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King-Emperor v. Karri Venkanna Patrudu
Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion
Factual and Procedural Background
This is a Letters Patent Appeal arising out of proceedings begun by the District Munsif of Peddapuram under Section 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) for alleged perjury by the 2nd plaintiff in O.S. No. 96 of 1914. During compromise negotiations in court on about 15–16 March 1915 the 2nd plaintiff (the appellant in the criminal proceedings) was reported to have said his land was known as "Munnuru-vari Cheruvu Istuva". A few days later, when called as a witness on 18 March, he denied on solemn affirmation that his land was so known. The District Munsif, recalling the earlier statement and recording depositions from two pleaders who said they had heard the earlier statement, drew up proceedings under Section 476 and sent the matter to the nearest Magistrate for prosecution for perjury.
Two learned Judges below had set aside the sanction/order of the District Munsif under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) (and in one judgment also under Section 15 of the Charter Act). The Government (which appears as the appellant in the Letters Patent Appeal before the High Court) challenged that result.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether interference with the District Munsif's order granting sanction (i.e., sending the witness to the Magistrate under Section 476 CrPC) can properly be made by the High Court under Section 115(c) CPC (or under Section 15 of the Charter Act), and if so whether the order was passed illegally or with material irregularity.
- Whether the District Munsif could initiate proceedings or hold a preliminary enquiry and act on evidence not strictly "legal evidence" recorded before the initiation of the enquiry.
- Whether it was illegitimate or materially irregular for the District Munsif to pass the sanction order before the civil trial was concluded and before all evidence the accused might have led was heard.
Arguments of the Parties
Accused's (Respondent's) Arguments
- The District Munsif had no legal power to take action or to initiate a preliminary enquiry until some legal evidence was before him; it was not sufficient for the Munsif to obtain such legal evidence after initiating proceedings.
- The earlier statement relied upon by the Munsif was privileged under Section 126 of the Indian Evidence Act (i.e., a communication to a pleader in the course of his employment).
- The sanction/order was passed prematurely — before the conclusion of the trial — and this would deter other witnesses from giving evidence and would impede a fair trial; therefore the order should be set aside.
- The Munsif relied upon what occurred during compromise negotiations (a conversation in court) and thus improperly imported into his judicial decision knowledge acquired in a preliminary discussion, thereby prejudging the civil cause.
Government/Appellant's Arguments (as presented or accepted by majority Judges)
- The District Munsif was entitled to act on the materials before him, including his own memory of the earlier statement and the depositions of two pleaders recorded at the preliminary enquiry; the authorities do not require that legal evidence exist before initiating enquiry.
- The earlier informal statement was not privileged under Section 126 because it was not made by the accused to his pleader in the course of pleader's employment but in conversation with others present, including opposing pleaders and the Munsif himself.
- Section 476 does not impose a requirement that the Court must wait until the whole evidence in the civil proceeding has been taken before forming the opinion that there is ground for enquiry; the Court may act when it reasonably forms such an opinion and may conduct any necessary enquiry in a judicial and reasonable manner.
- The Government Pleader informed the High Court that the District Munsif's judgment against the plaintiffs had been set aside on appeal and that the civil suit was pending before another District Munsif for a full enquiry — this reduced the imperative to set aside the criminal sanction on the ground of prejudice to the civil suit.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Palaniappa Chetti v. Annamalai Chetti | Example of this Court proceeding under the Charter Act in circumstances similar to those before the Court. | The Court noted only one reported case proceeding under the Charter Act in similar circumstances and observed that the facts of that case were of a "very special character," limiting its persuasive value. |
| Baperam Surma v. Gouri Nath Dutt | Holds that no preliminary enquiry is necessary even when there is no evidence on the record contradicting the case in respect of which sanction has been sought (cited for permissiveness of early enquiry). | The Court relied on it to reject the accused's contention that a District Munsif cannot take action until legal evidence exists beforehand; Baperam Surma supported the view that preliminary enquiry may not be strictly required before sanction. |
| Chota Sadoo v. Bhoobun Chukerbutty and Queen-Empress v. Matabadal (approved in Abdul Ghafur v. Raza Husain) | Authority for the proposition that an enquiry under the relevant provision need not be held in the presence of the accused and need not include cross-examination by him. | The Court cited these to support the proposition that an accused is not entitled as of right to insist on having all his evidence taken in the substantive proceeding before sanction is granted. |
| Aiyakannu Pillai v. Emperor | Discussed in relation to the timing of when powers analogous to Section 476 can be exercised — text shows differing emphases in the authorities. | Oldfield, J. treated the case as deciding how late action may be taken and observed that some observations are consistent with action being taken at any time during trial; Seshagiri Aiyar relied on authority reading that action should be at or immediately after termination. The Court treated Aiyakannu Pillai as not conclusively supporting the accused's contention. |
