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Arunachallam Chettiar v. Namakkal Union Board

Madras High Court
Nov 25, 1927
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Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petition challenges a decree of the District Munsif of Namakkal which dismissed the plaintiff's suit seeking a refund of a portion of profession tax paid to the Union Board of Namakkal. The plaintiff (a money-lender) contended that he was assessed on his gross income for the year, whereas profession tax should have been levied on his net income; accordingly he sought repayment of any excess collected. The Union Board raised several pleas, including (1) that the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain such a suit, and (2) that the Board was justified in using gross income as the basis for assessing profession tax. The District Munsif held that under the Local Boards Act gross income was the basis of taxation and therefore the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The present application is to revise that decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the expression "professional income" in Section 93 of the Local Boards Act means net income (income after legitimate charges) or gross income.
  2. Whether a Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit seeking to set aside an assessment where the basis of taxation adopted by a Local Board is challenged, notwithstanding the statutory provision barring suits to recover sums collected under the Act (Section 228).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Mr. Seshagiri Sastri)

  • The term "professional income" in Section 93 of the Local Boards Act should be read as net income, not gross income.
  • Because the petitioner is a money-lender who uses both his own funds and borrowed capital, the correct taxable basis is gross income minus legitimate business charges, including interest on borrowed capital.
  • The Act does not define "income"; where the Act uses "gross income" in one rule (Rule 8) but "income" in another (Rule 9), the terms must be distinguished according to context — supporting a construction of "income" as net income.
  • When "income" is the basis of taxation, it should be construed in its ordinary sense as the benefit accruing to a person (i.e., gross receipts less legitimate deductions).

Respondent's/Union Board's Arguments (Mr. T. M. Krishnaswami Aiyar)

  • The profession tax is levied because a person carries on a profession; thus the Board was justified in taking gross income as the basis for taxation.
  • Reliance on a decision (C.R.P. No. 294 of 1925) of this Court to contend that unless there was a contravention of natural justice or rules of procedure by the Board, a Civil Court has no jurisdiction to question the Board's order.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Subramaniam v. The President, Municipal Commission, Madras (1913) M.W.N. 935 Held (by Shephard and Boddam, JJ.) that the relevant word "income" should be taken to mean net income. The Court noted this earlier authority as supporting the view that "income" should be treated as net income.
Municipal Council of Mangalore v. The Cordial Bail Press, Mangalore (1903) I.L.R. 27 M 547 : 14 M.L.J. 410 (P.C.) Considered meaning of "income" in a municipal statute and held that "income" means net income (profits), not gross takings. The Court relied on this decision as a fully discussed authority that "income" denotes profits (net income), and used it as a primary precedent for construing "income" in the Local Boards Act.
Lawless v. Sullivan (1881) L.R. 6 A C 373 (Privy Council) Observed that "income" in a taxation context should be understood in its natural sense as the balance of gain over loss (i.e., net income). The Court cited the Privy Council's reasoning (quoted in the Municipal Council of Mangalore decision) to support the proposition that "income" ordinarily denotes net benefit (profits).
C.R.P. No. 294 of 1925 (decision of this Court) Held that where a Board did not contravene the provisions of the Act or the rules, a Civil Court has no jurisdiction to question the Board's order. The Court distinguished that case: it agreed that where the Board's procedure and provisions are complied with the Civil Court may be precluded, but here the challenge is to the very basis of assessment (income vs. gross income), and therefore the Civil Court can entertain the suit.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise analysis restricted to the materials and reasoning in the opinion:

  1. Textual and contextual construction:
    • The Act uses both the term "income" (in Section 93 and Schedule 4, Rule 9) and the phrase "gross income" (in Rule 8 for companies). The Court reasoned that the legislature's separate use of "gross income" in one provision and "income" in another indicates an intended distinction between the two terms.
    • Therefore the Court was unwilling to accept the argument that "income" in the Act must necessarily mean gross income; instead, in ordinary parlance "income" denotes what actually benefits the person (i.e., net income after legitimate charges).
  2. Reliance on precedent:
    • The Court surveyed earlier authorities. It noted that Subramaniam v. The President, Municipal Commission, Madras reflected an opinion that "income" meant net income.
    • The Court gave considerable weight to Municipal Council of Mangalore v. The Cordial Bail Press (and to the Privy Council decision in Lawless v. Sullivan relied upon there), which held that "income" when applied to commercial business should be understood in its natural sense as the balance of gain over loss (profits), not gross receipts.
  3. Jurisdictional question:
    • The respondent relied on a decision (C.R.P. No. 294 of 1925) to argue that Civil Courts lack jurisdiction to question Board orders unless procedural requirements were violated. The Court distinguished that authority: where the Board's procedural obligations are met, the remedy may be different, but where the very basis of assessment (the legislative meaning of "income") is in question, the Civil Court has power to consider whether the Board's basis of taxation is correct.
    • With reference to the statutory bar (Section 228, corresponding to Section 262(2) of the District Municipalities Act), the Court held that the bar does not apply to suits challenging the correctness of the basis of assessment itself; thus such a suit may be entertained in a Civil Court.
  4. Ultimate legal conclusion on construction:
    • Applying the textual distinction, ordinary meaning, and the cited precedents, the Court concluded that the word "income" in Section 93 of the Local Boards Act means net income and not gross income.
  5. Case management and outcome:
    • The Court adjourned to permit the Union Board to reconsider its assessment in the light of the Court's view. On further hearing the parties reported that the petitioner had been assessed on net income at Rs. 6 for the relevant half-year and that the matter had been settled between the parties.
    • The Court therefore did not remit the matter to the District Munsif for trial and proceeded to deal with costs and the decree.

