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Karana Maravar Service Society v. State Of Tamil Nadu

Madras High Court
Apr 4, 2012
Smart Summary (Beta)

Case Summary — S.A. (MD) No. 213 of 2006 (Decided April 4, 2012)

Factual and Procedural Background

This second appeal arises under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code against the judgment and decree dated 26.04.2005 in A.S. No. 110 of 2003 (II Additional Sub-Court, Madurai) which had reversed the trial Court judgment and decree dated 20.02.2003 in O.S. No. 415 of 1999 (District Munsif Court, Thirumangalam).

The plaintiff (appellant) is a society which was served with a notice by the Tahsildar (second defendant) in R.O.C No. 11011/99-A-2, dated 20.12.1999, demanding Rs. 16,394/- towards lease for the suit property. The plaintiff resisted the demand claiming ownership by registered sale deed dated 06.02.1998 and by prior title documents going back to 1951, and contested any tenancy relationship with the Government. The Government authorities (defendants) contended that the land is classified as “Gramanatham”, vested in the Government, and therefore indivdiuals cannot claim ownership or effect transfers.

The trial Court accepted the plaintiff's claim, held the impugned notice invalid and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants appealed and the lower Appellate Court admitted that the property was Gramanatham but reversed the trial Court, vesting ownership in the Government and upholding the notice. The plaintiff brought this second appeal to challenge the lower Appellate Court's reversal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether land classified as “Gramanatham” vests with the Government so as to justify dismissal of the suit claim?
  2. What is the legal right of an occupier of Gramanatham? Specifically, whether the occupier's rights favour the appellant/plaintiff as observed in the cited authorities (e.g., 2004 CTC 270 / 2004-3-L.W. 278)?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant / Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff (society) claimed ownership of the suit property on the basis of a registered sale deed dated 06.02.1998 and produced prior title deeds showing continuous possession and enjoyment by individuals as absolute owners from 1951 onwards.
  • The plaintiff challenged the validity, binding nature and enforceability of the Tahsildar's notice which treated the plaintiff as a lessee and demanded lease payments.
  • The plaintiff relied on the classification of the land as Gramanatham and on judicial precedent to argue that Gramanatham does not vest in the Government and thus the Government could not enforce the demand or treat the plaintiff as a lessee.

Respondents / Government Authorities' Arguments

  • The Government defendants denied the plaintiff's ownership and maintained that the land is classified as “Gramanatham”, which they argued vested in the Government, and therefore individuals had no right to claim ownership or to effect transfers.
  • On that basis they continued to assert the validity of the impugned notice demanding lease amounts and defended the lower Appellate Court's decision that vested ownership in the Government.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
A.K. Thillaivanam v. District Collector, Chengai Anna District, 1998 (3) LW 603 Held that land classified as Gramanatham does not vest with the Government; occupiers of Gramanatham can resist government action. The Court relied on this decision to support the proposition that Gramanatham does not vest in the Government and to answer the substantial questions in favour of the plaintiff.
The Executive Officer, Kadathur Town Panchayat v. V. Swaminathan, 2004 (3) CTC 270 : 2004-3-L.W. 278 Division Bench held that Gramanatham land never vested with Government/Town Panchayat and impugned cancellation of pattas and summary eviction was unsustainable. The Court relied on the Division Bench's reasoning to hold that Government authorities could not proceed against occupiers of Gramanatham in the manner alleged and to find the impugned notice unenforceable.
S. Rengaraja Iyengar v. Achikannu Ammal, 1959 (2) MLJ 513 : 1959 (72) L.W 767 Discussed definition of Gramanatham (via Law Lexicon) and concluded Gramanatham is not a communal property reserved for community use and does not vest with the Government; occupiers can resist ejectment; excluded from Land Encroachment Act provisions. The Court cited this authority for the definition and legal nature of Gramanatham and to show occupiers' protective rights against government action.
Chinnathambi Goundan v. Venkatasubramania Ayyar, 1936 (49) Law Weekly 326 Noted historical practice and control over unoccupied village sites and observed that village sites did not actually vest with the Government; Government powers under the Madras Estates Land Act are limited. The Court relied on this early authority (and its observations about village site control and non-vesting) to support the conclusion that Gramanatham does not vest with the Government.
Palani Ammal v. L. Sethurama Aiyangar, (1949) 62 L.W 204 : 1949 (1) MLJ 290 Approved the decision in Chinnathambi Goundan regarding the non-vesting of village sites with the Government. The Court cited this case as an approval of the principle that village sites (and by extension Gramanatham house sites) do not vest with the Government.
Papala Narayanaswamy Naidu v. The Secretary of State for India, 24 MLJ 36 Held that unassessed waste and many categories of communal property, porambokes, and certain village common lands vest with the Government. The Court referred to this authority to distinguish categories of land that do vest with the Government (communal porambokes, waste etc.) from Gramanatham.
Venkatarama Sivan v. M. Sambasiva Aiyar, 9 L.W 381 Used among earlier authorities when defining poramboke, pagodas and Gramanatham in historical jurisprudence. The Court referenced this authority as part of the body of older decisions used to define and differentiate kinds of village lands and their legal treatment.
C.V. Subbaya v. P. Anjayya, (1972) 1 SCC 521 : AIR 1972 SC 1421 Supreme Court held that communal lands, porambokes, other ryotwari lands, waste lands, forests, mines, quarries, rivers, tanks etc., other than land classified as Gramanatham, vest with the Government. The Court invoked this Supreme Court authority to reinforce the principle that many categories of land vest with Government but explicitly excluded Gramanatham from automatic vesting.
N.S. Kuppuswamy Odayar v. Narthangudi Panchayat, (1971) 84 L.W 120 : 1971 MLJ Reports 190 Earlier authority relevant to classification of village lands and municipal/panchayat rights over certain categories. The Court cited this case among earlier precedents relied upon by the Division Bench in similar matters concerning classification and governmental rights.
Krishnamurthy Gounder v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 2002 (3) CTC 221 Observed that house sites classified as Gramanatham cannot be construed as vesting with the Government. The Court relied on this decision to support the conclusion that Gramanatham house sites do not vest with Government and occupiers retain rights.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying the narrow issue: whether land classified as Gramanatham vests with the Government and what rights an occupier of such land enjoys. It framed two substantial questions of law accordingly.

