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Vijay Choudhary v. The State Of Bihar & Others
Structured Summary of the Opinion — B.L. Yadav, J.
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioner, a pisciculturist, was the highest bidder at a public auction held on 3.9.1993 for leases to operate fish-rearing ditches under the Mallikpur Branch Canal. Pursuant to letter no. 264.Goraul dated 7.8.1993 issued by the S.D.O., Tirhut Canal Sub-division No. 1, Goraul, the petitioner deposited the required auction sale amount and other sums (including sums identified as Rs. 16,200/- and Rs. 40,701/-) and commenced fishing operations after obtaining requisite approvals including from the Executive Engineer, Tirhut Canal Division.
The petitioner made substantial additional investments for developing the ditches and rearing fish (specific purchases recorded in the petition include Rs. 27,130/- on 15.10.1993, Rs. 37,080/- on 18.10.1993, and Rs. 35,460/- on 22.10.1993, plus further investments in pisci-fauna, fish-seeds and labour). The lease was for a three-year period expiring on 31.3.1996.
On 5.2.1994 the respondents issued an order (Annexure 4) cancelling the petitioner's lease. The cancellation was effected without prior notice, opportunity for representation, or hearing. The petitioner challenged the cancellation by filing a writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution seeking quashing of the 5.2.1994 order.
A counter-affidavit was filed by the respondents denying the petitioner's averments, including denial that the petitioner was entitled to an opportunity of hearing or to protection under the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the petitioner, who obtained a three-year lease under the auction and who made the requisite payments and investments, was entitled to the protection of the principles of natural justice (in particular the rule of audi alteram partem) before the lease was cancelled.
- Whether the petitioner was entitled to the benefit of the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation under the circumstances of this case.
- Whether the impugned order dated 5th February 1994 cancelling the lease without notice or hearing should be quashed.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioner's Arguments
- By being the highest bidder and depositing the entire required auction and other amounts, and after obtaining official approvals, the petitioner had a legal right to continue to operate the lease for three years.
- The petitioner invested substantial sums in development and pisciculture and thus had a significant proprietary interest that could not be taken away without notice and an opportunity to be heard; cancellation without hearing was arbitrary and violated natural justice.
- The petitioner had a legitimate expectation that, even if cancellation were considered, he would be given notice, an opportunity to explain or rectify any alleged irregularity, and a hearing before the lease was terminated.
- Counsel relied heavily on the Full Bench decision in Pancham Singh v. The State of Bihar (1991 (1) P.L.J.R 352-F.B.) (as cited in the petitioner's submissions).
Respondents' Arguments
- The principles of natural justice are not a rigid, universally applicable formula and need not be applied in the present circumstances.
- The Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation does not apply to the facts of this case.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Franklin v. Minister, Town and Country Planning — 1948 A.C. 87 : (1947) 2 All E.R. 289 | General common-law rules allied to audi alteram partem; illustrative of corollaries to the rule that no one shall be condemned unheard. | Cited as an authoritative example of common-law rules that support the requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard when rights or interests are affected. |
| John v. Rees (1970) Chancery Division 345 | Another common-law authority illustrating rules similar to audi alteram partem. | Used to reinforce the proposition that persons whose rights are affected should be afforded reasonable opportunity to meet the case against them. |
| Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill (470 U.S. 532) | Due process principle that deprivation of significant property or interest must be preceded by notice and an opportunity for hearing (cites Mullane). | The court relied on this authority to emphasise that deprivation of a significant property interest requires prior notice and hearing appropriate to the circumstances. |
| Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co. (339 U.S. 306) | Described as a root requirement of due process: notice and opportunity for hearing. | Referred to as foundational authority for the need of notice and an appropriate hearing before deprivation of property or interests. |
| S.L. Kapoor v. Jag Mohan (1981 S.C. 136) | Even where a statute is silent, the rule of natural justice (audi alteram partem) shall be read into the statute as an inbuilt provision unless excluded. | Applied to support the proposition that the rule of natural justice must be applied when a decision affects a person's right or interest, absent specific exclusion. |
| Smt. Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India — 1978 (2) S.C.R. 621 | Natural justice constitutes essential elements of a fair hearing and limits arbitrary State action. | Used to underscore the importance and place of natural justice in modern administrative law and to support the court's view that the petitioner should have been heard. |
| Union of India v. Tulsi Ram — 1985 Supp. (2) S.C.R. 131 | Affirms that the principles of natural justice are rooted in fair play and justice. | Referred to for the proposition that natural justice forms part of basic fairness which the court must enforce. |
| Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Edn.), Vol. I(1) p.151 | Authoritative statement of the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation: expectations may arise from representations, promises or consistent past practice and should not be defeated without overriding public policy. | Quoted to define the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation and to frame when that doctrine will constrain administrative action. |
| Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs [(1969) 2 Ch D 149] | Illustration that an alien granted leave to enter for a limited period has a legitimate expectation to be allowed to remain for that period and to be given an opportunity of representation if permission is revoked early. | Used as an illustrative example of how legitimate expectation requires opportunity to make representations before a benefit is withdrawn prematurely. |
| Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service (GCHQ) (All ER 935) | Legitimate expectation may arise from regular practice of consultation; where a benefit has been permitted in the past, its withdrawal may require reasons and an opportunity to comment. | Relied upon to show that legitimate expectation can give rise to an implied limitation on the exercise of administrative power and a right to consultation or representation. |
| Food Corporation of India v. M/s Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries — Judgments Today 1992 (6) S.C. 259 : (1993) 1 SCC 71 | Contemporary Indian authority cited for the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation and its application. | Cited as supporting authority for the proposition that a person may legitimately expect to be informed of and heard about actions affecting a right even where no private-law right strictly exists. |
| Pancham Singh v. The State of Bihar (1991 (1) P.L.J.R. 352 — Full Bench) | Relied upon by the petitioner's counsel in submissions (Full Bench decision of this Court). | Referred to by petitioner’s counsel in support of his submissions; the court considered the submissions but its decision rested on other cited authorities and principles. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court framed the core question as whether the petitioner was entitled to be heard under the principles of natural justice and to the protection of the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation. The court proceeded step-by-step as follows:
- Identified the relevant common-law principle of audi alteram partem — no one should be condemned unheard — and observed its corollary requiring reasonable notice of the case to be met. The court cited common-law authorities (Franklin; John v. Rees) to illustrate that other common-law rules support this requirement.
- Referred to constitutional/due-process jurisprudence (Cleveland and Mullane) to emphasize that deprivation of life, liberty or property ordinarily requires notice and an opportunity of hearing appropriate to the case; a significant property interest cannot be taken away without such procedure.
- Applied the principle from S.L. Kapoor that, even if a statute is silent, natural justice can be read into statutory decision-making unless expressly excluded. The court used this to justify imposing a hearing requirement where a decision affects a person's rights or interests.
- Explained the role of natural justice as protection against arbitrary State action, citing Menaka Gandhi and Union of India v. Tulsi Ram to show the doctrinal foundation in Indian law.
- Examined the facts: petitioner was highest bidder, deposited required sums, obtained approvals, and made substantial investments in pisciculture. The court concluded the petitioner had a significant proprietary interest and a legitimate expectation he would be given notice and an opportunity to be heard before termination of the lease.
- Discussed the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation, quoting Halsbury, and illustrated the principle with Schmidt and the GCHQ (Council of Civil Service Unions) authorities. The court explained that legitimate expectation may arise from representation, promise, or consistent practice, and that authorities should not defeat such expectations without overriding reasons.
- Applied these principles to the present case: because the petitioner had complied with formalities, invested heavily, and reasonably expected continuation of the lease or at least an opportunity to be heard before cancellation, the respondents' failure to provide notice or hearing violated both natural justice and legitimate expectation.
- Concluded that the impugned order of 5.2.1994 cancelling the lease was in utter violation of natural justice and deprived the petitioner of the benefits of legitimate expectation; therefore the order could not be sustained.
Holding and Implications
Writ petition allowed and the impugned order dated 5th February 1994 quashed insofar as it applies to the petitioner.
Consequences and immediate effects:
- The impugned cancellation order of 5.2.1994 is quashed as it applies to the petitioner.
- The respondents are restrained from disturbing or interfering with the petitioner's right to operate the fishing undertaking in the relevant ditches of the Mallikpur Branch Canal in respect of which the lease was granted, up to the lease period expiring on 31st March 1996.
- The court identified the decision as based on established principles of natural justice and the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation and did not purport to lay down a novel rule of law beyond applying those principles to the facts at hand.
The opinion records that N.K. Sinha, J. agreed with the reasoning and result.
B.L Yadav, J.:— Whether the petitioner-lessee for a period of three years, as pisciculturist (since 1993 to 1996) for rearing fish under Mallikpur Branch Canal, was entitled to the benefit of principle of natural justice and entitled to the benefit of the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation under the circumstances of the instant case are the short questions for determination in the present writ petition filed by the petitioner under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, seeking the relief to quash the order dated the 5th of February, 1994 (Annexure 4) cancelling the lease without any opportunity of show cause/hearing.
