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Orupulasseri Manakka... v. Kottilingal Madhathi...

Madras High Court
Jan 19, 1943
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Structured Summary of the Opinion (Delivered by Wadsworth, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion concerns two connected proceedings. The first is a suit by the appellant (the jenmi) for redemption of a kanom and eviction of the tenant. The second is an application by the tenant for renewal under the provisions of the Malabar Tenancy Act, XIV of 1930. The Bench heard both matters together because they raised a difficult question about the interpretation of Clause 3 of Section 25 of that Act.

The undisputed factual matrix is as follows. On 14 July 1914 the plaintiff's predecessor granted a kanom demise to the predecessors of defendants 1 to 3. The term fixed for redemption expired on 14 July 1926 but no action was taken and the tenants continued in possession under the kanom without any renewal having been obtained. After the Malabar Tenancy Act came into force, in 1936 the jenmi filed a suit for redemption and the tenant made a corresponding application for renewal.

A Court ordered a renewal; the deed recited an order of the Court passed on 30 March 1937 and recorded payment into Court of Rs. 74-2-9 (including a renewal fee of Rs. 26-6-5) and stated that the properties were granted on renewed kanom demise in accordance with the Malabar Tenancy Act for the prior kanom amount of Rs. 22-13-9 for the term prescribed under Section 25 of the Act.

The jenmi subsequently filed a fresh suit for redemption in 1939; the tenants, contending the jenmi's suit was premature, filed a fresh application for renewal. At trial the Court held that the 1937 renewal took effect from the expiry date stated in the original kanom (14 July 1926). On appeal the Subordinate Judge held the renewal took effect from the passing of the Malabar Tenancy Act. The jenmi appealed from that decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. How is the phrase in Clause 3 of Section 25 of the Malabar Tenancy Act — "from the date of the termination of the previous lease, kanom or kuzhikanom" — to be interpreted in the context of a kanom the period for redemption of which had expired before the Act came into force?
  2. Does a court-ordered renewal under Section 25(2) take effect retrospectively from the expiry of the original twelve-year period fixed in the prior kanom (thus potentially requiring a series of retrospective renewals), or does it take effect from the date on which the renewal is granted (or some other date such as the commencement of the Act)?
  3. Whether the appellant jenmi's suit for redemption was premature in the light of the earlier 1937 renewal order (i.e., whether that renewal enured for a new twelve-year term from a particular date).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as presented for the jenmi)

  • Reliance on the decision of Horwill, J. in A.A.O. No. 642 of 1941, where the phrase "date of the termination of the previous lease, kanom or kuzhikanom" was read to mean the "date of the expiry of the period" fixed in the prior document (i.e., the end of the twelve-year kanom period).
  • Argued that statutory language across the Act (including S.3(1), S.17, S.19, S.20 and especially S.24(2)(b)) shows the Legislature contemplated a renewal fee becoming due on some date prior to the commencement of the Act, suggesting the Act allows or contemplates retrospective renewals taking effect from dates anterior to the Act.
  • Contended that if the phrase in S.25(3) is read to mean the expiry of the ordinary twelve-year period, then where a kanom's period expired long before the Act, a court-ordered renewal would have to take effect from that expiry date; accordingly, tenants would be required to make successive renewal applications to bridge back to the date for which an effective renewal is sought.

Respondent's Arguments (as presented for the tenant)

  • Submitted that under Malabar custom, although a kanom commonly specifies a twelve-year redemption term, if neither party seeks renewal or redemption the kanom tenure continues to subsist; the kanom does not "terminate" merely because the prescribed period has elapsed.
  • Argued that the "termination" of a kanom occurs only by a positive act — redemption, eviction, or by grant of a renewal — and thus S.25(3)'s reference to "date of the termination" should be read as the date of the actual termination event (for a renewal, the date on which the renewal is granted).
  • Pointed out alternative readings of S.24(2)(b) that reconcile the provision with the respondent's construction: either it prevents a renewal fee being payable before the commencement of the Act or it relates to leases and kuzhikanom tenures which may have terminated earlier (for example, tenancies from year to year terminated on notice to quit), thereby explaining interest accrual provisions without requiring retrospective kanom renewals.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
A.A.O. No. 642 of 1941 (decision of Horwill, J.) Interpreted the phrase in S.25(3) as referring to the "date of the expiry of the period" of the prior kanom (i.e., the end of the twelve-year period), implying a renewal could be taken to operate retrospectively. The court noted and considered Horwill, J.'s view but declined to adopt that interpretation in full. The court distinguished and rejected the broader retrospective consequences that would follow from Horwill, J.'s construction, preferring an interpretation that treats the date of termination, for a kanom, as the date of grant of a renewal (thus the 1937 renewal operates for twelve years from the date it was granted).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by acknowledging the obscurities and inconsistent phraseology in the Malabar Tenancy Act (noting various provisions: S.3(1), S.17, S.19, S.20, S.24(2)(b) and S.25(3)). It analysed how different sections use terms like "period," "expiry," and "termination," and recognised that these terms sometimes appear to overlap and at other times to have distinct connotations.