The Court examined earlier precedents — both Single Judge and Division Bench decisions of the High Court and decisions going back to pre-Independence jurisprudence — that addressed the nature and classification of village lands, porambokes and Gramanatham. The analysis emphasised a recurring principle in those authorities: while many categories of communal and waste lands (porambokes, unassessed wastes, rivers, tanks, etc.) vest with the Government, the category "Gramanatham" (house-site village lands) has been understood in the cited authorities (including S. Rengaraja Iyengar, A.K. Thillaivanam and the Division Bench decision in Executive Officer v. V. Swaminathan) to be distinct and not to vest with the Government.

The Court observed that the classification of the suit property as Gramanatham was undisputed. It then considered the plaintiff's evidential material: possession and enjoyment of the land on the basis of a settlement deed dated 19.08.1987 and prior title deeds demonstrating proprietary occupation since 1951. The Court contrasted the plaintiff's recorded possession and title evidence with the Government authorities' reliance on classification alone to treat the plaintiff as a lessee and to issue the lease demand.

The Court found that the trial Court had correctly appreciated the plaintiff's case and held the impugned notice invalid. By contrast, the lower Appellate Court had reversed the trial Court without adequately considering (a) the legal significance of the land being Gramanatham, (b) the legal rights of the occupier, and (c) the absence of Government control sufficient to support the asserted lease demand. The Court held that the lower Appellate Court's finding was contrary to the ratio of the Supreme Court and High Court precedents cited and therefore legally unsustainable.

Applying the cited authorities and the factual record (undisputed classification, long possession, and title documents), the Court concluded that the occupier's rights and the jurisprudence forbade treating Gramanatham as property vested in the Government for the purposes contended by the respondents; thus the impugned notice could not be enforced against the plaintiff.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Second appeal allowed. The judgment and decree dated 26.04.2005 in A.S. No. 110 of 2003 (II Additional Sub-Court, Madurai) is set aside, and the trial Court judgment and decree dated 20.02.2003 in O.S. No. 415 of 1999 (District Munsif Court, Tirumangalam) is confirmed.

Consequences and implications:

  • The impugned notice issued by the Tahsildar demanding lease payment is held unenforceable against the plaintiff in respect of the suit property classified as Gramanatham; the trial Court decree for reliefs in favour of the plaintiff (including permanent injunction against enforcement of the notice) is restored.
  • No costs were awarded. The connected Civil Miscellaneous Petition was closed.
  • The opinion aligns with and applies earlier High Court and Supreme Court authorities distinguishing Gramanatham from communal porambokes and holding that Gramanatham does not vest in the Government. The judgment does not purport to create a new legal principle but applies established precedent to the facts before the Court.

Counsel recorded in the opinion: For Appellants: Mr. P.T.S. Narendra Vasan; For Respondents: Mr. T.S. Mohamed Mohideen, Additional Government Pleader.

(Decision signed off with the result: Second Appeal allowed. VCJ/VCS)

Show all summary ...

