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Name Dasrath v. State Of Andhra Pradesh .
Factual and Procedural Background
The appellant, who had served in various capacities within the Andhra Pradesh Prohibition and Excise Department, was charge-sheeted under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. On 4 February 2009 the State Government issued an order directing the Public Prosecutor to seek withdrawal of the prosecution under Section 321 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). The Public Prosecutor accordingly filed an application before the Principal Special Judge for SPE & ACB Cases, Hyderabad. By order dated 10 January 2011, the Special Judge dismissed the withdrawal application. The appellant’s Criminal Revision Case No. 178 of 2011 was thereafter dismissed by the High Court. The present appeal was filed before the Supreme Court by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the trial court and the High Court correctly applied the principles governing withdrawal of prosecution under Section 321 CrPC.
- Whether the guidance laid down by the Constitution Bench in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 288 was properly appreciated and applied by the courts below.
Arguments of the Parties
The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar, (1987) 1 SCC 288; AIR 1987 SC 877 | Interpretation of Section 321 CrPC—scope of Public Prosecutor’s power to withdraw, role of the court in granting consent, and the limited nature of judicial scrutiny. | The Supreme Court noted that the trial court and the High Court failed to follow paragraphs 69-71 (quoted as paras 77-79 in the extract) of the majority judgment, necessitating a remand for reconsideration in light of those principles. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Supreme Court reviewed the orders of both the trial court and the High Court and found that they had misapplied the law on withdrawal of prosecution. Referring extensively to the majority opinion in Sheonandan Paswan, the Court reaffirmed the following principles:
- Section 321 CrPC empowers the Public Prosecutor to seek withdrawal at any stage before judgment, subject to the court’s consent.
- The court’s role is limited to ensuring that the prosecutor’s executive discretion is not exercised for improper or illegitimate purposes; it is not required to conduct a detailed judicial inquiry or to give elaborate reasons when granting consent.
- The absence of specific statutory grounds for withdrawal in Section 321 places the initial responsibility on the Public Prosecutor, with the court merely exercising supervisory discretion.
Because the lower courts failed to appreciate these principles, their orders were deemed unsustainable.
Holding and Implications
Appeal Allowed; Orders of the Trial Court and High Court Set Aside; Matter Remanded.
The trial court must freshly consider the Public Prosecutor’s application for withdrawal in accordance with the Supreme Court’s clarification of Sheonandan Paswan. The decision directly affects only the appellant’s prosecution and does not create new precedent, but it underscores the correct approach to Section 321 CrPC for future cases.
Order
1. Delay condoned. Leave granted.
2. The appellant worked as an Assistant Excise Superintendent, Excise Superintendent, Assistant Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise and Deputy Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise, Government of Andhra Pradesh. After the investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against him under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Thereafter, by an order dated 4-2-2009, the Government of Andhra Pradesh passed an order for withdrawal of the prosecution against the appellant and accordingly instructed the Public Prosecutor to file a petition before the Court of the Principal Special Judge for SPE and ACB cases, Hyderabad under Section 321 CrPC for withdrawal of the prosecution. Pursuant to the said order, the Public Prosecutor filed a petition for withdrawal under Section 321 CrPC but the Principal Special Judge for SPE and ACB cases, Hyderabad dismissed the petition for withdrawal by a lengthy order dated 10-1-2011. Aggrieved by the order of the Special Judge, the appellant filed Criminal Revision Case No. 178 of 2011 before the High Court but by the impugned order, the High Court has dismissed the criminal revision. Aggrieved by the impugned order, the appellant has filed this appeal by way of special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution.
3. We have gone through the order of the trial court and the impugned order of the High Court and find that the trial court and the High Court have not correctly appreciated the law laid down by this Court in various decisions particularly in paras 69, 70 and 71 of the majority judgment delivered by Khalid, J. in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 288, AIR 1987 SC 877 as reported in AIR at pp. 914-16, the relevant portions of which are quoted hereinbelow:
“77. Section 321 reads as follows:
“321. Withdrawal from prosecution.—The Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of a case may, with the consent of the court at any time before the judgment is pronounced, withdraw from the prosecution of any person either generally or in respect of any one or more of the offences for which he is tried; and, upon such withdrawal—
(a) if it is made before a charge has been framed, the accused shall be discharged in respect of such offence or offences;
(b) if it is made after a charge has been framed, or when under this Code no charge is required, he shall be acquitted in respect of such offence or offences.
(Proviso omitted)'
This section enables the Public Prosecutor, in charge of the case to withdraw from the prosecution of any person at any time before the judgment is pronounced, but this application for withdrawal has to get the consent of the court and if the court gives consent for such withdrawal the accused will be discharged if no charge has been framed or acquitted if charge has been framed or where no such charge is required to be framed. It clothes the Public Prosecutor to withdraw from the prosecution of any person, accused of an offence, both when no evidence is taken or even if entire evidence has been taken. The outer limit for the exercise of this power is ‘at any time before the judgment is pronounced’.
78. The section gives no indication as to the grounds on which the Public Prosecutor may make the application, or the considerations on which the court is to grant its consent. The initiative is that of the Public Prosecutor and what the court has to do is only to give its consent and not to determine any matter judicially. The judicial function implicit in the exercise of the judicial discretion for granting the consent would normally mean that the court has to satisfy itself that the executive function of the Public Prosecutor has not been improperly exercised, or that it is not an attempt to interfere with the normal course of justice for illegitimate reasons or purposes.
79. The court's function is to give consent. This section does not obligate the Court to record reasons before consent is given. However, I should not be taken to hold that consent of the court is a matter of course. When the Public Prosecutor makes the application for withdrawal after taking into consideration all the materials before him, the court exercises its judicial discretion by considering such materials and on such consideration, either gives consent or declines consent. The section should not be construed to mean that the court has to give a detailed reasoned order when it gives consent. If on a reading of the order giving consent, a higher court is satisfied that such consent was given on an overall consideration of the materials available, the order giving consent has necessarily to be upheld.”
4. We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of the trial court and the impugned order of the High Court and remand the matter to the trial court for fresh consideration of the petition for withdrawal of prosecution against the appellant under Section 321 CrPC in the light of the judgments of this Court and in particular the majority judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 288, AIR 1987 SC 877 quoted above.
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