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Pramod Kumar And Others v. The State Of Bihar And Others
Factual and Procedural Background
The petitioners sought writs (certiorari and mandamus) to quash a recommendation dated 28 February 1987 (Annexure-5) and orders dated 18 April 1987 (Annexures-6 and 7) that led to withdrawal of earlier appointment recommendations and termination of the petitioners' services. The Bihar State Subordinate Services Selection Board invited applications for two distinct posts: Steno Sub-Inspector (scale Rs. 730-1080) and Steno Assistant Sub-Inspector (scale Rs. 680-965). The petitioners applied only for Steno Sub-Inspector and were selected and appointed by letter dated 30 June 1986. Respondents 4 to 16 had applied for both posts, filed separate applications, and appeared in two examinations; they obtained higher marks but were initially not offered appointment on an allegation of filing two applications/fraud.
Separate writ petitions were filed earlier by some candidates (not the petitioners here): C.W.J.C. No. 1713 of 1986 (judgment 7 August 1986) and C.W.J.C. No. 3778 of 1986 (order 5 September 1986). Those earlier decisions held the two posts to be distinct and directed consideration/appointment of certain candidates. The State sought special leave to the Supreme Court; the SLPs were dismissed on 11 February 1987. Pursuant to these earlier judgments, the Secretary of the Selection Board wrote on 28 February 1987 directing withdrawal of recommendations in favour of the present petitioners, and by orders dated 18 April 1987 the petitioners' services were terminated.
The State and private respondents filed counter-affidavits. The State stated it had implemented the High Court judgments. Respondents 4 to 16 asserted they had secured higher marks and that, if the matter were reconsidered, the State would have to appoint them.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the judgments in C.W.J.C. No. 1713 of 1986 and C.W.J.C. No. 3778 of 1986 are binding on the petitioners.
- Whether the petitioners have any legal right to maintain this writ application.
- Whether the petitioners' appointments/applications were valid in law.
- Whether, in any event, the petitioners are entitled to any relief from the Court on the facts and circumstances of the case.
Arguments of the Parties
Petitioners' Arguments
- The petitioners were not parties to the earlier writ petitions and therefore are not bound by those judgments.
- The High Court judgments did not cancel the petitioners' appointments; accordingly, the State could not withdraw selection and terminate services while purporting to implement those judgments.
- The selection committee's recommendations had been implemented and could not be withdrawn; the appointments were valid and not void ab initio.
- The terminations were illegal, without jurisdiction and violative of Article 311 of the Constitution (as argued).
- Counsel relied on precedents (including Piare Lal and Prabodh Verma) to support these contentions.
State and Private Respondents' Arguments
- The State pleaded that it had followed the judgments of this Court in earlier writ petitions and implemented them.
- Respondents 4 to 16 argued they had secured higher marks; even if reconsideration were ordered, the State would have to appoint them.
- Private respondents contended the petitioners had been appointed only temporarily and thus had no legal right to seek mandamus for permanent continuance.
- It was argued that the proceedings in earlier writs challenged a policy decision and hence it was not necessary to implead the petitioners; reliefs were claimed against the State and not against individuals.
- It was urged that interference under Article 226 should be refused if quashing the impugned orders would give rise to another illegality (i.e., upsetting the rights acquired by those earlier successful petitioners who had higher marks).
