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Newton Engineering And Chemicals Limited v. Indian Oil Corporation Limited And Others

Supreme Court Of India
Oct 18, 2012
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Factual and Procedural Background

M/s Newton Engineering and Chemicals Ltd. (“the contractor”) and Indian Oil Corporation (“the Corporation”) had an agreement containing an arbitration clause stating that all disputes would be referred to the sole arbitration of the Executive Director (Northern Region) – “ED (NR)”. If the ED (NR) was unable or unwilling to act, the clause permitted the ED (NR) to designate another person as sole arbitrator and expressly stipulated that no one other than the ED (NR) or such designee could act as arbitrator.

When disputes arose, the contractor requested appointment of the ED (NR). By letter dated 28-4-2004, the Corporation replied that, owing to internal re-organisation, the office of ED (NR) no longer existed and proposed substituting “Director (Marketing)” as the named arbitrator, subject to the contractor’s consent. On 19-5-2004 the contractor declined and instead sought a three-member tribunal in accordance with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“the 1996 Act”). The Corporation unilaterally appointed Director (Marketing) as sole arbitrator.

Aggrieved, the contractor filed an application under Sections 11(6)(c), 13 and 15 of the 1996 Act before the Delhi High Court seeking appointment of a retired High Court Judge as sole arbitrator and a stay of the proceedings before the Corporation’s appointee. A Single Judge dismissed the petition on 8-11-2006, directing the contractor to raise any challenge before the arbitral tribunal itself. The contractor appealed; the Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and rendered the present order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, upon abolition of the office of ED (NR), the arbitration clause survived so as to permit substitution of another sole arbitrator.
  2. Whether the Corporation could unilaterally appoint Director (Marketing) as sole arbitrator in the absence of the contractor’s consent.
  3. Whether Sections 11(6)(c), 13 and 15 of the 1996 Act were applicable to the contractor’s request for appointment of an arbitrator in these circumstances.
  4. Whether the Delhi High Court erred in dismissing the contractor’s Section 11 petition and directing it to appear before the unilaterally appointed arbitrator.

Arguments of the Parties

Contractor’s Arguments

  • The arbitration should proceed under the default mechanism of the 1996 Act, with each party appointing its own arbitrator, rather than through a substituted sole arbitrator.
  • The unilateral appointment of Director (Marketing) violated the express terms of the arbitration clause and therefore lacked legal validity.
  • An independent retired Judge should be appointed as sole arbitrator to ensure impartial adjudication.

Corporation’s Arguments

  • The parties’ intention was to arbitrate, and substitution of the ED (NR) with Director (Marketing) was a reasonable method to preserve that intention after the office of ED (NR) was abolished.
  • The contractor was invited to consent to the substitution but chose instead to alter the agreed arbitral mechanism; the Corporation therefore proceeded to appoint Director (Marketing) in accordance with the “spirit” of the clause.
  • Any challenge to the appointment should properly be raised before the arbitral tribunal itself, not before the High Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court focused on the “express, clear and unequivocal” terms of the arbitration clause. The clause confined arbitration strictly to the ED (NR) or a person designated by the ED (NR). Once the office of ED (NR) ceased to exist, no one possessed authority to act as arbitrator because:

  • The contingency expressly contemplated in the clause—substitution by the ED (NR)—became impossible.
  • The clause explicitly barred any person other than the ED (NR) or the ED (NR)’s designee from acting as arbitrator.

Consequently, the arbitration agreement was deemed to have “worked its course” and lapsed; there was no surviving mechanism under which either party could unilaterally appoint an arbitrator.

Because the arbitration clause itself failed, reliance on Sections 11(6)(c), 13 and 15 of the 1996 Act was misplaced; those provisions presuppose a subsisting arbitration agreement capable of being given effect. The High Court therefore erred in dismissing the contractor’s petition and compelling it to appear before an invalidly constituted tribunal.

Holding and Implications

ORDER SET ASIDE & ARBITRATOR APPOINTMENT QUASHED.

The Supreme Court:

  • Set aside the Delhi High Court’s order dated 8-11-2006.
  • Declared the appointment of Director (Marketing) (Respondent 3) as sole arbitrator, and all proceedings conducted by him, to be of no legal consequence.
  • Left it open to the contractor to pursue ordinary civil proceedings for redressal of its claims.

