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Bisweswar Rakshit v. The State Of West Bengal And Others

Calcutta High Court
Jun 6, 2012
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Patherya, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petition concerns a claim for interest on delayed payment of retiral benefits. The petitioner retired on 31 January 2000. A pension payment order (PPO) was issued on 16 January 2002 and the retiral benefit was paid to the petitioner on 26 March 2002. The writ petition raises the question whether a claim for interest, made after ten years, on the delayed payment of those retiral benefits should be allowed. The matter proceeded on written submissions from counsel for both sides, consideration of numerous precedents, and the Court issued directions including a costs order against the petitioner's advocate.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner's claim for interest made after 10 years on delayed payment of retiral benefits ought to be allowed.
  2. Whether the delayed payment of retiral benefits can be characterized as a "continuing wrong" giving rise to a cause of action de die in diem, and therefore not barred by limitation.
  3. Whether delay or laches should bar the petitioner from claiming interest, including the applicability of principles relating to third-party rights and settled rights.
  4. Whether entitlement to interest (including reliance on fundamental rights under Articles 14, 19 & 21) can be invoked despite delay.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner retired on 31 January 2000; the PPO issued on 16 January 2002; payment was made on 26 March 2002 — payment was delayed beyond the period (forthwith or maximum 30 days) to which the petitioner was entitled.
  • Therefore the petitioner is entitled to interest from the date of retirement until payment (i.e., from 31 January 2000 until 26 March 2002).
  • The petitioner relied on several decisions to support entitlement to interest and to argue that interest is a fundamental right (including cases cited to show interest need not be treated as mere bounty).
  • Distinctions were drawn between the present facts and decisions where delay or third-party rights made relief unsuitable (for example, the Land Acquisition context). The petitioner argued several precedents were distinguishable on facts.
  • The petitioner submitted that laches on the part of the advocate in drafting the petition should not prejudice the litigant; reliance was placed on precedent protecting litigants from suffering for their advocate's default.

Respondent (State) Arguments

  • The respondent authorities relied on Section 3 of the Limitation Act (three-year limitation) to argue the cause of action arose in 2002 and the present application was filed after 10 years, so it should be dismissed on the ground of delay.
  • Although Section 3 does not apply to writ proceedings in a strict sense, the respondents submitted that the principle of delay and limitation is relevant and should be considered by the Court.
  • The respondents argued many of the petitioner’s relied precedents were distinguishable, particularly where delay was not an issue in those cases or the facts were materially different (for example, third-party rights, custodial contexts, or where the State had agreed to pay interest).
  • The respondents accepted entitlement to interest in principle but insisted on consideration of delay/laches and the factual applicability of cited authorities before granting relief after a long delay.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
2012 (1) WBLR (Cal) 903 Referenced as a judgment delivered by J. Bhattacharya; relied upon in earlier proceedings.

The Court found this judgment distinguishable because the issue of delay was not considered in that decision.

(2007) 15 SCC 627 Authority addressing continuing/recurring rights in the context of pension (recurring cause of action).

The Court distinguished it on facts: being a pension case with a recurring cause of action, it does not apply to the present facts.

(2008) 3 SCC 44 Accepted proposition that entitlement to interest exists; held that claim for interest can be made under Part III of the Constitution (Articles 14, 19 & 21).

The Court accepted the proposition as to entitlement to interest and noted the decision went further to permit claims under fundamental rights; the decision was acknowledged but the delay issue remained the key question in the present case.

(2008) 8 SCC 648 Discussed in relation to the concept of continuing wrong; authority on whether wrongful act causes a continuing injury.

The Court relied on the principle that where the wrongful act caused a complete injury there is no continuing wrong; accordingly, it held (2008) 8 SCC 648 does not apply here because it concerned a recurring wrong.

(2009) 1 SCC 168 Cited in support of propositions advanced by the petitioner (specific principle not elaborated in the opinion).

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

(2011) 5 SCC 394 Case under the Land Acquisition Act where third-party rights had been created; courts reluctant to interfere once third-party rights are affected.