- Respondents cited authorities (including Rai Shivendra, Umakant Saran, A. Janardhana, B. Prabhakar Rao) in support of these positions.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| Piare Lal v. Union of India ((1975) 4 SCC 76 : AIR 1975 SC 650) | Relied upon by petitioners' counsel (invoked in submissions). | The Court observed that the decision in Piare Lal does not apply to the facts of this case. |
| Prabodh Verma v. State of U.P ((1984) 4 SCC 251 : AIR 1985 SC 167) | High Court should not hear and dispose of a writ under Article 226 without persons who would be vitally affected being before it; non-joinder may require dismissal. | Referred to as a governing principle but the Court examined exceptions and held that earlier writs were maintainable even without impleading the present petitioners because those writs challenged policy/arbitrary action. |
| Spencer Bower & Turner on the doctrine of res judicata (treatise) | Judgment inter partes operates as estoppel in favour of and against the parties and their privies only. | Used to support the proposition that a judgment is binding only on parties to the case and therefore the present petition is not barred by res judicata. |
| A. Janardhana v. Union of India ((1983) 3 SCC 601 : AIR 1983 SC 769) | Where no relief is sought against a person and a mere policy decision is under challenge, petition shall not fail for non-impleading persons who might be affected. | Applied to distinguish earlier writs: the Court held the earlier petitions were maintainable even in the absence of the petitioners here because those petitions challenged state action/policy. |
| General Manager, South Central Railway, Secunderabad v. A.V.R. Siddhanti ((1974) 4 SCC 335 : AIR 1974 SC 1755) | Similar principle that policy challenges may be maintainable without impleading all affected persons. | Relied on to support the proposition that earlier writs could proceed without the present petitioners being parties. |
| B. Prabhakar Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1985 Supp SCC 432 : AIR 1986 SC 210) | Policy or law challenges may not require impleading every affected person; also subsequent citation re: creating supernumerary posts. | Used both to justify maintainability of earlier writs without impleading all affected persons and to support the suggestion that government may create additional/supernumerary posts to accommodate displaced candidates. |
| Dr. Rai Shivendra v. Governing Body of the Nalanda College, Biharsharif (AIR 1962 SC 1210) | Cited by respondents for the proposition that temporary appointment may not confer a right to mandamus. | Referenced as part of respondents' submissions; the Court recorded the argument but applied separate reasoning in its decision. |
| Dr. Umakant Saran v. State of Bihar ((1973) 1 SCC 485 : AIR 1973 SC 964) | Cited by respondents to support the temporary appointment point. | Recorded as part of the private respondents' argument; Court considered the temporary nature but held temporary employees can challenge termination if termination is for extraneous/unauthorised reasons. |
| E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamilnadu ((1974) 4 SCC 3 : AIR 1974 SC 555) | Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness; equality and non-arbitrariness are foundational. | Invoked to emphasize that Articles 14 and 16 prohibit arbitrariness; the Court relied on this in concluding that the successful candidates in earlier writs had acquired enforceable rights. |
| Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India ((1978) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1978 SC 597) | Part of jurisprudence reinforcing fairness and reasonableness under Article 14 (procedural and substantive fairness). | Referred to in support of the Articles 14/16 discussion on arbitrariness and equal treatment in appointments. |
| M.K. Agrawal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank (1987 Supp SCC 643 : AIR 1988 SC 286) | Also cited in relation to Articles 14 and 16 and equality in appointment matters. | Used to reinforce the principle that equality and non-arbitrariness govern appointment decisions. |
| Godde Venkateshwara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1966 SC 828) | Authority for the discretionary nature of writ jurisdiction — courts should exercise discretion carefully. | Included among authorities establishing that writ relief is discretionary and should not be granted if quashing would produce another illegality. |
| Abdul Majid v. The State Transport Appellate Authority Bihar (AIR 1960 Patna 333) | Cited as local authority re: discretionary aspect of writ jurisdiction. | Relied on with other authorities to support refusal of certiorari where quashing creates further illegality or is inequitable. |
| Devendra Prasad & Others v. State of Bihar (1977 BBCJ 543 : 1977 PLJR 576) | Authority cited on discretionary character of writ jurisdiction. | Grouped with other precedents to justify refusal to interfere where it would lead to further illegality. |
| Hari Prasad Mandal v. Additional Collector (1978 BBCJ 575 : 1978 PLJR 636) | Authority on discretionary exercise of writ powers. | Used in the same context as other authorities on discretion to refuse certiorari. |
| Banwari Lal Newatia v. Under Secretary to Government of India (1982 BLT 311 ; (1988) 1 SCC 40) | Authority for the proposition that writ jurisdiction is discretionary and may be withheld in inequitable circumstances. | Relied upon in support of the Court's refusal to grant relief when quashing an order would create another illegality. |
| Jai Bharat Co. v. Central Coal Field Ltd. (1988 BLT (Rep) 192) | Decision (by the same Judge) holding that High Court may refuse to interfere with an illegal order if inequitable or contrary to public interest. | Invoked as recent authority supporting the Court's exercise of discretion to dismiss the petition despite possible technical illegality. |
| Miss Arti Sapru v. State of J & K ((1981) 2 SCC 484) | Principle that displaced candidates who have served for some months should be sympathetically considered and rule relaxed; accommodation by temporary measures may be appropriate. | Cited to support the Court's suggestion that the State should create additional posts or otherwise accommodate the petitioners sympathetically. |