2. The essential facts are these. The petitioner, being highest bidder of an auction sale, obtained a lease and after complying with all the formalities in pursuance of letter no. 264.Goraul dated the 7th of August, 1993 issued under the signature of the S.D.O, Tirhut Canal Sub-division No. 1, Goraul, deposited the entire required auction sale and other amounts and started fishing after having invested a handsome amount. Approval of the higher officials including the Executive Engineer, Tirhut Canal Division was also obtained. Earlier he had received a certificate of being the highest bidder vide Annexure 2 and was required to deposit a sum of Rs. 16,200/- and Rs. 40,701/-. After the receipt was obtained and the amount was deposited, as required, the petitioner started fishing operation in the ditches in question. The petitioner also made purchases for a sum of Rs. 27,130/- on 15.10.1993, Rs. 37,080/- on 18.10.93 and Rs. 35,460/- on 22.10.1993 for developing the ditches settled in his favour, as contained in Annexure 3 to this petition. Investment was made particularly for purchase of pisci-fauna, fish-seeds. Additional huge amount for investment by way of labour cost etc. was also made by the petitioner. It is needless to say that it takes about six months for pisci-fauna to grow. By the time the petitioner was expecting the outcome after investment of a huge amount, he learnt that the settlement made in his favour on the basis of public auction held on 3.9.1993, has been cancelled without any notice for representation and without affording any opportunity for hearing, when in fact the petitioner was legitimately expecting that in case his lease per chance is sought to be cancelled even after having complied with all the formalities and also being highest bidder, having invested a handsome amount, he would be afforded an opportunity of hearing. But nothing was done and by the impugned order dated 5.2.1994 (Annexure 4) the petitioner's lease for three years was cancelled.
3. A counter affidavit was filed and the averments in the petition, including that the petitioner must be entitled to hearing in compliance with the principles of natural justice and to the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation were denied.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that by grant of lease in favour of the petitioner, a legal right was created in his favour to continue to operate for a period of three years. He has invested a huge amount and deposited the requisite sale amount and other amounts, but without any notice for representation or any opportunity of hearing the lease deed has been illegally cancelled. In such matters the petitioner expects that some notice would be given to him and some explanations in respect of some assumed irregularity would be asked from him and he would be afforded an opportunity of hearing before the lease was cancelled but nothing was done. All of a sudden he received the impugned order of cancellation. It was arbitrary and violative of the rules of natural justice. In any case he being the highest bidder, obtained the lease after complying with all the formalities and was legitimately expecting to be heard and informed about the process of cancellation, but nothing was done. The learned counsel leaned heavily on a Full Bench decision of this Court in Pancham Singh v. The State of Bihar (1991 (1) P.L.J.R 352-F.B.).
5. The learned counsel for the respondents, including the State, on the other hand, urged that the principles of natural justice are not a strait-jacket formula nor it can be stretched too far. In the present case it was not required to be complied with. Similarly the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation would not apply.
6. Having considered the submissions of both sides, the points for determination are whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case the petitioner was entitled to the principle of natural justice and to the benefit of Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation.
7. Apart from the rule of Audi Alteram Partem, which means that no one shall be condemned unheard, corollary of which is that he should be given reasonable notice of the nature of the case to be met, there are other rules of common law to the same effect. (See Franklin v. Minister, Town and Country Planning — 1948 A.C 87 : (1947) 2 All E.R 289, John v. Rees (1970) Chancery Division 345). In case any person has acquired any right in any property or his right is being affected by the process, he would be afforded reasonable opportunity of hearing and also to meet the cause against him.
8. In Cleveland v. Board of Education, (470) U.S 532, 84 Lawyers Edition 2nd 494 (503) it was held—
“An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty or property be preceded by notice and opportunity of hearing appropriate to the nature of the case (See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Company—339 U.S 306 : 94 L.Ed 865). It has been described that root requirement of the due process clause being that an individual be given an opportunity for hearing before he is deprived of any significant property or interest.”
9. In S.L Kapoor v. Jag Mohan (1981 S.C 136) it was held that even where a statute is silent in respect of observance of this rule, it shall be read into the statute as an inbuilt provision. This rule must be held to be a necessary postulate in all the cases where a decision is to be taken affecting a person's right or interest, unless such rule is specifically excluded by the statute.