Holding and Implications

Core Holding: The Court held that the word "income" in Section 93 of the Local Boards Act means net income (i.e., gross receipts minus legitimate business charges) and not gross income. The Court also held that a Civil Court can entertain a suit challenging the basis of assessment adopted by a Board; Section 228 does not bar a suit where the basis of assessment itself is in question.

Direct Consequence for the Parties: The petition was allowed. Because the parties settled on the basis that the petitioner had been assessed on net income at Rs. 6 for the half year, the Court directed that a decree be entered in favour of the petitioner for Rs. 74 (being Rs. 80 paid less the Rs. 6 properly payable). The petitioner was awarded the costs of the petition and the costs in the lower court.

Broader implications: The opinion sets out and applies an interpretation of "income" in the Local Boards Act consistent with earlier authorities; the decision resolves the meaning of "professional income" for the purposes of the case and clarifies that challenges to the basis of a Board's assessment may be entertained by a Civil Court. The opinion does not state any separate order establishing a new procedural rule beyond these holdings.

Show all summary ...

1. This is an application to revise the decree of the District Munsif of Namakkal dismissing the suit of the plaintiff for a refund of a portion of the profession tax paid by him to the Union Board of Namakkal. The plaintiff's case is that he, a money lender, was assessed on the gross income for the year and that he is liable to pay profession tax only on the net income and that he is entitled to be paid back the amount which was collected in excess of the amount which he was liable in law to pay. The Union Board raised several pleas to the suit One of which was as regards the jurisdiction of the court to entertain such a suit and the second was that the defendant was justified in taking the gross income as the basis for assessing profession tax. The District Munsif held that under the Local Boards Act the gross income was the basis of taxation and that the court had therefore no jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

2. The main contention of Mr. Seshagiri Sastri for the petitioner is that the expression "professional income" in Section 93 of the Local Boards Act means only the net income and not the gross income of the petitioner. The petitioner is a money lender who carries on money lending business not only with his own money but with borrowed capital and the net income therefore would be the gross income minus the charges incurred in carrying-on the business and the interest that he has to pay on the borrowed capital. The word ' income' is not defined in the act. in section 93 the expression used is "professional income." In assessing a person to profession tax the President of the Board is given the power under Schedule 4, Rule 9, of classifying the persons liable to profession tax and in the classification the income is taken as the basis. Class 1 consists of persons whose income is not less than Rs. 2,000 per mensem and there is gradation of the classification going down to not less than Rs. 25 per mensem. This classification shows that a person is to be assessed on the income actually earned by him. It is suggested by Mr. T. M. Krishnaswami Aiyar that the profession tax is levied for the purpose of carrying on the profession and therefore a person who carries on a profession is bound to pay the tax. But this argument overlooks the fact that profession tax is not levied on the basis of the income derived by a person from the profession. When income is the basis of taxation, what actually benefits the person can be called income, and not everything that comes into the business but what accrues to his benefit, that is to say, the gross income, minus the legitimate charges, would be the income of the person. It has also to be noted that in the case of companies, in Rule 8 the expression " gross income " is used. When the legislature uses the expression "gross income " in one rule and uses the word income in another rule, the court construing the Act must give the expressions the meanings which they are intended to convey in the context. I am unable to accept the contention of Mr. Krishnaswami Ayyar that the word ' income' as used in the Act could only mean gross income. If that was so, then I fail to see why in Rule 8 the word 'gross' should have been used in front of the word 'income'. This shows that the legislature made a distinction between gross income and income as such and as I have observed income could only mean in the ordinary sense, income which really benefits a person and not the gross earnings or gross takings of which only a fraction may really benefit a person. Even if there were no authorities I should be inclined to hold that the word income as used in the Local Boards Act could only mean net income for the purposes of taxation under Rule 9.