| Smita Johnbhai Master v. The State of Gujarat ((1981) 4 SCC 542 : AIR 1981 SC 1633) | Relief may be moulded to mitigate harshness and protect fairness/equity for displaced candidates. | Used to justify the Court's equitable suggestion that the State consider creating additional posts to accommodate those displaced. |
| Syed Kabiruddin v. The Dean, Government Medical College, Nagpur (AIR 1985 Bombay 199) | Example of relief tailored to mitigate hardship where rules were declared invalid but students had already served a year. | Referred to support the approach of creating or relaxing seats to accommodate displaced persons. |
| Miss Swapna Rani Das v. Utkal University (AIR 1985 Orissa 37) | Another authority referenced in connection with sympathetic accommodation of displaced candidates. | Used to support the suggestion to create additional seats/posts rather than depriving those who had already served. |
| Brij Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar (1981 BBCJ 553 : 1981 PLJR 460) | Court directed admission of petitioners at a later stage so they could complete courses; equity in remedial relief. | Referred to in support of equitable accommodation for displaced candidates. |
| Dhirendra Chamoli v. State of U.P ((1986) 1 SCC 637) | Supreme Court expressed hope that posts would be sanctioned so class IV employees could be regularised. | Cited to support the proposition that governments may create sanctioned posts to regularise or accommodate employees affected by litigation. |
| State of Punjab v. Bhagwat Singh (1985 Supp SCC 102 : AIR 1985 SC 981) | Authority for creating supernumerary posts or additional seats to accommodate displaced persons. | Referred to as precedent supporting the Court's suggestion that the State consider creating additional posts to avoid hardship. |
| Anil Minhas v. H.P. University, Simla (AIR 1987 H.P 83) | High Court directed increase of one seat to accommodate a displaced candidate; followed Bhagwat Singh. | Used as a recent example confirming the Court's recommendation that additional seats/posts can be created to mitigate hardship. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The Court proceeded in structured steps:
- Res judicata and parties: The Court accepted the established principle (citing Spencer Bower & Turner) that a judgment is binding only on parties and their privies. On that basis the present petition was not barred by res judicata because the petitioners were not parties to the earlier writs.
- Necessary parties / Prabodh Verma: The Court considered the Supreme Court's decision in Prabodh Verma that a High Court should not decide a writ without joinder of persons vitally affected. The Court recognized this rule but also noted exceptions — principally where a policy decision or challenge to state action/law is involved and the relief sought is against the State (citing A. Janardhana and related authorities).
- Maintainability of earlier writs: Applying those exceptions, the Court held that the earlier writ petitions were maintainable in the absence of the present petitioners because those petitions attacked the State's arbitrary cancellation of candidatures and sought relief against the State. Thus the earlier judgments were not nullified merely because the petitioners here were not impleaded.
- Rights of the petitioners: The Court accepted that the petitioners had been validly appointed in terms of the then-existing merit list and that temporary employees may challenge termination if the termination is for reasons extraneous or not germane. Consequently, the petitioners had standing to maintain the writ if termination was for unauthorised reasons.
- Comparative merits and equality (Articles 14 & 16): The Court emphasized that Articles 14 and 16 proscribe arbitrariness and confer an equal-treatment right in appointments. The Court found that because respondents 4 to 16 had obtained higher marks and had a right established by earlier High Court judgments, the State was obliged to revise the merit list and that the petitioners (with lower marks) would have to give way to those earlier successful candidates.
- Discretion to grant certiorari and consequential illegality: The Court held that certiorari is a discretionary remedy and refused to quash the impugned orders where doing so would produce another illegality — namely, it would defeat rights acquired by the earlier successful candidates whose merit-based claims had been upheld. The Court relied on multiple authorities establishing that a High Court should not exercise writ jurisdiction in a manner that causes further injustice or is inequitable.
- Equitable mitigation: Although the petitioners were not granted relief, the Court observed equitable considerations — that the petitioners had served for some months and that the State ought, if possible, to create additional or supernumerary posts to accommodate them. The Court cited authorities where courts directed temporary relaxation or creation of seats to mitigate hardship.
Holding and Implications
Holding: The writ application is DISMISSED.
Implications and immediate effects:
- The Court declined to quash the impugned administrative orders because doing so would create another illegality by upsetting rights acquired by candidates who secured higher marks and whose claims were upheld in earlier writs.
- The petitioners retain the right to challenge termination in principle, but on the facts the Court found no relief should be granted to them in this petition.
- The Court urged (in an equitable vein) that the State of Bihar should consider creating additional/supernumerary posts to accommodate the petitioners who had already served for some months; the Court cited precedents supporting such remedial accommodation.
- There shall be no order as to costs.
- The decision is fact-specific and was grounded in application of established principles; the Court did not purport to lay down a novel legal precedent beyond applying existing authorities concerning res judicata, necessary parties, equality under Articles 14 and 16, and the discretionary nature of writ relief.