| Gendan Singh v. The King-Emperor | One of the authorities relied on by the accused; concerned magisterial orders and an appeal pending at trial. | The Court noted that the decision turned on the fact an appeal was pending and that it related to magisterial orders (invoking provisions of CrPC different from Section 115 CPC); therefore it afforded little guidance for the present case. |
| Emperor v. Rustomji (Ruslomji / Rustomji) | Often relied upon for the proposition that it may be improper (or that a Magistrate may be incompetent) to order prosecution of a witness while proceedings are pending. | The Court observed that the headnote is misleading: the body of the judgment described the order in that case as "improper" rather than as showing lack of jurisdiction. The Court treated the case as not decisive against the Munsif's action here. |
| In re Kolli Appiah | One of the cases relied on to argue prematurity/impropriety of sanction before trial conclusion. | The Court considered that these authorities concerned magisterial orders and were decided under different statutory provisions; thus they afforded little guidance for the present review under Section 115 CPC. |
| Abdul Ghafur v. Raza Husain | Approved earlier authorities (Chota Sadoo and Queen-Empress v. Matabadal) regarding conduct of preliminary enquiry. | The approval was noted as reinforcing that preliminary enquiry may be limited in form (not necessarily in presence or allowing cross-examination), supporting the view that sanction may be based on limited enquiry. |
| Somayajipad v. Emperor | Referred to in the context of the High Court's power of revision (Section 439 CrPC). | Used by Sadasiva Aiyar, J. to illustrate the argument that Section 439 CrPC is the proper provision for revision of certain criminal proceedings even where taken by a civil court. |
| In re Chennana Goud | Single-Judge decision (Sir Bashyam Iyengar) holding no jurisdiction under Sections 435/439 CrPC to revise an order under Section 195 CrPC; suggested civil revision provision might be appropriate. | Recounted as the decision that altered earlier practice and contributed to the divergent approaches as to whether Section 439 CrPC or Section 115 CPC should be employed for revision of some proceedings by civil courts. |
| Emperor v. Muhammad Khan | Single-Judge decision (Burkitt J.) that changed practice by treating some revision applications as falling under civil revisional provisions. | Referred to in the discussion of procedural practice and the historical development of whether revision lies under the Civil or Criminal Procedure Code. |
| In the matter of the petition of Bhup Kunwar | Followed Burkitt J.'s approach in subsequent Madras decisions. | Referred to as part of the sequence of authority leading to current practice in the Madras Presidency accepting revision under civil provisions in some cases. |
| Lakshmayya v. Raja Varadaraja Appa Row | Authority relied upon for views that materials not strictly legal evidence may ground action under the relevant provision. | Sadasiva Aiyar, J. cited his prior view in that case to support the proposition that a court may base a Section 476 order on materials that have not been strictly made legal evidence. |
| In re Kachi Madar Labbai | Authority expressing the view that the words of Section 476 are wide and that an order under it may be based on materials not strictly legal evidence. | Sadasiva Aiyar relied on Ayling, J.'s opinion in that case as supportive of permitting the District Munsif to act on the materials available to him. |
| Karnam Yellappa v. Emperor | Example cited where revision was entertained under Section 439 CrPC in a similar context (order revised had been passed by a Criminal Court). | Noted by Sadasiva Aiyar as an instance where Section 439 was used in revision by other judges; used in the discussion about proper revisional procedure. |
| Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh | Privy Council authority urging strict exercise of the High Court's revisional powers (Section 115 CPC). | Sadasiva Aiyar referred to it to underscore the principle that interference under Section 115 CPC should be sparingly and strictly exercised. |
| Sambasiva Aiyar v. Ganapathy Aiyar | Interpreted as authority that Section 15 of the Charter Act should be used in practice only where irremediable wrong would occur absent such interference. | Sadasiva Aiyar cited Spencer, J. in that case to support reluctance to invoke the Charter Act absent exceptional need. |
| Ramadhin Bania v. Sewbalak Singh | Example of practice in certain Presidencies treating Section 476 proceedings on the Civil side. | Seshagiri Aiyar cited it to show established practice in some jurisdictions for entertaining such applications on the Civil side. |
| Emperor v. Rustomji and In re Kolli Appiah (repeated) | Cited by some judges as authorities indicating that taking action before trial conclusion may be "improper" or premature. | Different judges in the opinion treated these cases as not decisive here because they related to different statutory contexts or were to be read as indicating impropriety rather than lack of jurisdiction; nevertheless they informed the debate over prematurity of sanction. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The High Court's opinions (delivered seriatim by Oldfield, J.; Sadasiva Aiyar, J.; and Seshagiri Aiyar, J.) engaged three principal questions: (1) the proper statutory basis and limits for High Court interference (Section 115 CPC versus Section 439 CrPC or Section 15 Charter Act); (2) whether the District Munsif had before him no evidence or insufficient evidence to justify sending the witness for prosecution; and (3) whether it was illegitimate or a material irregularity to pass a sanction order under Section 476 CrPC before conclusion of the civil trial.
