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Depta Tewari And Others v. State Of Bihar & Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioners challenged the orders passed by respondent nos. 2 and 3 directing that rent receipts for certain lands be issued in the names of respondent nos. 4 to 7, and that the rent being accepted from the petitioners not be accepted. The petitioners questioned the jurisdiction of the Land Reforms Deputy Collector (L.R.D.C), Sadar Daltonganj, and raised issues concerning the basis of possession and mutation entries relating to the lands in dispute. The matter proceeded through various administrative and appellate orders, culminating in this writ petition.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the L.R.D.C, Daltonganj had jurisdiction to initiate proceedings regarding mutation and rent receipts for the lands in question.
- Whether the orders passed by respondent nos. 2 and 3, relying on possession rather than disputed title, were legally valid.
- Whether reliance on reports of officers (Karamchari and Circle Inspector) without their examination as witnesses was permissible.
- Whether mutation orders are judicial or administrative in nature and the implications thereof.
- Whether the petitioners could challenge the mutation or cancellation of zamabandi entries without having appealed within the prescribed period.
- The applicability and effect of precedents concerning mutation, zamabandi cancellation, and jurisdiction of authorities in such matters.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The L.R.D.C, Daltonganj had no jurisdiction to initiate the proceedings as the application was filed before it improperly.
- The Appellate Court improperly relied solely on the reports of the Karamchari and Inspector without examining them as witnesses.
- The private respondents did not file documents to prove title, whereas objectors did, undermining the orders based on possession.
- The lands were previously mutated in the petitioners' names, and since no appeal was filed against such mutation, the respondents could not challenge it.
- The matter concerns cancellation of zamabandi rather than mutation, relying on precedents such as Jamaluddin Ahmad v. S.D.O and Khiru Gope v. L.R.D.C.
Respondents' and State's Arguments
- The respondents approached the Circle Officer who directed them to file the application before the L.R.D.C, establishing jurisdiction.
- The orders were rightly based on possession, as mutation matters are decided on possession and not disputed title.
- The authorities passing mutation orders do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions and thus are not bound by Evidence Act procedures.
- The mutation or zamabandi entries in petitioners' names were irregular, lacking proper procedures such as issuance of Am Istehar or traceable correction slips.
- The petitioners' reliance on cases concerning cancellation of zamabandi is misplaced, as the facts here differ significantly.
- Disputed questions of possession are better suited for determination by Civil Courts in civil suits.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Mahanth Dhansukh Giri v. The State of Bihar, 1985 PLJR 255 | Validity of orders based on possession and administrative nature of rent fixation. | Supported the view that mutation orders are administrative and based on possession, not title disputes. |
| Kundori Labour Co-operative Societies Ltd. v. The State of Bihar, 1986 PLJR 837 | Clarification on administrative nature of mutation orders and procedural aspects. | Reinforced that mutation authorities are not courts and need not follow Evidence Act procedures. |
| Jamaluddin Ahmad v. S.D.O, 1979 BBCJ 605 | Interference with cancellation of zamabandi following proper procedure and limitation for appeal. | Distinguished as not applicable due to procedural deficiencies in the instant case. |
| Khiru Gope v. L.R.D.C, AIR 1983 Patna 121; 1983 PLJR 727 | Jurisdictional limits of L.R.D.C in cancelling zamabandi and tenant register entries. | Distinguished on facts; court held L.R.D.C had no jurisdiction in that case, but instant case differs. |
| Gobri Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1978 NOC 88 | Mutation and rent fixation orders are administrative, not judicial; disputed possession should be decided by civil courts. | Applied as binding precedent supporting the administrative nature of mutation orders and limiting writ jurisdiction. |
| Harihar Singh v. State of Bihar, 1978 BBCJ 323 | Jurisdictional and procedural aspects related to mutation and zamabandi cancellation. | Referenced to distinguish jurisdictional limits in mutation and zamabandi matters. |
| Quinn v. Leathern, 1900-3 A.E.R (Reprint) p.1 | Principle that a case is authority only for what it actually decides, not for logical extensions. | Supported the court’s reasoning in limiting the application of cited precedents strictly to their facts. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court analyzed the jurisdictional issue and found that the L.R.D.C had proper jurisdiction as the Circle Officer directed filing before it. It emphasized that mutation orders are administrative, not judicial or quasi-judicial, and thus the authorities are not bound by Evidence Act procedures requiring examination of witnesses. The court held that mutation orders must be based on possession rather than disputed title, which is a factual determination properly made by the authorities concerned. The court found no evidence of malafide, non-application of mind, or reliance on irrelevant considerations in the impugned orders.
