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Ram Chander And Others v. Amar Singh .
Factual and Procedural Background
The land in dispute (232 Kanals 12 Marlas) originally belonged to Ram Sarup who, by a sale deed dated 12 April 1966, sold it to Ram Chander and other vendee-defendants for Rs. 34,890/-. Amar Singh, the son of the vendor, instituted a suit for possession by pre-emption claiming a superior right as the vendor's son and seeking possession on payment of the sale price. The trial Court (Sub Judge Second Class, Kaithal) framed multiple issues and ultimately passed a decree dated 15 June 1970 directing possession by pre-emption in favour of Amar Singh against the vendee-defendants on payment of Rs. 34,890/-.
The vendee-defendants appealed to the District Judge, Karnal. The Additional District Judge (Shri N.S. Rao) dismissed the appeal on 9 December 1970 on a preliminary point: appellants Nos. 1 to 3 (Ram Chander, Hukam Chand and Multan Singh) were minors and the guardian ad litem appointed by the trial Court (the Ahlmad of that Court) had not filed the appeal for them; instead, the memorandum of appeal had been signed on behalf of the minors by the Court's stenographer who had not been validly appointed as guardian. The vendee-defendants (appellants) then appealed to this Court (P.S. Pattar, J.).
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the appeal was validly filed on behalf of the minor appellants given that the trial Court had appointed its Ahlmad as guardian ad litem and that guardian's appointment had not been terminated.
- Whether the appellate Court could, or ought to, transpose appellants Nos. 1–3 as respondents and appoint a guardian ad litem for them so as to cure any defect in the appeal.
- Whether, given that the decree was joint and indivisible and the appeal was filed on behalf of only 9 out of 12 vendees, the appeal could proceed or must be dismissed to avoid conflicting decrees.
Arguments of the Parties
Appellants' Arguments
- The appellate Court should have transposed appellants Nos. 1 to 3 as respondents and then appointed their guardian ad litem, since all parties were before the Court.
- Counsel relied on provisions of the Civil Procedure Code (Order 41 rules 4 and 33) as well as authorities such as Sm. Saila Bala Dassi v. Sm. Nirmala Sunderi Dassi (AIR 1958 SC 394) to support the contention that the Court could, if necessary, act to transpose parties and thereby regularize the procedural defect.
The opinion does not set out a detailed account of any respondent's counter-arguments in separate, enumerated form; the Court's reasoning (below) addresses and rejects the appellants' contentions on the facts and legal authorities cited.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Sambhoo v. Kanhaya, AIR 1922 All. 332 | The principle that where a guardian ad litem has once been appointed his appointment endures for the whole lis in which it was made unless revoked by the Court. | The Court relied on this authority to hold that the Ahlmad appointed by the trial Court remained the guardian ad litem throughout the proceedings and was the only person entitled to file the appeal for the minors; consequently the stenographer's filing on their behalf was invalid. |
| Bhagelu v. Mt. Dharma, AIR 1924 All. 79 | The rule that a guardian ad litem, once appointed for a minor defendant, continues for the whole lis or until revoked and is the sole person who can file an appeal on behalf of the minor. | The Court applied this authority to reinforce that the trial Court's appointed guardian (Ahlmad) was the only proper officer to present the appeal for the minors and that any appeal filed by another person without revocation of the appointment was improper. |
| Sm. Saila Bala Dassi v. Sm. Nirmala Sunderi Dassi, AIR 1958 SC 394 | The case stands for the proposition that a Court can, if necessary, take action suo motu under Order 1 rule 10 or under its inherent jurisdiction to transpose an appellant as respondent in an appeal. | The Court distinguished this authority: in Saila Bala Dassi the appeal had been properly instituted and the issue was transposition where a party had elected not to contest; the facts did not match the present case, and the Court held the ruling inapplicable to cure the present defect of there being no proper appeal on behalf of the minors. |
| Bhubneshwar Prasad Narain Singh v. Sidheswar Mukherjee, AIR 1949 Pat 309 | Authority for transposition of parties in certain circumstances where doing so does not alter the scope of the appeal and may be done in the ends of justice. | The Court noted that in that case minors (who had become respondents) were transposed as appellants on application and transposition was allowed. The Court held that the present case is distinguishable because here the minors were not made respondents and no application for transposition had been made; therefore the authority did not assist the appellants. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court's analysis proceeded in a stepwise manner grounded in the facts and applicable procedural rules as stated in the record:
- Identification of the governing procedural rule: The Court cited Order XXXII rule 3(5) (as reproduced in the opinion) which provides that a person appointed under sub-rule (1) to be guardian for a suit for a minor shall continue as such throughout all proceedings arising out of the suit, including appellate proceedings, unless his appointment is terminated by retirement, removal or death.