10. Natural justice is a concept which has succeeded in keeping arbitrary action of the State within limits. At the same time a Court has to be circumspect in deciding whether it can extend the rule. In the instant case it cannot be said to be a strait-jacket formula nor it can be stretched too far. However, it has significant place in modern administrative law. In other words it is substantially fair play in action. (See Smt. Menaka Gandhi v. Union of India—1978 (2) S.C.R 621). It was held by the Apex Court that the principles of natural justice constitute the basic elements of a fair hearing, having their roots in the innate sense of men for fair play and justice which is not the reserve of any particular race or country but, is shared in common by all men. (See Union of India v. Tulsi Ram—1985 Supp. (2) S.C.R 131 at page 225).
11. By grant of lease in favour of the petitioner, who was highest bidder, who deposited the entire required amount and other amount or instalment, as required by the relevant rules and also invested handsome amount for rearing fish, he never expected that his lease would be cancelled without affording any opportunity of hearing and without serving any notice upon him. But by the impugned order it is crystal clear that before cancelling the lease in question no notice was served on the petitioner nor he was afforded any opportunity of hearing nor he was actually heard. The principles of natural justice constitute the basic element of a fair hearing. As the petitioner was being deprived of the significant property right or an interest therein, hence compliance of the principles of natural justice, in my opinion, was a must.
12. In that view of the matter, in my opinion, the impugned order of cancellation of lease deed in favour of the petitioner for a period of three years has been rendered in utter violation of the principles of natural justice.
13. As regards the second point about the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation and its concept and applicability it is better to quote the statement of law from the Halsbury Laws of England (4th Edition) Volume I(1) 151 as follows:—
“A person may have legitimate expectation of being treated in a certain way by an administrative authority, even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment. The expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority including an implied representation or from consistent past practice. In common parlance it means that the authority ought not to act so as to defeat the expectations without some overriding reason of public policy to justify its doing so.”
14. In Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs [(1969) 2 Chancery Division 149], it was observed that “an alien who had been given leave to enter U.K for a limited period, had a legitimate expectation of being allowed to stay for the permitted time and if that permission was revoked before the time expires that alien ought to be given an opportunity of making representation.”
15. In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service (1934 3 All England Reports 935) it was observed-
“A question arose whether decision of the Minister withdrawing the right to trade union membership, without consulting the staff which, according to the appellant, was his legitimate expectation arising from the existence of a regular practice of consultation was valid.”
16. It was further held:
“An aggrieved person was entitled to invoke judicial review if he showed that a decision of a public authority affected him by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which in the past he has been permitted to enjoy and which he could legitimately expect to be permitted to enjoy either until he was given reasons for its withdrawal and the opportunity to comment on those reasons or because he has received an assurance that it would not be withdrawn before he had been given an opportunity of making representation against the withdrawal. The appellant's legitimate expectation arising from the existence of a regular practice of consultation which the appellant could reasonably expect to continue, gave rise to an implied limitation on the minister's exercise of the powers.”
17. In my opinion, in case, in a given situation a person even though strictly he might not have some legal rights in private law, but nevertheless in case he has an expectation from the promise made by the authorities or from the consistent past practice, he was given to operate a lease or some other right consistent with the legal transaction, or in case any action pertaining to the petitioner's lease was initiated, he could legitimately expect that he shall be informed about the actions initiated and also would be afforded reasonable opportunity to make representation and an opportunity of being heard. This is how the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation comes into operation.
18. To put it differently the petitioner being the highest bidder was granted lease and has deposited required sale amount, including the other requisite amount and also instalments within time and also spent handsome amount in making investment for the purpose of rearing fish. In that case he could legitimately expect that before he was compelled to leave the operation of fishing even after compliance of all the legal formalities, he would have at least been given an opportunity to make representation and an opportunity of hearing, for which he has been legitimately expecting. This is how this new Doctrine comes into operation. In my opinion, the petitioner was entitled to the benefits of this Doctrine. (See Judgments Today, 1992 (6) S.C 259 : (1993) 1 SCC 71 in Food Corporation Of India v. M/S Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries.).
19. As neither the petitioner was afforded any opportunity of hearing nor he was given any opportunity of making representation, hence the principles of natural justice were violated and the petitioner was also deprived of the Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation. In that view of the matter the impugned order dated the 5th of February, 1994 (Annexure 4) cannot be sustained. In the result the present writ petition succeeds and the same is allowed and the impugned order dated the 5th of February, 1994 (Annexure 4) is quashed to the extent it is applicable to the case of the petitioner. The inevitable corollary is that the respondents are restrained from disturbing or interfering with the petitioner's right to operate fishing undertaking in the said ditches of Mallikpur Branch Canal in respect of which the lease was granted for a period expiring on the 31st of March, 1996.
N.K Sinha, J.:— I agree.
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