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P.M.V.P Pappu Reddiar (Deceased) And Another v. S.A Pichu Ayyar

Madras High Court
Dec 7, 1937
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Factual and Procedural Background

The first defendant sued defendants 7 and 8, had their properties attached and obtained a decree in 1923. Defendants 7 and 8 sold the properties in 1924 to the second defendant under Ex. A, disclosing the attachment and undertaking to get the properties released. In 1925, pursuant to an agreement with defendants 7 and 8, the first defendant received Rs. 4,500 in full satisfaction of about Rs. 5,000 due under his decree, but failed to enter satisfaction and fraudulently proceeded to execute the decree. He caused the mortgaged properties (mortgaged to the plaintiff by the second defendant in 1927) to be put up for sale and purchased them through his clerk on 16 September 1927. The plaintiff made the statutory deposit under Order 21, Rule 89, Civil Procedure Code, got the sale set aside and brought the present suit to recover from the first defendant the amount paid into Court to avoid the sale. Varadachariar, J., and the Courts below negatived the plaintiff's claim; the present opinion is on the Letters Patent Appeal from that decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an owner who pays money to rid himself of unlawful interference (execution) may recover that money where the decree under which execution was levied had already been satisfied but not entered as satisfied.
  2. Whether a payment made under or in relation to Order 21, Rule 89, Civil Procedure Code, is excluded from the principle allowing recovery of money paid under coercion.
  3. Whether the first defendant's liability is founded in tort (as contended by the appellant) and whether that characterization affects the plaintiff's right to recover.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The first defendant's liability is founded on tort (this contention was the one pressed before the court).
  • The plaintiff is entitled to recover sums paid to defeat unlawful execution, relying on Privy Council authority and the statutory principle under Section 72 of the Indian Contract Act.
  • The present case is distinguishable from decisions upholding unconditional payments under Order 21, Rule 89 because here the decree was in fact satisfied and the decree-holder obtained money by fraud.

Respondent's Arguments

  • Reliance on the ratio decidendi of Kummakntty v. Neelakandan Nambudri and the Full Bench in Krishna Aiyar v. Arunachalam Chettiar that Order 21, Rule 89 is inconsistent with payment being made under protest or coupled with conditions.
  • Submission that where a subsisting decree and a real decree-holder exist, payments under execution cannot be recovered.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Fatima Khatoon Chowdrain v. Mahomed Jan Chowdry (1868) 12 M.I.A. 65 That payment to get rid of wrongful interference is involuntary and may be recovered by the owner. Used to support the proposition that an owner may recover money paid under compulsion; the opinion quotes the Board to show a satisfied decree disentitles respondents from retaining money.
Dulichand v. Ramkishen Singh (1881) L.R. 8 I.A. 93 : I.L.R. 7 Cal. 648 (P.C.) Payment to avoid execution is involuntary; owner entitled to recover where decree had been satisfied. Cited with Fatima Khatoon as early authority for recovery; the Board's observation that it is unreasonable for a decree-holder to retain money where the debt was already satisfied is relied upon.
Kanhaya Lal v. National Bank of India Ltd. (1913) 25 M.L.J. 104 : L.R. 40 I.A. 56 : I.L.R. 40 Cal. 598 (P.C.) Interpretation of Section 72, Indian Contract Act: 'coercion' in s.72 is to be taken in its ordinary sense and is not controlled by definition in Section 15; statutory right to recover money paid under coercion. Relied upon to show the owner's right to recover is a statutory right under Section 72, not merely an equitable principle; supports recovery in the present case.
Kanhaya Lal v. National Bank of India Ltd. (1923) 45 M.L.J. 497 : L.R. 50 I.A. 162 : I.L.R. 4 Lah. 284 (P.C.) Re-affirmation that the right is a statutory right under Section 72 of the Contract Act. Cited to confirm that circumstances giving rise to recovery constitute a statutory right enforceable by the owner.
Kummakntty v. Neelakandan Nambudri (1930) 59 M.L.J. 893 : I.L.R. 53 Mad. 943 Held that Order 21, Rule 89 is inconsistent with payment made under protest or coupled with conditions; judgment proceeded on existence of a subsisting decree and a real decree-holder. Relied on by respondent; court distinguished it because that decision assumed a subsisting decree and genuine decree-holder, whereas the present case involved a decree already discharged and fraudulently executed.
Krishna Aiyar v. Arunachalam Chettiar (1935) 69 M.L.J. 349 : I.L.R. 58 Mad. 972 (F.B.) Full Bench approval and following of Kummakntty's ratio regarding Order 21, Rule 89 and unconditional payments. Relied on by respondent; court treated it as following Kummakntty and distinguished it on the same ground of absence of a subsisting decree and presence of fraud here.
Dooli Chand v. Ram Kishen Singh (1881) L.R. 8 I.A. 93 : I.L.R. 7 Cal. 648 (P.C.) Observation that where a decree has already been satisfied, it is unreasonable for the decree-holder to retain money paid under compulsion. Quoted to reinforce the view that receipt of money under a satisfied decree disentitles the decree-holder to retain it; supports plaintiff's claim.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by identifying established law from the Privy Council and subsequent decisions that an owner who pays money to rid himself of wrongful interference can recover it. It noted that this rule rests upon Section 72 of the Indian Contract Act as a statutory right, and that 'coercion' in that section must be understood in its ordinary sense (not confined to the definition in Section 15). The court accepted that the person obtaining payment under execution proceedings is a wrongdoer but emphasized that by whatever name the action is called, the owner's right to recover is settled.