This summary has been prepared strictly from the content of the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences not present in the text.
S.B Sinha, J.:—In this writ petition, the petitioners initially prayed for Issuance of a writ of certiorari for quashing the impugned recommendation dated the 28th February, 1987, as contained in Annexure-5 to the writ petition and further for a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to allow the petitioners to continue on the posts which they held till they attained the age of superannuation without giving effect to the impugned recommendation. Thereafter, the petitioners filed an application for amendment of the writ petition, inter-alia, praying therein that an appropriate writ be issued by this Court quashing the order dated the 18th April, 1987, as contained in Annexure-6 to the said application for amendment of the writ petition as also the order dated the 18th April, 1987, as contained in Aunaxure-7 thereto.
2. The facts of the case lie in a very narrow compass.
3. The Bihar Rajya Awar Seva Chayan Parishad. The Bihar State Subordinate Services Selection Board) invited applications from eligible candidates for appointment to the posts of Steno Sub-Inspector in the office of the Director General-Cum-Inspector General of Police, Bihar, Patna. The requisite qualification for such posts was that the candidate should be graduate from a recognised University. The aforementioned Board also invited applications from eligible candidates for appointment to the posts of Steno Assistant Sub-Inspector in the said office and in the office of the Inspector General of Police, Cabinet (Vigilance) Department. So far as the posts of Steno Sub-Inspector are concerned, the same were in the scale of Rs. 730-1080 whereas the posts of Steno Assistant Sub-Inspector were in the scale of Rs. 680-965/-. Admittedly, the petitioners applied for the posts of Steno Sub-Inspector whereas the respondents nos. 4 to 16 being eligible for appointment to the said posts applied for both the posts of Steno Assistant Sub-Inspector and Steno Sub-Inspector. It is also admitted that the respondents 4 to 16 filed two different applications for two different posts. The petitioners appeared in one examination, whereas the respondents 4 to 16 appeared in two examinations, allegedly for appointment in two different posts.
4. The petitioners were selected and by a letter bearing no. 4235 dated the 30th June, 1986, they were informed that they had been appointed to the aforementioned posts. So far as the respondents 4 to 16 are concerned, admittedly, although their position was higher than that of the petitioners they were not offered any appointment on the allegation that they had committed fraud in filing two applications and managed to appear in two different tests.
5. One Shri Rajendra Singh purported to be aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforementioned order of the State of Bihar whereby and whereunder he was not considered for appointment in the aforementioned post filed a writ petition in this Court bearing C.W.J.C No. 1713 of 1986. It is admitted that at the time of the admission of the said application, this Court directed that one post should be kept vacant for him.
6. Thereafter, by a judgment dated the 7th August, 1986, a Division Bench of this Court after taking into consideration the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties to the said writ petition held that the posts of Steno Sub-Inspector and the posts of Steno Assistant Sub-Inspector were two different posts and, as such, allowed the said writ petition and quashed the impugned orders and directed the authorities to consider him for appointment to the post of Steno Assistant Sub-Inspector either in ‘Ka’ or ‘Gha’ category. The said judgment is contained in Annexure-A to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no. 4. It is admitted that in the aforementioned writ petition, the petitioners were not impleaded as parties. Thereafter, several other persons being Amar Kumar Singh and others filed a writ petition in this Court which was registered as C.W.J.C No. 3778 of 1986. By a judgment dated the 5th September, 1986, the said writ petition was disposed of in the following terms:—
“So far as this application is concerned, we are disposing it of after hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the State with a direction that the order passed in C.W.J.C No. 1723 of 1986 on 7.8.1986 be implemented in favour of those persons who are similarly situated.”
7. The aforementioned judgment dated the 5th September, 1986, is contained in Annexure-B to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent no. 4.
8. In the said writ petition also, the petitioners were not impleaded as parties nor were they heard. The State of Bihar purported to be aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid decision, filed applications for grant of special leave to appeal before the Supreme Court of India which were registered as S.L.P (Civil) No. 311 and 1544-1545 of 1987. The said Special Leave Petitions were dismissed by an order dated the 11th February, 1987. The order of the Supreme Court of India is contained in Annexure-F to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent no. 5.
9. It further appears that the State of Bihar also filed review applications in this Court one of them being Civil Review Application No. 95 of 1986, but it appears from para 17 of the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent no. 5 that the said review application had also been dismissed.