The Court held this precedent was distinguishable on facts because it involved third-party rights and settled positions under land acquisition law.

(2011) 3 SCC 436 Emphasizes consideration of delay and the explanation for delay; involved recurring claim to revised pay-scale.

The Court treated it as emphasizing that delay must be considered and explanations examined; it was noted that the case was decided on merit because the cause was recurring.

(2010) 6 SCC 1 Cited by parties in support of legal propositions regarding interest (specific principle not detailed in opinion).

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

(2011) 1 WBLR 486 Accepted entitlement to interest; in that decision delay was not an issue.

The Court accepted the principle from this decision but noted it was distinguishable on the ground that delay was not considered there.

(2010) 12 SCC 538 Case of continuing wrong where relief was restricted to the preceding three years.

The Court observed that although it was a case of continuing wrong, the relief there was limited to the preceding three years and therefore it did not assist the petitioner fully.

(2005) 13 SCC 161 Discussed in the context that there was no cut-off date for interest; distinguished pension/gratuity differences.

The Court referred to it when highlighting that pension differs from gratuity (pension periodic; gratuity one-time) and noted its relevance but did not apply it to negate delay concerns in the present facts.

(2006) 9 SCC 630 Case concerning pensionary benefits.

The Court stated it was not applicable to the facts of the present case.

(2011) 2 SCC 94 Cited in the list of authorities accepted on principle by earlier courts (specific principle not elaborated in opinion).

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

(1988) 2 SCC 580 Laid down the test for a continuing wrong.

The Court indicated that the test for a continuing wrong as laid down in this case should be applied to the facts of the present matter.

AIR (1959) SC 798 Principle that if wrongful act causes a complete injury there is no continuing wrong even though damage may continue.

The Court relied on this authority to explain that once payment was made the original wrongful act (refusal to pay forthwith) caused a complete injury; therefore it was not a continuing wrong.

(2007) 1 CLJ 21 Cited in support of authorities where matters were allowed on merits; also referenced in relation to circumstances when delay may not bar relief.

The Court treated this decision as distinguishable on facts.

AIR (1992) SCW 3181 Cited for the proposition that relief may be granted where no parallel right has been created or no third party right accrued.

The Court referred to this authority to support the view that delay is not to be measured solely by passage of time but by whether parallel or third-party rights have been created.

AIR (1958) SC 956 Authority for the proposition that fundamental rights are not lost by non-exercise (no loss by laches).

The Court relied on it, together with (1985) 2 SCC 197, to note that fundamental rights do not lapse merely by non-exercise.

(1985) 2 SCC 197 Used with AIR (1958) SC 956 regarding non-loss of fundamental rights by non-exercise.

The Court cited it to support the principle that non-exercise of a fundamental right does not lead to its loss.

AIR (1981) SC 1400 Rule that a litigant should not suffer due to laches/default of his advocate.

The Court relied on this authority to justify penalising the advocate (imposition of costs) rather than dismissing the petition for the advocate's defaults in pleading.

(2007) 3 Calcutta Law Times 531 Cited by petitioner to show that delay was considered in some Calcutta cases and thus provided support for the claim.

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by accepting that the petitioner was entitled to interest on delayed payment of retiral benefits — entitlement to interest was not disputed. The decisive issue was whether interest could be claimed after a delay of ten years.

The Court analysed the concept of a "continuing wrong." It explained that to constitute a continuing wrong, a fresh wrong must be committed every day (de die in diem) so that a cause of action accrues continuously. The Court relied on authorities (including AIR (1959) SC 798 and (1988) 2 SCC 580) to state that if a wrongful act causes a complete injury at the time of commission, there is no continuing wrong merely because the damage resulting from that injury continues.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found that when payment was withheld at the time of retirement a wrong was committed and injury was caused; on eventual payment the petitioner's right to receive payment forthwith had been fully injured, and although damage continued, the wrongful act itself was not continuing. Consequently, precedents treating recurring or continuing wrongs (e.g., (2008) 8 SCC 648 and (2007) 15 SCC 627) were found inapplicable or distinguishable where the cause was recurring.