On the standard for interference under Section 115(c) CPC
- Oldfield, J. emphasized that interference under Section 115(c) is limited to orders passed "illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction." He stated the Court's review is not to assess whether the order was founded on a sound discretionary judgment (as under Section 439 CrPC) but only whether the order complied with the minimum legal requirements.
- Sadasiva Aiyar, J. accepted that interference under Section 115 should be strictly exercised and noted precedent counsel on both sides about whether Section 439 CrPC is the more appropriate vehicle for revision (but declined to resolve that historical procedural question in this judgment).
- Seshagiri Aiyar, J. similarly declined to re-open the larger procedural question concerning Section 439, and concentrated on whether illegality or material irregularity could be shown.
On the sufficiency and admissibility of evidence
- Oldfield, J. addressed the contention that the District Munsif could not take action until legal evidence existed beforehand and rejected it as unsupported by the section and opposed by Baperam Surma v. Gouri Nath Dutt. He held it was reasonable for the Munsif, who had heard the earlier statement, to record the pleaders' depositions to obtain legal evidence.
- On privilege under Section 126 Evidence Act, Oldfield found the earlier statement was not made by the accused to his pleader in the course of employment; it was a remark made in the presence of opposing pleaders and the Munsif, so Section 126 did not apply.
- Regarding sufficiency, Oldfield set a high threshold for appellate interference: evidence can be attacked under Section 115(c) only if it is so weak as to be negligible and the Court was unreasonable in acting on it. He accepted that a prior contradictory statement (even if the later statement was on oath) could justify a prima facie finding that the later sworn statement was false for purposes of forming ground for enquiry.
On timing — whether sanction could be granted before the civil trial concluded
- Oldfield analyzed Section 476 CrPC and concluded the statute requires the Court to form an opinion that there is ground for enquiry; it does not prescribe that that opinion must await the whole of the evidence or any particular stage of its production. Any necessary enquiry must be "necessary" in the reasonable and judicial exercise of discretion. Thus he refused to impose a rule requiring the Court to await conclusion of trial before forming such opinion.
- Oldfield found authorities relied upon by the accused to be either inapplicable (because they related to magisterial orders or different statutory provisions) or inconclusive (Aiyakannu Pillai concerned how late powers could be exercised rather than how early). He therefore held the District Munsif's action in sending the witness to the Magistrate before the civil trial finished was not per se illegitimate under Section 476.
- Sadasiva Aiyar agreed generally with allowing the appeal and restoring the sanction, but candidly expressed that the District Munsif "ought to have waited" until the whole evidence had been let in because in the present case the Munsif's action apparently led to the plaintiffs' vakil abandoning further conduct of the civil suit. Nevertheless, Sadasiva Aiyar concluded the irregularity was not of such a material character as to invalidate the sanction, particularly since the civil suit's judgment had been set aside on appeal and a new inquiry was pending before another Munsif.
- Seshagiri Aiyar dissented: he found the procedure "highly improper" and held that the Munsif had acted illegally and with material irregularity. He emphasized that a judicial officer must keep an open mind until the case is closed and should not import preliminary conversation into a decision to initiate prosecution, and he considered the initiation of prosecution before the case was closed to be premature and likely to defeat justice in the civil proceeding.
Process and practical remedies
- Sadasiva Aiyar observed that any prejudice to the civil litigation caused by the criminal sanction might be met by a stay of the criminal proceedings until the civil suit is decided; such a stay could be granted by the Magistrate or this Court on proper cause.
- All judges considered the narrow scope of review under Section 115(c) CPC: the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction should be invoked only in exceptional cases where illegality or material irregularity is shown.
Holding and Implications
Core Ruling: The Letters Patent Appeal is allowed and the sanction order of the District Munsif is restored. (Majority: Oldfield, J. and Sadasiva Aiyar, J.; Dissent: Seshagiri Aiyar, J.)
Implications and immediate effect:
- The direct consequence is that the District Munsif's order sending the 2nd plaintiff to the Magistrate under Section 476 CrPC for alleged perjury is reinstated by the High Court.
