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Sind Mahajan Exchange Ltd. v. State Of M.P Opposite Party.

Madhya Pradesh High Court
Sep 7, 1978
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Factual and Procedural Background

This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking quashing of the order of the Tahsildar (Nazul), Gwalior dated 29-6-1970 in Case No. 414/415-A 68-69 Nazul.

The dispute concerns a small strip of land (152.50 sq. ft.) in Mor Bazar, Lashkar, adjacent to the petitioner Sind Mahajan Exchange Ltd.'s Exchange Building. The petitioner was in possession and had constructed a wall and a latrine on the disputed portion pursuant to permission granted by the Municipal Corporation (file No. 526/67 × 3/3) on 8-11-1968. After construction, the Nazul Inspector considered the structure an encroachment on Nazul land and proceedings were initiated against the petitioner and a tenant, Vishandas; proceedings against Vishandas were later dropped when it was accepted he was a tenant.

The Nazul Department maintained that the disputed open land vested in Nazul and was recorded as an 'Abadi'. The Tahsildar (Nazul) concluded the plot did not belong to the petitioner, held the Municipal permission invalid for lack of a Nazul "No Objection Certificate", ordered removal of the trespass and imposed a fine of Rs. 200 on 29-6-1970. The petitioner appealed unsuccessfully to the Sub-Divisional Officer (Nazul), Gwalior (file No. 40/69-70) and thereafter filed the present writ petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the disputed property vests in the Nazul (Nazul department) or in the Municipal Corporation (i.e., whether the Tahsildar had jurisdiction to treat the land as Nazul land).
  2. Whether the order of the Tahsildar (Nazul) imposing a fine and directing removal of the alleged trespass (under section 248 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959) was valid and sustainable.
  3. Whether the availability of an alternative remedy (a suit under section 248(3) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code) precludes the writ petition.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner claimed possessory title over the disputed strip and produced sale-deeds dated 11-2-1948 and 25-5-1965 to show acquisition.
  • The petitioner relied on a municipal permission (file No. 526/67 × 3/3 dated 8-11-1968) authorising the construction on the disputed land.
  • Implicitly, the petitioner challenged the jurisdiction of the Nazul Officer to treat the land as Nazul land and to impose penalties despite municipal permission and statutory vesting of certain open lands in municipal authorities.

State / Nazul Department's Arguments

  • The State contended that the property vested in the Corporation for management and, because the State remained the owner, the Nazul Officer was entitled (under Government instructions and Nazul rules) to vacate a trespass; the State relied on the decision State of Madhya Pradesh v. Atmaram (1970 MPLJ 195).
  • The State further argued that the petition should be rejected because an alternative remedy existed — a suit under section 248(3) of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959.
  • The Nazul Department's factual stance was that the disputed land was open land recorded as 'Abadi' and that the Collector had in 1964 declared that open lands in municipal limits would be Nazul lands.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Atmaram (1970 MPLJ 195) Authority on the powers of the Nazul/Tahsildar to vacate trespass (relied on by State). The court noted that this decision was relied upon by the State but observed that the Atmaram ruling has been considered in a later case (Municipal Council, Mandsaur v. State of M.P.). The court treated the Atmaram decision as part of the legal context but relied more directly on the analysis in the subsequent Mandsaur decision on the limits of Nazul rules against statutory municipal vesting.
Municipal Council, Mandsaur v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1972 MPLJ 911) Principle that rights conferred by statute and protected under successive municipal enactments cannot be taken away by an executive order (Nazul rules); consideration of section 57 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. The Court expressly adopted the quoted observation from Mandsaur that statutory vesting of municipal rights is protected and cannot be nullified by executive orders or non-statutory Nazul rules. This principle was central to the Court's conclusion that Nazul rules could not affect property vested in the Corporation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in the following steps, constrained strictly to the materials and legal points set out in the opinion:

