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Koshy Daniel v. P.S. Rajan
Factual and Procedural Background
The first respondent instituted O.S No. 500 of 1995 seeking declaration of title and possession over certain parcels of land, fixation of boundaries, permission to construct a compound wall, recovery of possession if necessary, and a permanent injunction against interference. The plaint schedule property comprised two land parcels in Thazhakkara Village, Alappuzha District, originally belonging to the plaintiff’s great grandfather as per a Will dated 4th Edavom 1087ME. The plaintiff claimed title through devolution from his paternal grandfather and his sons. The sole defendant contested the suit denying plaintiff’s title and possession, asserting adverse possession and limitation, and disputed the property’s identity.
At trial, the plaintiff and witnesses were examined, and documentary evidence was produced. The trial court found the plaintiff failed to prove title or possession, noting no certified copy of the Will was produced. The suit was dismissed on 21.3.2002. The plaintiff appealed by filing A.S No. 533 of 2002. During the appeal, applications were filed to implead additional respondents due to alleged transfers of the suit property.
A certified copy of the Will was later produced in this Court with an application under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC. On 3.2.2011, the learned single Judge dismissed the appeal, observing that remand would not clarify the matter and directing the plaintiff to file a comprehensive fresh suit to establish rights including partition. The appeal was dismissed with liberty to file such suit within two months, with any transfers bound by the ultimate decision. The additional second respondent’s Special Leave Petition (SLP) against this judgment was dismissed by the Apex Court on 10.5.2012 on grounds of delay and merits.
The legal heir of the first respondent filed this review petition seeking review of the 3.2.2011 judgment to the extent it permitted the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit despite dismissal of the appeal and affirmed decree. The review petitioner contended the Court erred in permitting a fresh suit without an application to withdraw the original suit under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC, and that the observations would preclude the review petitioner from contesting the second suit on res judicata grounds.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether this Court erred in permitting the appellant/plaintiff to institute a fresh suit despite dismissing the appeal and affirming the decree of the trial court without an application for withdrawal of the original suit under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC.
- Whether the review petition is maintainable given that the Special Leave Petition against the impugned judgment was dismissed by the Apex Court.
- Whether the legal heir of the first respondent is competent to maintain the review petition when the predecessor-in-interest did not raise the grounds therein.
- Whether the judgment sought to be reviewed is vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record.
- Whether the review petition is barred due to implementation of the judgment by institution of a fresh suit pursuant to the impugned judgment.
Arguments of the Parties
Review Petitioner’s Arguments
- The Court erred in allowing the appellant/plaintiff to institute a fresh suit after dismissal of the appeal and affirming the decree, without an application for withdrawal of the original suit as mandated by Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC.
- The observations in the impugned judgment preclude the review petitioner from contesting the second suit on grounds of res judicata.
- Relying on the Privy Council decision in Fateh Singh v. Jagannath Bakhsh Singh and the Apex Court decision in Dadu Dayalu Mahasabha Jaipur (Trust) v. Mahant Ram Niwas, the review petitioner contended that dismissal of the suit affirmed by the Court precludes institution of a fresh suit without permission to withdraw the original suit.
First Respondent’s Arguments
- The review petition is not maintainable as the additional second respondent unsuccessfully challenged the judgment by filing a Special Leave Petition in the Apex Court.
- Relying on Apex Court decisions (Devaraju Pillai v. Sellayya Pillai, Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi), review jurisdiction under Order XLVII CPC is limited and cannot be used to re-hear or correct errors requiring detailed reasoning; the appropriate remedy is appeal, not review.
- The review petitioner, being the legal heir, cannot raise new grounds not raised by the predecessor-in-interest, relying on Krishna Sathyadas v. Lakshmikutty Amma.
- Relying on Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. N. Raju Reddiar, the review petitioner should have filed the petition through the same counsel who represented the predecessor-in-interest.
- The decree dismissing the appeal is not in conflict with the judgment; dismissal of the appeal confirms the trial court’s decree by necessary consequence, supported by rule 6 of Order XX CPC.
- The review petition is not maintainable as the judgment has been implemented by institution of a fresh suit, relying on State of Nagaland v. Toulvi Kibami.