- The majority held that the High Court should not interfere under Section 115(c) CPC unless there is illegality or material irregularity of a degree sufficient to vitiate the order; in the present facts the majority did not find such illegality or material irregularity.
- The opinion clarifies (within the limits of the judgment) that Section 476 CrPC does not, by its wording, require the court to wait until all evidence in the civil proceeding has been produced before forming an opinion that there is ground for enquiry; reasonable preliminary enquiries and reliance on limited materials can be permissible.
- The judgment reflects a split of view: one judge would have set aside the proceedings as illegal and materially irregular (Seshagiri Aiyar), while the majority would not. The decision therefore does not establish an unambiguous new rule that precludes early initiation of sanction in all cases; it affirms that context and the presence or absence of material irregularity are decisive.
- No broader, novel precedent beyond these conclusions is enunciated as a categorical rule in this opinion; the Court emphasized narrow supervisory review and the exceptional character of interference under Section 115 CPC (and reliance on existing case law and distinctions between review under civil and criminal revisional provisions).
Disposition recorded in the opinion: Letters Patent Appeal allowed. (Majority decision restoring the District Munsif's sanction order; one dissenting opinion recorded.)
Oldfield, J. — It is not disputed that interference with the order of the District Munsif, granting sanction, can be justified only under Sect. 115 (c) of the Civil Procedure Code. Both the learned Judges have dealt with the case on that assumption, and it is therefore unnecessary to refer to authorities in support of it. Abdur Rahim, J., further referred to Sect. 15 of the Charter Act, and something was said regarding it by accused's counsel. We have, however, been shown only one reported case, in which this Court proceeded under it in circumstances similar to those now in question: Palaniappa Chetti v. Annamalai Chetti and the facts in it were of a very special character. I moreover agree with Ayling, J. that our power of superintendence should be invoked only in exceptional cases; and this is not one. The question then is whether the District Munsif in the words of Sect. 115 (c) acted in passing his order illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction; and I, therefore, note once for all that we are in my opinion at liberty to consider, not (as we might under Sect. 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) whether his order is founded on a sound use of his discretion, but only whether it complies with the minimum requirements of the law.
The facts need not be repeated, as they have been stated fully in the judgments of the two learned Judges; and the arguments relied on here are with one exception stated fully in them. It is accordingly possible to deal shortly with the first two objections to the District Munsif's order, that he had before him no evidence or insufficient evidence to justify it. Accused's alleged false statement was that his land was never known by a particular name. The evidence to prove it false was that of two pleaders, who heard him say shortly before that it was known by that name, their depositions to that effect having been recorded by the District Munsif at the preliminary enquiry, which he held. Contra it is urged first that the District Munsif could not take action or even initiate a preliminary enquiry, until some legal evidence was before him, and that it was not sufficient for him to secure it afterwards. But this is supported by nothing in the section, is opposed to Baperam Surma v. Gouri Nath Dutt and is unreasonable, when, as here, the District Munsif himself heard the earlier statement made and merely recorded the pleader's depositions in order to obtain legal evidence of the fact. Secondly it is said that the earlier statement was privileged under Sect. 126 of the Indian Evidence Act. This is not in accordance with the facts. For the statement was not made by accused to his pleader in the course of and for the purpose of his employment as such, but merely in the presence of his pleader as well as those of his opponents and of the District Munsif in the course of the conversation regarding compromise, in which the last mentioned appears to have officiously and perhaps injudiciously taken part.
Next, was the evidence sufficient? The sufficiency of evidence is not a matter, which can in my opinion be considered under Sect. 115 (c) except in so far as it can be shown that the evidence available is so weak as to be negligible and that the Court was unreasonable in acting on it. But that is not the case here. For in the absence of direct evidence, which (as Ayling, J., says) may in fact be available at the trial, a previous contradictory statement by the deponent is as good a reason for distrusting his later deposition as can be imagined. It is said that there is no reason for assuming that the earlier statement was true and the later, which alone was on oath, was false; and no doubt there could be no assignment of perjury in the alternative. But the Court, which tries the case, will have to decide which statement is false with reference to the circumstances, if not to other direct evidence; and it is easily intelligible that the District Munsif found sufficient reason in those circumstances for holding that prima facie the false statement was that made on oath. It is for obvious reasons undesirable to attempt in this Court to anticipate the course, which argument at any future trial may take: and I, therefore, hold without further discussion that the District Munsif had sufficient evidence before him.