  1. Factual foundation: the Court accepted, as recorded in the administrative files, that the disputed land is within municipal limits, admitted to be an 'Abadi' land, and that the Municipal Corporation had granted permission for the petitioner's construction (permission dated 8-11-1968).
  2. Historical statutory framework: the Court reviewed successive municipal enactments (variously named municipal Acts over time) culminating in the M.P. Municipal Corporation Act, which contain provisions vesting specified property within municipal limits in the municipality/corporation (quoted provisions: sections enumerating property vested in the municipality or corporation). From this narration, the Court observed that open lands within municipal limits which were not assessed to land revenue were transferred to municipal bodies and continued to vest in them under successive enactments.
  3. Administrative circular and recording practice: the Court considered Circular No. 3 issued by the Gwalior Government (Samvat 1998) directing that unoccupied lands within municipal limits be recorded in revenue papers as "Milkiyat of the Municipality". The Court treated the existence and effect of that circular as supporting the conclusion that lands within municipal limits were intended to be treated as municipal property in revenue records.
  4. Competence to object: on the basis of the statutory vesting and Circular No. 3, the Court held the Municipal Corporation to be the competent authority to raise objections about the use of such municipal property. It noted that in the present case the municipality had granted permission, and thus was not asserting the land as Nazul property in opposition to the petitioner.
  5. Assessment of Tahsildar's order: the Tahsildar's order admitted municipal permission and acknowledged petitioner's possession since 1952 but labeled that possession illegal. The Court observed that the Tahsildar's order (and the appellate order) did not satisfactorily explain how the plot was treated as Nazul land; the appellate authority had not explained the basis either.
  6. Precedential/legal limitation on Nazul rules: the Court relied on the principle articulated in Municipal Council, Mandsaur v. State of M.P. — that rights conferred under a statute (and preserved under successive municipal statutes) cannot be taken away by executive orders or non-statutory Nazul rules. The Court agreed with that observation and applied it to conclude Nazul rules could not override the statutory vesting of property in the Corporation.
  7. Interaction with section 248 and Atmaram: the Court noted the State's reliance on State of M.P. v. Atmaram, and recalled the passage (as discussed in Mandsaur) that Nazul rules being non-statutory cannot negate or control the positive statutory provisions under section 248 of the Land Revenue Code. The Court treated this as further support for the limitation on Nazul rules vis-à-vis statutory powers.
  8. Jurisdictional conclusion: applying these legal principles to the facts — i.e., municipal vesting, municipal permission, lack of clear foundation in the Tahsildar's orders for declaring the land Nazul, and the protection of statutory municipal rights from executive Nazul rules — the Court concluded that Nazul rules could not affect property vested in the Corporation and therefore that the Tahsildar's and appellate orders could not be maintained.
  9. On alternative remedy: the Court rejected the State's contention that the petitioner should have pursued a suit under section 248(3), holding that when the jurisdiction of the Nazul Officer is challenged, a writ petition under Article 226 is an appropriate remedy and the alternative remedy objection was not acceptable in this context.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is allowed; the orders passed by the Tahsildar (Nazul) dated 29-6-1970 (Annexure V) and the appellate order (Annexure VI) are quashed as being without jurisdiction.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The Tahsildar's order imposing removal of the alleged trespass and a fine of Rs. 200, and the subsequent appellate order, are set aside for want of jurisdiction.
  • The Court did not adjudicate the private inter se rights between the petitioner (Sind Mahajan Exchange Ltd.) and Rajkumari (wife of Ravidatta); the Court specifically left those civil rights to be determined in the pending civil litigation between them.
  • Procedural directions: parties are to bear their own costs and the amount of security deposited by the petitioner is to be refunded.
  • The opinion does not articulate any broader doctrinal change or new precedent beyond applying established principles (as discussed in Municipal Council, Mandsaur v. State of M.P.) that statutory vesting of municipal property cannot be overridden by executive Nazul rules; the decision's direct effect is limited to quashing the two impugned administrative orders in this case.
Petition allowed.
Show all summary ...

Navkar, J.:— This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the order of the Tahsildar (Nazul), Gwalior, dated 29-6-1970 in Case No. 414/415-A 68-69 Nazul.