The Court further considered the role of delay and laches. It accepted that although Section 3 of the Limitation Act does not apply strictly to writ petitions, the principle of delay is relevant. The Court emphasised the material distinction between cases where third-party or parallel rights have arisen (where courts are reluctant to disturb settled positions) and the present case where no such parallel or third-party rights had been created. Authorities such as AIR (1992) SCW 3181 were referred to for this proposition.

The Court also acknowledged the petitioner's argument regarding fundamental rights (Articles 14, 19 & 21) and cited authorities (AIR (1958) SC 956 and (1985) 2 SCC 197) to note that fundamental rights are not lost by non-exercise. However, the Court observed that the writ petition did not plead infringement of fundamental rights. The Court was unwilling to dismiss the petition on the basis of pleading deficiencies attributable to the advocate and invoked the principle from AIR (1981) SC 1400 protecting litigants from suffering for their advocates' defaults.

Balancing these considerations, the Court concluded that (i) the petitioner was entitled to interest, (ii) the claim was not barred by the mere passage of ten years because no parallel or third-party rights had been created, and (iii) the wrong was not of a continuing nature that would preclude recovery under the authorities distinguishing recurring causes. The Court therefore ordered payment of interest with directions as to rate, period, and timeline for compliance, and imposed a cost on the advocate for inadequate pleading.

Holding and Implications

DISPOSED OF

Holding (core ruling):

  • The writ application is disposed of in favour of the petitioner insofar as interest is concerned.
  • Respondent No. 4 is directed to pay the petitioner interest on the delayed payment of retiral benefits at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of retirement (31 January 2000) until the date of payment of those benefits.
  • The interest to be paid is limited up to the date of payment of the retiral benefits (the Court explicitly noted the interest directed is not "till date" but restricted to the date of payment of retiral benefits).
  • The payment is to be made by respondent No.4 within a fortnight from the date of receipt of the order.
  • The petitioner's advocate is penalised by an order for costs of Rs. 500, to be paid to the petitioner within one week of receipt of the order.

Implications:

  • The direct effect: the petitioner is to receive interest at 8% p.a. for the period from retirement to the date of payment, and the State respondent is ordered to make prompt payment within the specified timelines; the petitioner's advocate is to pay costs.
  • The Court emphasised that delay alone, measured solely by lapse of time, is not dispositive where no parallel or third-party rights have been created; therefore, in similar factual scenarios relief may be available despite long delays, subject to application of the continuing-wrong test and consideration of third-party effects.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal precedent beyond application of existing tests and authorities; the decision is fact-specific and the Court distinguished numerous precedents accordingly.

Additional note from the opinion: No affidavit in opposition had been filed in the matter, and therefore the allegations in the petition were not admitted by the respondents.

Show all summary ...

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Patherya, J.:— In this writ petition the only issue that arises for consideration is whether the claim of interest made after 10 years on the delayed payment of retiral benefits ought to be allowed.

Counsel for the petitioner contends that it is an admitted position that the petitioner retired on 31st January, 2000 and the pension payment order was issued on 16th January, 2002 and within two months of the issuance of the pension payment order that is on 26 March, 2002 the retiral benefit was paid to the petitioner. As the petitioner was entitled to payment of retiral benefits forthwith or maximum within a period of 30 days and admittedly, the said was not done the petitioner is entitled to payment of interest on and from the date of retirement till payment was made to the petitioner in March, 2002.

The contention of the respondent authorities is that in view of Section 3 of the Limitation Act which entitles a person to seek remedy within three years from the date, the cause of action arose, in the instant case the cause of action arose in 2002 and the application has been filed after 10 years therefore on the ground of delay alone this application be dismissed.

The judgment delivered by J. Bhattacharya, J. on 9 February, 2012 and reported in 2012 (1) WBLR (Cal) 903 is distinguishable as the issue of delay was not considered in the said judgment. To claim interest after 10 years, the petitioner must show and establish his right which is a continuing right as has been held in (2007) 15 SCC 627. In the instant case, the petitioner has not established his right to interest within the period of limitation. Therefore, he will not be entitled to claim payment of interest at this belated stage.

