on me namely, John v. Dodwell and Company(3). Lord Haldane there points out referring to Ceylon, “Under principles which have always obtained in Ceylon, law and equity have been administered by the same Courts as aspects of a single system, and it could never have been difficult to treat an action analogous to that for money had and received as maintainable in all cases ‘where the defendant has received money which ex aequo et bovo he ought to refund.’ If, as in Ceylon, there is no necessity to find an actual contract or to impute the fiction of a contract, inasmuch as every Court can treat the question as one not merely of contract, but of trust fund where necessary, there is no difficulty in extending the remedy to all the cases covered by the words just quoted”. I take that as being equally applicable to the Courts of British India and I take it to mean this that in Courts such as those in Ceylon and those of British India, an action for money had and received, may be treated, though the English Common Law cannot treat it, as an action founded on an equity binding on the conscience of the recipient of the money which is shown not to be his. If that be right, it follows that the remedy being an equitable one is enforceable because it is binding as ex aequo et bono on the conscience of the defendant and cannot possibly be either a suit for damages or compensation, I do not quite understand His Lordship's words “trust fund,” but it appears to me reasonably clear that as he is dealing throughout with an action for money had and received, he cannot be supposed to have intended to apply what he said merely to earmarked funds, for such do not arise in the case of actions for money had and received. I consider it broadly as coming to this, that Lord Haldane considers that for Ceylon and therefore for India, where there has never been any divergence between equitable and legal remedies, it is permissible to apply the suggestion of Lord Mansfield, whether it offends against the Common Law of England or not to such actions when brought in India. In this view, the suit for the recovery of the payments made outside the limitation period of six months is unaffected by the provisions of Sect. 350 and neither the necessity for the notice nor the limitation of six months contained in that section applies.

I may add that a tax, the amount of which is fixed solely by the paid-up capital of the company, without reference to the amount of business done in the area of proposed assessment is one whose incidence the Courts should watch with a jealous eye. The municipalities are to get this tax without incurring any expense of enquiry into, or consequent on, the assessment on amount of business actually done. The tax no doubt is not heavy and perhaps it suits both sides to avoid the trouble of going into the actual volume of business done in the particular municipality. But the principle is a dangerous one, and it and is not difficult to imagine cases where it would inflict great injustice on the company to be taxed

The appeal will be dismissed with costs.

Madhavan Nair, J. — The plaintiff, the Bombay Company, Limited, is a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act and carries on business in Madras and elsewhere. The defendant, the Municipal Council of Dindigul, is a corporation constituted under the District Municipalities Act of 1920 and has its office at Dindigul. The defendant municipality purporting to act under Sect. 92 and E. 16, Sch. 4 of the District Municipalities Act assessed the plaintiff company to Company's tax for the half years ending 30th September 1922, 31st March, 1923, 30th September, 1923, 31st March, 1924 and 30th September, 1924, and 31st March, 1925, in the sum of Rs. 250 in respect of each half year. Under this section tax is leviable if the Company has transacted business for profit within the municipality for a specified period. The plaintiff company paid this tax under protest and filed the suit to recover the sums so paid which amount to Rs. 1,500. The contention of the plaintiff company is that it did not transact business in the municipality and therefore the tax is not leviable; the defendant on the other hand, contends that the tax is leviable as the company transacted business in Dindigul and also that the suit is barred under Sect. 350, Cl. (2) of the District Municipalities Act. The learned Judge (Beasley, J.), who heard the case overruled the contentions of the defendant and gave a decree to the plaintiff company. This appeal is against his judgment and decree.

Two questions for consideration in this appeal are:(1) Whether the defendant is entitled to levy the tax on the plaintiff company under Sect. 92 of the District Municipalities Act? and (2) Is the suit barred by limitation?

The relevant portion of Sect. 92 of the District Municipalities Act is as follows:—

“..……… every company transacting business within the municipality for profit or as a benefit society shall………pay a half-yearly tax on its paid-up capital on the scale shown in Sch. IV, if, and as soon as it has transacted business in the Municipality for a period laid down in Sect. 95.”