Addressing whether payment under Order 21, Rule 89 removes the principle, the court analyzed Kummakntty and Krishna Aiyar and observed those decisions proceed on the footing of an actually subsisting decree and a genuine decree-holder. The court held that where the foundation—i.e., a subsisting decree—was gone (as here, by prior satisfaction and fraudulent subsequent execution), the authorities which treat payments as unconditional do not apply. The court rejected procedural technicalities (e.g., satisfaction not being reported) as irrelevant to substantive liability. It also rejected the distinction that recovery is proper only to prevent a sale and not after sale, calling that distinction immaterial.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is allowed. A decree is passed in favour of the plaintiff against the first defendant for Rs. 1,172-4-6 with interest at 6% from the date of plaint and costs throughout. The decree against defendants 7 and 8 passed by the learned Judge is vacated. The lower appellate Court's order directing the plaintiff to pay the first defendant's costs of the appeal before it is set aside.

Implications: The direct effect is that the plaintiff recovers the specified sum with interest and costs, the earlier decree against defendants 7 and 8 is vacated, and the lower appellate costs order is set aside. The opinion applies and affirms existing statutory and Privy Council authority enabling recovery of money paid under coercion where the decree was in fact satisfied and subsequently enforced by fraud; it does not purport to establish a novel legal principle beyond those authorities.

Show all summary ...

1. The question which this Letters Patent Appeal raises is an important one, and the facts divested of all that is immaterial, may be shortly stated. The first defendant filed a suit against defendants 7 and 8, got their properties attached before judgment and obtained a decree in 1923 in due course. Defendants 7 and 8 sold in 1924 under Ex. A the properties in question to the second defendant. In the sale-deed the vendors (that is, defendants 7 and 8) disclosed the attachment that, had been effected and undertook to get the properties sold released from the attachment. In 1925, by virtue of a transaction we need not go into, the first defendant, to whom about Rs. 5,000 was due under his decree, received in full satisfaction of his claim Rs. 4,500 (that is, the concurrent finding of the Courts below accepted by Varadachariar, J.), in pursuance of an agreement with the judgment-debtors, namely, defendants 7 and 8. In 1927 the plaintiff obtained a mortgage of the suit property from the second defendant. Though the first defendant's decree was fully satisfied as stated above, he failed to enter up satisfaction and fraudulently proceeded to execute the decree. He brought the properties mortgaged to the plaintiff to sale and purchased them himself in the name of his clerk on 16th September, 1927. The plaintiff made the statutory deposit under Order 21, Rule 89, Civil Procedure Code and got the sale set aside. The present suit has been brought by him to recover from various defendants, of whom we are concerned only with the first defendant, the amount which he was obliged to pay into Court for getting the sale avoided. Varadachariar, J., agreeing with the Courts below, negatived the plaintiff's claim as against the first defendant.

2. Several contentions were raised for the appellant and disallowed by the learned Judge. One of them was that the first defendant's liability was founded on tort, and that is the only contention that has been pressed before us. There can be no doubt that under the law as declared by the Judicial Committee, a person making a payment to rid himself of unlawful interference with his property can recover the money back. The principle on which this rule rests, has been clearly expounded in four decisions, to none of which the learned Judge's attention was called. In the first two cases, their Lordships stated that under the English Common Law, a payment to get rid of wrongful interference would be involuntary, being made under compulsion of law, and held that in this country, as in England, an owner may bring an action to recover back the money so paid Fatima Khatoon Chowdrain v. Mahomed Jan Chowdry (1868) 12 M.I.A. 65 and Dulichand v. Ramkishen Singh (1881) L.R. 8 I.A. 93 : I.L.R. 7 Cal. 648 (P.C.). In the two later cases, the principle was applied not merely on the analogy of English law and on grounds of justice and equity but as* resting upon a statutory right conferred by an express provision of the Indian Contract Act. Section 72 of that Act provides inter alia that a person to whom money has been paid under coercion must repay it. Formerly, the view that prevailed in India was, that the word 'coercion' in this section meant the same thing as 'coercion' as defined in Section 15 and therefore no act was coercion unless it was done "with the intention of causing any person to enter into an agreement", as required by the definition. That view, their Lordships have declared, is wrong. Lord Moulton delivering the judgment observes:

It would be to make nonsense of the statute if it were to be taken to mean that 'coercion' in a legal sense could only exist if the object was to bring about a contract. Indeed such an interpretation would render the Act inconsistent with itself.