10. From a perusal of the aforementioned order dated the 11th February, 1987, it appears that another similar writ application was filed in this Court bearing C.W.J.C No. 3994 of 1986. Thereafter, pursuant to the judgments of this Court in the aforementioned writ applications, the Secretary of the Bihar Rajya Awar Seva Chayan Parishad, by a letter dated the 28th February, 1987, written to the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police directed withdrawal of recommendations of appointment in favour of the petitioners which was sent vide letter no. 337 Cha. Pa. and 338 Cha. Pa. both dated the 3rd April, 1986. The said letter is contained in Annexure-5 to the writ petition. Thereafter, it appears that by the aforementioned orders dated the 18th April, 1987, as contained. In Annexure-6 to the amendment petition, the Services of the petitioners were terminated. By another letter dated the 18th April, 1987, the Superintendent of Police, Cabinet (Vigilance) Department asked the respondent no. 4 to appear at an interview on the 28th April, 1987.
11. The State has filed a counter-affidavit in this case wherein it has merely been stated that it has followed the judgments of this Court in the aforementioned writ petitions. Two separate counter-affidavits have been filed on behalf of the respondents 4 and 5, respectively. It has been asserted in the said counter-affidavits that the respondents 4 to 16 evidently secured higher marks than the petitioners and even if the whole matter is remitted to the Parishad or the State Government for a fresh consideration, the State would have no option but to appoint the said respondents.
12. Mr. Basudeva Prasad, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that the petitioners being not parties in the earlier writ applications are not bound by the said judgment. Mr. Prasad has further contended that even from a perusal of the judgments of this Court as contained in Annexures-A and B to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent no. 4, it would appear that the petitioners, whereof even did not challenge the offer of appointment made to the petitioners. According to Mr. Prasad, the judgments passed by this Court in the aforementioned writ petitions being not binding upon the petitioners, State of Bihar while purporting to implement the said judgments could not have withdrawn the selection of the petitioners and terminated their services while purporting to proceed to appoint the respondents 4 to 16. The learned counsel further submitted that the recommendations of the Selection Committee having already been implemented whether rightly or wrongly the question of its withdrawal does not arise. The learned counsel further submitted that the petitioners have been appointed by a valid offer of appointment and in this view of the matter the order terminating their services is wholly illegal, without jurisdiction and is in violation of Article 311 of the Constitution of India. It has further been stated that the petitioners, appointment having not been quashed and/or set aside by the Court, the reasons assigned in the impugned orders being wholly extraneous and not germane the same cannot be sustained by this Court.
13. Mr. Basudeva Prasad, in this connection, has relied upon decisions in the case of Piare Lal v. Union of India ((1975) 4 SCC 76 : A.I.R 1975 S.C 650) and Prabodh Verma v. State of U.P ((1984) 4 SCC 251 : A.I.R 1985 S.C 167).
14. The learned Government Pleader No. 5 has not advanced any argument whatsoever except stating that the State being bound by the judgments of this Court in the aforementioned writ applications have implemented the same.
15. Mr. S.P Mukherjee, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the private respondents, however, made the following submissions:—
(a) The petitioners having no legal right to the posts as they had been appointed on a purely temporary basis, the writ of mandamus cannot be Issued at their instance.
16. In this connection, reference has been made to the cases of Dr. Rai Shivendra v. Governing Body of the Nalanda College, Biharsharif (A.I.R 1962 S.C 1210) and Dr. Umakant Saran v. State of Bihar ((1973) 1 SCC 485 : A.I.R 1973 S.C 964).
(b) By reason of the decisions of this Court, the illegality committed by the Selection Board in not considering the cases of the petitioners having been removed the Board is enjoined to consider the case of all candidates afresh and pass the impugned order.
(c) As the respondents merely challenged the policy decision of the State, it was not necessary for them to implead the petitioners as parties in the earlier writ petitions as all the reliefs were claimed as against the State and no particular reliefs were claimed against any individual.
17. Reference in this connection has been made to the cases of A. Janardhana v. Union of India ((1983) 3 SCC 601 : A.I.R 1983 S.C 769); The General Manager, South Central Railway Secunderabad v. A.V.R Siddhanti ((1974) 4 SCC 335 : A.I.R 1974 S.C 1755) and B. Prabhakar Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1985 Supp SCC 432 : A.I.R 1986 S.C 210).
(d) The appointment of petitioner no. 1 was initially not valid and, as such the writ petition at his instance is not maintainable. It has further been submitted that, if the impugned orders as contained in Annexures-5 and 6 are set aside, the same would give rise to another illegality meaning thereby cancellation of the respondents 4 to 16's examination and in that view of the matter, this Court should not exercise its extraordinary discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It has further been pointed out that from Annexure-G to the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent no. 5, it would appear that the names of respondents 4 to 16 are at serials 3 to 12 whereas those of the petitioners are below the said respondents.