According to this section if the plaintiff company transacted business in the municipality for the specific period, the tax is leviable by the defendant. The question whether the plaintiff company transacted business within the municipality for profit is ultimately a question of fact depending on the evidence in each case. The question in what circumstances a company or person may be said to carry on or exercise a trade in any locality has been considered in England in various cases mainly under the Income-tax Act: the principles laid down in these cases will be very helpful’ in examining the evidence in this case. These decisions are so well known that I propose to refer only to a few of them; and further, most of these cases have been very exhaustively, if I may say so with respect, considered in a judgment of this Court in Clan Line Steamers, Limited v. Municipal Council of Coca nada. In Grainger and Son v. William Lane Gough, it was held by the House of Lords that a foreign merchant, who canvasses through agents in the United Kingdom for orders for the sale of his merchandise to customers in the United Kingdom, does not exercise a trade in the United Kingdom within the meaning of the Income-tax Acts, so long as all contracts for the sale and all deliveries of the merchandise to customers are made in a foreign country. In that case a wine merchant whose place of business was in France employed Grainger and Son who had an extensive business of their own as wine merchants, as agents for the sale of his wine in the United Kingdom. They sought orders in the name of the foreign merchant and transmitted them to him in France where he exercised his discretion as to executing these orders. It was sought to assess Grainger and Son to income-tax on the ground that they were exercising a trade in the United Kingdom. The following extract from the judgment of Lord Herschell explains the basis of the judgment:

“Taking the findings together, I think it is clear that no contracts to sell wine were ever made by the appellants on behalf of Roederer. All that they did was to transmit to him the orders received, and until he had agreed to comply or complied with them there was no contract………An order given to a merchant for the supply of goods does not of itself create any obligation. Until something is done by the person receiving the order which amounts to an acceptance, there is no contract. It is clear that the appellants in receiving an order did not accept or purport to accept it on Roederer's behalf so as to constitute a contract, and that they had no authority so to do.”

In another part of the same judgment appears the statement: “If all that a merchant does in any partciular country is to solicit orders, I do not think he can reasonably be said to exercise or carry on his trade in that country. What is done there is only ancillary to the exercise of his trade in the country where he buys or makes, stores and sells his goods.” Enchsen v. Last is another case where similar principles have been enunciated. In Lovell and Christmas, Limited v. Commissioner of Taxes(4) the following observation appears in the judgment of the Privy Council: “One rule is easily deducible from the decided cases: The trade or business in question in such cases ordinarily consists in making certain classes of contracts and in carrying those contracts into operation with a view to profit; and the rule seems to be that where such contracts, forming as they do the essence of the business or trade, are habitually made, there a trade or business is carried on within the meaning of the Income-tax.” Acts, so as to render the profits liable to Income-tax.” See also San Paulo (Brazilian) Railway Company, Limited v. Carter. All the well-known cases on this point have been discussed, as I have already pointed out, under two heads, the tax cases and the jurisdiction cases in Clan Line Steamers Ltd.…Plaintiffs; v. Municipal Council Of Cocanada…Defendants., which is a decision on the District Municipalities Act of 1884. It was held in that case that the shipping company which was sought to be assessed at Cocanada was not exercising any trade in Cocanada so as to be liable to be taxed because the freight earning contracts entered into by the company were not entered into at the Port of Cocanada.