The court considered the appellant's submission, grounded on the decision of Horwill, J., that the words "date of the termination of the previous lease, kanom or kuzhikanom" ought to be read to mean the date of expiry of the period ordinarily fixed in a kanom (the twelve-year point). The consequences of that construction were examined: it could produce a rule under which, when a kanom's period had expired long before the Act, a court could order a renewal to take effect retrospectively from that expired date — and tenants would be obliged to seek a chain of retrospective renewals to reach the date relevant to a present application.

The court found such a result to be drastic and unlikely to have been the deliberate intention of the Legislature; if the Legislature intended to permit a series of retrospective renewal fees covering periods during which the jenmi took no action, it would have done so in clearer and more explicit language. Thus the court was disinclined to adopt an interpretation that produced that anomalous result when a plausible, less radical interpretation was available.

The court accepted the respondent's contextual argument about customary practice in Malabar: in practice a kanom continues to subsist until it is brought to an end by redemption, eviction or by the grant of a renewal. Under that practice the mere elapsing of the usual twelve-year term does not necessarily terminate the kanom. The court then addressed the specific textual difficulty posed by S.24(2)(b) (which speaks of interest on instalments "from the date on which it became due or from the date of the commencement of this Act, whichever is later"). The court offered two explanations that would render S.24(2)(b) consistent with the respondent's view:

  • Read S.24(2)(b) as simply indicating that no renewal fee shall be payable with effect from a date prior to the commencement of the Act (though the court acknowledged the language is not ideal for that purpose); or
  • Relate S.24(2)(b) to leases and kuzhikanom tenures which commonly originate in a written contract and may, after expiry of the contracted term, become tenancies from year to year that can be terminated by notice to quit. In such cases a notice to quit might have been given (or a tenancy terminated) before the Act came into force, making it necessary to treat a renewal as taking effect from the date of termination and to provide for interest accordingly.

On this account, the court concluded that the wording of S.24(2)(b) is explicable without resorting to the conclusion that kanom renewals must operate retrospectively to the expiry of the originally stipulated twelve-year period.

The court further explained that the words in S.25(3) — "from the date of the termination of the previous lease, kanom or kuzhikanom" — are not rendered meaningless by adopting the respondent's view. They are necessary to cover cases (for example, terminated leases or kuzhikanom tenures ended by notice to quit) where the date of termination may indeed differ from the date on which a renewal is granted. But in the case of a kanom that has simply been continued in possession without any renewal or termination action, the "termination" of that kanom for the purpose of a court-ordered renewal will be the date on which the renewal is granted.

On this interpretative footing the court concluded that the 1937 court-ordered renewal must be taken to operate from the date it was granted (the court expressly states the renewal “granted by the Court on 18th August, 1937 will enure for twelve years thereafter”), rather than retrospectively from the expiry of the earlier kanom term in 1926 or from the commencement date of the Act.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that the words "from the date of the termination of the previous kanom" in Section 25(3) indicate the date on which a renewal of that kanom is granted. On that basis the Court concluded that the renewal granted on 18 August 1937 enures for twelve years from that date, and consequently the jenmi's subsequent suit and the tenant's fresh application were premature. The second appeal and the civil miscellaneous second appeal were dismissed with costs.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The immediate practical effect is that the 1937 renewal creates a twelve-year term starting from the date the renewal was granted (18 August 1937), and not from the original kanom expiry date of 14 July 1926 or from the commencement of the Act.
  • Accordingly, the jenmi's 1939 suit for redemption and the tenants' contemporaneous renewal application were premature and the appeals were dismissed with costs.
  • The court refused to accept an interpretation that would require tenants to obtain a chain of retrospective renewals covering periods during which the jenmi took no action; the opinion therefore narrows the scope for retrospective operation of court-ordered renewals under S.25(3) as applied to kanom tenures continued in possession.

This summary is confined strictly to the statements and reasoning contained in the provided opinion. No facts, arguments or holdings beyond the opinion have been added.

Show all summary ...

(Delivered by Wadsworth, J.)