Prayer:— Second Appeal has been filed under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code against the Judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court, dated 26.04.2005 made in A.S No. 110 of 2003 on the file of the II Additional Sub Court, Madurai reversing the judgment and decree of the trial Court, dated 20.02.2003 made in O.S No. 415 of 1999 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Thirumangalam.

S.A (MD) No. 213 of 2006 and C.M.P (MD) No. 1623 of 2006
Decided on April 4, 2012
C.P.C, Gramanatham, Permanent injunction, Notice, Quashing of. Classification of the land is undisputedly ‘Gramanatham’ — Property in question had been under the possession and enjoyment of individuals as absolute owners from 1951. Para 11 Lower Appellate Court has without duly considering classification of the land, legal right of the occupier of the same and the absence of control of the Government over the same reversed the findings of the trial Court — Hence legally unsustainable warranting interference by restoring the trial Court decree for permanent injunction against the enforceability of the impugned notice. Para 12 The simple issue arising for consideration of this Court in this second appeal is as to whether the suit property, being classified as Gramanatham, is vested with the Government or not and what is the right of the occupier over the suit property. Para 4 As rightly argued by the learned Counsel for the appellant/plaintiff, the ratio laid down in the Judgments above referred to is forcibly applicable to the facts herein. Herein also the classification of the land is undisputedly ‘Gramanatham’. The plaintiff Sangam has been in possession and enjoyment of the land in question on the strength of the settlement deed, dated 19.08.1987 The plaintiff has also produced the prior title deeds which go to show that the property in question had been under the possession and enjoyment of individuals as absolute owners from 1951 onwards. Whereas, the Government authorities issued the impugned notice demanding lease amount from the plaintiff by treating the plaintiff's occupation as that of lessee with the permission of the Government and the validity, binding nature and enforceability of the same is rightly questioned by the plaintiff. Para 11 The trial Court correctly appreciated the plaintiff's claim and decided the suit reliefs in favour of the plaintiff, whereas, the lower Appellate Court has without duly considering the classification of the land, legal right of the occupier of the same and the absence of control of the Government over the same reversed the findings of the trial Court and upheld the validity of the impugned notice and allowed the Government Authorities to proceed with the demand. Such finding of the lower Appellate Court is totally contrary to the ratio laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court and our High Court and is hence legally unsustainable warranting interference by restoring the trial Court decree for permanent injunction against the enforceability of the impugned notice. The substantial questions of law are accordingly answered in favour of the plaintiff. Para 12 In the result, the second appeal is allowed by setting aside the judgment and decree dated 26.04.2005 made in A.S No. 110 of 2003, on the file of the II Additional Sub-Court, Madurai. The judgment and decree dated 20.02.2003 made in O.S No. 415 of 1999, on the file of the District Munsif Court, Tirumangalam stands confirmed. Para 13
A.K A.K. Thillaivanam v. District Collector, Chengai Anna District, 1998 (3) LW 603;
The Executive Officer, Kadathur Town Panchayat v. V. Swaminathan, 2004-3-L.W. 278 : 2004 (3) CTC 270;
S. Rengaraja Iyengar v. Achikannu Ammal, 1959 (2) MLJ 513 : 1959 72 L.W 767;
Chinnathambi Goundan v. Venkatasubramania Ayyar, 1936 (49) Law Weekly 326;
Palani Ammal v. L. Sethurama Aiyangar, (1949) 62 L.W 204 : 1949 (1) MLJ 290;
Papala Narayanaswamy Naidu v. The Secretary of State for India, 24 MLJ 36;
Venkatarama Sivan v. M. Sambasiva Aiyar, 9 L.W 381;
C.V Subbaya v. P. Anjayya, (1972) 1 SCC 521 : AIR 1972 SC 1421;
N.S Kuppuswamy Odayar v. Narthangudi Panchayat, (1971) 84 L.W 120 : 1971 MLJ Reports 190; and
Krishnamurthy Gounder v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 2002 (3) CTC 221;— Referred to.
Second Appeal allowed.
For Appellants: Mr. PT. S. Narendra Vasan
For Respondents: Mr. T.S Mohamed Mohideen Additional Government Pleader

JUDGMENT

1. The above second appeal arises against the judgment and decree, dated 26.04.2005 made in A.S No. 110 of 2003, on the file of the II Additional Sub-Court, Madurai reversing the judgment and decree, dated 20.02.2003 made in O.S No. 415 of 1999, on the file of the District Munsif Court, Thirumangalam.

