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Gian Chand v. M/S. G. Kay (Kay) Industries

Punjab & Haryana High Court
Apr 26, 1971
Smart Summary (Beta)

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Harbans Singh, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Gian Chand was employed as a weaver on a piece-rate basis by the respondent employer and was paid monthly. He was retrenched on 19 January 1966. The legality of the retrenchment was referred to the Labour Court, which on 8 September 1967 held the retrenchment illegal and directed (1) reinstatement with continuity of service and (2) payment of back wages (average pay from 20 January 1966 until reinstatement), subject to deduction of wages already paid. Gian Chand was reinstated on 2 September 1967.

There was a dispute between the parties about the actual amount of back wages due. On 19 April 1968 Gian Chand filed an application under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act claiming Rs. 3,265.08 for the period 20 January 1956 to 20 September 1967, asserting average wages of Rs. 175 per month. The employer contended the average was Rs. 70.29 and offered to pay a balance of Rs. 802.82 after deductions already made.

The Authority under the Payment of Wages Act relied on exhibits filed by the employer (Exhibits R.1 and R.2) and calculated an average daily wage of Rs. 4.36, awarding Rs. 2,123.32 for the period, less Rs. 246.02 already paid, directing payment of Rs. 1,877.30 as unpaid wages and Rs. 10 as compensation.

Before that Authority the employer had objected that under section 15 the Authority had no jurisdiction to determine the disputed calculation; the Authority rejected that contention. On appeal the Appellate Authority accepted that contention, held the Payment of Wages Authority lacked jurisdiction, allowed the appeal, and awarded only Rs. 802.82 (the amount the employer admitted). The Appellate Authority suggested the workman could seek remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act. The workman filed this revision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Authority under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act has jurisdiction to determine, as an incidental matter, the amount of back wages owed when the dispute is one of computation (average wage and number of days) arising from an award of a Labour Court.
  2. Whether the availability of alternative procedures under the Industrial Disputes Act (notably section 33-C) ousts or limits the jurisdiction of the Payment of Wages Authority under section 15 to entertain such claims.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Employer) — Arguments

  • The employer contended that the Authority under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act had no jurisdiction to determine the disputed calculation of wages when such a dispute exists.
  • The employer relied on authority (referred to in the judgment as Payment of Wages Inspector v. Suraj Mal Mehta, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 590) and urged that the Authority's jurisdiction under section 15(2) is limited to certain classes of cases (deductions and delay in payment within wage periods) and does not cover disputed claims like the present one.
  • In the appeal before the Appellate Authority the employer specifically argued that the Authority under the Act had failed to work out average wages as stated by the appellant and had applied a different (and, according to the employer, incorrect) method; thus the actual calculation was disputed (Ground No. 4 of the Grounds of Appeal).