3. Then, after quoting Section 72, which as already stated enacts that a person to whom money has been paid under coercion must repay it, His Lordship goes on to say:

It is impossible to contend that the word 'coercion' referred to in this section...is 'with the intention of causing any person to enter into an agreement'. The word 'coercion' must therefore be there used in its general and ordinary sense as an English word and its meaning is not controlled by the definition in Section 15". Kanhaya Lal v. National Bank of India Ltd. (1913) 25 M.L.J. 104 : L.R. 40 I.A. 56 : I.L.R. 40 Cal. 598 (P.C.)

4. The last mentioned case went tip before the Board again and Lord Dunedin re-affirmed this view, observing:

The right here sought to be enforced is a statutory right expressed in terms of Section 72 of the Contract Act, and this Board has already held that the circumstances gave rise to a statutory right." Kanhaya Lal v. National Bank of India Ltd. (1923) 45 M.L.J. 497 : L.R. 50 I.A. 162 : I.L.R. 4 Lah. 284 (P.C.).

5. Thus the 'owner's right to recover back the money paid under compulsion does not rest, as assumed in the two earlier' decisions, merely upon justice and equity founded upon the English analogy, but is a statutory right expressed in terms of an Indian Act. What then is the true nature of the action brought to recover such money back? The person obtaining payment under force of execution proceedings, that is, under coercion within the meaning of Section 72, is a wrongdoer, as described by their Lordships in Kanhaya Lal v. National Bank of India Ltd. (1913) 25 M.L.J. 104 : L.R. 40 I.A. 56 at 63 and 66 : I.L.R. 40 Cal. 598 (P.C.). This would suggest, contrary to the view taken by Varadachariar, J., that the liability is one in tort. But by whatever name the action may be called, it must now be taken as settled beyond doubt, that an owner may bring an action to recover back the money he has so paid.

6. This being the true conception, does the fact that the payment made here was under Order 21, Rule 89, Civil Procedure Code, remove the case from the operation of this principle? Mr. Champakesa Aiyangar for the respondent strongly relies upon the ratio decidendi of Kummakntty v. Neelakandan Nambudri (1930) 59 M.L.J. 893 : I.L.R. 53 Mad. 943, approved and followed by the Full Bench in Krishna Aiyar v. Arunachalam Chettiar (1935) 69 M.L.J. 349 : I.L.R. 58 Mad. 972 (F.B.). In the former case, it has been held that Order 21, Rule 89 is inconsistent with the notion that payment can be made either under protest or coupled with conditions. True, but the whole judgment proceeds upon the footing, first that there was a subsisting decree, that is, subsisting in fact and secondly, there was a decree-holder, one who really answered that description. The principle as stated in that very decision is, once "the decree debt is discharged and the decree-holder's remedy is gone", it would be improper for the person paying the money to claim it back. That this is the idea underlying the judgment, will be manifest on a reading of it and it is most significant that in not a single case of the many cited for the respondent, was the money, which the courts held could not be recovered, paid in execution of a satisfied decree. It is the existence of fraud, the dishonest obtaining of the money after the decree was satisfied, that distinguishes the present case from those cited at the Bar. This difference is fundamental and ought not to be ignored. Order 21, Rule 89 assumes the existence of a "decree" and of a "decree-holder", and where the very foundation is gone, namely? a subsisting decree, it would be futile to contend that the decisions which refer to unconditional payment can apply.

7. It has been contended that in the Privy Council cases cited above, the money was paid to prevent a sale and not after the sale; but that is a distinction without a difference. As their Lordships pointed out in Kanhaya Lal v. National Bank of India Ltd. (1913) 25 M.L.J. 104 : L.R. 40 I.A. 56 : I.L.R. 40 Cal. 598 (P.C.), already quoted, the greater or less probability of a sale taking place does not affect the real principle; nor is there any reason to hold that the position is altered by the sale having actually taken place.

8. The contention again that the decree was executable under the Law of Procedure, satisfaction not having been reported, is utterly beside the point. Although a fraudulent decree-holder can, under the Code, execute his satisfied decree where the adjustment has not been certified, his liability under the substantive law remains. When the rights of parties are in question, a contention based on the technicality of procedure law seems utterly irrelevant.

9. It may be of interest to note, though that fact has not much bearing on our decision, that in Fatima Khatoon Chowdrain v. Mahomed Jan Chowdry (1868) 12 M.I.A. 65, their Lordships after indicating that the facts suggest that the decree there was a satisfied decree, observe,

"that alone would be a, ground upon which the respondents must be held disentitled to retain the money they have received"
.

10. Similarly, in Dooli Chand v. Ram Kishen Singh (1881) L.R. 8 I.A. 93 : I.L.R. 7 Cal. 648 (P.C.), after stating that the appellant obtained a decree in question upon a debt which had been already satisfied, their Lordships observe:

He has, therefore, received it twice over and it is obvious in such a case that it is unreasonable that he should hold the money paid to him under compulsion by the respondents.

11. In the result, we allow the appeal and pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff against the first defendant for Rs. 1,172-4-6 with interest thereon at 6 per cent, from date of plaint and costs throughout. The decree against defendants 7 and 8 passed by the learned Judge is vacated. The order of the lower appellate Court directing the plaintiff to-pay the first defendant's costs of the appeal before it is also set aside.