The court distinguished precedents relied upon by the petitioners, noting that prior mutation entries in the petitioners' favor were irregular and lacked proper procedural basis such as Am Istehar publication. It held that disputed questions of possession are better suited for civil courts. The court reaffirmed the binding precedent from Gobri Singh that mutation and rent fixation orders are administrative and not judicial, limiting the scope of writ jurisdiction in such matters.
Finally, the court noted that the petitioners' challenge to the mutation orders in this writ petition was not maintainable, as the proper forum for disputed possession claims is civil court, and the mutation authorities’ findings on possession were supported by relevant evidence and law.
Holding and Implications
The writ petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
The direct effect of this decision is that the mutation orders directing rent receipts to be issued in the names of respondent nos. 4 to 7 stand affirmed. The court clarified that mutation and rent fixation orders are administrative and based on possession, limiting the scope of judicial interference in such matters through writ petitions. No new precedent was set, and no order as to costs was made.
S.B Sinha, J.:— In this writ petition the petitioners challenge the orders as contained in Annexures-12 and 13 to the writ petition passed by the respondent nos. 3 and 2 respectively.
2. The aforementioned respondents by the said orders held that rent receipts should be issued in respect of the lands in question in the names of respondent nos. 4 to 7 and directed that the rent which was being accepted from the petitioners be not so done. Mr. Debi Prasad, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, has raised three questions. He firstly submitted that from the application filed on behalf of respondents as contained in Annexure-10 to the writ petition it would appear that the same was filed before the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Sadar Daltonganj. He therefore submitted that L.R.D.C, Daltonganj had no jurisdiction to initiate the aforementioned proceeding at all.
3. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State has drawn my attention to the statements made in the said annexure itself wherein it has been stated that the said respondents approached the Circle Officer but the Circle Officer directed that the respondents to file the application in question before the L.R.D.C In this view of the matter the first contention of Mr. Deti Prasad has no merit.
4. Mr. Debi Prasad then submitted that the Appellate Court in its order has merely relied upon the report of the Karamchari and the Inspector. He further has drawn my attention to the fact that from a perusal of the order dt. 6.4.77 as contained in Annexure 12 to the writ petition it would appear that the private respondents did not file any document to prove their title, whereas the two sets of objectors who appeared before the respondent no. 3 filed various documents which have been mentioned in the said order itself.
5. From a perusal of the impugned order it appears that the respondent nos. 2 and 3 have rightly decided the case of the respective parties on the basis of the possession. It is not disputed nor can it be in law, that an order with regard to mutation has to be passed on the basis of possession only inasmuch as the authorities concerned cannot decide in such a case a disputed and complicated question of title. The findings of fact by aforementioned respondents having been arrived after taking into consideration all relevant facts and as such I am not in a position to interfere therewith.
6. It has not been suggested that the said findings are based on no evidence, nor has it been suggested that the said orders are vitiated in law as the same are based on irrelevant matters or on extraneous consideration. It has also not been suggested that the orders suffer from the vice of a total non-application of mind or are otherwise malafide. Reference in this connection may be made to the recent Full Bench decisions reported in 1985 PLJR 255 (Mahanth Dhansukh Giri v. The State of Bihar) and A.I.R 1986 Patna 242 : 1986 PLJR 837 (Kundori Labour Co-operative Societies Ltd. v. The State of Bihar).
7. Mr. Debi Prasad submitted that the report of the Karamchari and the Circle Inspector could not have been relied upon without examining them as witnesses.
8. In my view the Officers passing the orders on mutation matter do not exercise any judicial or quasi-judicial function. They arrive at a decision of possession on the basis of the evidences placed before them including the reports of the officers concerned. Respondent nos. 2 and 3, in my opinion, cannot be said to be a ‘Court’ within the meaning of section 3 of the Evidence Act and as such it was not necessary for them to follow the procedure laid down under the Evidence Act for the purpose of proving any document or otherwise.
9. Mr. Prasad thereafter submitted that the lands were previously mutated in the name of the petitioners and a jamabandi was opened in their names. He therefore submitted that if the respondents or their predecessors in office or any other persons were adversely affected by such orders, it was obligatory on their part to prefer an appeal within the prescribed period.
10. From a perusal of the orders dated 6.4.77 as contained in Annexure 12 to the writ petition it appears that the name of Munshi Tewari and Giri Tewari have been entered in respect of some lands in question in the demand register, but the basis for issuance of correction slip could not be traced out.
11. So far as the case of Ambika Singh is concerned, it has clearly been found in the order of the concerned respondents that no Am Istehar was issued and the purported application for mutation was allowed in favour of Ambika Singh only on the basis of the report of the Sarpanch. In the order as contained in Annexure 12 it has been rightly held that had the Am Istehar been issued, the position might have been different and the aggrieved parties in that event could have got an opportunity of putting forward their case. In this view of the matter I find no substance in the contention of Mr. Debi Prasad.
