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A. Pathu And Others v. Katheesa Umma And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
Deceased Mohammedkutty married five times. This suit for partition concerns one item (B schedule) and involves children of his first wife (plaintiffs 1–13) and first defendant (defendants 1–8), totaling 19. The first defendant is said to have sold her kanom right by Ext. A1 dated 16-10-1943 and Mohammedkutty purportedly purchased the jenmom right under Ext. A2 (8-8-1951). Plaintiffs alleged Mohammedkutty was in possession as full owner when he died and claimed their shares. The first defendant denied execution of Ext. A1 and alternatively pleaded limitation and adverse possession; defendants 2–6 supported her, while defendants 3 and 4 claimed special rights over some constructions. The trial court dismissed the suit holding that execution of Ext. A1 was not proved and therefore did not consider adverse possession. Plaintiffs appealed.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether execution of Ext. A1 by the first defendant is proved.
- Whether registration and comparison of thumb impressions (Ext. C1 and PW4) suffice to establish execution and intention/knowledge of contents.
- Whether any vitiating circumstance (e.g., incapacity, purdanashin status, fraud) was alleged or proved to rebut the presumption of execution and registration.
- Whether the trial court was justified in dismissing the suit without considering pleas of adverse possession and limitation.
Arguments of the Parties
Plaintiffs' Arguments
- Mohammedkutty was in possession of the suit property as full owner when he died and plaintiffs are entitled to their shares.
- Ext. A1 was executed and registered; thumb impressions were compared and found identical (Ext. C1, PW4).
- There was no dispute about ownership during Mohammedkutty's lifetime; he had no reason to defraud his wife.
First Defendant's Arguments
- Denial of execution of Ext. A1.
- Alternatively pleaded limitation and adverse possession.
- Defendants 3 and 4 additionally claimed special rights over certain constructions.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sivaramakrishnayya v. Kasiwiswanadham, A.I.R 1957 A.P 584 | Support for presumption under Section 114 that persons sign documents in token of execution following common course of conduct. | Cited to support the prima facie acceptance of signatures/thumb impressions as execution unless special circumstances are alleged and proved. |
| Dalchand Mulchand v. Hasanbi, A.I.R 1938 Nagpur 153 | Special circumstances (e.g., execution under vitiating factors) must be alleged and proved to shift the normal burden. | Applied to hold that the first defendant had to allege and prove any disabling/vitiating circumstance to rebut presumption. |
| Mahabir Saha v. Haripada Saha, A.I.R 1982 Calcutta 353 | When execution is admitted or proved, it is not necessary to prove that contents were read over and explained. | Relied upon to state that proof of execution/registration suffices to shift burden unless special circumstances are proved. |
| Gangamoyi Devi v. Trilokhyanath Chowdhary, I.L.R 1933 Calcutta 537 | Registration carries presumption that formalities were properly and regularly undergone by the registering authority. | Used to support the presumption in favor of regular registration absent proof of deliberate fraud on the Sub Registrar. |
| P.C Kunhamina Umma v. Special Tahsildar, I.L.R 1976 (2) Kerala 678 | Same principle regarding regularity of registration and duty of registering authority to ensure proper execution. | Applied with other authorities to reinforce presumption of regular registration and burden on challenger to prove fraud. |
| Sumathi Amma v. Kunjulakshmi Amma, 1964 K.L.T 945 | Registration presumption and requirement to prove illegality/fraud in registration. | Invoked to support the conclusion that no evidence of improper registration was produced. |
| Mathu v. Cherchi, 1990 (1) K.L.T 416 | Authority on presumption of proper registration and execution procedures. | Referenced to support the court's reliance on registration as evidence of regular formalities absent contrary proof. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court reviewed the evidence: Ext. A1 was registered; PW2 (scribe/stamp vendor) testified about writing and stamp supply but could not attest execution; PW4 (expert) compared a left-thumb impression taken in court with the thumb impression recorded in the Sub Registrar's register and opined identity (Ext. C1). The trial judge rejected Ext. A1, assuming without pleading that the first defendant was a purdanashin or illiterate woman and that fraud or misrepresentation might have been played upon her. The appellate court held that (1) registration is a solemn act and gives rise to a presumption that formalities were duly observed; (2) Section 114 and cited authorities establish a prima facie presumption that a person signs in token of execution and that special/vitiating circumstances must be alleged and proved to rebut that presumption; (3) no allegation or proof of deliberate fraud on the Sub Registrar or of disabling circumstances was made; (4) the first defendant was not shown to be a purdanashin or incapacitated person and, on her own admissions, had acted independently in litigation and official matters; and (5) therefore execution and registration of Ext. A1 were proved and the subordinate judge erred in rejecting it and in going beyond pleadings to assume incapacity.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The appeal is allowed; the decree and judgment under appeal are set aside. It is found that Mohammedkutty was the owner and the property is available for partition between plaintiffs and defendants. The matter is remanded to the trial court for disposal on the merits, permitting further evidence if any.