Other Respondents’ Arguments
- Respondents 2 to 4 supported the contentions of the review petitioner regarding the error in permitting a fresh suit without withdrawal of the original suit.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Fateh Singh v. Jagannath Bakhsh Singh, AIR 1925 PC 55 | Requirement of permission under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC to withdraw suit with liberty to file fresh suit; effect of dismissal without withdrawal | Held that without permission to withdraw, a fresh suit on the same subject matter is barred; court relied on this to find error in permitting fresh suit. |
| Dadu Dayalu Mahasabha Jaipur (Trust) v. Mahant Ram Niwas, AIR 2008 SCW 3324 | Reinforcement of the principle that fresh suit cannot be instituted without withdrawal of original suit; res judicata bar | Supported the principle that the Court erred in permitting fresh suit absent withdrawal application. |
| Devaraju Pillai v. Sellayya Pillai, (1987) 1 SCC 61 | Scope and limitation of review jurisdiction under Order XLVII CPC; review cannot be used to re-hear or correct errors requiring detailed reasoning | Applied to reject review petition on ground that error was not apparent on face of record but required reasoning. |
| Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury, (1995) 1 SCC 170 | Same as above; review jurisdiction is limited | Applied in similar manner to limit scope of review. |
| Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, (1997) 8 SCC 715 | Review petition cannot be appeal in disguise; error must be apparent on face of record | Supported the limitation on review jurisdiction. |
| Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, AIR 2000 SC 2587 | Dismissal of Special Leave Petition by non-speaking order does not bar High Court from exercising review jurisdiction | Court held review petition maintainable despite dismissal of SLP by non-speaking order. |
| K.S Bhoopathy v. Kokila, AIR 2000 SC 2132 | Interpretation of Order XXIII Rule 1(3) CPC; court must be satisfied of proper grounds before permitting withdrawal with liberty to file fresh suit | Applied to hold that permission to institute fresh suit without withdrawal application was improper. |
| Executive Officer, Arthanareswarar Temple v. R. Sathyamoorthy, AIR 1999 SC 958 | Same as above; withdrawal of suit should not nullify findings favorable to defendant | Supported strict approach to withdrawal and fresh suit permission. |
| Ramadhin Singh v. Mt. Chandrama Kuer, AIR 1925 PC 55 | Effect of dismissal without withdrawal on right to file fresh suit; no power to grant leave to file fresh suit absent withdrawal | Relied upon to hold that Court had no power to permit fresh suit without withdrawal of original suit. |
| Shiv Kumar Sharma v. Santhosh Kumari, (2007) 8 SCC 600 | Followed Ramadhin Singh principle on withdrawal and fresh suit | Reinforced the principle barring fresh suit absent withdrawal. |
| Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. N. Raju Reddiar, AIR 1997 SC 1005 | Attorney of record principle in review petitions; review petition should be filed by same counsel unless consent obtained | Applied to reject objection to maintainability of review petition filed by different counsel. |
| Krishnan Sathyadas v. Lakshmikutty Amma, 1990 (2) KLT 795 | Legal heir cannot raise new pleas different from predecessor-in-interest | Applied to reject contention that review petitioner was disabled from filing petition on grounds not raised earlier. |
| State of Nagaland v. Toulvi Kibami, (2003) 8 SCC 671 | Review petition not maintainable after judgment acted upon and implemented | Distinguished on facts; held review petition maintainable as judgment did not direct compliance but only reserved right to file fresh suit. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court first addressed the maintainability of the review petition despite dismissal of the Special Leave Petition by the Apex Court. Relying on Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, it held that dismissal of an SLP by a non-speaking order does not bar the High Court from exercising review jurisdiction under Order XLVII CPC. The doctrine of merger and Article 141 of the Constitution do not apply to such non-speaking dismissals.
Next, the Court analyzed whether the error claimed was apparent on the face of the record or required detailed reasoning. Citing Apex Court precedents, it reiterated that review is not an appeal in disguise and cannot be used to re-examine evidence or legal conclusions requiring extended analysis.
However, the Court found that the impugned judgment erred in permitting the appellant/plaintiff to institute a fresh suit without an application to withdraw the original suit under Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC. The Court emphasized that granting liberty to file a fresh suit after affirming dismissal of the original suit without withdrawal application nullifies the trial court’s findings and prejudices the defendants.
The Court relied on authoritative decisions of the Privy Council and Apex Court, which held that absent withdrawal of the original suit, a fresh suit on the same cause is barred. The Court found that the impugned judgment’s observation allowing a fresh suit was an error apparent on the face of the record that did not require lengthy reasoning.
The Court rejected the contention that the decree was not in agreement with the judgment, explaining that dismissal of the appeal necessarily confirms the trial court’s decree.
Regarding the competence of the review petitioner, the Court held that the legal heir is not disabled from filing the review petition merely because the predecessor did not raise the grounds, as no new plea or concession was being introduced.
The Court also distinguished the principle in State of Nagaland v. Toulvi Kibami, explaining that the judgment sought to be reviewed did not direct any positive act but only reserved liberty to file a fresh suit, and the review petition raised an error apparent on the face of the record that remains open for adjudication.
In conclusion, the Court found the impugned judgment liable to be reviewed and recalled the decree and judgment dated 3.2.2011 in A.S No. 533 of 2002, directing the Registry to post the appeal for hearing as per roster.
Holding and Implications
The review petition is allowed, and the decree and judgment dated 3.2.2011 in A.S No. 533 of 2002 are reviewed and recalled.
The Court’s decision rectifies the error of permitting the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit without withdrawing the original suit as required by Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC, thereby upholding the principle that a fresh suit on the same cause is barred absent such withdrawal. The appeal will be posted for further hearing, and the legal dispute will continue to be adjudicated on its merits. No new precedent is set beyond reaffirming established principles on withdrawal and review jurisdiction.
ORDER
This review petition is filed by the legal heir of the first respondent in A.S No. 533 of 2002, seeking a review of the judgment delivered on 3.2.2011 The brief facts of the case are as follows:
2. The first respondent herein instituted O.S No. 500 of 1995 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Mavellikara joining the predecessor-in-interest of the review petitioner as the sole defendant. The relief sought in the suit was declaration of the plaintiff's title and possession over the plaint schedule property, fixation of the northern boundary of plaint schedule item No. 1, to permit the plaintiff to put up a compound wall on the northern boundary of plaint schedule item No. 1, recovery of possession of that portion of item No. 1 of the plaint schedule if any portion thereof is found to be in possession of the defendant and a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's peaceful possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property.