(e) It has further been submitted that this Court should not interfere with the impugned orders on the ground of equity also as the respondents 4 to 16 admittedly had obtained higher marks than the petitioners.
18. In reply to the aforementioned submissions, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that true it is that the petitioners were appointed temporarily but their services could not have been terminated except on the ground for which the services of a temporary employee can be terminated and not on a ground which is extraneous or not germane thereto. It has further been submitted that the appointment of the petitioners by reason of the offer of appointment as contained in Annexure-4 to the writ application were not void ab initio and in this view of the matter it cannot be contended that the appointment of the petitioners was illegal. It has further been submitted that the petitioners were bound to be impleaded as parties in the earlier writ petitions in this Court as the same concerns their livelihood.
19. In view of the rival contentions of the parties, the followings questions arise for decisions in this case:—
(1) Whether the judgment of this Court passed in C.W.J.C No. 1713 of 1986 and 3778 of 1986 are binding on the petitioners
(2) Whether the petitioners have any legal right to maintain this writ application?
(3) Whether the applications of the petitioners were valid in law?
(4) Whether in any event the petitioners are entitled to any relief from this Court on the facts and in the circumstances of this case?
20. Re: Question No. (1):
21. So far as the decisions rendered in C.W.J.C No. 1713 of 1986 and C.W.J.C No. 3778 of 1986 are concerned, it is admitted that the petitioners were not parties to these cases. It is an admitted position that no prayer was made in the aforementioned writ petitions for cancellation of the appointments of the petitioners.
22. It is true that by reason of the aforementioned judgments, the petitioners have been adversely affected. It is a well known principle of law that a judgment is binding only on the parties to the case.
23. Reference in this connection may be made to Spencer Bower and Turner on the doctrine of res judicata, wherein under Article 225 at page 198, the learned author has observed that a judicial decision inter parties operates as an estoppel, in favour of, and against, the parties and their privies only. In Article 226 at page 199 of the said Book the said learned author has observed as follows:—
“Since there can be no estoppel by res-judicata unless the claim, defence, or the other matter set up by the person sought to be established is in conflict with the res judicata, and since there can be no such conflict unless the parties, or their privies in one proceeding are the same as the parties, or their privies, in the other where both proceedings are in personam it followed that in all cases of this class the onus is on the person asserting estoppel to establish Identity of parties, or privies. Whenever the burden has not been discharged in case of any English civil decision inter parties the estoppel negatived. Any question of physical identity of persons is one of facts.’
24. In this view of the matter, it must be held that this writ petition is not barred under the principle of res Judicata.
25. But the question which arises for consideration is as to whether the judgments passed in the earlier cases as referred to hereinbefore were not maintainable as the petitioners hereof were not parties therein or in other words, the said judgments being not binding upon the petitioners they are to be totally ignored being nullifies. In this connection the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Praboth Verma v. State of U.P ((1984) 4 SCC 251 : AIR 1985 SC 167) may be noticed. In Praboth Verma's case (supra) it has been held by the Supreme Court that a High Court ought not to hear and dispose of the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution without the persons who would be vitally affected by its judgment being before it as a respondents or at least some of them being before it as respondents in a representative capacity if their number is too large to join them as respondents individually, and if the petitioners refuse to join them, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition for non-joinder of necessary parties. The decision in Piare Lal's case (supra), however, does not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case.
26. However, the Supreme Court in the case of A. Janardhana v. Union of India ((1983) 3 SCC 601 : AIR 1983 SC 769), The General Manager, Sooth Central Railway Secunderabad v. A.V.R Sidhanti ((1974) 4 SCC 335 : AIR 1974 SC 1755); and B. Prabhakar Rao v. State of Andhara Pradesh (1985 Supp SCC 432 : AIR 1986 SC 210) has held that where no relief is sought for as against a person and a mere policy decision is under challenge, in such an event the petition shall not fail for non-impleading the other persons who might be affected by a result of the said decision. In those cases, either the policy decision of the State was under challenge or the law itself was under attack and there had been a fight in between the two warring groups.
27. However, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, it must be noticed that the petitioners of the aforementioned cases some of whom are respondents wherein were really concerned with the orders passed by the State Government refusing to appoint them on the ground that they had taken part in both, 4 the examinations. At that stage they were not required to challenge the appointment of the petitioners.