2. The plaintiff is the appellant herein. The plaintiff's society filed the suit arising out of which is the present second appeal thereby questioning the validity and enforceability of the notice issued by the second defendant/Tahsildar in his R.O.C No. 11011/99-A-2, dated 20.12.1999 in and under which, the plaintiff was demanded to pay Rs. 16,394/- per cent towards lease in respect of the suit property. The plaintiff has resisted the demand by claiming himself to be the owner of this property on the strength of registered sale deed, dated 06.02.1998 and by denying the existence of any tenancy relationship between the plaintiff and the Government, whereas, the ownership of the plaintiff is seriously denied by the contesting defendants/Government Authorities mainly on the ground that the land in question is classified as ‘Gramanatham’ and is vested with the Government and individuals have no right to effect any transfer or to claim any individual right of ownership over the same. The trial Court on the basis of the available evidence, accepted the claim made by the plaintiff by negativing the right claimed by the Government and held that the impugned notice is not valid and is not binding upon the plaintiff and decreed the suit accordingly. Aggrieved against the same, the defendants 1 and 2 preferred an appeal and the lower appellate Court though admitted the nature of the property to be Gramanatham, negatived the plaintiff's claim for ownership and vested the ownership of the same upon the Government. Hence, this second appeal by the plaintiff before this Court.

3. The substantial questions of law framed for consideration in the second appeal are as follows:—

“1. Whether Gramanatham will vest with Government so as to justify the dismissal of the suit claim?

2. What is the legal right of an occupier of Gramanatham? Whether will it not be in favour of the appellant/plaintiff as observed in 2004 CTC 270 : 2004-3-L.W. 278?.”

4. The simple issue arising for consideration of this Court in this second appeal is as to whether the suit property, being classified as Gramanatham, is vested with the Government or not and what is the right of the occupier over the suit property. The issue is directly answered by our High Court in the judgment reported in 1998 (3) LW 603 in A.K. Thillaivanam v. District Collector, Chengai Anna District and the judgment of the Division Bench of our High Court reported in 2004 (3) CTC 270 : 2004-3-L.W. 278 in The Executive Officer, Kadathur Town Panchayat v. V. Swaminathan. The learned single Judge of our High Court in A.K Thillaivanam's case cited supra dealt with the Writ Petition for a Mandamus, forbearing the Government officers, men, subordinates and agents from in any manner proceeding against the petitioners in respect of the property comprised in survey number in question. The property in question was admittedly Gramanatham and the cause of action for filing the writ petition was the attempt made on the part of the petitioners to convert the agricultural lands into plots and to sell the same and the same way objected to by the Thasildar resulting in police complaint and criminal case also was registered for the offence under Section 420 I.P.C, on the ground that the petitioner sold the portion of the Government property. The relief was sought for before the High Court on the ground that the land being Gramanatham does not vest with the Government and the Government officials have no right to proceed against the writ petitioners in respect of the land classified as Gramanatham. Our High Court in para 23 onwards discussed the issue as to whether the Government has any right over the land classified as Gramanatham. The learned Single Judge, relied upon the judgment reported in 1959 (2) MLJ 513 : (1959) 72 L.W 767 in S. Rengaraja Iyengar v. Achikannu Ammal, and referred to the definition of Gramanatham in Law Lexican and then arrived at a conclusion that the land classified as Gramanatham has been defined in the Law Lexican as groundtset apart on which the house of a village may be built and the same is not a communal property reserved for the use of the community. The land classified as Gramanatham does not vest with the Government and the individual occupier of Gramanatham could very well resist ejectment or any other act and the same is excluded from the provisions of the Land Encroachment Act and no action could be taken by invoking the provisions of the same. Our High Court having observed so granted the relief as sought for by the writ petitioners.

5. The same issue arose for consideration before Division Bench of this Court in the case reported in (1) 2004 (3) CTC 270 : 2004-3-L.W. 278 in The Executive Office, Dharmapuri District v. V. Swaminathan and the Division Bench has relied on the judgements in reported in (2) 1998 (3) Law Weekly 603 in A.K. Thillaivanam v. District Collector, Chengai Anna District and also earlier cases in (3) Chinnathambi Goundan v. Venkatasubramania Ayyar reported in 1936 (49) Law Weekly 326; (4) Palani Ammal v. L. Sethurama Aiyangar reported in 1949 (1) MLJ 290 : 1949 62 L.W 204; (5) Papala Narayanaswamy Naidu v. The Secretary of State for India reported in 24 MLJ 36; (6) Venkatarama Sivan v. M. Sambasiva Aiyar reported in 9 L.W 381; (7) S. Rangaraja Iyengar v. Achi Kannu Ammal reported in 1959 (2) MLJ 513 : 1959 (72) L.W 767; (8) C.V Subbaya v. P. Anjayya reported in (1972) 1 SCC 521 : AIR 1972 SC 1421; (9) N.S Kuppuswamy Odayar v. Narthangudi Panchayat reported in 1971 MLJ Reports 190 : 1971 84 L.W 120 and (10) Krishnamurthy Gounder v. Government of Tamil Nadu reported in 2002 (3) CTC 221 and by defining as to what is poramboke, pagodas and Gramanatham and by referring to the definition of Gramanatham in Law Lexicon and Tamil Lexicon published under the authority of University of Madras approved the observation of the learned Single Judge about the nature of the property classified as Gramanatham and the right of the Government or Town Panchayat in respect of the same.