(2008) 3 SCC 44 relied on by J. Bhattacharya, J. in his judgment was not a case wherein the issue of delay was considered. It was a case with regard to entitlement of interest and there is no dispute that the petitioner is entitled to payment of interest, but the question is will he be entitled to such interest beyond the period of limitation. (2008) 8 SCC 648 so also (2009) 1 SCC 168 were relied on by the petitioner before J. Bhattacharya, J. In fact, in view of decisions reported in (2011) 5 SCC 394, (2011) 3 SCC 436, (2010) 6 SCC 1, (2011) 1 WBLR 486, (2010) 12 SCC 538, (2005) 13 SCC 161, (2006) 9 SCC 630 and (2011) 2 SCC 94, this application merits no order. In (1988) 2 SCC 580 the test for a continuing wrong has been laid down and the said test be applied to the facts of this case.

In opposing the issue of delay counsel for the writ petitioner has submitted that (2011) 5 SCC 394 is distinguishable on facts as the case related to a Land Acquisition proceeding wherein third party rights were created and status quo ante could not be restored, such is not the case here. Similarly (2011) 3 SCC 436 is distinguishable as the State was represented which agreed to make payment of interest and it is not a case of a wrong order. In fact although the issue of delay was raised and considered there is no finding in respect thereof and the case was decided on merits. (2008) 3 SCC 44 was a case of interest and not delay and the only reason for placing reliance on the said judgment by J. Bhattacharya, J. was for the purpose of highlighting that interest was a fundamental right. Interest on interest has never been granted and (2008) 8 SCC 648 aids the petitioner. There is no dispute with the proposition laid down in (2009) 1 SCC 168, (2010) 6 SCC 1 and (2010) 12 SCC 538. In the case of (2005) 13 SCC 161 there was no cut off date for interest while in (1988) 2 SCC 580 there was a cut off date. (2006) 9 SCC 630 is inapplicable to the facts of this case and (2011) 2 SCC 94 is accepted on principle.

(2011) 1 WBLR Cal. 486 is relied on as it aids the petitioner and although the issue of interest was dealt with the question of delay did not arise for consideration. (2007) 1 CLJ 21, (2008) 8 SCC 44 and (2007) 15 SCC 627 were all allowed on merits therefore it is distinguishable on facts. AIR (1992) SCW 3181 be considered. In fact, in (2007) 3 Calcutta Law Times 531 delay was considered and therefore no reason exists to reject the claim for interest. The State in case overburdened though no such plea has been taken is entitled to recover sums from the delinquent officers therefore interest be paid.

In reply counsel for the State respondents submits that the entitlement to interest may be a fundamental right and can be invoked at any time as generally fundamental right is not bound by any restriction and is uncontrolled. Delay and limitation are synonymous terms and although Section 3 of the Limitation Act is not to apply to writ proceedings, the principle of delay can be considered. (2011) 1 WBLR Cal. 486 is distinguishable on facts as delay was not in issue. (2008) 3 SCC 44 for the same reason is also distinguishable. (2007) 1 CLJ 21 was a case of custodial death and delay was being considered in that context therefore the said decision is distinguishable. AIR (1992) SCW 3181 is also distinguishable and the delay issue in the light of the decisions cited by the State respondents be considered.

Having considered the submissions of the parties there is no reason to doubt the entitlement of the petitioner to payment of interest but whether such interest can be claimed after 10 years is the issue which has arisen for consideration. One of the grounds on which the petitioner would be entitled to interest on delayed payment of retiral benefits would be if the same constituted a continuing wrong. To constitute a continuing wrong a fresh wrong must be committed everyday to give rise to a cause of action de die in diem. The injury caused must be continuing. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue as held in AIR (1959) SC 798 and followed in (2008) 8 SCC 648. In the instant case in refusing to make payment to the petitioner on retirement a wrong was committed and an injury caused. On payment the right of the petitioner to receive payment forthwith was completely injured and damage caused by such injury continued. But it cannot be said that the wrongful act was continuing to give rise to a cause of action de die in diem. The petitioner after 10 years is seeking to avail of such damage caused by the injury, therefore (2008) 8 SCC 648 will not apply to the facts of this case, as it was a case of a recurring wrong.