3. The plaint schedule property consists of two items. Item No. 1 is a parcel of land of 2.01 acres in extent, consisting of 60 cents in Sy No. 27/8-B and 1.41 acres in Sy No. 27/8-C of Thazhakkara Village, Mavellikara Taluk, Alappuzha District. Item No. 2 is a parcel of land 35 cents in extent, situate in Sy No. 31/4-B of Thazhakkara Village, Mavellikara Taluk, Alappuzha District. It was contended that the said lands originally belonged to the plaintiff's great grandfather late Chandy Kathenar, that as per a Will executed by him on 4th Edavom 1087ME, registered as document No. 6/1087ME of SRO, Mavellikara, the plaint schedule property was set apart to the share of Idi Chandy, the plaintiff's paternal grandfather and that under the said will, the plaintiffs paternal grandfather was in possession and enjoyment of 2.36 acres of land more particularly described in the plaint schedule. It is stated that on the death of Idi Chandy, the plaint schedule property devolved on his sons P.A Simon (the plaintiff's father who died in the year 1952) and P.A Alexander (who died issue less in 1964). The plaint proceeds to state that P.A Simon died in the year 1952 and Smt. Susamma Alexander, wife of late P.A Alexander passed away in the year 1971, that the share of late P.A Alexander in the plaint schedule property devolved on the sons of P.A Simon, viz the plaintiff and P.A Stephen. It was alleged that the plaintiff has obtained the share of P.A Stephen who is residing in America ever since 1974 and that the plaintiff is constrained to institute the suit on account of the refusal of the defendant to give consent for the construction of a compound wall separating the plaint schedule property from the property belonging to the defendant, situated on the northern side of the plaint schedule property. The sole defendant resisted the suit by filing a written statement contending inter alia that the plaintiff has no right, title or interest over the plaint schedule property and that his right if any, is lost by adverse possession and limitation. He also disputed the identity and description of the plaint schedule property.
4. In the trial court, the plaintiff was examined as PW-I and the neighbouring land owner as PW-2. Exts.A1 and A2 were produced and marked on the side of the plaintiff. On the side of the defendant, DWs 1 to 4 were examined and Exs.B1 to B13 were produced and marked. The trial court on an analysis of the evidence oral and documentary available in the case held that the plaintiff has not proved title to or possession over the plaint scheduled property. The trial court also noticed that though the plaintiff claims title to the plaint scheduled property on the strength of a Will executed by his great grandfather not even a certified copy thereof is produced. The trial court also held that the identity of the plaint scheduled property with reference to the Will executed in the year 1087ME and the devolution of title exclusively in the plaintiff, have not been proved. The suit was accordingly dismissed by decree and judgment delivered on 21.3.2002 Aggrieved by the decree and judgment dismissing the suit, the plaintiff filed A.S No. 533 of 2002 in this Court. While A.S No. 533 of 2002 was pending, the appellant/plaintiff filed I.A No. 1839 of 2010 to implead the second respondent in this review petition as the additional second respondent in the appeal on the allegation that the sole defendant had during the pendency of the appeal, transferred the suit property to her. Later, respondents 3, 4 and 5 in this review petition were impleaded as additional respondents 3, 4 and 5 in the appeal on the allegation that the additional second respondent has transferred portions of the suit property to them.
5. After the appeal was filed, a certified copy of the Will relied on by the appellant/plaintiff was produced in this Court along with I.A No. 35 of 2004, an application filed under Order XLI Rule 27 of the Code of Civil Procedure to receive it into evidence on the side of the appellant. A.S No. 533 of 2002 came up for hearing before a learned single Judge of this Court on 3.2.2011 After hearing the learned counsel on both sides, the learned single Judge held that no purpose will be served by remanding the suit to the trial court for fresh disposal having regard to the pleadings and the materials on record and that the only possible solution is therefore to dismiss the appeal, giving an opportunity to the plaintiff to file a comprehensive suit to establish his right. The appeal was accordingly dismissed with the following observations:-
“After hearing the learned counsel for both sides, I feel that even if this case is remanded, the matter will remain in the same state of confusion and therefore the only possible solution is to dismiss the appeal giving an opportunity to the plaintiff to file a comprehensive suit which is legally sustainable establishing all his rights which takes in the right to partition etc. So this appeal is dismissed with the said reservation in favour of the plaintiff. Parties are directed to bear their respective costs. I make it also clear that if any transfer is effected and if the suit is filed within a period of two months or even if it is prior to the institution of the suit, it will be all bound by the ultimate decision on the right of the parties.
6. Though the additional second respondent in the appeal filed S.L.P(C) No. 17128 of 2012 in the Apex Court from the judgment delivered on 3.2.2011 in A.S No. 533 of 2002, the said Special Leave Petition was dismissed in limine on 10.5.2012 The order passed by the Apex Court is extracted below.
“Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed on the ground of delay and also on the merits.”
7. The legal heir of the first respondent in the appeal, has filed this review petition seeking a review of the judgment delivered on 3.2.2011 in A.S No. 533 of 2002 to the extent it permits the appellant/plaintiff to institute a fresh suit in respect of the plaint schedule property notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal and the observation therein that if a fresh suit is filed within two months from the date of the judgment, even if any transfer is made prior to the institution of the suit, it will be bound by the ultimate decision in the suit regarding the rights of parties. The main ground raised in the review petition is that after having upheld the decree dismissing the suit, this Court erred in allowing the appellant/plaintiff to institute a fresh suit in relation to the same subject matter and also in observing that if such a suit is instituted within two months, transfers if any made even prior to the institution of such a suit, will be bound by the ultimate decision in the suit regarding the rights of parties. It is contended that as no application for permission to withdraw O.S No. 500 of 1995 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Mavelikkara had been filed in terms of the stipulations contained in Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, this Court erred in reserving liberty with the appellant/plaintiff to institute a fresh suit.