The remaining objection is that the order of sanction was passed before the conclusion of the trial, in which the alleged false statement was made. The contention before the learned Judges was that an order so passed should be set aside, because the inevitable result would, as stated by Abdur Rahim, J., be to keep away any other witnesses, who might give valuable evidence, and in other ways impede a fair trial ot the cause. Ayling, J., met this by reference to the probability that any injustice, which the litigant might suffer, could be corrected on appeal. But with all respect I prefer the broader grounds that (1) the applicability of our revisional powers depends on the existence of material irregularity or illegality in the order under consideration itself, not on its possible consequences and the Court's use of its discretion in risking them and (2) the order cannot fairly be regarded as likely to deter other witnesses than those who had reason for apprehending similar orders in their pwii cases, and their failure to give evidence would not be matter for regret. In connection with (2) it is to be observed that, even had the District Munsif reserved his order of sanction, until the judgment in accused's suit had been delivered, the postponement would not have deprived that order of its deterrent effect on other litigants and witnesses before him.
The objection, thus failing in the form first referred to, has been taken before us in another, in which it merits fuller consideration, namely that the passing of the sanction order before the Court has heard all the evidence, which the accused might adduce, if the trial were completed, is not only ill-advised, but also illegitimate, because the Court might change its opinion after hearing the whole. It is not shown that this argument corresponds with any request to the District Munsif by the accused or his pleader to postpone passing the sanction order, until all the witnesses had been examined. I however deal with the principle involved. It is supported by reference to general considerations and also to authority, especially to Aiyakannu Pillai v. Emperor.
The authorities relied are Gendan Singh v. The King-Emperor, Emperor v. Ruslomji and In re Kolli Appiah. But in the first case the ground of decision was not that the Court had not heard all the evidence to be adduced at the trial, but that an appeal against its decision at the trial was pending and the general objection to all these cases is that they relate to magisterial orders of sanction and that therefore the wider provisions of Sect. 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code, not those of Sect. 115 (c) of the Civil Procedure Code, with which we are concerned, were in question. These cases therefore afford no guidance. The argument from Aiyakannu Pillai v. Emperor also is in conclusive, because the question decided in that case was not, as here, at how early, but at how late a stage the Court's powers under Sect. 476 can be exercised, the objection being that their exercise had been deferred unduly after the judgment; and, though I am unwilling to rely on implications from language used, when a different issue was under decision, it may be pointed out that the observations of Sankaran Nair, J., at page 58 are at least consistent with the view that action may be taken at any time during the course of the trial.
Turning to the merits, I observe that the argument derives no support from the wording of Sect. 476. Proceedings thereunder are to take place, when the Court is of opinion that there is ground for “enquiry” and I do not feel entitled to introduce the requirement that this opinion shall have been formed on the whole of the evidence or at any particular stage in its production. The opinion has to be supplemented by “any enquiry which may be necessary” but that means only “necessary” in the reasonable and judicial exercise of the Court's discretion. It has in fact been held that no preliminary enquiry is necessary, even when there is no evidence on record contradicting the case, in respect of which sanction on a charge under Sect. 211 of the Indian Penal Code has been granted, Baperam Surma v. Gouri Nath Dutt; and that the enquiry need not be held in the presence of the accused and need not include cross-examination by him of the witnesses, Chota Sadoo v. Bhoobun Chukerbutty and Queen-Empress v. Matabadal approved in Abdul Ghafur v. Raza Husain. A fortiori an accused is not entitled as of right to insist on all his evidence being taken in the substantive proceeding, before sanction is granted against him. And there is nothing in the wording of the section inconsistent with this conclusion. For it postulates, not any decision by the Court that a case has been established even prima facie, but merely its adoption of an opinion that there is ground for enquiry. No doubt that must be its opinion, as distinguished from its mere surmise or assumption; and we are accordingly entitled to satisfy ourselves that it has not acted on no evidence or perversely. But we cannot on the view I take go further and attempt to fix the quantity or nature of the material on which the Court's opinion is to be formed, or restrict its exercise of the general discretion, which the Legislature has conferred, in the way proposed by the accused, I therefore cannot accept the latter's contention.
I would allow the Letters Patent Appeal and restore the sanction order of the District Munsif.
Sadasiva Aiyar, J.— This Letters Patent Appeal is from the judgment of the learned Officiating Chief Justice who, differing from Mr. Justice Ayling, held that the District Munsif of Peddapuram ought not to have sent the petitioner (appellant) to the nearest Magistrate under Sect. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code to be prosecuted on a charge of perjury. The learned Judge set aside that order under Sect. 115, Civil Procedure Code and under Sect. 15 of the Charter Act. The Government is the appellant before us.