Respondent (Workman / Petitioner) — Arguments

  • The workman (Gian Chand) filed under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act claiming Rs. 3,265.08 for the specified period, asserting an average monthly wage of Rs. 175.
  • The workman's position (as reflected in the Authority's proceedings) relied upon documentary material, and the Authority proceeded to compute average daily wages using the employer's own exhibits (R.1 and R.2), arriving at the award summarized above. The workman sought enforcement of that calculation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in This Opinion
Ambica Mills Co. Ltd. v. S.B. Bhatt (1961 L.L.J. 1) Payment of Wages Authority, when dealing with claims of deductions or delay in payment, must consider incidental questions necessary to determine the claim; no rigid demarcation of incidental matters; jurisdiction should not be unreasonably extended nor unduly curtailed. The Court relied on this case to support the proposition that incidental questions (including questions as to terms of employment and which contract applied) fall within the Authority's jurisdiction and that a dispute about the contract alone does not oust s.15 jurisdiction.
A.V.D'Costa v. B.C. Patel (A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 412) The Authority has jurisdiction to decide what actually the terms of the contract were (i.e., to determine actual wages) but has no jurisdiction to determine "potential wages." The Court cited this authority to distinguish between matters within the Authority's competence (actual terms / actual wages) and matters beyond it; used to show that determining actual average wages is within s.15 jurisdiction.
Viswanath Tukaram v. General Manager, Central Railway (A.I.R. 1958 Bom. 111) Expressed a view substantially similar to A.V.D'Costa on the scope of the Authority's jurisdiction to determine matters incidental to wage claims. The Court relied on the Full Bench decision as supporting the same principle that incidental factual and contractual questions relevant to wage claims can be considered by the Authority.
Payment of Wages Inspector v. Suraj Mal Mehta, Director, The Barnagar Electric Supply & Ind. Co. Ltd. (A.I.R. 1969 S.C. 590) Section 15(2) provides jurisdiction to entertain two classes of cases (unauthorised deductions and delay in payment beyond wage periods); the Authority has power to determine incidental matters, but some complex claims (e.g., contested compensation under section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act raising complicated factual and legal issues) may lie outside s.15(2). The Court distinguished the present facts from Barnagar: Barnagar involved complicated disputes about entitlement to compensation under section 25-FF which required prolonged inquiry of law and fact and therefore might be beyond s.15(2). The present dispute was held to be a simple mathematical calculation incidental to an award, and Barnagar's observations supported jurisdiction under s.15 for such cases.
Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. K.L. Kharbanda (A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 487) Section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act is in the nature of execution: where the amount due is worked out or can be worked out without dispute, sub-section (1) applies; where the amount is not worked out and its calculation is disputed, sub-section (2) applies for computation by a specified Labour Court. The Court cited this authority when discussing alternative remedies under section 33-C and observed that section 33-C(1) applies when amounts are worked out, while 33-C(2) applies when computation is disputed; the point was used to show that alternative procedures exist but do not automatically bar the Authority under s.15 from dealing with incidental computational disputes.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court reviewed the factual matrix: a Labour Court award for reinstatement and back wages, a disagreement over the quantum of back wages, an initial s.15 application and award by the Payment of Wages Authority based on the employer's exhibits, followed by an Appellate Authority decision holding that the Payment of Wages Authority lacked jurisdiction to decide the disputed calculation.

The Court reasoned through precedent and statutory provisions:

  • It accepted the settled principle (from Ambica Mills and related authorities) that the Payment of Wages Authority possesses jurisdiction to determine matters incidental to claims of deductions or delayed payment of wages; incidental matters include questions necessary to determine the claim (for example, whether an employment relationship subsists, what the terms of employment are, or which contract applied).
  • The Court emphasized that while the Authority's incidental jurisdiction should not be unreasonably extended, it also should not be unduly curtailed; no rigid demarcation is possible and each case must be judged on its facts.
  • Distinguishing the Barnagar Electric Supply Co. case, the Court noted that Barnagar involved a complex contest over entitlement to statutory compensation under section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act where resolution would involve prolonged inquiries of law and fact; Barnagar therefore did not support a rule that s.15 jurisdiction is wholly ousted in all contested cases.
  • Applying these principles to the present facts, the Court found that the dispute before the Authority was essentially a mathematical calculation of average wages and the number of days — purely incidental to the back wages awarded by the Labour Court — and therefore within the Payment of Wages Authority's competence under section 15.
  • The Court also considered the availability of remedies under section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act. It observed the distinction between sub-section (1) (where the amount is worked out) and sub-section (2) (where the amount must be computed when disputed). The Court noted prior authority indicating section 33-C is in the nature of execution and that where computation is disputed sub-section (2) applies; but it did not accept that availability of section 33-C procedures automatically bars the Authority under section 15 from deciding incidental computational disputes.

Concluding the analysis, the Court found the Appellate Authority incorrectly ousted the Payment of Wages Authority's jurisdiction in this case and had thereby failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it on appeal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The revision is accepted; the order of the Appellate Authority is set aside on the ground that it wrongly concluded that the Payment of Wages Authority had no jurisdiction to determine the disputed calculation of back wages. The matter is remanded to the Appellate Authority to decide on merits.

Direct consequences and directions explicitly stated by the Court:

  • The case is remitted to the Appellate Authority for determination on its merits (the Appellate Authority had failed to work out average wages correctly according to the employer's own grounds of appeal).
  • Counsel was directed to have the parties appear before the Appellate Authority on 24 May 1971 to take a further date; the records of the case were to be sent back immediately.
  • There was no order as to costs before the revising Judge; other costs were to be costs in the cause.

The Court expressly held that mere mathematical calculations as to average wage and duration (incidental to a Labour Court award of back wages) fall within the jurisdiction of the Authority under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act and that availability of remedies under the Industrial Disputes Act (section 33-C) does not automatically oust that jurisdiction.