12. Mr. Prasad thereafter submitted that it is not a case of mutation but it is a case of cancellation of zamabandi and in support of this submission he relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in (Jamaluddin Ahmad v. S.D.O, Khagaria reported in 1979 BBCJ 605 and Khiru Gope v. L.R.D.C, Jamui reported in AIR 1983 Patna 121 : 1983 PLJR 727.
13. It appears that the attention of the Division Bench of those cases was not drawn to an earlier Division Bench judgment of this Court in C.W.J.C No. 215 of 1976 (R) Gobri Singh v. State of Bihar decided on 21st July, 1977 reported in AIR 1978 NOC 88. In the aforementioned decision of Gobrl Singh it has clearly been held that the orders with regard to the fixation of rent are not judicial orders but merely administrative ones. It has further been held in the said case that while passing such orders the provision of B.L.R Act does not come into picture at all.
14. In that judgment it was further held that in view of the disputed question of facts with regard to possession it is better if such disputed questions of possession be decided by the Civil Courts in properly framed civil suit.
15. In the instant case like Gobri Singh case the petitioners vis-a-vis the private respondents are claiming possession in or over the lands in question. The respondent nos. 2 and 3 while passing the impugned orders in this writ petition as contained in Annexures 12 and 13 thereto have found possession of the respondent nos. 4 to 7 in the lands in dispute. The petitioners in this petition cannot challenge the said findings on this Court, is not a proper forum where such disputed question of possession can be decided.
16. So far as the submission of Mr. Prasad with regard to the question as to whether the impugned orders are in relation to mutation matters or for cancellation of zamabandi, in my opinion, does not make much difference in the facts and circumstances of the case. In the instant case it has been held that so far as the zamabandi opened in the name of Ambika Singh is concerned, the same has been done without publication of the Am Istehar. In the case of the petitioners it has been held that the basis upon which the correction slip was issued was not traceable, which was allegedly done only on the basis of the report of the Sarpanch. In such a situation it cannot be said that pro-per procedures laid down for opening up of zamabandi were followed and in that view of the matter as there was no legal order for opening of a zamabandi, an application filed by respondent nos. 4 to 7 for opening of a zamabandi in their names was maintainable.
17. In my opinion, the decisions cited by Mr. Prasad cannot be said to have any application whatsoever in the facts and circumstances of this case. In Jamaluddin Ahmad's case this Court interfered with the order of cancellation of zamabandi which was opened after following the procedures laid down therein. In such a situation it was held that the respondents of that case who had the knowledge of the fact that the zamabandi was opened in the year 1970 in the name of the petitioners thereof and which position continued till 1978 could not have come forward with an application for cancellation of zamabandi as they did not prefer an appeal within the stipulated time, which they were bound to do.
18. In the case of Khira Gope the person who obtained a settlement from the ex-intermediary filed an application for fixation of rent before the Dy. Collector which was allowed after due scrutiny. The State of Bihar had been accepting the rent from the said person for a number of years but later on an application filed by it before the L.R.D.C who cancelled the zamabandi. In the aforementioned judgment it was held, following the judgment of Jamaluddm Ahmad and also the judgment of Harihar Singh v. State of Bihar reported in 1978 BBCJ 323 that in such a situation the L.R.D.C had no jurisdiction or power to cancel the zamabandi and remove the name of the petitioner nos. 1 and 2 from the tenant's register, the effect whereof was to cancel the settlement by the ex-intermediary in favour of the petitioner nos. 1 and 2.
19. In the instant case, therefore, the situation is entirely different. Here the parties are fighting amongst themselves as to in whose name the demand register should be opened in respect of the lands in question.
20. Further as found hereinbefore in the instant case it appears that the narags of the petitioners were entered into the demand register in hush manner and there are materials on record to show that prosper procedures laid down for opening a zamabandi were not followed. It is how well settled that a case is an authority for which it has been decided and not what can logically follows therefrom. Reference in this connection may be made to a decision of Quinn v. Leathern reported in 1900-3 A.E.R (Reprint) page 1 at page 7 wherein Lord Halsbury held as follows:—
“The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.”
21. After having given my anxious consideration I am of the view that the Division Bench decision of this Court in Gobri Singh's case apply in all fours to the facts and circumstances of the case. Even assuming that there is some conflict, although I do not find any, between the case of Gobri Singh and other decisions cited by Mr. Prasad, namely, Jamalud-din Ahmad's case and Khiru's case, the decision of the earlier Division Bench shall have to be followed by this Court. In any view of the matter the questions which were posed for determination in this case viz., as to whether the orders of mutation are judicial orders or not were not posed either in Jamaluddin Ahmad's case or in Khira's case.
22. I, therefore, do not find any merit in this writ petition which is hereby dismissed but in the facts and circumstances of the case there will be, however, no order as to costs.
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