During the hearing of the appeal, I threw out a strong suggestion that even when the Court taking proceeding under Sect 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code is a Civil Court, the proper section under which the High Court's power of revision (See Somayajipad v. Emperor), should be exercised is Sect. 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code and not Sect. 115, Civil Procedure Code. Till 1902, it was assumed, without question, that the revision of such proceedings, (even when the proceedings were passed by a Civil Court) lay under Sect. 439, Criminal Procedure Code. In that year, that eminent Judge, Sir Bashyam Iyengar, J., sitting as a single Judge, held (See In re Chennana Goud, that he had no jurisdiction under Sects. 435 and 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code to revise the criminal order in question before him in that case, which was an order granting sanction under Sect. 195, Criminal Procedure Code and not an order under Sect. 476, Criminal Procedure Code. He then threw out the suggestion, that orders of a Civil Court passed under that Sect. 195, Criminal Procedure Code, may be revised under Sect. 622 of the old Civil Procedure Code corresponding to Sect. 115 of the present Code. Later decisions of this Court have held that against the order on an application for sanction under Sect. 195, Criminal Procedure Code successive applications to higher Courts lay in the nature of successive appeals. However, the suggestion of that eminent Judge seems to have been accepted as a matter of practice even as regards orders passed by Civil Courts under Sect 476, Criminal Procedure Code, though the question seems never to have been directly raised and decided in this Court by a Bench. In Allahabad also till December 1902, the practice was (as in Madras) to treat applications for revision of proceedings of even Civil Courts made under Sect. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code as falling under Sect 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code and not Sect. 622 of the Civil Procedure Code. But in that year Burkitt J. sitting as a single Judge decided otherwise (Emperor v. Muhammad Khan), and in the case reported in In the matter of the petition of Bhup Kunwar, the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blair (Justice Bannerjee dissenting) followed in 1903 the opinion of Burkitt, J.
While the inclination of my mind is to agree with the dissenting judgment of Bannerji, J. who pointed out that Courts should be loath to depart from an established practice unless they are convinced that that practice has not the sanction of law and is grossly erroneous, I do not wish to reconsider now the correctness of the decision in I.L.R, 26 Mad., 139 as the long practice previous to 1902 was unsettled in that year and that unsettlement seems to have given rise to another settled practice during the last 14 years.
Taking it then that this Court has power to interfere either under Sect. 115, Civil Procedure Code, or under Sect 15 of the Charter Act, the questions for determination are:—
(1) Whether the order of the District Munsif was passed without jurisdiction or whether he acted illegally or with material irregularity in the passing of that order; and
(2) Whether if Sect. 115, Civil Procedure Code does not apply, it is a fit case for interference under Sect. 15 of the Charter Act.
I might here conveniently set out the facts. The appellant was the 2nd plaintiff in O. S. No. 96 of 1914 on the file of the District Munsif's Court of Peddapuram. When the case came on for hearing on the 15th or 16th March 1915, the 2nd plaintiff stated in the hearing of the District Munsif during the course of compromise negotiations in the Court-house that his land was known as “Munnuru-vari Cheruvu Istuva”, a statement, which, if true, was though not inconsistent with his claim to the exclusive right to the water of another tank put forward in the suit, a fact which the defence could fairly rely on as making their contentions more probable than the plaintiffs' contentions. When the 2nd plaintiff was, however, put into the box on the 18th March (two or three days afterwards), he denied on solemn affirmation that his land was known as “Munnurivari. Cheruvu Istuva”. As the District Munsif seems to have remembered the contrary statement made by the 2nd plaintiff two or three days before that, he at once drew up proceedings under Sect. 476, holding that there was ground for enquiry as to whether the 2nd plaintiff had not been guilty of perjury in denying as witness that the land was called” Munnuruvari Cheruvu Istuva”.
I agree with Mr. Justice Abdur Rahim in the view that the District Munsif ought to have waited till the whole evidence had been let in before taking proceedings under Sect. 476 as his action seems to have led the plaintiff's vakil to abandon the further conduct of the civil suit. But it was stated by the learned Government Pleader before us (and was not denied on the other side) that the District Munsif's judgment against the plaintiffs has been set aside on appeal and the suit is now pending before a different District Munsif for a full and complete enquiry. It is therefore not necessary now to set aside the proceedings under Sect. 476 on the ground that the conduct of the civil suit might seriously surfer though, no doubt, there is still some danger of other witnesses of the plaintiffs being scared away from giving evidence on that same point, that is, in support of 2nd plaintiff's denial.