- Application of that rule to the facts: It was common ground that the trial Court had appointed the Ahlmad as guardian ad litem for appellants Nos. 1–3 (the minors), and that the appointment had not been terminated. The Court therefore concluded that the Ahlmad continued to be the guardian ad litem throughout all proceedings arising out of the suit.
- Consequence of the guardian's continuing appointment: Because the Ahlmad remained the appointed guardian, any appearance or filing on behalf of the minors by a person who had not been appointed guardian (in this case, the Court's stenographer) was without authority. The memorandum of appeal signed on behalf of the minors by the stenographer therefore did not constitute a proper appeal on their behalf.
- Reliance on precedent: The Court invoked Sambhoo v. Kanhaya and Bhagelu v. Mt. Dharma which establish that the appointment of a guardian ad litem endures for the whole lis unless revoked and that the appointed guardian alone can file an appeal for the minor. These authorities were applied directly to conclude the stenographer's act was invalid.
- Consideration and rejection of appellants' proposals to cure the defect: The appellants' counsel urged transposition of the minors as respondents and reliance on provisions such as Order 41 rule 4 and Order 41 rule 33. The Court observed that these provisions did not apply to the present facts and rejected the contention that transposition could be used to remedy the fundamental defect that no proper appeal had been filed on behalf of the minors.
- Distinguishing other cited authorities: The Court examined Sm. Saila Bala Dassi v. Sm. Nirmala Sunderi Dassi and Bhubneshwar Prasad Narain Singh v. Sidheswar Mukherjee and found them inapplicable. In Saila Bala Dassi the appeal had been properly instituted and the issue was transposition where a party had decided not to contest; that factual posture was absent here. In Bhubneshwar Prasad, minors had been respondents and were transposed after application; here the minors had not been made respondents and no application for transposition had been made in the appellate Court.
- Final practical and procedural consequence: The decree was joint and indivisible; the appeal had been filed on behalf of only 9 of the 12 vendees, with no proper appeal on behalf of the three minors. The Court held that because the rights of the vendees were joint and their shares undivided, an incomplete or improper appeal would risk conflicting decrees. To avoid such conflict and because there was no valid appeal on behalf of the minors, the appeal as a whole could not be allowed to proceed and had to fail.
Holding and Implications
HOLDING: The appeal is dismissed; the decision of the Additional District Judge is affirmed.
Direct implications for the parties:
- The appeal to this Court failed and the decree of the trial Court (for possession by pre-emption in favour of Amar Singh on payment of Rs. 34,890/-) stands as validated by the appellate dismissal.
- The parties were ordered to bear their own costs in this Court, consistent with the trial and lower appellate rulings.
Broader implications: The Court applied established procedural law regarding the appointment and continuity of guardians ad litem and distinguished authorities on transposition. The opinion does not purport to lay down any new precedent beyond applying existing authorities (as cited) to the facts; no broader or novel legal rule was announced beyond the direct application described above.
P.S Pattar, J.:— This an appeal filed by Ram Chander and other defendants against the judgment dated 9th December, 1970, of Shri N.S Rao, Additional Sessions Judge, Karnal, dismissing their appeal against the judgment and decree dated 15th June, 1970 of Shri N.K Jain, Sub Judge Second Class, Kaithal, passed for possession by pre-emption of land in suit on payment of Rs. 37,352/- against them in favour of the plaintiff.
2. The facts of this case are that the land in suit measuring 232 Kanals 12 Marlas belonged to Ram Sarup who sold the same to Ram Chander and other defendants appellants for Rs. 34,890/- on the basis of a sale deed dated 12th April, 1966. Amar Singh Advocate who is the son of the vendor filed suit for possession by pre-emption of this land on payment of whole of the sale price on the allegation that being the son of the vendor he had a superior right of pre-emption. The defendants contested the suit on various grounds and the following issues were framed by the trial Court:—
“1. Whether the plaint is adequately valued and stamped for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction?
2. Whether the property in suit is a joint. Hindu family property of the vendor and the plaintiff. If so to what effect?
3. Whether the suit is within limitation?
4. Wither plaintiff has got a superior right of pre-enption?
5. Whether the suit land was banjar at the time of sale and if so, whether it has been reclaimed by the vendees before the date of institution of the suit?