This summary is confined strictly to the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond that text.

Show all summary ...

Harbans Singh, C.J:— This revision has arisen out of a dispute between a worker and his employer in the following circumstances.

2. Gian Chand petitioner admittedly was working as a weaver in the factory of the respondent on plecerated basis. He was, however, paid every month. On 19th January, 1966, Gian Chand was retrenched. The question of legality of this retrenchment was referred to the Labour Court. On 8th September, 1967, the Labour Court held the retrenchment to be illegal. Two directions were issued, first, that Gian Singh should be reinsteated with all back wages and with continuity of service and, secondly, that the employer should pay all the back wages to the applicant-petitioner, i.e, average pay from 20th January, 1566, till the date of his reinstatement subject to deduction of wages already paid to the employee. Gian Chand was actually reinstated on 2th September, 1967. So far as the back wages are concerned, there was a dispute between the parties as to the actual amount due. On 19th April, 1968, Gian Chand filed an application under section 15 of the Payment Wages Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) claiming a sum of Rs. 3,265-08 as wages for the period from 20th January, 1956, to 20th September, 1967, asserting his average wages to be Rs. 175 per mensem. According to the employer the average monthly wages of the workman came to Rs. 70-29 and after making deduction of the sum already paid, the employer offered to pay the balance which came to Rs. 802.82

3. The Authority under the Act relying on the two statements, Exhibits R. 1 and R. 2 filed by the employer giving the total amount of wages paid to the workman from time to time during the period of his employment from the year 1959, to 1965 and total number of working day of the workman during this period respectively, came to the conclusion that the average daily wages of the workman were Rs. 4-36 and after calculating the number of days for which he was entitled to payment, arrived at a figure of Rs. 2,123-32, as being payable for this period mentioned above. Deducting a sum of Rs. 246.02, which had admittedly been paid to the workman the employer-respondent was directed to pay a sum of. Rs. 1,877.30 by way of anpaid wages and Rs. 10 by way of compensation.

4. Incidentally before the Authority under the Act an objection was taken that under section 15 of the Act the Authority concerned had no jurisdiction to go into the question of calculating the amount of wages due because there was a dispute about it. This contention, however, did not find favour with the Authority.

5. In appeal, however, the Appellate Authority has accepted this contention and held that the Authority under the Act had no jurisdiction to go into this matter and, consequently, the appeal was accepted. Except for giving a direction to the payment of Rs. 802-82, which was admitted as payable by the employer, the Appellate Authority rejected the claim of the workmen. It was suggested that the workman can seek his remedy under the Industrial Disputes Act. The workman has come up in revision.

6. It is now well settled that simply because there is some depute about the terms of the contract between the employer and the employee or there is a dispute about the interpretation of these terms would not by itself oust the jurisdiction of the authority under the Act under section 15 to determine the disputed question regarding the terms applicable or the interpretation of those terms. All matters which are incidental to the determination of the wages, which have been wrongly deducted, or the wages payment of which has been delayed, can be settled and decided by the Authority concerned. Reference in this respect may be made to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Ambica Mills Company Ltd. v. S.B Bhatt . 1961 L.L.J 1. at page 3 the relevant he ad note runs as follows:—

“It was further contended that when the employee and the employer go before the payment of wages Authority with two different contracts, it has got no jurisdiction to decide which of the Contract held the field, which of them is subsisting and under which of the employer is liable to pay wages to the applicant-employee.

Negativing the said contention, held that in dealing with claims arising out of deductions or delay made in payment of wages the authority inevitably would have to consider questions incidental to the said matters. In determining the scope of these incidental questions care must be taken to see that under the guise of deciding incidental matters the limited jurisdiction is not unreasonably or unduly extended. Care must also be taken to see that the scope of these incidental questions is not unduly limited so as to affect or impair the considering of questions as to what could be reasonably regarded as incidental questions. If a claim is made by an employee on the ground of alleged illegal deduction or alleged delay in payment of wages, several relevant facts would fall to be considered. Is the applicant an employee of the opponent? And that refers to the subsistence of the relation between the employer and the employee. If the said fact is admitted, then the next question would be:

“What are the terms of employment? Is there any contract of employment in writing or is the contract oral? If that is not a point of dispute between the parties, than it would be necessary to enquire what are the terms of the admitted contract. In some cases a question may arise whether the contract which was subsisting at one time had ceased to subsist and the relationship of employer and employee had come to an end at the relevant period. In regard to an illegal deduction a question may arise whether the lockout declared by the employer is legal or illegal. In regard to contracts of service sometimes parties may be at variance and may set up rival contracts and in such a case it may be necessary to enquire which contract was in existence at the relevant time.