8. I heard Sri. M.P Sreekrishnan, learned counsel appearing for the review petitioner, Smt. Jeena Joseph, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent, Sri. P.B Krishnan, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent, Sri. K.M Mohammed Ali, learned counsel appearing for respondents 3 and 4 and Sri. B. Premnath, learned counsel appearing for the fifth respondent. Sri. M.P Sreekrishnan, learned counsel appearing for the review petitioner contended that the observations made by this Court in paragraph 4 of the impugned judgment would stand in the way of the review petitioner from contesting the second suit already instituted by the appellant/plaintiff (O.S No. 81 of 2011 on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Mavelikkara) by raising a plea that the findings in O.S No. 500 of 1995 and A.S No. 533 of 2002 would operate as resjudicata and therefore, this Court ought not to have made such an observation. The learned counsel for the review petitioner contended that in the absence of an application for permission to withdraw O.S No. 500 of 1995 in terms of the provisions contained in Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure and even without an oral request in that regard, this Court erred in reserving liberty with the appellant/plaintiff to institute a fresh suit. Relying on the decision of the Privy Council in Fateh Singh v. Jagannath Bakhsh Singh (AIR 1925 PC 55) and the Apex Court in Dadu Dayalu Mahasabha Jaipur (Trust) v. Mahant Ram Niwas (AIR 2008 SCW 3324), the learned counsel for the review petitioner contended that this Court's observation that notwithstanding the dismissal of the earlier suit, a fresh suit can be filed will not enable the appellant/plaintiff to institute a fresh suit and that he would still be precluded by the principles of resjudicata from instituting such a suit, having regard to the fact that the decree dismissing O.S No. 500 of 1995 was affirmed by this Court by the impugned judgment itself. The learned counsel appearing for respondents 2 to 4 reiterated the contentions raised by the learned counsel appearing for the review petitioner.
9. Per contra, Smt. Jeena Joseph, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent (appellant/plaintiff) contended that as the additional second respondent in the appeal had unsuccessfully challenged the judgment of this Court by filing a Special Leave Petition in the Apex Court, the review petition is not maintainable and is liable to be dismissed on that short ground. The learned counsel for the first respondent further contended relying on the decisions of the Apex Court in Devaraju Pillai v. Sellayya Pillai. ((1987) 1 SCC 61), Meera Bhanja (Smt) v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury (Smt). ((1995) 1 SCC 170) and Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi ((1997) 8 SCC 715) that in exercise of the jurisdiction under Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is not permissible to rehear and correct erroneous decisions and even assuming that the decision in the instant case is erroneous, the remedy available to the review petitioner is to challenge the judgment before the Apex Court and not to seek a review of the judgment. The learned counsel for the first respondent contended that an error which is not self evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning cannot be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record so as to attract the jurisdiction under Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, that expect after a long drawn out process of reasoning this Court cannot pronounce on the issues raised in the review petition and therefore, no relief can be granted in the instant review petition. The learned counsel for the first respondent contended relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. N. Raju Reddiar (AIR 1997 SC 1005) that the sole defendant in the suit (first respondent in the appeal) was represented by counsel and therefore, the review petitioner, his son, could not have filed the instant review petition by engaging another lawyer. Relying on the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Krishna Sathyadas v. Lakshmikutty Amma (1990 (2) KLT 795) the learned counsel for the first respondent contended that the review petitioner cannot set up a defence which was not set up by his predecessor-in-interest in the appeal and therefore on that score also, he is not entitled to institute and maintain the instant review petition. Relying on the decision of the Apex Court in State of Nagaland v. Toulvi Kibami ((2003) 8 SCC 671) the learned counsel for the first respondent contended that after the judgment sought to be reviewed was delivered, the appellant/plaintiff has instituted O.S No. 81 of 2011 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Mavellikara, that summons was issued in the said suit to the defendants therein who are parties to the instant review petition, that they have entered appearance and filed written statements and therefore, as the judgment sought to be reviewed has already been implemented, the review petition is not maintainable. The learned counsel lastly contended that the decree dismissing A.S No. 533 of 2002 is not in agreement with the judgment, that in the judgment this Court did not direct that the judgment and decree of the trial court shall stand confirmed and therefore, the review petitioner cannot be heard to contend that by the judgment sought to be reviewed, the decree and judgment of the trial court were confirmed. Reliance was placed on rule 6 of Order XX of the Code of Civil Procedure in support of the said contention.
10. I have considered the submissions made at the Bar by the learned counsel on either side. I shall first consider whether the review petition is maintainable for the reason that the second respondent in the appeal (the second respondent herein) had unsuccessfully moved the Apex Court by filing a Special Leave Petition from the judgment sought to be reviewed. It is no doubt true that the second respondent herein, who was the second respondent in the appeal, had filed S.L.P(C) No. 17128 of 2012 in the Apex Court. That Special Leave Petition accompanied by an application to condone the delay in filing it came up for consideration before the Apex Court on 10.5.2012 and was dismissed. The order passed by the Apex Court is extracted below for easy reference.
“Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed on the ground of delay and also on the merits.”
11. In Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (AIR 2000 SC 2587) the Apex Court considered the question whether the dismissal of a Special Leave Petition by a non speaking order would stand in the way of the High Court from exercising the review jurisdiction conferred on it under Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure. After a survey of the case law on point and the relevant statutory provisions, the Apex Court held as follows:
“39. We have catalogued and dealt with all the available decisions of this Court brought to our notice on the point at issue. It is clear that as amongst the several two-Judge Bench decisions there is a conflict of opinion and needs to be set at rest. The source of power conferring binding efficacy on decisions of this Court is not uniform in all such decisions. Reference is found having been made to (i) Article 141 of the Constitution, (ii) doctrine of merger, (iii) res judicata, and (iv) Rule of discipline flowing from this Court being the highest Court of the land.