6. In the earliest Judgment reported in 1936 (49) L.W 326 in Chinnathambi Goundan's case cited supra, the learned Single Judge took note of the recognised practice of the then Madras Presidency regarding the exercise of control of unoccupied village site in the proprietor whoever he may be. The learned Single Judge has referred to about the nature of the control exercised by Zamindar in Zamindari areas and shrotriemdar village not falling under the Estates Land Act, by shrotriemdar. While doing so, it is observed that the exercise of the power of the Government in respect of land covered under the Madras Estate Land Act is very limited to prevent the diversion of village site poramboke for different purpose other than the purpose for which it is reserved. It is further observed therein that the village site did not actually vest with the Government. The same decision was approved in Palani Ammal's case cited supra.

7. In the other Judgment Papala Narayanaswamy Naidu v. The Secretary of State for India reported in 24 MLJ 36, the Division Bench of this Court is of the view that unassessed waste and all kinds of communal property and road porambokes and river porambokes, unassessed house sites and backyards, burning grounds and cattle-stands vest with the Government.

8. The Supreme Court has in the Judgment in C.V Subbaya v. P. Anjayya reported in (1972) 1 SCC 521 : AIR 1972 SC 1421, held that the communal lands, porambokes, other ryotwari lands, waste lands, forests, mines and minerals, quarries, rivers and streams tanks and irrigation works etc., other than the land classified as Gramanatham vest with the Government.

9. In Thillaivanam's case and Krishnamurthy Gounder's case cited supra, it is categorically observed that the house sites classified as ‘Gramanatham’ cannot be construed as vesting with the Government.

10. The Division Bench judgment reported in 2004 (3) CTC 270 : 2004-3-L.W. 278 in The Executive Officer's case cited supra decided the issue involved in the writ petition, as to whether the Government can exercise any right against the writ petitioners in the occupation of ‘Gramanatham’ land to evict them from the land in question and decided the same in favour of the writ petitioners, on the ground that the ‘Gramanatham’ land never vested with the Government or Town Panchayat and the impugned order in cancelling the pattas in favour of the ancestors on the basis of the resolution passed by the Panchayat with a view to evict them summarily is not sustainable.

11. As rightly argued by the learned Counsel for the appellant/plaintiff, the ratio laid down in the Judgments above referred to is forcibly applicable to the facts herein. Herein also the classification of the land is undisputedly ‘Gramanatham’. The plaintiff Sangam has been in possession and enjoyment of the land in question on the strength of the settlement deed, dated 19.08.1987 The plaintiff has also produced the prior title deeds which go to show that the property in question had been under the possession and enjoyment of individuals as absolute owners from 1951 onwards. Whereas, the Government authorities issued the impugned notice demanding lease amount from the plaintiff by treating the plaintiff's occupation as that of lessee with the permission of the Government and the validity, binding nature and enforceability of the same is rightly questioned by the plaintiff.

12. The trial Court correctly appreciated the plaintiff's claim and decided the suit reliefs in favour of the plaintiff, whereas, the lower Appellate Court has without duly considering the classification of the land, legal right of the occupier of the same and the absence of control of the Government over the same reversed the findings of the trial Court and upheld the validity of the impugned notice and allowed the Government Authorities to proceed with the demand. Such finding of the lower Appellate Court is totally contrary to the ratio laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court and our High Court and is hence legally unsustainable warranting interference by restoring the trial Court decree for permanent injunction against the enforceability of the impugned notice. The substantial questions of law are accordingly answered in favour of the plaintiff.

13. In the result, the second appeal is allowed by setting aside the judgment and decree dated 26.04.2005 made in A.S No. 110 of 2003, on the file of the II Additional Sub-Court, Madurai. The judgment and decree dated 20.02.2003 made in O.S No. 415 of 1999, on the file of the District Munsif Court, Tirumangalam stands confirmed. No costs. Consequently, connected Civil Miscellaneous Petition is closed.

VCJ/VCS