It is argued for the respondent that the Judge ought not to have used his knowledge of what the 2nd plaintiff had said during the compromise negotiations in arriving at his conclusion that there was a fair case for sending the 2nd plaintiff to the Magistrate. I am not prepared to accept this contention. (My views' on this question have been set out by me in Lakshmayya v. Raja Varadaraja Appa Row. I also agree with the opinion of Ayling, J., in In re Kachi Madar Labbai that the words of Sect. 476 are very wide and that an order under it may be based on materials which have not been strictly made legal evidence. In the present case, moreover, the accused was sent the Magistrate after taking the evidence of two vakils and it was therefore perfectly legal.
Sect. 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code does not in terms state that the Court should not send a person to the Magistrate till it had taken the whole evidence and decided the judicial proceeding in the course of which the Court arrived at the opinion that there was ground for inquiring into any offence (referred to in Sect. 195, Criminal Procedure Code) and committed before it or brought to its notice. It would, no doubt, be “improper” in most cases to do so. In exceptional cases, as where the perjury committed by the witness called for a party is so barefaced that the party himself represented at once to the Court he did not mean to call further evidence in support of the perjured statement of his witness, the Court can, in my opinion, properly send the witness at once to the Magistrate. I cannot therefore accept that it should be an invariable rule that no proceedings under Sect. 476, Criminal Procedure Code, should be taken till the conclusion of the case. In Emperor v. Rustomji, the head-note runs “It is not competent to a Magistrate to order the prosecution of a witness for perjury while the proceedings……………are pending before him (the Magistrate)” and this passage looks as if the decision intended to lay down that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to do so. The head-note is, however, misleading as the body of the short judgment says merely that the order in that case was “improper” and not incompetent. I am clear therefore that no objection on the ground of want of jurisdiction or on the ground that the District Munsif “acted illegally” under Sect. 115, Civil Procedure Code can be sustained in this case. I shall next consider the objection based on the District Munsif's having acted with “material irregularity”. I shall try to clear the ground in respect of two subsidiary matters. I am inclined to think that if the parties and pleaders do not object, there is nothing improper in a judicial officer making suggestions in the matter of compromise negotiations made in his presence and that he does not thereby necessarily act against his duty as a Judge. I am not against judicial officers suggesting compromises in suitable cases though, of course, it is possible (as might be expected) that a few lazy judicial officers might suggest them, not in order to do good to the litigants but in order to save themselves the trouble of deciding suits in the regular course. The sending by a Court of a witness to the Magistrate before the judicial proceedings are over would be acting with impropriety which I take to mean “irregularity” in all but exceptional cases. Whether such irregularity was a “material irregularity would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. After anxious consideration, I have come to the conclusion (though not without hesitation) that the irregularity committed by the District Munsif in this case cannot be called “material irregularity”. The respondent has not alleged that he was prepared with the evidence of other witnesses in the suit to prove that the Istuya was not known as “Munnuruvari Cheruvu Istuva,” the arguments put forward before us on his behalf being all based on hypothetical surmises and not on any affidavits disclosing the existence of such evidence.
The prejudice to the conduct of the civil litigation (if the other three plaintiffs in the suit are unable to conduct it on behalf of the respondent also) might be met by the stay of the criminal proceedings till the suit is decided, a stay which would, on proper cause being shown, no doubt, be granted by the Magistrate himself or by this Court.
I have always held the view that interference under Sect. 115, Civil Procedure Code, should be very strictly exercised, having regard to the opinion of their Lordships of the Privy Council in the wellknown case of Amir Hassan Khan v. Sheo Baksh Singh decided thirty years ago. If Sect. 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code were held applicable to this case in revision, I would not have felt so much hesitation to interfere in revision. (Mr. Justice Ayling sitting with Mr. Justice Hannay seems to have interfered under Sect. 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code in a similar case, Karnam Yellappa v. Emperor, the order revised having been passed by a Criminal Court).
As regards interference under Sect. 15 of the Charter Act, that section should be resorted to in practice only where irremediable wrong would be done but for such interference (see per Spencer, J. in Sambasiva Aiyar v. Ganapathy Aiyar) and I do not think this is such a case.
I would therefore allow this appeal.
Seshagiri Aiyar, J.— I respectfully dissent from the view which has found favour with my learned colleagues.
The facts of the case are not in dispute. Both the learned Judges have condemned the course adopted by the District Munsif. The only question is whether the proceedings were tainted with material irregularity or illegality.