2. The subject-matter of the dispute is a small strip of land situated in Mor Bazar, Lashkar. The plot lies by the side of the petitioner's Exchange Building and the plot is in its possession. It is alleged that it is in a Survey No. 274, but the dispute is with respect to the piece of land which is only 152.50 sq. ft. The petitioner has constructed a wall and latrine over this part of the land. This construction was done with the permission of the Municipal Corporation in file No. 526/67 × 3/3, on 8-11-1968. The dispute arose when the construction was completed. The Nazul Inspector, after seeing the construction, was of the opinion that this is encroachment over the Nazul land and the tenant Vishandas has trespassed over the land belonging to Nazul. He reported the matter to the Nazul Authorities and Tahsildar, Nazul, Gwalior started the proceedings in file No. 415/68-69 A-68 and 415/68-69 A/68 against the tenant Vishandas and the petitioner. We are not concerned with the case of Vishandas, because the Nazul Officer dropped the proceedings against him when he came to know that he is only a tenant. The contention of the petitioner before the Nazul Officer was that he has not trespassed over the land of Nazul and in fact, the land does not belong to Nazul at all. He submitted before the Nazul Officer how he acquired this land through different sale-deeds. The first sale-deed is dated 11-2-1948 and the second sale-deed is dated 25-5-1965.

3. The case of the Nazul Department was that as the disputed land was an open land by the side of the road, it vested in the Nazul Department. The suit land which is in Survey No. 274 is also recorded as an ‘Abadi’. The Nazul Officer after taking evidence, came to the conclusion that this plot does not belong to the petitioner and the permission given by the Municipal Corporation being without obtaining ‘No objection Certificate’ from the Nazul it is of no significance and because he has committed a trespass, he asked for the removal of the trespass and fined the petitioner with Rs. 200. This order was passed on 29-6-1970. An unsuccessful appeal was maintained by the petitioner in the Court of the Sub-Divisional Officer Nazul, Gwalior vide file No. 40/69-70. Aggrieved by these two orders, the present petition is filed.

4. The petitioner has made one Rajkumari as a party to the proceedings in this petition and certain objections have been filed by Rajkumari through her learned counsel Shri Balwant Singh. But, we are not called upon to decide those objections because the only point we have to decide in this petition is whether the property vests in Nazul and whether the order of Nazul Officer imposing fine and removal of trespass is correct or not.

5. The stand taken by the learned counsel for the State is that the property vests in the Corporation for management and as it vests for management in the Corporation, basically, the State remains the owner of the land and as Government is the owner of the land, the Nazul Officer on the basis of the instructions issued by the Government is entitled to vacate a trespass. He has relied on a judgment of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Atmaram . 1970 MPLJ 195. He also raised an objection before us that there is an alternative remedy of filing a suit under Section 248(3) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959 and as such, the petition deserves to be rejected. As far as the second contention is concerned, we are of the opinion that when the jurisdiction of the Nazul Officer itself is challenged there is no need of filing a suit and it can be decided in a writ petition. Therefore, this objection of alternative remedy cannot be accepted.

6. It is admitted by the State that this land is an Abadi land and it is within municipal limits. The first Act which we have to consider is the Act Municipality hai, Gwalior, Samvat 1969. Section 81 of this Act mentions what is the property of the Municipality. It also mentions that the property within the municipal limits will be in possession and use of the municipality and it will remain the property of the municipality. The section runs as under:—

This Act was repealed by Kanun Municipality hai, Riyasat Gwalior, Samvat 1993. Section 87 of the said Act mentions what will be the property of municipality. It says as under:—

This Act was repealed by M.B Municipalities Act, 1954. The said Act says what will be the property of the municipality. It is mentioned in section 48 which reads as under:

“48. All property of the nature hereinafter in this section specified, and not being specially reserved by the Government shall be vested in and belong to the municipality, and shall, together with all other property, of what nature or kind soever not being specially reserved by the Government, which may become vested in the municipality, be under their direction, management and control, and shall be held and applied by them as trustees, subject to the provisions and for the purposes of this Act,………”

This Act was repealed subsequently by M.P Municipalities Act, 1961. Section 100 of the said Act mentions the property vested in Municipal Council and reads thus:

“100. Property vested in Council.—(1) Subject to any special reservation made or to any special conditions imposed by the State Government, all property of the nature hereinafter in this section specified within the limits of the municipality, shall vest in and be under the Control of the Council and with all other property which has already vested, or may hereafter vest in the Councils shall be held and applied by it as trustees for the purposes of this Act………”

Then came the M.P Municipal Corporation Act. Section 82 of the said Act says what will be the property vested in the Corporation. The section runs as under:—

“82. Property vested in Corporation. Subject to any special reservation made or to any special conditions imposed by the Government, all property of the nature hereinafter in this section specified and situated within the city, shall vest in and be under the control of the Corporation, and with all other property which has already vested, or may hereafter vest in the Corporation, shall be held and applied by it for the purposes of this Act………”