The first of these cases arises out of a suit by the appellant, who is the jenmi, for redemption of a kanom and eviction of the tenant. The second case arises out of an application by the tenant for renewal under the provisions of the Malabar Tenancy Act XIV of 1930. The cases have been placed before a Bench because they involve a question of some difficulty, relating to the interpretation of Cl. 3 of S. 25 of that Act. There is no doubt about the facts. On the 14th July, 1914 the plaintiff's predecessor granted a kanom demise to the predecessor of defendants 1 to 3. The term for the redemption of this kanom expired on 14th July, 1926 but nothing was done and the tenants continued in possession on the basis of the kanom without the question of renewal being raised. In 1936 after the Malabar Tenancy Act came into force the jenmi filed a suit for redemption and there was a corresponding application by the tenant for renewal. The Court ordered a renewal, the term of the order being recited in the deed as follows:

“Whereas under the orders of this Court passed on the said petition on 30th March 1937 you have duly deposited into Court the sum of Rs. 74-2-9 made up of the arrears of michavaram and interest inclusive of the renewal fee of Rs. 26-6-5, the properties in the sub-joined schedule have been hereby granted to you on renewed kanom demise in accordance with the provisions of the Malabar Tenancy Act for the prior kanom amount of Rs. 22-13-9 for the term prescribed under S. 25 of the Tenancy Act.”

The tenants appear to have thought that they had got a renewal which would last for a considerable period, whatever be the date with effect from which it operated. But the jenmi in 1939 filed a fresh suit for redemption and as a matter of caution the tenants filed a fresh application for renewal while contending that the jenmi's suit was premature. The trial Court took the view that the previous renewal granted in 1937 would take effect from the expiry of the period stipulated in the original kanom, that is to say, 14th July, 1926. In appeal the Subordinate Judge took the view that the renewal ordered by the Court in 1937 would take effect from the passing of the Malabar Tenancy Act.

The jenmi has appealed and for the appellant Mr. Govinda Menon has relied very strongly on the decision of Horwill, J. in A.A.O No. 642 of 1941. The learned Judge, while noticing that the Tenancy Act contemplates only one renewal fee, felt constrained to hold that the phrase “date of the termination of the previous lease, kanom or kuzhikanom” in S. 25(3) must be read as if it were “the date of the expiry of the period of the previous lease, kanom or kuzhikanom.” That is to say, it is argued for the appellant that the view taken by the trial Court was right and that the jenmi's suit was not premature. The draftsmanship of the Malabar Tenancy Act has frequently come up for criticism and it cannot be denied that it contains obscurities. The definition of a kanom in S. 3(1) speaks of the liability of the transferee to pay a renewal fee to the transferor, if the transferee is permitted to enjoy the said property for a further period after the termination of the original period; that is to say, the word “period” is used to indicate the term of twelve years which is customarily fixed in a kanom document. S. 17, however, speaks of the right of the kanomdar to a renewal on “the expiry of the kanom under which he holds,” that is to say, it seems to treat the expiry of the kanom as the same thing as the expiry of the period fixed in the kanom. When we come to S. 19 we have the phrase “the year next after the termination of the expiring transaction,” while S. 20 reverts to more explicit language and speaks of the period of the verumpattamdar, kuzhikanomdar, or kanomdar as having expired and no renewal having been obtained.

Then in S. 24(2)(b) there is a provision for the payment of interest on instalments of renewal fee ordered under the provisions of the Act, which is payable on each instalment “from the date on which it became due or from the date of the commencement of this Act, whichever is later.” These words were emphasised before Horwill, J. and have been emphasised before us, as indicating that the Act contemplates a renewal fee becoming due on some date prior to the passing of the Act, which it is argued suggests that the Legislature contemplated an order for retrospective renewal to take effect from some date anterior to the Act. Then we get to the provisions of S. 25(3) with which we are mainly concerned, which provides that a renewal deed executed by the Court under Sub-S. (2) shall have the same effect as if it was executed by the landlord himself, and shall entitle the tenant to enjoy the holding for twelve years “from the date of the termination of the previous lease, kanom or kuzhikanom.” The argument for the appellant is that the Act speaks of “the termination of a kanom” or “the termination of a transaction” or “the expiry of the period of the kanom,” meaning in each case precisely the same thing, namely, the end of the twelve years period ordinarily fixed for the redemption of a kanom and that this is the meaning of the phrase “date of the termination of the previous lease, kanom or kuzhikanom,” in this sub-section. The argument is fortified by reference to S. 24(2)(b) as showing that the Act necessarily has reference to a renewal which takes effect at some point antecedent to the passing of the Act and the argument is that when there is a kanom the period of which expired more than twelve years before the passing of the Act, although under the judgment of Horwill J. the Court would order only one renewal fee to be paid, the renewal would have to take effect from the date of the expiry of the period in the previous kanom and it would be incumbent on the tenant to make a succession of renewal applications, until these retrospective renewals extend upto the date with reference to which an effective renewal is sought. That is to say, we are asked to assume an intention on the part of the Legislature to give to the jenmi a right to claim retrospective renewal fees once in every twelve years from the end of the period fixed in the last kanom document executed by the parties.