6. Whether the suit is bad for partial pre-emption?
7. Whether the defendant vendees have effected improvements? If so, how much?
8. Whether the plaintiff has waived his right of pre-emption, if any?
9. Relief.”
3. The Sub-ordinate Judge passed decree for possession by pre-emption of this land in favour of Amar Singh plaintiff against the vendee-defendants on payment of Rs. 34,890/-. Feeling dissatisfied the vendee defendants filed appeal in the Court of District Judge, Karnal which was dismissed by Shri N.S Rao, Additional District Judge Karnal on 9th December, 1970, on a preliminary point. He held that the appellants Nos. 1 to 3, namely, Ram Chander, Hukam Chand and Multan Singh were minors and that Ahlmad of the Court of Sub-Judge Second Class, Kaithal was their guardian ad litem appointed by the lower Court, but the appeal had not been filed by the minors through that guardian and that the appeal was filed through the Stenographer of that Court and therefore there was no proper appeal in that Court on behalf of the minor appellants and dismissed the appeal of all the appellants, but left the parties to bear their own costs. Feeling aggrieved the vendee-defendants have come up in appeal to this Court. It is admitted that Ram Chander, Hukan Chand and Multan Singh appellants Nos. 1 to 3 are minors and the trial Court had appointed Ahlmad of its Court as the guardian ad litem during the pendency of the suit. After passing of the decree by the trial Court the vendees filed any appeal in the Court of the District Judge and the memorandum of appeal and the Vakalatnama etc., were signed by 9 major vendees and that on behalf of the miners these were signed by the Stenographer to the Sub-Judge Second Class. Kaithal as their next friend/guardian and it is also admitted that the Stenographer of that Court was never appointed as guardian ad litem of the minors and that the Ahlmed of that Court was appointed as their Guardian. It appears that the this Stenographer had appeared in the trial Court on one hearing that is 10th May, 1970, on their behalf but on subsequent hearings the Ahlmad who was the guardian ad litem had been appearing on behalf of the minor vendees.
4. Order XXXII rule 3(5) says that a person appointed under sub-rule (1) to be guardian for the suit for a minor shall, unless his appointment is terminated by retirement, removal or death, continue as such throughout all proceedings arising out of the suit including proceedings in any Appellate or Revisional Court and any proceedings in the execution of a decree. It is common case of the parties that the Ahlmed of the trial Court who was appointed by the Court as guardian ad litem of the appellants was neither removed nor retired as guardian and that the Stenographer of that Court was never appointed as guardian of the minor. Consequently the Stenographer had no right to file this appeal on behalf of the minors and the appeal on their behalf was not property filed.
5. In Sambhoo v. Kanhaya . AIR 1922 All. 332 2., where the facts were that:—
“In a mortgage suit, in which the minor mortgagor was represented by the Nazir appointed as guardian ad litem the claim of the mortgagee was decreed and a third person appealed as next friend. Held: Where a guardian ad litem has once been appointed his appointment ensures for the whole of the lis in the course of which it was made, unless and until it was revoked by the Court.”
6. In Bhagelu v. Mt. Dharma . AIR 1924 All. 79., it was held as under:—
“Where a guardian ad litem to a minor defendant has once been appointed, such appointment continues for the whole of the lis or until it is revoked by Court, and the guardian so appointed is the only person who can file an appeal on behalf of the minor.”
7. The law laid down in both these authorities applies to this case. The Ahlmed of the Court who was appointed as guardian ad litem of the minor-appellants Nos. 1 to 3 was the only person who could file the appeal on their behalf because his appointment enured for the whole of the lis until it was revoked by the Court. Where a guardian ad litem of a minor defendant has once been appointed such appointment shall continue for the whole of the lis or until it is revoked by the Court. The filing of the appeal by the Stenographer of the Court of the Sub-Judge Second Class, Kaithal on behalf of the appellant Nos. 1 to 3 was illegal and there was no proper appeal on behalf of Appellants Nos. 1 to 3.