28. This Court, in its judgment as contained in Annexures-A and B to the counter-affidavit clearly held that the petitioners of the aforementioned cases were discriminated against. In so far as the case of Rajendra Singh is concerned (the petitioner of C.W.J.C No. 1713 of 1986), there was absolutely no difficulty to accommodate him inasmuch as one post was reserved for him. However, so far as the petitioners of C.W.J.C No. 3778 of 1986 are concerned, this Court, by order as contained in Annexure-B to the counter-affidavit merely directed the respondents to follow the judgment passed in CWJC No. 1713 of 1986. It may be relevant here to quote the operative portion of the judgment as follows:—
“We, therefore, quash the order cancelling the examination of the petitioner and direct the authorities to consider him for appointment to the post of Steno A.S.I, either in the ‘kha’ or ‘Ga’ category.”
29. Evidently, by reason of the impugned orders, only the judgments of this Court have been giken effect to as a result whereof the petitioners of this writ application might have prejudicially been affected. However, the very fact that by reason of the aforementioned judgments, neither the appointment of the petitioners were cancelled nor were the petitioners thereof directed to be appointed, clearly goes to show that in those cases the petitioners thereof did not claim any relief individually as against the petitioners hereof. The petitioners in the aforementioned writ applications, i.e, the respondents 4 to 16 herein were merely concerned either the arbitrary manner in which the respondents purported to cancel the their examinations. This Court upon a consideration of the facts and circumstances of those cases found that the orders impugned therein were unjust and arbitrary. In the said cases, the petitioners thereof had alleged arbitrary action on the part of the authorities concerned. This Court also in the said judgments did not grant any relief as against the petitioners of this case but merely directed the State Government to consider the cases of the petitioners thereof for appointment.
30. The State of Bihar and its officers were, thus, bound by the said judgment and were bound to consider the cases of the petitioners of the said writ cases in the light of the directions of this Court. In this situation, in my opinion, although the petitioners herein were not parties to the said writ applications and therefore, were not bound by the judgments passed in the aforementioned cases but the State of Bihar and its officers were bound thereby. The judgments of C.W.J.C No. 1713 of 1986 and C.W.J.C No. 3778 of 1986 are thus not nullified as the said writ petitions were maintainable even in absence of the petitioners of this writ petition.
31. Re: Question No. 2.— There cannot be any doubt that the petitioners were appointed in terms of the merit list as it was existing then. At a point of time when such appointments were made no body considered their appointments to be illegal. In this situation, if the services of the petitioners have been terminated because of certain orders passed by this Court, in my opinion, they have a right to maintain the writ application questioning the jurisdiction of the authorities concerned as also questioning the propriety of the orders impugned in this writ application. In my opinion, if the petitioners succeed in their contention that the impugned orders have been passed on a consideration which was not germane, this petition could be maintained.
32. If the petitioners' contention is correct that the impugned orders have been passed in spite of the fact that this Court did not cancel their appointment but merely directed the State of Bihar to consider the cases of other candidates and if in the event it is held that the orders of termination have been passed for unauthorised purpose or for reasons not germane for the purpose of passing the said orders, in my opinion, even a temporary employee will have a right to maintain a writ application.
33. Therefore, the moot question which requires consideration by this Court is as to whether the petitioners had a better claim for appointment in the posts vis-a-vis the other candidates viz. respondents nos. 4 to 16.
34. Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India strikes at arbitrariness. It has been held in a series of decisions by the Supreme Court that arbitrariness and equality are sworn enemies.
35. Reference, in this connection, may be made to the case of E.P Royappa v. State of Tamilnadu ((1974) 4 SCC 3 : AIR 1974 SC 555), Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India ((1978) 1 SCC 248 : A.I.R 1978 S.C 597) and M.K Agrawal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank (1987 Supp SCC 643 : A.I.R 1988 S.C 286). It is also well known that Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India confer right upon every citizen to be treated equally in the matter of appointment. The petitioners of C.W.J.C No. 1317 of 1986 and C.W.J.C No. 3778 of 1986 had also such a right. This Court has held and in my opinion rightly that only they because appeared in two different examinations, i.e, for the post of Steno S.I and Steno A.S.I, which evidently are two different categories, their candidature could not have been cancelled on that ground. The petitioners of the aforementioned two writ applications, therefore, could legitimately complain about the arbitrary acts on the part of the authorities concerned and this Court has rightly decided the case in their favour. In such a situation, the State of Bihar had no other option but to revise the merit list in accordance with the marks obtained by each candidate and appoint the candidates in order of merit. While making such revision, it has been found that the petitioners who obtained less marks must give way to the petitioners of the earlier cases. An unfortunate situation seems to have arisen but this Court cannot shut its eyes to the legal right which accrued in favour of the petitioners of the earlier writ applications in view of the judgments passed in their favour as also the equitable considerations which are in their favour in view of the fact that they obtained higher marks than the petitioners of the instant case.