Implications are confined to the parties: arbitration between them cannot proceed under the impugned clause or the Corporation’s unilateral appointment. No broader legal precedent was articulated beyond strict enforcement of the parties’ arbitration clause.

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Order

1. We have heard Mr Jagdeep Kishore, learned counsel for the appellant petitioner, and Mr Chetan Sharma, learned Senior Counsel for the respondents.

2. Leave granted. It is not necessary to refer to the facts of the case. Suffice it to say that the arbitration clause in the agreement between the parties provides that all disputes and differences between them shall be referred by any aggrieved party to the contract to the sole arbitration of ED (NR) of Respondent 1, Indian Oil Corporation (for short “the Corporation”). The arbitration clause further provides that, if such ED (NR) is unable or unwilling to act as the sole arbitrator, the matter shall be referred to the sole arbitration of some other person designated by such ED (NR) in his place who is willing to act as sole arbitrator. The arbitration clause also provides that no person other than ED (NR) or the person designated by the ED (NR) should act as arbitrator.

3. It is the admitted case that when the disputes arose between the parties, the present appellant, M/s Newton Engineering and Chemicals Ltd. (for short “the contractor”) wrote to the Corporation for appointment of ED (NR) as sole arbitrator as per the arbitration clause. The Corporation, vide communication dated 28-4-2004, informed the contractor that due to internal reorganisation in the Corporation, the office of ED (NR) has ceased to exist and since the intention of the parties was to get their disputes settled through arbitration, the Corporation offered to the contractor the substitution of the named arbitrator i.e ED (NR), with Director (Marketing) in the existing arbitration clause. The Corporation further informed the contractor that, if it agrees to the same, it may send written confirmation giving its consent to the substitution of the named arbitrator. The said communication further stated that on receiving the confirmation, the case for appointment of arbitrator would be put up before the new agreed arbitrator between the parties i.e Director (Marketing).

4. To the above communication, the contractor informed the Corporation, vide communication dated 19-5-2004, that it would like to have the arbitration as per the provisions contained in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short “the 1996 Act”) whereby each of the parties would be appointing one arbitrator each. The contractor stated that it would be appointing its arbitrator soon after confirmation from the Corporation. It appears that the Corporation did not agree to that and ultimately appointed Director (Marketing) as the arbitrator.

5. The contractor aggrieved thereby made an application under Section 11(6)(c) read with Sections 13 and 15 of the 1996 Act before the Delhi High Court for appointment of a retired Judge of that Court as a sole arbitrator to adjudicate upon the claims of the contractor raised in the petition. It was also prayed that the arbitration proceedings be stayed before the arbitrator appointed by the Corporation.

6. The Single Judge of the High Court, by the impugned order dated 8-11-2006, dismissed the petition filed by the contractor and directed it to appear before the Arbitral Tribunal. While doing so, the Single Judge observed that the challenge to the appointment of the arbitrator may be raised by the contractor before the Arbitral Tribunal itself.

7. Having regard to the express, clear and unequivocal arbitration clause between the parties that the disputes between them shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the ED (NR) of the Corporation and, if ED (NR) was unable or unwilling to act as the sole arbitrator, the matter shall be referred to the person designated by such ED (NR) in his place who was willing to act as sole arbitrator and, if none of them is able to act as an arbitrator, no other person should act as arbitrator, the appointment of Director (Marketing) or his nominee as a sole arbitrator by the Corporation cannot be sustained. If the office of ED (NR) ceased to exist in the Corporation and the parties were unable to reach to any agreed solution, the arbitration clause did not survive and has to be treated as having worked its course. According to the arbitration clause, sole arbitrator would be ED (NR) or his nominee and no one else. In the circumstances, it was not open to either of the parties to unilaterally appoint any arbitrator for resolution of the disputes. Sections 11(6)(c), 13 and 15 of the 1996 Act have no application in the light of the reasons indicated above.

8. In this view of the matter, the impugned order dated 8-11-2006 has to be set aside and it is set aside. The appointment of Respondent 3 as sole arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes between the parties is also set aside. The proceedings, if any, carried out by the arbitrator are declared to be of no legal consequence. It will be open to the contractor, the appellant to pursue appropriate ordinary civil proceedings for redressal of its grievance in accordance with law.

9. The civil appeal is disposed of as above with no order as to costs.