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Muthukumarappa Ethan... v. Appavoo Nadar And Se...
Structured Summary of the Opinion (Sir Lionel Leach, C.J.)
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellants and the fourth respondent were managers of the communal lands of the village of Natarajapuram (also called Ethandarpatti) in Trichinopoly taluk. They filed a suit in the Court of the District Munsif of Trichinopoly seeking a declaration that a decree obtained in Original Suit No. 82 of 1929 was not binding upon them or upon the other ryots of Natarajapuram.
Original Suit No. 82 of 1929 was brought by defendants 1 to 4 (as representatives of Arasankudi) against four ryots of Natarajapuram (as representatives of that village) to recover Rs. 1,667-4-0 said to be due in respect of the construction of a road connecting the two villages. The two villages had both asked the Taluk Board authorities to construct the road and had agreed to contribute to the cost; the arrangement between the villages resulted in Arasankudi paying the full amount and Natarajapuram reimbursing only Rs. 500 of its share, leaving a balance claimed by Arasankudi.
The District Munsif received the plaint on 20 February 1929 and numbered it Original Suit No. 82 of 1929. Two applications accompanied the plaint: one for permission to the plaintiffs to sue on behalf of Arasankudi, and one for an order allowing the defendants to be sued as representatives of Natarajapuram. The District Munsif ordered notice to be issued to the defendants and a general notification published in the District Gazette. On 19 April 1929 the District Munsif granted leave to the plaintiffs to sue as representatives of Arasankudi and directed that the case proceed ex parte as to the third defendant (who was absent). The third defendant later applied successfully to set aside the ex parte order and a written statement was filed; all defendants ultimately filed written statements.
On 2 April 1931 the plaintiffs and three defendants (first, second and fourth) filed statements consenting to a decree for Rs. 1,250 and costs against the communal properties of Natarajapuram, with liberty to proceed in execution against those properties. The third defendant did not join but filed a memorandum consenting to the suit proceeding against the other three and asking for his name to be removed. On 7 April the District Munsif entered a decree in accordance with those statements.
The appellants filed the present suit on 4 January 1933 under Order XXI, rule 63, of the Code of Civil Procedure, objecting to the attachment of the communal lands of Natarajapuram in execution of the decree in Original Suit No. 82 of 1929. Their objection to the execution (attachment) had been overruled by the District Munsif, who decreed the suit on grounds that: (i) the earlier suit had not complied with Order I, rule 8; and (ii) the Court had no power to pass a decree against the three remaining defendants as representatives after the third defendant had disappeared without an express order directing the suit to proceed against the remaining representatives. The District Munsif's decree was confirmed on appeal by the Subordinate Judge. The defendants then appealed to this Court, and Somayya, J. dismissed the appellants' suit holding the former decree to be binding; the present appeal is from Somayya, J.'s judgment under clause 15 of the Letters Patent.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the decree in Original Suit No. 82 of 1929 is binding on the appellants (i.e., whether the former suit complied with Order I, rule 8 of the Code so as to attract res judicata under section 11, Explanation VI).
- Whether, after one representative defendant (the third defendant) dropped out, the Court had power to pass a decree against the remaining representative defendants without an express order permitting the suit to proceed against them.
- Whether the Court can permit persons to be sued in a representative capacity in respect of a mere debt (i.e., whether a representative suit is permissible for enforcement of a village debt).
- Whether the defendants in the former suit had power to enter into a compromise which would bind those whom they represented.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The appellants contended that the requirements of Order I, rule 8 were not properly complied with in Original Suit No. 82 of 1929 because the permission to sue in a representative capacity was given after public notice had already been published; counsel (Mr. Muthukrishna Ayyar) argued that the permission must precede publication and, because the permission was granted after publication, a fresh notice was required and the failure to issue one vitiated the proceedings. He relied on a passage from Kumaravelu Chettiar v. Ramaswami Ayyar emphasizing the Court's "imperative duty" to direct notice when permission is given.