40. A petition seeking grant of special leave to appeal may be rejected for several reasons. For example, it may be rejected (i) as barred by time, or (ii) being a defective presentation, (iii) the petitioner having no locus standi to file the petition, (iv) the conduct of the petitioner disentitling him to any indulgence by the Court, (iv) the question raised by the petitioner for consideration by this Court being not fit for consideration or deserving being dealt with by the Apex Court of the country and so on. The expression often employed by this Court while disposing of such petitions are “heard and dismissed”, “dismissed”, “dismissed as barred by time” and so on. May be that at the admission stage itself the opposite party appears on caveat or on notice and offers contest of the maintainability of the petition. The Court may apply its mind to the merit worthiness of the petitioner's prayer seeking leave to file an appeal and having formed an opinion may say “dismissed on merits”. Such an order may be passed even ex parte, that is, in the absence of the opposite party. In any case, the dismissal would remain a dismissal by a non-speaking order where no reasons have been assigned and no law has been declared by the Supreme Court. The dismissal is not of the appeal but of the special leave petition. Even if the merits have been gone into, they are the merits of the special leave petition only. In our opinion neither doctrine of merger nor Article 141 of the Constitution is attracted to such an order. Grounds entitling exercise of review jurisdiction conferred by Order 47, Rule 1 of the C.P.C or any other statutory provision or allowing review of an order passed in exercise of writ or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court (where also the principles underlying or emerging from Order 47, Rule 1 of the C.P.C act as guidelines) are not necessarily the same on which this Court exercises discretion to grant or not to grant special leave to appeal while disposing of a petition for the purpose. Mere rejection of special leave petition does not take away the jurisdiction of the Court, tribunal or forum whose order forms the subject-matter of petition for special leave to review its own order if grounds for exercise of review jurisdiction are shown to exist. Where the order rejecting an SLP is a speaking order, that is, where reasons have been assigned by this Court for rejecting the petition for special leave and are stated in the order still the order remains the one rejecting prayer for the grant of leave to appeal. The petitioner has been turned away at the threshold without having been allowed to enter in the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. Here also the doctrine of merger would not apply. But the law stated or declared by this Court in its order shall attract applicability of Article 141 of the Constitution. The reasons assigned by this Court in its order expressing its adjudication (expressly or by necessary implication) on point of fact or law shall take away the jurisdiction of any other Court, tribunal or authority to express any opinion in conflict with or in departure from the view taken by this Court because permitting to do so would be subversive of judicial discipline and an affront to the order of this Court. However this would be so not by reference to the doctrine of merger.
41. Once a special leave petition has been granted, the doors for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction of this Court have been let open. The order impugned before the Supreme Court becomes an order appealed against. Any order passed thereafter would be an appellate order and would attract the applicability of doctrine of merger. It would not make a difference whether the order is one of reversal or of modification or of dismissal affirming the order appealed against. It would also not make any difference if the order is a speaking or non-speaking one. Whenever this Court has felt inclined to apply its mind to the merits of the order put in issue before it though it may be inclined to affirm the same, it is customary with this Court to grant leave to appeal and thereafter dismiss the appeal itself (and not merely the petition for special leave) though at times the orders granting leave to appeal and dismissing the appeal are contained in the same order and at times the orders are quite brief. Nevertheless, the order shows the exercise of appellate jurisdiction and therein the merits of the order impugned having been subjected to judicial scrutiny of this Court.
42. “To merge” means to sink or disappear in something else; to become absorbed or extinguished; to be combined or be swallowed up. Merger in law is defined as the absorption of a thing of lesser importance by a greater, whereby the lesser ceases to exist, but the greater is not increased; an absorption or swallowing up so as to involve a loss of identity and individuality. (See Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. LVII, pp. 1067-1068).
43. We may look at the issue from another angle. The Supreme Court cannot and does not reverse or modify the decree or order appealed against while deciding a petition for special leave to appeal. What is impugned before the Supreme Court can be reversed or modified only after granting leave to appeal and then assuming appellate jurisdiction over it. If the order impugned before the Supreme Court cannot be reversed or modified at the SLP stage obviously that order cannot also be affirmed at the SLP stage. To sum up our conclusions are:-
(i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an order passed by a Court, tribunal or any other authority before superior forum and such superior forum modifies, reverses or affirms the decision put in issue before it, the decision by the sub-ordinate forum merges in the decision by the superior forum and it is the latter which subsists, remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the eye of law.
(ii) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution is divisible into two stages. First stage is up to the disposal of prayer for special leave to file an appeal. The second stage commences if and when the leave to appeal is granted and special leave petition is converted into an appeal.
(iii) Doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be determinative of the applicability or merger. The superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in issue before it. Under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court may reverse, modify or affirm the judgment-decree or order appealed against while exercising its appellate jurisdiction and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can therefore be applied to the former and not to the latter.
(iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed.
(v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the Court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the Court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties.
(vi) Once leave to appeal has been granted and appellate jurisdiction of Supreme Court has been invoked the order passed in appeal would attract the doctrine of merger; the order may be of reversal, modification or merely affirmation.
(vii) On an appeal having been preferred or a petition seeking leave to appeal having been converted into an appeal before Supreme Court the jurisdiction of High Court to entertain a review petition is lost thereafter as provided by sub-rule (1) of Rule (1) of Order 47 of the C.P.C”
12. The Apex Court held that even an order dismissing the Special Leave Petition with the observation “dismissed on merits” would remain a dismissal by a non-speaking order where no reasons have been assigned and no law has been declared, that even if the merits had been gone into, it is on the merits of the Special Leave Petition only and the mere rejection of a Special Leave Petition by a non-speaking order does not take away the jurisdiction of the Court, Tribunal or Forum whose order forms the subject-matter of the petition for special leave, to review its own order, if grounds for exercise of review jurisdiction are shown to exist. The Apex Court held that even in cases where the order rejecting a Special Leave Petition is a speaking order, that is, where reasons have been assigned by the Apex Court for rejecting the Special Leave Petition and are stated in the order, still the order remains one rejecting the prayer for grant of leave to appeal, that as the petitioner has been turned away at the threshold without having been allowed to enter in the appellate jurisdiction of the Apex Court, the doctrine of merger would not apply. In the instant case, as noticed earlier, the Special Leave Petition was dismissed by a non-speaking order. In the light of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (supra), I find no reason why the review petition cannot be entertained by this Court. I accordingly overrule the objection raised by the learned counsel for the first respondent to the maintainability of the review petition.