Hence it would be inexpedient to lay down any hard and fast or general rule which would afford a determining test to demarcate the field of incidental facts which can be legitimately considered by the authority and those which cannot be so considered.”

7. Thus no hard and fast rules were laid down, yet it has clearly been held that the jurisdiction of the Authority under the Act is not ousted simply because a dispute arises as to the contract under which different amounts are claimed as due by the parties.

8. Earlier also in A.V.D Costa v. B.C Patel . A.I.R 1955 S.C 412., Sinha J., as he then was, speaking for the Court, observed in headnote (b) as follows:—

“The authority has the jurisdiction to decide what actually the terms of the contract between the parties were, that is to say, to determine the actual wages; but the authority has no jurisdiction to determine the question of potentional wages.”

9. That was a case where the dispute was whether the employee was entitled to be promoted to a higher group of workers entitled to higher wages. See in this respect also a Full Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court in Viswanath Tukaram v. General Manager, Central Railway . A.I.R 1958 Bem. 111., where Chief Justice Chagla, speaking for the Courts expressed the view substantially to the same effect.

10. In the case before me it is not disputed that Gian Chand was a weaver and was working with this employer from 1959 till he was retrenched, at piece-rate basis. The rate at which he was paid is not disputed. The fact that he was paid alter every month is also not in dispute. In fact, as already stated, the Authority has proceeded on the basis of the copies of the documents produced by the employer himself, the correctness of which is not being challenged by the employee. The only question of dispute is what are the average wages according to the material placed on the record, payable to the employee for the period which is also not in dispute. I am unable to agree that a dispute with regard to this simple mathematical calculation would oust the jurisdiction of the authority.

11. The learned counsel for the employer placed reliance on Payment of Wages Inspector v. Suraj Mal Mehta, Director, The Barnagar Electric Supply and Industrial Co. Ltd. . A.I.R 1969 S.C 590. The facts of that case were entirely different and the observations made therein rather support the case of the petitioner in this case. There the license of an Electric Supply Company was revoked by the Madhya Pradesh Government and the Company's undertaking was taken over by the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board). The Managing Director of the Electric Supply Company was proceeded against under section 15(2) of the Act for payment of compensation to about 20 employees treating the transfer as amounting to retrenchment and the claim of compensation being based under sections 25-FF and 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, in the first instance dealt with the question whether, if an amount became due under section 25-FF or 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act, it would fall within the definition of ‘wages’ as it existed at the time. This question was answered in the affirmative. The provisions of the Payment of Wages Act were then examined in detail and at page 595 of the report it was observed as under:—

“It is explicit from the terms of section 15(2) that the Authority appointed under sub-section (1) has jurisdiction to entertain applications only in two classes of cases, namely of deductions and fines not authorised under sections 7 to 13 and of delay in payment of wages beyond the wage periods fixed under section 4 and the time of payment laid down in section 5”.

12. Obviously the present case does not fall under the first of the two classes mentioned above. There is no deduction unauthorised under the law. Back wages have been ordered to be paid under the award and those wages are being delayed. Therefore, it would fall under the second category of cases envisaged by their Lordships of the Supreme Court.

13. After discussing the cases in A.V D'Costa v. B.C Patel and Ambica Mills Company Ltd. v. S.B Bhatt, noticed above, their Lordships of the Supreme Court went on to observe in Bartnagar Electric Supply Co's case (supra) at page 596 of the report as follows:—

“It is true that the Authority has the jurisdiction to try matters which are incidental to the claim in question. Indeed section 15(1) itself provides that the Authority has the power to determine all matters incidental to the claim arising from deductions from or delay in payment of wages. It is also true that while deciding whether a particular matter is incidential to claim or not care should be taken neither to unduly expand nor curtail the jurisdiction of the Authority. But it has at the same time to be kept in mind that the jurisdiction under section 15 is a special jurisdiction. The Authority is conferred with the power to award compensation over and above the liability for penality of fine which an employer is liable to incur under section 20”