- The appellants argued that the Court had no power to pass a decree against the three remaining defendants when the third defendant had disappeared from the suit and that an express order permitting the suit to proceed against the remaining representatives was required.
- The appellants argued that a representative suit is not permissible in respect of a mere debt, and therefore the plaintiffs in the former suit ought not to have been allowed to sue the defendants in a representative capacity for the claimed debt.
- The appellants contended that the defendants in the former suit had no power to enter into the compromise which produced the decree and so the decree could not bind those whom the defendants purported to represent.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Kumaravelu Chettiar v. Ramaswami Ayyar (Privy Council) | That a decision in a former representative suit does not operate as res judicata under section 11, Explanation VI unless the former suit was instituted in compliance with Order I, rule 8 (permission to sue in representative capacity and notice as prescribed). Also recognized a narrow exception where omission to comply may be excused if bona fide, inadvertent and caused no injury. | The Court read the judgment in full and held that although permission ideally should have been granted before notice, non-compliance was not fatal here because no person from Natarajapuram applied to be made a party, the villagers had notice and were prepared to let the suit proceed with the chosen representatives, and no one was prejudiced. Therefore there was sufficient compliance with Order I, rule 8 in the circumstances of the case. |
| Venkatakrishna Reddi v. Srinivasachariar (and Subbayya Naiker v. Sankarappa Naiker) | Holdings (as cited) that where sanction is given eo nomine to certain persons to institute or defend a suit and one of them dies, the right does not survive and heirs cannot come on the record unless the order can be construed as conferring that right; the proper procedure is for remaining persons to apply to the Court for directions. | The Court noted these decisions (Ramesam, J.) but observed that in the present case it was unnecessary to decide whether such directions are always essential because all parties (including the third defendant) were willing that the decree be entered against the remaining representatives, and by entering the decree the Court effectively permitted the suit to proceed against them. |
| Krishnamachariar v. Chinnammal | That persons conducting a suit on behalf of themselves and others with the leave of the Court can enter into a compromise binding those whom they represent. | The Court relied on this decision to hold that the defendants in the former suit who were sued in a representative capacity could lawfully enter into the compromise which resulted in the decree, and that the compromise bound those represented. |
| Mahalingam Chettiar v. Anthony Nadar (unreported) | Same principle as Krishnamachariar v. Chinnammal regarding the binding effect of compromise entered by persons conducting a suit with the court's leave on those they represent. | The Court referenced this unreported bench decision alongside Krishnamachariar v. Chinnammal to support the conclusion that a compromise by representative parties binds those represented. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded issue by issue, relying closely on the text of Order I, rule 8 and on precedents cited in the opinion.
On the compliance with Order I, rule 8: the Court quoted the rule and examined the appellants' submission that permission to sue in a representative capacity must be granted before public notice is published. The Court acknowledged that, strictly speaking, the District Munsif should have granted the permissions contemporaneously with admission of the plaint, but concluded that the grant of permission after the public advertisement did not prejudice anyone in the present case. The Court relied upon the fuller context of the Privy Council decision in Kumaravelu Chettiar v. Ramaswami Ayyar to show that an omission to comply with the rule need not be fatal where the omission was inadvertent, bona fide and caused no injury; given that the villagers had notice and nobody applied to be made a party, the Court found "sufficient compliance" with Order I, rule 8.
On the power to decree against the remaining representatives after one dropped out: the Court considered earlier bench decisions (Ramesam, J.) holding that sanction given eo nomine may not survive the death or disappearance of an individual and that the remaining parties should apply for directions. However, the Court found it unnecessary to decide the general question because in this case all relevant parties (including the third defendant) were willing that a decree be entered against the other three representatives; by entering the decree, the Court in effect permitted the suit to proceed against the remaining defendants. Thus the appellants' objection on this ground failed.
On whether representative suits can be used to recover a debt: Somayya, J.'s view (adopted by the Court) was that the appellants should not be permitted to maintain the objection. The Court observed that permission had been given to sue in a representative capacity and that the plea had not been raised in the plaint. Moreover, because the suit sought enforcement of a debt said to be due by the whole village in connection with construction of a road for the benefit of all villagers, it was difficult to see why the defendants could not be sued as representatives, as otherwise every inhabitant would have to be joined.