It is true that where third party rights are affected or settled rights of parties adversely affected Courts will not interfere, (2011) 5 SCC 394 was a case under the Land Acquisition Act where third party rights had been created and the Court was not inclined to interfere. Therefore, the said case is distinguishable on facts. (2011) 3 SCC 436 lays emphasis on considering the issue of delay and the explanation for such delay by courts of law although in the said case as claim to the revised pay-scale gave rise to a recurring cause of action the case was considered on merit. There is no dispute with the proposition laid down in (2008) 3 SCC 44 and (2011) 1 WBLR 486 and the entitlement to interest under Articles 14, 19 and 21 is undisputed. It is only whether such interest can be paid in case of delay in making the claim.

The difference between pension and gratuity was highlighted in AIR (1988) SC 580 and (2005) 13 SCC 161. Pension is payable periodically while gratuity is a one time payment, therefore (2007) 15 SCC 627 being a case of pension and the cause of action recurring is distinguishable on facts. For the same reason (2010) 12 SCC 538 will not apply as though a case of continuing wrong, the relief was restricted to the preceding 3 years. (2006) 9 SCC 630 is not applicable to the facts of the case in hand as it was a case of pensionary benefit.

In (2008) 3 SCC 44 and (2011) 1 WBLR 486 entitlement to interest has been accepted. (2008) 3 SCC 44 has gone a step ahead and held that a claim for interest can be made under Part III of the Constitution of India by relying on Articles 14, 19 & 21 of the Constitution. It is also an accepted proposition of law that retiral benefits is no longer in the nature of “bounty”.

If this be so then as held in AIR (1958) SC 956 and (1985) 2 SCC 197 there can be no loss of fundamental right on the ground of non-exercise and the question of delay in the facts of the instant case would not be germane.

Infringement of fundamental rights is relevant and although on a reading of the writ petition no infringement of fundamental rights has been pleaded but to dismiss the writ petition on this ground would cause grave injustice to the petitioners who have reposed confidence in their advocate and it is the advocates who draft the petition therefore for laches and default on the part of his advocate as held in AIR (1981) SC 1400 a litigant ought not to suffer. It is true that each case has to be considered on its facts alone and orders passed in earlier matters should not be the order of the day this writ petition therefore is not dismissed but the issue involved is considered on a broader perspective. In appropriate cases as in this one too necessary pleadings are lacking for which the advocate ought to be penalised by either imposition of cost or any other form of penalty. Accordingly cost of Rs. 500/- is imposed on the advocate. Such costs be paid to the petitioner within a week from the date of receipt of the order.

As the petitioner is entitled to interest and the real test to be applied in dealing with the issue of delay is that no parallel right has been created or 3rd party right accrued as held in AIR (1992) SCW 3181 and (2007) 1 CLJ 21 and not physical running of time. In fact by virtue of the delayed payment, the State has earned interest thereon and this payment therefore cannot be deprived to the petitioner

It may not be out of place to mention that the interest directed to be paid is not till date but is restricted to the date of payment of retiral benefits. Therefore all that the State is to do is to make payment of interest out of the sum which accrued to itself on account of the delayed payment.

For all the said reasons the issue of delay is decided against the State respondents and the respondent No. 4 is directed to make payment of interest to the petitioner on the delayed payment of retiral benefits at 8% per annum on and from the date of retirement till the date of payment as the petitioner was entitled to payment of retiral benefits on retirement or maximum within a month of retirement within a fortnight from the date of receipt of this order.

In view of the aforesaid this application is disposed off. As no affidavit in opposition has been filed the allegations contained in the petition is not admitted.