14. Then their Lordships went on to consider the question whether on the footing, that compensation payable under sections 25-FF and 25-FFF of the Industrial Disputes Act are wages within the meaning of section 2(vi)(d) of the Act, a claim for it on the ground that its payment was delayed by an employer could be entertained under section 15(2) of the Act. It was observed that the claim was being resisted inter alia on the ground that there has been no interruption in the employment of the workmen because they have been taken over by the Board and the conditions of service under the Board were no less favourable than those under the Electric Supply Company and that the Board, as the new employer, had become liable to pay compensation to the workmen if there was retrenchment in the future. These defences having been taken, the Authority under the Act shall have to go into these matters and give a decision. With regard to this, their Lordships observed as follows:—

“Such an inquiry would necessarily be a prolonged inquiry involving questions of fact and of law. Besides, thus failure to pay compensation on the ground of such a plea cannot be said to be either a deduction which is unauthorised under the Act, nor can it fall under the class of delayed wages as envisaged by sections 4 and 5 of the Act. It may be that there may conceivably be cases of claims of compensation which are either admitted or which cannot be disputed which by reason of its falling under the definition of wages the Authority may have jurisdiction of to try and determine. But we do not think that a claim for compensation under section 25-FF” which is denied by the employer on the ground that it was defeated by the proviso to that section, of which all the conditions were fulfilled, is one such claim which can fall within the ambit of section 15(2).”

15. It is, therefore, clear that the case before their Lordships of the Supreme Court was a peculiar one where the claim for compensation under section 25-FF of the Industrial Disputes Act was being denied on the ground that all the conditions for the grant of such a compensation were not complied with and the defences taken raised complicated issues of law and fact, for deciding which the Authority under the Act had no jurisdiction under section 15(2) of the Act Their Lordships, however, stated earlier, as quoted above, that the Authority under section 15(2) of the Act has full jurisdiction to decide all incidental matters and I am of the view that mere mathematical calculations as to how much was the “average wage” and for how long was it due are matters which are purely incidental in respect of the I back wages which have been awarded by the Labour Court.

16. Another point urged was that there was also another procedure available to the employee, namely, to proceed under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act Sub-sections (1) and (2) of the section 33-C of the said Act run as follows:—

“(1) Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter V-A, the workman may without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that, any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue.

(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the amount at which such benefit should be computed may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act be determined by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government and the amount so determined may be recovered as provided for in sub-section (1)”

17. These two sub-sections also came up for consideration in the above-mentioned Barnagar Electric Supply Company's case. Relying upon an earlier decision in Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. K.L Kharbanda . A.I.R 1963 S.C 487., it was observed as under:—

“…….section 33C was a provision in the nature of execution and where the amount to be executed was worked out or where it might be worked out without any dispute sub-section (1) would apply but where such amount due to the workman was not stated or worked out and there was a dispute as to its calculation, sub-section (2) would apply and the workman would be entitled to apply thereunder to have the amount computed provided he was entitled to a benefit, whether monetary or non-monetary, which was capable of being paid in terms of money.”

18. The learned Judges posed the question, whether for such a claim the legislature intended to provide alternative remedies both under the Industrial Disputes Act and the Payment of Wages Act and for answering this question they examined in detail the provisions and scheme of the earlier Wages Act and came to the conclusion as reproduced above. However, it was not held by their Lordships that if a claim can be made under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act, then it would be barred under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act. In any case, so far as the present case is concerned, the matter is quite clear and all that was in dispute were mathematical calculations, which would be merely incidental and would be well within the jurisdiction of the Authority.

19. I would, therefore, accept this revision and set aside the order of the Appellate Authority on the ground that it had failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it, The case is remanded back to the Appellate Authority to decide it on merits, because I find that in ground No. 4 of the Grounds of Appeal filed by the employer before the Appellate Authority it was specifically mentioned that the Authority under the Act failed to work out average wages as stated by the Appellant and applied a different method, which was basically wrong and incorrect. Thus the actual calculation was disputed. Counsel will direct the parties to appear before the Appellate Authority on 24th May, 1971, to take a further date. Records of the case will be sent back immediately. There would no order as to costs before me. The other costs would be costs in the cause.

20. Petition accepted.