On the power to compromise: the Court relied on two bench decisions of this Court (Krishnamachariar v. Chinnammal and the unreported Mahalingam Chettiar v. Anthony Nadar) holding that persons conducting a suit on behalf of themselves and others with leave of Court can enter into a compromise binding those whom they represent. Applying that principle, the Court concluded that the compromise recorded in the former suit was valid and binding.
Holding and Implications
APPEAL DISMISSED WITH COSTS.
Holding (core ruling): The Court dismissed the appeal and held that the decree in Original Suit No. 82 of 1929 was binding on the appellants. The Court found there was sufficient compliance with Order I, rule 8 in the circumstances, that the Court validly permitted the suit to proceed against the remaining representatives after the third defendant removed himself, that a representative suit could be maintained in respect of the village debt claimed, and that the compromise reached bound those represented.
Implications: The direct consequence is that the appellants' challenge to the earlier decree fails and the decree entered in Original Suit No. 82 of 1929 stands; the appeal has been dismissed with costs. The opinion does not set out any broader or novel rule of law beyond its application of established authorities and does not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond the reasoning applied to the facts of this case.
Sir Lionel Leach, C.J:— The case for the appellants is completely devoid of merit, but questions of law have been raised and it is necessary to consider them.
The appellants and the fourth respondent are the managers of the communal lands of the village of Natarajapuram (also known by the name of Ethandarpatti) in the Trichinopoly taluk. They sued in the Court of the District Munsif of Trichinopoly for a declaration that the decree obtained in Original Suit No. 82 of 1929 was not binding upon them or upon the other ryots of this village. In that suit defendants 1 to 4, as the representatives of the village of Arasankudi, sued four ryots of the village of Natarajapuram, as the representatives of that village, to recover a sum of Rs. 1,667-4-0 which they claimed was due to the villagers of Arasankudi by the villagers of Natarajapuram in respect of the construction of a road connecting the two villages with the main road. Both the villagers had asked the Taluk Board authorities to construct the road and promised that they would contribute one-third of the cost, if the Taluk Board would bear the rest. It was afterwards arranged that the two villages should contribute a total sum of Rs. 4,000 which was to be borne by them equally. At a later stage it was agreed between the villagers of Arasankudi and the villagers of Natarajapuram that the Arasankudi villagers should pay Rs. 2,250 of the Rs. 4,000 and the villagers of Natarajapuram Rs. 1,750. The villagers of Arasankudi paid the full amount and the villagers of Natarajapuram reimbursed them to the extent of Rs. 500, but they failed to pay the balance, and in consequence defendants 1 to 4, suing on behalf of all the villagers of Arasankudi, instituted the suit to recover the balance.
The District Munsif took the plaint on his file on 20th February 1929 and numbered the suit as Original Suit No. 82 of 1929. With the plaint were filed two applications, one for an order permitting the plaintiffs to sue on behalf of the villagers of Arasankudi and the other for an order allowing them to sue the defendants as the representatives of the village of Natarajapuram. Having numbered the plaint, the District Munsif directed that notice should issue to the defendants and that a general notification should be published in the District Gazette. The defendants were served, and the notification was duly published. After this had been done, namely, on 19th April 1929, the District Munsif granted leave to the plaintiffs, as representing Arasankudi, to sue the defendants, as representing Natarajapuram. In this order he pointed out that there was no opposition to the application. He also directed that as the third defendant was absent the case should proceed against him ex parte. Subsequently the third defendant filed an application for an order setting aside the ex parte order which was passed against him on 19th April 1929 and asked for permission to file a written statement. This application was granted. All the defendants filed written statements.