I do not feel inclined to re open the question whether proceedings taken under Sect. 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, by a Civil Court is not a criminal proceeding and as such revisable, under Sect. 439 of the Cede of Criminal Procedure, by the High Court. In Calcutta, Allahabad and Madras, the practice is to entertain these applications on the Civil side, Ramadhin Bania v. Sewbalak Singh, In the matter of the petition of Bhup Kunwar, and In re Chennanagoud. A Civil Court acting under Sect. 476 cannot be regarded as a Criminal Court, as under Sect. 6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure only the High Court, the Sessions Court and the Courts presided over by Magistrates are Criminal Courts.
I do not propose to examine the case law on the powers of the High Court under Sect. 115. I have stated my conclusion in some of the recent judgments pronounced by me. The saying attributed to a great common law judge that justice administered in the Equity Courts depends upon the conscience of him that administers ft is more than true of the powers exercised all over India under Sect. 115. It is a pity that the rights of the parties should be dependent upon such an uncertain consideration. But it is no use attempting to lay down abstract propositions under the circumstances.
In my opinion, the procedure adopted by the District Munsif was highly improper. When the case was called on, the pleaders and the parties were endeavouring to effect a compromise. I do not know whether the District Munsif suggested it himself. I shall take it that he did not. In the course of the conversation, in which the Munsif seems to have taken part, the 2nd plaintiff made a statement, regarding the existence of a particular Cheruvu, and said that the Cheruvu was traceable in the plan filed. The compromise was not brought about. Three days after, when the case was called on, and the 2nd plaintiff was in the witness box, he denied the existence of the Cheruvu. This put out the Munsif so much that he examined on oath the pleaders who were present when the conversation took place three days back and directed the prosecution of the 2nd plaintiff, I cannot conceive of a procedure more calculated to defeat justice. But it is said we are not concerned with the result of the suit, but only with the question whether there were prima facie grounds for taking action under Sect. 476. True. What are the materials on which the prosecution was directed:—the personal knowledge of the Munsif as to what the 2nd plaintiff said, and the not very consistent testimony of the two pleaders. It has to be remembered that the direction to take action is not based on the final conclusion that the evidence of the 2nd plaintiff was false; because the other witnesses in the case were not examined at this stage. It was really and in effect a prosecution for having made two contradictory statements:—one in the casual conversation at the time of the suggested compromise and the other in the witness box. 1 cannot help saying that the Munsif has failed to realise that until the case was closed, he must keep an open mind, and should not try to prejudge the case or to terrorise the parties that appear before him. If he was anxious for a compromise or if he was informed of the possibility of an adjustment of the disputes, it was his duty to have asked the parties and their pleaders to retire for consultation. His time ought to have been taken up with the disposal of other and more legitimate work. I do not say that he ought not to have taken part at all in the conversation that was going on between the pleaders. But I must say that it was no part of a Munsif's duty to exchange conversations with the parties in a preliminary discussion about the compromise. In my opinion, the Munsif acted both illegally and with material irregularity in importing into the consideration of the question, his knowledge of the preliminary conversation in the case.
I am of opinion that the action of the Munsif was highly irregular, for another reason. Under Sect. 476 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it has been held that the proceedings must be taken at or immediately after the termination of the trial of the suit or case: Aiyakannu Pillai v. Empcror. I do not think the Munsif was warranted in taking action before the case was closed, although I do not wish to say that he had no jurisdiction to so act. It is for this reason, I take it, that it was held in Emperor v. Rustomji, and In re Kolli Appiah, that the action should be regarded as improper, as it was premature.
The suggestion of the learned Government Pleader that it is not necessary to have legal evidence to come to the conclusion that the accused has not spoken the truth does not commend itself to me. Prosecutions of this nature and sanctions ought not to be indulged in without coming to the conclusion that there are prima facie grounds to sustain a conviction. The consolation that the man may be acquitted, if there is no further evidence and the statement that he is being afforded in opportunity to clear his character are suggestions which I listen to with impatience. I do not know of the state of feeling in other countries but in this country the direction or sanction to prosecute is regarded as one of the greatest humiliations to which a person can be subjected. It is no consolation to him that he may be acquitted, if the evidence is insufficient. I am emphatically of opinion that before a person is asked to stand his trial, it must be fairly clear to the sanctioning authority that there is a probability of a conviction being had. Generally, Subordinate Judicial Officers in this Presidency, act in this view. Fotunately, for the administration of Justice, there are not many men who would have acted in the way this Munsif had done. Still it is necessary not only to express our condemnation of the course adopted, but to say that the action is vitiated by material irregularity and is illegal.
I agree with Abur Rahim, J., and am for setting aside the proceedings.
In the view I have taken, it is not necessary to say whether the Charter Act enlarges the powers given under Sect. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure or not.
In the result, in accordance with the decision of the majority, this Letters Patent Appeal is allowed.
S. S.Appeal allowed.
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