According to these decisions, provided they are applicable to the circumstances of the case before us, what we have to find out mainly from the evidence is as to where the contracts relating to the business of this company are habitually made. If the contracts are made elsewhere, then the company cannot be taxed for transacting business in Dindigul. But it is argued by Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar for the appellant that these tests should not be applied in judging the evidence in this case because they were decided under the English Income-tax Acts and they were concerned with the interpretation of the words “exercising a trade for profit” or “carrying on a trade” and not with the meaning of the term “transacting business” which are the words used in the District Municipalities Act. He also relies on the explanation to Sect. 92 of the Act to show that these decisions are no longer applicable in considering cases arising under the section. In support of his first argument he has referred us to the decision in Smith v. Anderson and a few other cases to show that the word “business” has a more extensive signification than “trade” and that, if there is evidence to show that some kind of business was done in Dindigul such as buying raw cotton, etc., though the contracts with regard to such purchase are made in Madras, then the company must be considered to be transacting business in Dindigul and not in Madras. It is difficult to accept this distinction. What we have to see under the Act is whether the company transacts business for profit in Dindigul. The place where the business is transacted is the place where the tax is leviable. Whether the words are “carrying on business” or “exercising a trade” or transacting business” I think all must be considered to be used in the same sense and therefore the principles deducible from the decisions are equally applicable to the present case. The second argument that these principles are inapplicable because of explanation to Sect. 92 of the District Municipalities Act presents some difficulty. It is obvious that the intention of the legislature in enacting the explanation, was to nullify the effect of the decision in Clan Line Steamers Ltd.…Plaintiffs; v. Municipal Council Of Cocanada…Defendants. and also generally to exclude the operation of the English cases referred to. But I think the language employed has not succeeded in fully carrying out that intention. According to the explanation, if a company employs a servant for transacting business within the municipality such company shall be deemed to transact business within the municipality and such servant shall be liable for the tax in respect of the company's business whether or not he has power to make binding contracts. Even so, it is the company that is sought to be made liable for the tax and in order to make it liable for the tax, the agent or servant should be employed for the purpose of transacting business within the municipality for profit and so we are thrown back again to the consideration of the question, what is meant by “transacting” business. The mere employment of the agent to do some work for the company within the municipality will not, I think, make the company liable to pay the tax so long as the effective management of the business, its administration and control are vested elsewhere; otherwise the mere soliciting of an order by an agent in any particular case will make the company of which he is the representative, liable for the company's tax in that case and this will clearly be against the accepted notions of the commercial community here and elsewhere. In my view the section and its explanation should not be interpreted to lead to this result.

As regards the evidence, there can be no doubt in this case that all the business contracts are concluded at Madras and that the whole business of the company is effectively controlled from there.

On the evidence in the case I agree with the conclusion of Beasley, J., that no tax should have been levied on the plaintiff company by the municipality as it was not transacting any business within the municipality during the period in question. It therefore follows that the sum which the plaintiff seeks to recover from the defendant was collected by the municipality wrongfully under the provisions of the District Municipalties Act.

The next question for consideration is whether the plaintiff's suit is barred by limitation under Sect. 350, Cls. (1) and (2), of the District Municipalities Act. If the section applies, the suit for the refund of the tax paid for the first five instalments will clearly be barred, and it will be maintainable only with respect to the last instalment. According to Sect. 350, Cl. (1), “No suit for damages or compensation shall be instituted against the municipal council………in respect of any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of this Act or any rule………regulation or order made under it or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of this Act, etc.” unless some formalities are complied with and Cl. (2) of that Act states “Every such suit shall be commenced within six months after the date on which the cause of action arose………” It is argued on behalf of the plaintiff-company that the present suit is not one for damages or compensation as mentioned in Cl. (1) of Sect. 350 and therefore is not barred under Cl. (2) of that section. The defendant argues contra.

The question is whether the present suit is one for damages or compensation within the meaning of Sect. 350, Cl. (1) of the Act. I may state at once that I have not found the question an easy one to decide and that no decisions directly bearing on the question have been brought to our notice. The section is evidently modelled upon the provisions of Sect. 1 of the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893, i.e, 56 and 57 Vict., Ch. 61, but there is one striking difference between the wording of the provisions of the two enactments. In speaking of the proceedings against persons with reference to acts done in execution of statutory or other public duty, Sect. 1 of the English Act refers to “any action, prosecution or other proceeding” and Cl. (a) states that “such action shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within six months next after the act, etc.” whereas in speaking of such proceedings. Sect. 350, Cl. (1) uses the expression “Suit for damages or compensation.” While the English Act gives exemption for all action, prosecution or other proceeding unless commenced within six months next after the act complained against, the Indian enactment confines its operation to “suits for damages or compensation.” With the words of the English enactment “any action, prosecution or proceeding” before it, why the Indian Legislature in enacting the District Municipalities Act chose to use the expression “suits for damages or compensation “in Sect. 350, Cl. (1) of the Act, it is not easy to conjecture. It may be, as contended for by the appellants, that the legislature thought that all actions of the kind that we are dealing with, namely, those brought against public authorities: for acts done in execution of their authority might be brought under the description “suits for damages or compensation” in which case there can be no difference between the English Law and the Indian Law; or it may be, as contended for by the respondent that the Indian Legislature confined the operation of the section to what are strictly called “suits for damages or compensation” thus deliberately excluding from its scope other kinds of suits which do not strictly come within that description. In this connection, it is interesting to note that in speaking of actions which may be brought against the Municipal Council, etc., for acts done in pursuance of or in execution of the Act, Sect. 261 (1) of the old Act (that is Act IV of 1884) states that “no action shall be brought, etc.” thus bringing within its scope all descriptions of actions as under the English law.