On 2nd April 1931 the plaintiffs and the first, second and fourth defendants, filed in Court a statement agreeing that a decree for Rs. 1,250 and costs should be passed against the communal properties of the village of Natarajapuram with full liberty to the plaintiffs to proceed in execution against these properties. The third defendant did not join in this application. In conjunction with the plaintiffs, he filed a memorandum stating that he was not willing to continue on the record as one of the representatives of the village of Natarajapuram and that the plaintiffs consented to the suit being proceeded with against the first, second and fourth defendants as the representatives of Natarajapuram. In these circumstances the asked that his name be removed from the suit. On 7th April the District Munsif passed a decree in accordance with the terms agreed upon by the parties and set out in these two statements.
The suit out of which this appeal arises was filed by the appellants on 4th January 1933 in accordance with the provisions of Order XXI, rule 63, of the Code of Civil Procedure. The decree-holders in Original Suit No. 82 of 1929 had attached the communal lands of Natarajapuram in execution of their decree and the appellants' objection to the attachment had been overruled. The District Munsif decreed the suit on the following grounds:—(i) In the earlier suit the requirements of Order I, rule 8, had not been complied with, and (ii) as the third defendant had disappeared from that suit the Court had no power to pass a decree against the three remaining defendants as the representatives of Natarajapuram without an order expressly directing the suit to proceed against them. On appeal the decree of the District Munsif was confirmed. The defendants then appealed to this Court. Somayya, J. held that the decree which had been passed in the former suit was binding upon the plaintiffs and consequently dismissed their suit with costs. This appeal is from the judgment of the learned Judge under clause 15 of the Letters Patent.
As before Somayya, J., the appellants have raised four contentions. The first two are the contentions which the District Munsif and the Subordinate Judge accepted. They also say that the Court has no power to pass an order allowing persons to be sued in a representative capacity when the claim is upon a mere debt. Further they say that the decree in the former suit is not binding upon them because the defendants had no power to enter into a compromise.
Order I, rule 8, reads as follows:—
“(1) Where there are numerous persons having the same interest in one suit, one or more of such persons may, with the permission of the Court sue or be sued, or may defend, in such suit, on behalf of or for the benefit of all persons so interested. But the Court shall in such case give, at the plaintiff's expense, notice of the institution of the suit to all such persons either by personal service or where from the number of persons or any other cause such service is not reasonably practicable, by public advertisement, as the Court in each case may direct.
(2) Any person on whose behalf or for whose benefit a suit is instituted or defended under sub-rule (1) may apply to the Court to be made a party to such suit.”
Mr. Muthukrishna Ayyar on behalf of the appellants says that when the plaint is first filed it is incumbent upon the Court to pass an order permitting the suit to be brought in a representative capacity or the defendants to be sued as representatives, if the allegations in the plaint justify the order. After permission has been given, it is incumbent upon the Court to issue public notice that the suit has been instituted so that other persons may apply to be added as defendants. Here the permission to the plaintiffs in the former suit to sue, as the representatives of the Arasankudi village, the defendants named therein, as the representatives of Natarajapuram village, was granted after the publication in the District Gazette of the notice that the suit had been filed. Consequently Mr. Muthukrishna Ayyar argues that as the rule contemplates permission before publication of the notice it was necessary for the District Munsif to issue a fresh notice and his failure to do so vitiated the proceedings. In this connection he has pointed to the following passage in the judgment of the Privy Council in Kumaravelu Chettiar v. Ramaswami Ayyar:—
“On such permission being given it becomes the imperative duty of the Court to direct notice to be given to the absent parties in such of the ways prescribed as the Court in each case may require; while liberty is reserved to any represented person to apply to be made a party to the suit.”
Emphasis is laid on the words “imperative duty”. Divorced from its context this passage does give support to the appellants, but when the judgment is read as a whole it is quite clear that the Judicial Committee did not intend to lay down a rule that non-compliance with the strict wording of the rule was fatal to the case.