13. I shall next consider the question whether a long drawn out process of reasoning is required to pronounce on the issue arising in the instant case, namely, whether even while dismissing the appeal and affirming the decree and judgment of the trial court, this Court could have reserved liberty with the unsuccessful plaintiff to institute a fresh suit. The Apex Court has in Devaraju Pillai v. Sellayya Pillai. [(1987) 1 SCC 61] held that in exercise of the power of review a learned single Judge of the High Court could not have construed a document differently and held that it is a Will and not a settlement as was held by another learned Judge when the Second Appeal, was first heard and disposed of. It was held that if the party is aggrieved by the judgment of the learned single Judge sitting in Second Appeal, the appropriate remedy was to file an appeal and the remedy by way of reviewed was misconceived. In Meera Bhanja (Smt) v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury (Smt). [(1995) 1 SCC 170] the Apex Court held that the Division Bench of the High Court could not have reviewed the earlier judgment by reconsidering the entire evidence with a view to finding out the alleged apparent error for justifying the invocation of review powers. The Apex Court also referred to and relied on the decisions in Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Bishak Sharma [AIR 1979 (4) SC 389] and Sathyanarayanan, Lakshmi Narayanan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanabba, Tirumale [AIR 1960 SC 137] to hold that an error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may be conceivably two opinions, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. It was also held that where an alleged error is far from self evident and if it can be established, it has to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments, it cannot be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. The same view was reiterated by the Apex Court in Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi [(1997) 8 SCC 715]. It was held that under Order XLVII rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be re-heard and corrected and that a review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be an appeal in disguise. It is relying on the principles emerging from the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court that, the learned counsel for the first respondent contended that the instant review petition is not maintainable. Review is sought in the instant case on the ground that this Court could not have after upholding the judgment and decree passed by the trial court dismissing the suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff, reserved liberty with him to file a fresh suit seeking partition and other appropriate reliefs. The contention raised by the review petitioner, which is supported by respondents 2 to 5 is that in the absence of an application for permission to withdraw the suit, this Court could not have after upholding the decree and judgment of the trial court granted liberty to the appellant/plaintiff to institute a fresh suit. The fact that a fresh suit has been filed and the defendants (the review petitioner and respondents 2 to 5) have entered appearance and filed their written statements in the said suit is not in dispute.
14. In K.S Bhoopathy v. Kokila [AIR 2000 SC 2132] the Apex Court considered the scope of Order XXIII Rule 1(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure and held that the court dealing with an application for permission to withdraw the suit, filed at the appellate stage should feel satisfied that there exist proper grounds/reasons for granting permission for withdrawal of the suit with leave to file a fresh suit and in such a matter, the statutory mandate is not complied with by merely stating that the grant of permission will not prejudice the defendants. The Apex Court held that in case such permission under Order XXIII Rule 1(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure is granted at the appellate or second appellate stage, prejudice to the defendant is writ large as he loses the benefit of the decision of the lower court in his favour. Reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex Court in The Executive Officer, Arthanareswarar Temple v. R. Sathyamoorthy [AIR 1999 SC 958] wherein it had been held as follows:
“It is true that in a large number of cases decided by the High Courts, it was held while dealing with applications under Order 23, Rule 1, CPC, that if an appeal was preferred by an unsuccessful plaintiff against the Judgment of the trial Court dismissing the suit and if the plaintiff appellant wanted to withdraw not only the appeal but also the suit unconditionally, then such a permission so far as the withdrawal of the suit was concerned, can be granted if there was no question of any adjudication on merits in favour of the defendants by the trial being nullified by such withdrawal. On the other hand, if any such findings by the trial Court in favour of the defendant would get nullified, such permission for withdrawal of the suit should not be granted (See Thakur Balaram Singh v. K. Achuta Rao, (1977) 2 AP LJ (HC) 111; Kedar Nath v. Chandra Karan, AIR 1962 All 263; V. Dube v. Harcharan, AIR 1971 All 41; Charles Samuel v. Board of Trustees, (1978) 2 Mad LJ 243, Lala Chetram v. Krishnamoni, (1984) 1 Mad LJ 28; Jubedan Begum v. Sekhawat Ali Khan, AIR 1984 Punj & Har 221; Ram Dhan v. Jagat Prasad, AIR 1982 Raj 235. In the present case, the learned Judge felt that no such finding in favour of the Commissioner was being nullified by the withdrawal of the OP at the stage of revision and therefore the withdrawal of OP was permissible”.
15. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that no application seeking withdrawal of the suit from which the appeal in the instant case arose, was filed in this Court. Not even an oral request in that regard was admittedly made by the learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff. In such circumstances, this Court could not have after affirming the decree and judgment of the trial dismissing the suit for declaration of title, reserved liberty with the unsuccessful plaintiff to institute a fresh suit seeking the same relief. Any observation made by this Court while dismissing the appeal, that the dismissal of the suit would not stand in the way of the plaintiff from filing a fresh suit would still be resjudicata. A similar issue arise for consideration in Ramadhin Singh v. Mt. Chandrama Kuer [AIR 1925 Privy Council 55] wherein, the Privy Council held as follows:
“When the plaintiffs brought their first suit, they had to show their title to impeach the widow's gift. For this purpose they had to show either that they were some at least of the nearest reversionary heirs, or that the only nearer reversionary heir had colluded with the widow. In their plaint they did not rely on collusion, which they only introduced in their replication. Taking, however, that view of the pleadings which is most favourable to them and treating them as relying equally on both grounds of claim, it is now clear that they can only make out a claim to be some of the next reversioners on the footing of the family custom, and that the allegation of that custom therefore was an allegation which “might and ought to have been made” within the meaning of Explanation 4.