So, from the narration of the change of law, it is clear that the property which vested in the municipality is now vested in Municipal Corporation, Gwalior and the property is to be utilised and used for the purposes mentioned in M.P Corporation Act. To make it clear, the above provisions of law and changes therein go to show that open lands which were not assessed to land revenue and which fell within the municipal limits were transferred to the municipal committee during the times of Gwalior State by the Circular No. 3. Those properties continued to vest in the municipal committee under the Gwalior Act, M.B Act and now under the M.P Act. We are not to decide in this petition the extent of right over this open land vested in the municipality. There is no dispute that this property is not applied for the purposes mentioned in section 82. The only dispute before us is what is the effect of Nazul rules over his land which vests in the Corporation.

7. It will be better to mention here that Circular No. 3 was issued by Gwalior Government in Samvat 1998 and it was about the municipalities in Gwalior State. The existence of the circular is not disputed. The relevant portion of that circular reads thus:

The circular indicates that unoccupied lands lying within the municipal limits vested in the municipality and it was ordered that they should be so recorded in the revenue papers. The Circular indicates that it was intended that in the settlement papers, such land should be recorded as ‘Milkiyat of the Municipality’. So, it cannot be disputed now that as this land is within the municipal area, the Municipal Corporation is the only competent person to raise any objection regarding the use to which the property should be put. In this case, the municipality has given a permission to the petitioner to construct over the disputed property. From the permission it can be held that the municipality is not claiming the land as its. When this is the position, we are to see whether Nazul Officer had any right to start the proceedings and decide that the petitioner has trespassed over the Nazul land and that he has to suffer penalty under section 248 of the M.P Land Revenue Code, 1959.

8. The order given by the Tahsildar (Nazul) dated 29-6-1970 admits that permission by the Corporation was given to the petitioner. The learned Tahsildar (Nazul) also held that the Sind Mahajan Exchange Ltd. is in possession of the property since 1952, but the possession is illegal. He also mentions that this land is a Nazul land, but how he came to that conclusion is not clear from the order. The appellate Court also has not said a word as to how this property is a Nazul land. He mentions that in 1964, the Collector has declared that all the open lands in municipal limits will be Nazul lands and, therefore, he has treated this land as a Nazul land. Whether these rules can make the open lands situated in the municipal area as Nazul land is considered in this Court's judgment in Municipal Council, Mandsaur v. State of Madhya Pradesh . 1972 MPLJ 911. This judgment also considered section 57 of the M.P Land Revenue Code, 1959 and it is held as under:—

“These rights are conferred under a statute and have been saved and protected under the successive enactments enacted from time to time for the purposes of municipal administration. Consequently, the right so vested under a statute and protected by a successive statute cannot be taken away by an executive order of the Government or anyone of its officers.”

We are completely in agreement with the observations made in that judgment as quoted above.

9. The learned counsel for the State cited before us this Court's decision in State of M.P v. Atmaram. Suffice it to say that this ruling is also considered in Municipal Council, Mandsaur v. State of M.P (supra). We can only mention the important portion of that ruling, namely:—

“Lastly it is contended that the power of the Tahsildar under section 248 of the Code is either taken away or controlled by the Nazul rules. It was, however, conceded that the Nazul rules are not statutory, and, if that is so the positive provisions of a statutory enactment like section 248 of the Code cannot be negatived or controlled by such rules.”

10. The extent of the rights of the Municipal Corporation we need not decide, because that was not the dispute before us.

11. As we have come to the conclusion that the Nazul rules cannot affect the property vested in the Corporation, the order passed by the Tahsildar (Nazul) and the appellate authority against the petitioner cannot be maintained.

12. The result is that the petition is allowed. The orders passed by the Tahsildar (Nazul) (Annexure V) and the appellate order (Annexure VI) are hereby quashed as being without jurisdiction.

13. Here, we may mention that we are not deciding what are the inter se rights of the petitioner Sind Mahajan Exchange, Ltd. and Rajkumari wife of Ravidatta. It was submitted before us that a civil litigation is going between these two parties. Their rights will be decided finally in that litigation.

14. Parties to bear their own costs. Amount of security be refunded to the petitioner.

Petition allowed.