In Kumaravelu Chettiar v. Ramaswami Ayyar the question was whether the decision in a former suit operated as res judicata when no permission had been sought or granted under Order I, rule 8. The Privy Council held that in a representative suit the decision in a former suit does not operate as res judicata by reason of section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Explanation VI, unless the former suit was instituted in compliance with Order I, rule 8, of the present Code. By compliance was meant the institution of the suit with the permission of the Court after the notice as prescribed by Order I, rule 8, had been given. But Lord Blanesburgh in delivering the judgment of the Board said that their Lordships would not exclude the possibility of a decree being within the benefit of Explanation VI of section 11 where the litigation having been bona fide the omission to comply with the conditions of the rule had been inadvertent and no injury from the omission had been sustained by the plaintiff in the second suit. It was, however, imperative to have it recognized that the burden upon a defendant seeking a ruling to that effect was heavy indeed. No encouragement should, they thought, be offered to litigants if they would obtain the full benefit of Order I, rule 8, to be careless in securing full compliance with the conditions of the rule, both in the letter and in the spirit.
The object of Order I, rule 8, is to permit a person who has an interest in the subject-matter of the suit to apply to the Court to be made a defendant. He may not be convinced that the defendants named in the plaint, will defend the suit properly as the representatives of all persons concerned. In this case the District Munsif, strictly speaking, should have passed orders on the two applications filed by the plaintiffs in the former suit when he admitted their plaint and left the publication of the notice of the suit to a later stage, but the fact that he gave to the plaintiffs, as the representatives of Arasankudi, permission to sue the defendants, as the representatives of Natarajapuram, after he had notified by public advertisement the institution of the suit prejudiced no one. Any person residing in Natarajapuram could have applied to be made a defendant, but no one chose to do so. The villagers of Natarajapuram had notice of the institution of the suit and they were prepared to allow it to proceed with the defendants chosen by the plaintiffs. Consequently we hold that there was sufficient compliance with Order I, rule 8.
We consider that there is no greater force in the appellants' contention that the Court was not entitled to pass a decree against the first, second and fourth defendants, because it had allowed the third defendant to drop out. Here Mr. Muthukrishna Ayyar has relied on the judgment of Ramesam, J. in Venkatakrishna Reddi v. Srinivasachariar and Subbayya Naiker v. Sankarappa Naiker(2). In the former of these two cases Ramesam, J. held that where sanction is given by a Court to certain persons eo nomine to institute or defend a suit and one of them dies, the right does not survive and therefore his heirs cannot come on the record unless the order granting the sanction can be construed as conferring the right to do so. He considered that the proper procedure was for the remaining persons to apply to the Court for directions and it was for the Court to decide whether it would permit them to continue to prosecute or defend the suit or whether it would insist upon the original number, in which case it should give directions in this respect. The judgment in Subbaya Naicker v. Sankarappa Naicker was to the same effect. Somayya, J. considered these two decisions and in his opinion it was not incumbent upon the remaining parties to apply to the Court for directions. The suit could lawfully proceed without them. It is not necessary for the purpose of this appeal to decide whether the Court's directions are necessary or not, because it is quite clear that all parties, including the third defendant, were willing that there should be a decree against the first, second and fourth defendants in their representative capacity. In passing the decree, which it did, the Court in fact permitted the suit to proceed against the remaining defendants.
Somayya, J. considered that the appellants ought not to be allowed to raise the plea that there cannot be a representative suit in respect of a debt and we agree with him. Permission had been given to the plaintiffs in the former suit to sue in a representative capacity and it may be added that the plea was not raised in the plaint. It may also be pointed out that the suit was a claim to enforce payment of a debt due by the whole village in connection with the construction of a road for the benefit of all the villagers and it is difficult in such circumstances to see why the defendants could not be sued in a representative capacity. Otherwise it would mean the joining of every inhabitant of the village.
The last contention, namely, that the defendants in the former suit had no power to compromise can be disposed of in a few words. There are two Bench decisions of this Court which say that persons conducting a suit on behalf of themselves and others with leave of the Court can enter into a compromise so as to bind those whom they represent and the same principle must apply when the defendants are sued in a representative capacity. The first case is Krishnamachariar v. Chinnammal and the second, the unreported case of Mahalingam Chettiar v. Anthony Nadar
The appeal will be dismissed with costs.
G.R
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