Or, to put in another way. One of the alternative cases on which they were basing their title to sue was their nearness of kin, and to prove their nearness of kin it was essential to aver the family custom. They claimed as next heirs, and their claim was dismissed. They cannot fight it over again.
But, as the Judges in the Court of the Judicial Commissioner have observed, some complication was introduced by the language of the Judge who tried the first case and by his expressing himself as if he had power to give leave to bring a fresh suit. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiffs that in so expressing himself he was purporting to exercise the powers given to the Court by Order 23, which allows the Court in certain cases to grant the plaintiff permission to withdraw from a suit with liberty to issue a fresh suit, in which case the bar against a fresh suit which is otherwise imposed on a plaintiff who abandons his first suit is removed.
The same point was raised at their Lordships' bar, but their Lordships agree with the Court of the Judicial Commissioner that it is not a good one. There was no application for leave to withdraw the suit, nor was it withdrawn: it was dismissed and the power of the learned Judge ceased upon this dismissal. It may have been unfortunate for the plaintiffs that the learned Judge thought that he had a power which he did not possess, but happily, as the Judges on the appeal observed, it is improbable that there was substance in the claim which they have been prevented from further prosecuting.
(emphasis supplied)
In passing it may be observed that if the learned Judge thought that he was exercising power under Order 23 he must also have thought that the subject matter of any future suit would be the same subject matter as that of the suit which he dismissed. This confirms the view which the Courts below and their Lordships have taken”.
16. The decision of Privy Council in Ramadhin Singh (supra) was followed by the Apex Court in Shiv Kumar Sharma v. Santhosh Kumari [(2007) 8 SCC 600] and Dadu Dayalu Mahasabha, Jaipur (Trust) v. Mahant Ram Niwas (AIR 2008 S.C.W 3324). In the light of the authoritative pronouncements of the Apex Court and the Privy Council and in the absence of an application for permission to withdraw the suit, no process of reasoning or an analysis of the pleadings or a re-appreciation of the evidence adduced in the case is required to hold that this Court committed an error apparent on the face of the record, when, this Court permitted the unsuccessful plaintiff to institute a fresh suit even after upholding the decision of the trial court dismissing his suit. A mere reading of paragraph 4 of the judgment sought to be reviewed in the light of the principles laid down by the Apex Court and the Privy Council is enough to hold that an observation of the kind made in paragraph 4 of the judgment could not have been made by this Court, while dismissing the plaintiff's appeal.
17. That takes me to the question whether the decree passed in A.S No. 533 of 2002 is in agreement with the judgment therein. Though the learned counsel for the first respondent contended that the decree dismissing the appeal to the extent it recites that the decree and judgment of the trial court be confirmed, is not in agreement with the judgment, a reading of paragraph 4 of the judgment in A.S No. 533 of 2002 discloses that this Court had come to the conclusion that the only possible outcome is a dismissal of the appeal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, but with the observation that the plaintiff will be free to file a comprehensive suit to establish his rights including the right to seek partition. With the dismissal of the appeal, the decree and judgment passed by the trial court stood confirmed. All that the decree passed by this Court in the instant appeal recites is that “the decree of the court below be and is hereby confirmed”. One cannot dispute the fact that when the appellate court dismisses an appeal from the decree of the trial court, the necessary consequence is confirmation of the decree of the trial court. Therefore, the mere fact the words “the decree of the trial court be confirmed”, is lacking in the judgment is not a reason to hold that the decree in the instant appeal is not in agreement with the judgment therein.
18. I shall now consider the question whether the legal heir of the first respondent in the appeal is competent to maintain the review petition. The competence of the review petitioner to seek a review of the judgment dismissing the appeal with observations is questioned on the ground that as the legal heir of the first respondent in the appeal he could not have raised any ground which his predecessor-in-interest had not raised. Reliance is placed on the decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Krishnan Sathyadas v. Lakshmikutty Amma [1990 (2) KLT 795], wherein it was held that a legal heir who is impleaded as a party to the suit, cannot have a plea which is different from the plea raised by his predecessor-in-interest. In the instant case, the predecessor-in-interest of the review petitioner passed away shortly after A.S No. 533 of 2002 was dismissed. The question of filing a review petition arose only later. The predecessor-in-interest of the review petitioner had not put forward any contention in the appeal memorandum regarding the maintainability of a fresh suit after the dismissal of the instant appeal. If the predecessor-in-interest of the review petitioner had been alive, he could have filed a petition seeking a review of the impugned judgment. I therefore find no merit in the contention that the review petitioner is disabled from filing a review petition. The first respondent has also raised a contention that the review petitioner should have filed the review petition through the learned counsel who appeared for his predecessor-in-interest, in the appeal. It is relying on the observations of the Apex Court in Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. N. Raju Reddiar [(1997) 9 SCC 736] that such a contention is put forward. In Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. N. Raju Reddiar (supra) the Apex Court was considering an application for clarification which itself was filed after a review petition seeking a review of the judgment in the Special Leave Petition was dismissed. After the Special Leave Petition was dismissed, an application for review was filed through another counsel. That review petition was dismissed. Thereafter through another counsel an application for clarification was filed on the plea that the order is not clear and unambiguous. It was in such circumstances that the Apex Court held that when an appeal or a Special Leave Petition is dismissed, except in rare cases where an error of law or fact is apparent on the record, no review can be filed by an Advocate-on-Record who did not appear in the main case and that too without obtaining the consent of the Advocate-on-Record at the earlier stage. In the case on hand, the said principle has no application. The review petitioner was not a party to the appeal. The review petitioner is also not seeking to review any concession or admission made by his predecessor-in-interest or his counsel. The judgment of this Court in the appeal does not indicate that the respondents in the appeal had consented to the suit being dismissed as withdrawn or liberty being granted to the unsuccessful plaintiff to file a fresh suit. In such circumstances, I find no reason to hold that the instant review petition filed through a counsel who did not appear in the appeal is not maintainable.