8. The learned counsel for the appellants contended that the appellate Court should have transposed appellants No. 1 to 3 as respondents and then appointed their guardian ad litem and since all the parties were before the Court it could not be said that there was no proper appeal filed in the Court of the District Judge in support of this contention he referred to Order 41 rule 4 and 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Order 41 rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down that when there are more plaintiffs or more defendants than one in a suit and the decree appealed from proceeds on any ground common to all of them any one of the plaintiffs or of the defendants may appeal from the whole decree and thereupon the appellate Court may reverse or vary the decree in favour of all the plaintiffs or defendants as the case may be. Rule 33 of Order 41 of the Cede of Civil Procedure says that the appellate Court has power to pass any decree or make any other which ought to have been passed or made. These provisions obviously do not apply to this case.
9. The learned counsel for the appellants then referred to Sm. Saila Bala Dassi v. Sm. Nirmala Sunderi Dassi . AIR 1958 SC 394. wherein it was held that the Court can, if necessary, take action suo motu either under O. 1 R. 10 or in its inherent jurisdiction and transpose an appellant as respondent in the appeal. In that case Sudhir Khmar Mitter was owner of two houses and he mortgaged the same in favour of one Smt. Nirmala Sunderi Dassi who obtained a preliminary decree for sale of those houses and after taking accounts final decree for Rs. 3914/6/6 was passed on 20th April, 1936. According to the Rules of Calcutta High Court on the original side the decree holder was to take steps to have the decree prepared but she did not do so for about 18 years. On 12th May, 1952, Sudhir Kumar Mitter mortgagor judgment-debtor sold both the houses to Smt. Saila Bala Dassi for Rs. 60,000/- wherein it was stated that the amount was utilised largely for discharging the prior mortgages on which the decree had been obtained and execution proceedings had been taken and that the property were sold free from all encumbrances. The decree holder Smt. Nirmla Sunderi Dassi took steps to draw the decree and on 17th February, 1954, obtained an ex parte order granting her leave to draw and complete the decree and thereafter she started proceedings for sale of the mortgaged property. Then litigation started between the parties. The judgment debtor Sudhir Kumar Mitter and Saila Bala Dassi took objection that the execution of the decree was barred by limitation. A Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court held that the execution of the decree was not barred. There was further litigation between the parties regarding execution of that decree. Sudhir Kumar Mitter and Saila Bala Dassi had filed on appeal against some orders passed in those proceedings. It appears that Sudhir Kumar Mitter dropped the fight with Nirmala Sunderi Dassi the decree-holder and on the application made under Order 1, rule 10, Sudhir Kumar Mitter was transposed as respondent in appeal. In this authority there was a proper institution or presentation of the appeal to the Court and it was only a case of transposing one of the appellants as respondents as he had decided not to contest the claim of the respondents. Therefore this ruling has no application to this case.
10. The counsel for the appellants then referred to Bhubneshwar Prasad Narain Singh v. Sidheswar Mukherjee . AIR 1949 Pat 309.. Its facts were that the Minor sons were defendants 3 and 4 in the suit were not made co-appellants and were arrayed as respondents to the appeal. On their behalf applications had been made before the Court by their guardian ad litem to have them transposed from the category of the respondents to that of the appellant wherein it was mentioned that on account of the default of their guardian ad litem, who represented them in the Court below, no appeal was filed on their behalf. This application was accepted because their transposition from the category of the respondents to that of the appellants did not in any manner change the scope of the appeal and the main question which was to be decided in the appeal and this should be done in the ends of justice. However, in the Instant case the minor-defendants were not made respondents. But the appeal had been filed on their behalf by a person who was not their validly appointed guardian and had no authority to file the appeal on their behalf. Consequently there was no proper appeal filed on behalf of the minors. No application at any stage was made by any person on their behalf to transpose them as respondents. Moreover no application was made under Order 1 rule 10, Civil Procedure Code, in the Court of the Additional District Judge to transpose them as respondents by any person.
11. The objection raised in this case is whether the appeal was validly filed on their behalf or not. The decree was joint and indivisible and an appeal was filed on behalf of 9 persons only out of 12 vendees and thus there was no proper appeal before the Court. The rights of the vendees are joint and their shares are not defined. Therefore the request of the counsel for the appellants to transpose the minors as respondents is rejected. No proper appeal was filed on behalf of the minor appellants and therefore the appeal in the lower appellate Court on their behalf had to be dismissed. Since the decree was joint and indivisible and the decree on behalf of the remaining 9 appellants in the Court of the Additional District Judge could not proceed and consequently to avoid the conflicting decrees in the same case the appeal must fail and decision of the Additional District Judge must be affirmed. This appeal is therefore, dismissed, but under the circumstances the parties are left to bear their own costs.
12. Appeal dismissed.
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