Implications: Direct effect is reversal of the trial court's dismissal, a finding in favour of plaintiffs on ownership through Mohammedkutty, and remand for determination of outstanding issues (adverse possession, mesne profits, quantum of shares). No broader precedent beyond application of existing evidentiary and registration presumptions was announced. Parties will bear costs incurred before the appellate court; records to be transmitted and parties to appear on 6-8-1990.
1. Deceased Mohammedkutty married five ladies in succession. We are concerned only with two among them, first plaintiff and first defendant. In the first plaintiff, he left 12 children, who are plaintiffs 2 to 13 and in the first defendant seven, defendants 2 to 8, totalling 19. This suit for partition involves only one item. It is B schedule over which first defendant had a kanom right. She is alleged to have sold her kanom right to her husband under the original of Ext. A1 on 16-10-1943 pursuant to which he purchased the jenmom right under Ext. A2 on 8-8-1951. Alleging that Mohammedkutty was in possession of the suit property as full owner when he died, the plaintiffs claimed their share. First defendant denied execution of Ext. A1 and, in the alternative, pleaded limitation and adverse possession. Defendants 2 to 6 supported her. Defendants 3 and 4 in addition claimed special right over some constructions. Trial court dismissed the suit finding that execution of Ext. A1 is not proved. Hence the plea of adverse possession was not considered. That is how the plaintiffs came up in appeal.
2. No attesting witness to Ext. A1 is alive and available for examination. PW 2 is the scribe and stamp Vendor. He could not swear to execution, or attestation. He said that the stamp was supplied and the document written by him. The document is a registered one. The impression of the left thumb of the first defendant was taken in court and it was compared by an expert with the thumb impression contained in the register kept in the Sub Registrar's office for having registered the original of Ext. A1 which is not available. PW 4 is the expert. In Ext. C1 opinion and in the court he said that both impressions are of the same thumb.
3. Not only that the trial Judge was not convinced by these items of evidence, but he is also of opinion that even if these items of evidence are accepted, they are not sufficient to show that she consciously affixed her thumb impression knowing and understanding the contents of the document and no vitiating factor was played on her. Without any contention from the first defendant, the trial Judge assumed her to be a purdanashin or illiterate lady on whom fraud or misrepresentation might have been played and the burden in that connection was not discharged.
4. There is the evidence of the fourth plaintiff as PW 1 regarding possession. There is the admission of the first defendant in the box that till his death Mohammed Kutty lived with her and he died at her residence. Ext. A1 was in 1943. In 1951, Mohammedkutty took Ext. A2 sale of the jenmon right from the wife of PW 3 mentioning his right and possession under Ext. A1. During his life time, there is no evidence of any dispute regarding right over the property. He had no reason to play any fraud on his wife. These factors coupled with registration and proof of thumb impression are normally more than sufficient to establish execution. Courts should not overlook probabilities and assume contentions not taken up by parties.
5. It is an established fact that the science of identification of thumb impression has reached a stage of almost perfection that its correctness cannot be disputed provided the materials supplied by the opinion are capable of inspiring confidence. The document was presented for registration by her and the thumb impression indicates that she gave consent. Ext. C1 and the evidence of PW 4 gave sufficient materials and reasons in support of the conclusion of identity of impressions. No vitiating circumstance is alleged and there is no allegation that she is a purdanashin or illiterate lady who executed and registered the document without understanding what the content is. On her own admission, though illiterate, she conducted cases of her own, gave instructions for filing written statement, reply notice, etc. and appeared before police station, court, Sub Registrar's office and office of lawyers.