19. The only other contention that remains to be considered is whether the review petition is liable to be dismissed for the reason that pursuant to the judgment sought to be reviewed, the first respondent has filed a fresh suit, O.S No. 81 of 2011 in the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Mavelikkara. Relying on the decision of the Apex Court in State of Nagaland v. Toulvi Kibami ((2003) 8 SCC 671) the learned counsel for the first respondent contended that as the impugned judgment has already been acted upon, a review petition is not maintainable. It is contended that in view of the subsequent events that have taken place consequent on the judgment sought to be reviewed, the review petition is not maintainable. In State of Nagaland v. Toulvi Kibami (supra) the Apex Court was considering the question whether the Division Bench of the High Court was right in allowing a review petition after the judgment of the Division Bench which was sought to be reviewed was given effect to and the rules governing service conditions of State Government employees were amended. The first respondent before the Apex Court who held a degree in engineering filed a writ petition in the High Court contending that the second respondent before the Apex Court was not eligible to be promoted to the post of Additional Chief Engineer. He contended that a diploma holder is ineligible to be appointed by promotion as Additional Chief Engineer in view of the fact that as per the rules, the post of Additional Chief Engineer should be filled up from among degree holders. A learned single Judge of the High Court accepted the said contention, allowed the writ petition and set aside the promotion of the diploma holder as Additional Chief Engineer. The State of Nagaland preferred an appeal before the Division Bench. By judgment delivered on 4.9.1995, the Division Bench allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the learned single Judge and directed the State Government to decide whether diploma holders could also be promoted to the post of Additional Chief Engineer having regard to the fact that they have rendered meritorious service. Pursuant to the direction of the Division Bench, the State Government amended the relevant rules with retrospective effect from 12.9.1996 to enable promotion of meritorious persons among diploma holders to the post of Additional Chief Engineer. Thereupon, the diploma holder was again promoted as Additional Chief Engineer. In the meanwhile, the degree holder who had moved the High Court filed an application before the Division Bench for a review of the judgment delivered by it on 4.9.1995 The review petition was allowed and the writ appeal filed by the State of Nagaland was dismissed. On appeal, the Apex Court held that in view of the subsequent events that had taken place consequent on the judgment of the Division Bench, the review petition was not maintainable and that the remedy of the writ petitioner is to challenge the promotion of the diploma holder by filing a fresh writ petition.
20. In my considered opinion, the principle laid down by the Apex Court in State of Nagaland v. Toulvi Kibami (supra) can have no application in the instant case for the reason that even in the suit filed pursuant to the judgment sought to be reviewed, the question whether that suit is barred by resjudicata in view of the dismissal of the first suit, which was the subject matter of the instant appeal and the review petition, will arise for consideration. The judgment sought to be reviewed does not put an end to the dispute. Order XLVII rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure stipulates that any person considering himself to be aggrieved (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred; (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a court (exercising Small Cause Jurisdiction), and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order. It is evident from a reading of Order XLVII rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure that a review can be sought by a person considering himself aggrieved by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed but from which no appeal has been preferred or a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed. The review petitioner who is aggrieved by the decree passed in the appeal to the extent it allows the unsuccessful plaintiff to file a fresh suit even after the dismissal of the first suit filed by him, is in my opinion entitled to seek a review of the judgment on the ground that it is vitiated by a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. The power of this Court to rectify an error or mistake committed by it is not in my opinion fettered merely for the reason that pursuant to the impugned judgment, the unsuccessful plaintiff has filed a fresh suit. The very issue which is raised in the instant review petition will arise for consideration in the second suit filed by the unsuccessful plaintiff. In the light of the binding decisions of the Privy Council and the Apex Court referred to in paragraphs 15 and 16 above, the issue will necessarily have to be answered in favour of the defendants in the second suit. Unlike in the case before the Apex Court, this Court had not issued a positive direction to the parties but had only reserved a right in favour of the unsuccessful plaintiff to file a fresh suit. The principle laid down by the Apex Court in State of Nagaland v. Toulvi Kibami (supra) can have application only in a case where the court directs one of the parties to do a particular thing and it is complied with and not to a case like the one on hand, where one of the parties has availed the benefit of an observation of this Court, which, as held by me earlier could not have been made while dismissing plaintiff's appeal. I accordingly overrule the said contention as well.
A reading of the impugned judgment discloses that this Court has not considered in detail the pleadings and the evidence available in the case and come to an independent finding on the issues arising for consideration in the appeal. In such circumstances, I am of the opinion that the proper course would be to review and recall the judgment dismissing the appeal, instead of vacating the observation regarding the reservation of the right to file a fresh suit. I accordingly allow the review petition and review and recall the decree and judgment dated 3.2.2011 in A.S No. 533 of 2002. The Registry is directed to post the appeal for hearing as per roster.
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