3. The question as to the meaning of the word income arose so far back as 1900 in a case Subramaniam v. The President, Municipal Commission, Madras (1913) M.W.N. 935, stated by the Presidency Magistrate for the opinion of the High Court. Shephard and Boddam, JJ., held that they were of opinion that it was the net income which should be considered. No reasons are given for the opinion although it appears from the report that the point was argued by very able counsel. But in a later judgment of this Court reported in Municipal Council of Mangalore v. The Cordial Bail Press, Mangalore (1903) I.L.R. 27 M 547 : 14 M.L.J. 410 (P.C.), this point was fully discussed. There the question was as to the meaning of the word income used in Schedule A of the District Municipalities Act of 1884. Sir Subramania Aiyar, O. C. J., and Bhashyam Aiyangar, J., held that the word income meant net income. They relied upon Lawless v. Sullivan (1881) L.R. 6 A C 373, at P. 375 (P.C) for their view that income meant net income. The Privy Council in that case observed;

The question is whether the word "income" in the enactment to be construed is to be understood in a different and what, for the purpose of taxation would be a more onerous sense.

4. After adverting to various provisions of the Act their Lordships observe that there is nothing in the enactment imposing the tax nor in the context which should induce them to construe the word "income" when applied to the income of a commercial business for a year, otherwise than in its natural and commonly accepted sense, as the balance of gain over loss.

In that case a banking concern was assessed to profession tax on the gross income. The learned Judges who decided Municipal Council of Mangalore v. The Cordial Bail Press, Mangalore (1903) I.L.R. 27 M 547 : 14 M.L.J. 410 (P.C.) observe at page 550:

We find nothing in the context in the schedule A (to the District Municipalities Act), or in any other part of the Act, which would lead to the conclusion that the word "income" is there used in the ' more' onerous sense' as contended for on behalf of the Municipality or otherwise than in its 'natural and commonly accepetd sense' as denoting the profits or not income derived from the business.

There is no other case on the point. Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar relies upon a recent decision of this Court in C. R. P. No. 294 of 1925, in support of the contention that unless there was in the decision of the Board anything contrary to natural justice or a violation of the rules which are to govern its procedure, a Civil Court has no jurisdiction to question the order of the Board. In that case Odgers and Jackson, JJ., held that the Board did not contravene any of the provisions of the Act or the rules under which the Board had to act. Here the question is not whether the Board contravened any of the provisions of the Act but whether their basis of taxation is correct or not correct. Where the basis of taxation itself is challenged I think the Civil Court has power to consider whether the basis relied upon by the Board is the correct one or not. The question of jurisdiction was raised in Municipal Council of Mangalore v. The Cordial Bail Press, Mangalore (1903) I.L.R. 27 M 547 : 14 M.L.J 410 (P.C.) and reliance was placed upon Section 262, Sub-section 2 of the District Municipalities Act. It was held the Civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit. The corresponding provision in this Act is Section 228 which is as follows:

No suit shall be brought in any court to recover an)' sum of money collected under the authority of this Act, or to recover damages on account of any assessment or collection of money made under the said authority provided that the provisions of this Act have been in substance and effect complied with.

5. It cannot be said that the provisions of the Act have been complied with when the word "income" is treated as meaning gross income and not net income. As I said when the basis of assessment is in question, the Civil Court can entertain a suit for setting aside the assessment on the ground that the basis of assessment itself is wrong and Section 228 (2) does not bar such a suit. section 93 of the present act is almost word for word for Section 93 of the District Municipalities Act of 1920, and the provisions of that section are the same as the provisions in the District Municipalities Act of 1884 with regard to profession tax. I therefore hold that the word 'income' in Section 93 of the Local Boards Act is net income and not gross income.

6. The question as to whether the case should be sent down or not will be considered after Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar ascertains from the Board whether the Board will reconsider its decision in view of the decision of this Court. If the Board would agree to revise the assessment, in the light of my decision, it would not be necessary to send the case back to the District Munsif for trial.

7. The question of costs will be considered later on.

8. Adjourned for two weeks.

9. This petition coming on again for further hearing, the Court delivered the following JUDGMENT

10. Mr. T.M. Krishnaswami Aiyar says that the petitioner, Mr. Seshagiri Sastri's client, has been assessed on the net income at Rs. 6 for the half year in question in accordance with the view expressed in my judgment. The matter having been settled between the parties it is unnecessary to send the case back for a trial by the District Munsif.

11. As regards the question of costs, Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar urges that there was no decision on the point and the Union Board acted in accordance with the legal advice which it received. I do not think that would be a ground for depriving the petitioner of his costs. The ordinary rule is that costs should follow the event unless there is some ground, which would be sufficient to deprive the successful party of his costs. I do not think in this case the petitioner has done anything to disentitle him to the costs of this litigation, I therefore allow the petition and direct that a. decree be passed in favour of the petitioner for Rs. 74, that is, Rs. 80, which he has paid, minus Rs. 6 at which he has been assessed and which he is bound to pay. He will be entitled to the costs of this petition and costs in the lower court.