Decisions of the English Courts under the Public Authorities Protection Act and Sect. 264 of the Public Health Act which it repealed, Waterhouse v. Keen, Selmes v. Judge Midland Railway Co. v. Withington Local Board, Cree v. The Vestry of St. Pancras, Lyles v. Southend-on-Sea Corporation(5), Bradford Corporation v. Myres(6) were referred to, for showing that actions of the kind we are dealing with in this case are either actions in tort or in contract and therefore should be considered as “suits for damages or compensation.” (See also paragraph 700 of Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 23 at page 346). In view of the express language used in the Indian enactment, I do not think a discussion of the question whether an action of this kind would come within the description of the old form of action known to English Law as an action in assumpsit or whether the claim is one in tort will yield much profitable result. It is conceded and it is clear from the English cases referred to above that actions for the recovery of money wrongfully collected by local authorities are actions for money had and received and that, in understanding the nature of such actions, we have to look more to their substance than to their form. Lord Mansfield in the well-known case of Moses v. Macferlan stated that the action for money had and received is founded on the equity of the plaintiff's case and that the action is an equitable one to recover back the money which ought not in justice to be kept by the defendant. The learned judge pointed out that the action is maintainable for money which ex aequo et bono the defendants are to refund. The money that has been wrongfully collected by the defendant from the plaintiff is to be regarded as a trust fund which the defendant is in equity bound to refund to the plaintiff. This is in substance the essence of the action for money had and received, though it is not clear as to what extent Lord Mansfield intended to import the equitable principles within the domain of the common law action. [See Viscount Haldane's comment in John v. Dodwell and Company on Lord Sumner's view in Sinclair v. Brougham(9)]. However that may be, the Privy Council has, in John v. Dodwell and Company a case from Ceylon pointed out that where law and equity are administered as parts of a single system, actions for money had and received may be considered as equitable actions; and if so, it must follow that it is not correct to describe them as suits for damages or compensation. There can be no doubt that what has been said with reference to Courts in Ceylon will apply equally to Courts in India as well, inasmuch as in these Courts also law and equity are administered as parts of a single system. The remarks of Viscount Haldane in John v. Dodwell and Company relevant to the present question are as follows: “For under principles which have always obtained in Ceylon, law and equity have been administered by the same Courts as aspects of a single system, and it could never have been difficult to treat an action analogous to that for money had and received as maintainable in all cases ‘where the defendant has received money which ex aequo et bono he ought to refund.’ If, as in Ceylon, there is no necessity to find an actual contract, or to impute the fiction of a contract, inasmuch as every Court can treat the question as one not merely of contract, but of trust fund where necessary, there is no difficulty in extending the remedy to all the cases covered by the words just quoted”. In view of these observations it must be held that the plaintiff's suit for recovery of the money wrongfully collected by the defendant cannot be described as a suit for damages or compensation being essentially an equitable action for money had and received and that therefore the bar of limitation prescribed by Sect. 350, Cl. 2 of the District Municipalities Act does not apply and the suit is not barred by limitation as regards the refund of any one of the plaint instalments.

I would also add that having regard to the meaning of the words “damages and compensation” and also the relief claimed in the plaint, viz., a refund of the amount of the tax overpaid, it is hardly correct to call the plaintiff's suit one for damages or compensation.

In the result the appeal is dismissed with costs.

N. R. R.Appeal dismissed.