It seems to us that this is a very drastic result to be achieved by mere inferences from not very precise language. We are constrained to think that had the Legislature formulated the intention of giving the jenmi a right to claim a series of renewal fees covering a period during which he took no action to assert his rights, such an intention would have been expressed in explicit language. We are therefore disposed not to accept this interpretation of the provisions of S. 25(3), unless no other interpretation consistent with the language of the Act and not open to similar objections can be discovered. We can see no logical or legal basis for the view taken by the learned Subordinate Judge that the date of the termination of the previous kanom must be the date of the commencement of the Tenancy Act. It has been argued by Mr. Ramakrishna Iyer for the respondent that the obvious date of the termination of the previous kanom is the date of the renewal itself. The argument may be summarised thus: Under the customs prevailing in Malabar when a jenmi gives a kanom to his tenant a period of twelve years is fixed for its redemption. But if, as very frequently happens, neither party wishes to raise the question of the amount of the renewal fee, the value of the improvements and the state of the account between the parties and if the tenancy continues in such circumstances without any renewal, there is no question of the kanom tenure coming to an end. The kanom remains what it was except that the jenmi has the right at any time to file a suit for redemption or eviction. Until he does so, the tenant remains a kanomdar holding under the document and the kanom has not expired, though the period for redemption fixed in the kanom has come to an end. It is argued that reading S. 25(3) in the light of the ordinary practice in Malabar, the termination of the kanom would only be by redemption or eviction or by the grant of a renewal and that there is no basis for reading this phrase to mean anything else. The difficulty in the way of this view which impressed Horwill J. in the case already quoted, was how to give some meaning to the provision regarding interest in S. 24(2)(b) and how to explain the insertion of this provision that the tenant should enjoy the holding for twelve years from the date of the termination of the previous document in S. 25(3), when in the absence of any such words the deed would naturally take effect from the date on which it was executed. The first of these two difficulties may be got over in one of two ways. It may be possible to read S. 24(2)(b) as merely intended to indicate that no renewal fee shall be payable before the date of the commencement of the Act, though it must be admitted that the language used is not very apt for the purpose. Alternatively this provision may be given a meaning by relating it to the lease and the kuzhikanom which also are subject to renewals. Such tenancies would normally be started by a written contract stipulating for a term. If at the end of that term the parties continued to pay and receive rents in accordance with the contract without executing any fresh document, there would result a tenancy from year to year which would terminate on notice to quit. Cases might arise in which such a tenancy had been terminated by a notice to quit before the Act came into force and with reference to which a suit was pending at the time when the Act came into force. To meet such a case it would be necessary to provide that the renewal would take effect from the termination of the lease, that is to say, the termination of the tenancy from year to year, and in such a case the renewal fee would become payable with effect from some date prior to the commencement of the Act. It was therefore necessary to provide that interest on the renewal fee would accrue due from the date on which the fee became due or the date of the commencement of the Act, whichever is later. It seems to us that this explanation gives a sufficient reason for the provisions of S. 24(2)(b) consistent with the view suggested as to the meaning of the words “termination of the previous lease, kanom or kuzhikanom.”

Similarly it has been contended that the words in S. 25(3) “from the date of the termination of the previous lease, kanom or kuzhikanom” are not superfluous when it is remembered that there may be a terminated lease in respect of which a notice to quit has been issued which may be renewed under this Act with effect from the date of the notice to quit. That is to say, we are asked to hold that though the date of the termination of the previous lease or kuzhikanom may be a different date from the date on which the application for renewal is granted, that cannot be so in the case of a kanom tenure which will continue to subsist until it is put an end to either by eviction or by the grant of a fresh kanom in the shape of a renewal. It seems to us that this explanation of the words of S. 25(3) can be accepted without doing violence to the language and without leading to the anomalous result of requiring the tenant to take out a whole series of retrospective renewals for periods which had expired before the commencement of the Act.

We are therefore of opinion that the words, “from the date of the termination of the previous kanom” must indicate the date on which a renewal of that kanom is granted. In this view it follows that the renewal granted by the Court on 18th August, 1937 will enure for twelve years thereafter and that the present suit and the application are both premature. The second appeal and the civil miscellaneous second appeal are therefore dismissed with costs.

N.R.R