6. Normally, when execution of a document is either admitted or proved and when no disabling factor or vitiating circumstance is alleged or proved, admission or proof of signature with the necessary formalities, if any, will be proof of execution with knowledge of the contents atleast, prima facie, for the purpose of shifting the burden. If a person denies, the execution of a document which contains his signature, he must first explain how the signature happened to be there without actual execution. That may be by getting the signature in a blank paper or under other circumstances which disclose that there was no conscious or voluntary execution. When a person's signature appears at the place where the executant would normally sign, the signature may be accepted prima facie as having been put in token of execution. There is the presumption under Section. 114 of the Evidence Act that a person only puts signature in a document in token of execution. Ordinarily, persons do not sign documents without intending to execute them. That is the common course of human conduct or the common course of their public or private business Sivaramakrishnayya v. Kasiwiswanadham, A.I.R 1957 A.P 584). If any person wants to rely on any special circumstance, which abrogates the common course of public or private business, he must allege and prove it for the purpose of shafting the burden (Dalchand Mulchand v. Hasanbi, A.I.R 1938 Nagpur 153). The question whether a person is a purdanashin lady or an illiterate person who was made to put the signature under vitiating circumstances is a special circumstance to be alleged and proved in order to shift the normal initial burden. Otherwise, when execution is admitted or proved, it is not necessary to prove that the contents of the document were read over and explained (Mahabir Saha v. Haripada Saha, A.I.R 1982 Calcutta 353).
7. Purdanashin ladies are so excluded from ordinary social inter course that an amount of incapacity for business must be subcribed/to them. I do not mean to say that the protection is confined to that class alone. But outside that class, the protection must depend in each case on the character and position of the individual woman, whether those who deal with her are or are not bound to take special precautions that her actions shall be intelligent and voluntary and to prove that it was so in the case in dispute. No such character and position is alleged or proved in this case and, in fact, it was disproved also. First defendant is an independent woman of more than ordinary capacity for, and experience in, dealing with property.
8. Registration of a document is a solemn act to be performed in the presence of the Sub Registrar, who is statutorily authorised for that purpose. He is duty bound to see that documents are executed by proper and competent persons. He has to get the parties identified by proper persons if they are not personally known to him. He has to ascertain from the executant that the execution was on free will after understanding the contents. When it is proved that the document was executed and registered, the presumption is that all the formalities were properly and regularly undergone by the registering authority. Then it is for the party challenging execution and registration to prove that some deliberate fraud was played on the Sub Registrar and the registration was not legal and proper (Gangamoyi Devi v. Trilokhyanath Chowdhary, I.L.R 1933 Calcutta 537 P.C Kunhamina Umma v. Special Tahsildar, I.L.R 1976 (2) Kerala 678, Sumathi Amma v. Kunjulakshmi Amma, 1964 K.L.T 945, and Mathu v. Cherchi, 1990 (1) K.L.T 416). No such plea or evidence is there.
9. In the above circumstances, nobody could say that execution and registration are not proved. These are the only facts denied. The Subordinate Judge was not justified in going beyond the pleadings and assuming that the first defendant is an incapacitated or illiterate woman who requires the protection of law to insist on special precautions as in the case of pardanashin ladies before accepting the document. Presumption arising from execution and registration had to be rebutted by the first defendant for which even the allegations were not there, much less, proof. Still the Subordinate Judge rejected Ext. A1 on the possibility of it being executed and registered without knowing what it is by incapacity or vitiating factors. These reasons cannot be sustained.
10. Status or entitlement of the plaintiffs to get shares are not factors in dispute in case it is found that Mobammedkutty was the owner. But adverse possession and claim for mesne profits as well as quantum of shares were not decided. The case must, therefore, go back.
11. The appeal is allowed. Decree and judgment under appeal are set aside. It is found that Mohammedkutty was the owner and the property is available for partition between plaintiffs and defendants. The case is remanded for disposal on the merits subject to what is stated above, after allowing evidence, if any, to be let in. Parties will suffer costs incurred before this court. Office will transmit the records forthwith and the parties will appear before the trial court on 6-8-1990.
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