36. In this view of the matter, I am of the view that no relief can be granted to the petitioners, as prayed for by them.
37. Re: Question No. 4.— Even assuming for the sake of argument that technically the State of Bihar and its officers have committed illegality in passing the impugned orders but even then this Court may not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 in favour of the petitioners, if it is found that by quashing an illegal order the same would give rise to another illegality. The correctness of decisions of a Division Bench of this Court in Civil Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 1713 of 1986 and C.W.J.C No. 3778 of 1986 is not under challenge in this writ petition and, as such, the same has got to be respected. By reason of the aforementioned judgments as also in view of my finding aforementioned, it would appear that the orders passed by the State of Bihar and its officers concelling the examination of the concerned respondents, who were petitioners in C.W.J.C No. 1317 of 1986 and C.W.J.C No. 3778 of 1986, were discriminated against. In view of the fact that such an action on the part of the State of Bihar being violative of equal opportunity in law and equal protection of law as enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, the merit list excluding the names of such candidates was non-est in the eye of law.
38. In the event the orders impugned the writ application are quashed by this Court, evidently the same would give rise to revival of an other illegal orders namely those who were the subject matter of the aforementioned C.W.J.C No. 1713 of 1986 and C.W.J.C No. 3778 of 1986.
39. It is now well settled by the various decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court of India that issuance of a writ of certiorari is a discretionary remedy. In this connection reference may be made in the case of Godde Venkateshwara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1966 SC 828); Abdul Majid v. The State Transport Appellate Authority Bihar (AIR 1960 Patna 333); Devendra Prasad & Others… v. State Of Bihar & Another… (1977 B.B.C.J 543 : 1977 PLJR 576); Hari Prasad Mandal v. Additional Collector (1978 B.B.C.J 575 : 1978 PLJR 636); Banwari Lal Newatia v. Under Secretary to Government of India (1982 BLT 311) and (1988) 1 SCC 40. The aforementioned decisions are authorities for the proposition that writ jurisdiction of a High Court only provides for discretionary remedy and it should not be exercised for quashing an order which might give rise to another illegal order as if substantial justice has been done to the parties.
40. In this connection, reference may be made to recent decision of mine in the case of Jai Bharat Co. v. Central Coal Field Ltd. reported in 1988 BLT (Rep) at page 192 wherein it was held that a High Court would be justified in a given case to refuse to interfere with illegal order if it is inequitable so to do or if the same would be against public interest.
41. Taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case, no relief can be granted to these petitioners in this writ application.
42. However, it may be observed that the petitioners have served the State for some time at a point of time when they were appointed they were not aware that some of the candidates have been left out. In this situation, it is proper for the State of Bihar to create some additional posts apart from the existing posts so as to accommodate all the petitioners.
43. In Miss Arti Sapru v. State of J & K ((1981) 2 SCC 484), it was held that the cases of the candidates who would be displaced in terms of the judgment delivered by the Supreme Court having already completed a few months of service will be sympathetically considered by the State Government, and while giving the effect to the judgment of the Supreme Court, the rule should be suitably relaxed and if possible a number of seats should be temporarily in order to accommodate the displaced candidates.
44. Similarly, in the case of Smita Johnbhai Master v. The State of Gujarat ((1981) 4 SCC 542 : AIR 1981 SC 1633), the Supreme Court held that relief should be granted to a citizen for mitigating harshness of law blended with fairness and equity. In Syed Kabi ruddin v. The Dean, Government Medical College, Nagpur (AIR 1985 Bombay 199), a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, while declaring the rules relating to reservation for passing the 10th and 12th standard examinations, being Rule 5-C(ii) of the relevant rules concerned in the said case as ultra vires, held that, although the petitioners thereof were in law to be discontinued from their studies but they should not suffer since they had already put in one year of studies. The Bombay High Court, therefore, directed the respondents 1 and 2 thereof to work out the number of seats that were filled in during the relevant academic year on the basis of rules declared to be invalid and such number of seats should be filled in by accommodating the candidates from the waiting list on the basis of the merit by creating additional seats in the current session.
45. Reference in this connection may also be made to the case of Miss Swapna Rani Das v. Utkal University (AIR 1985 Orissa 37).
46. This Court in a similar circumstance in the case of Brij Kishore Prasad v. State of Bihar (1981 BBCJ 553 : 1981 PLJR 460), while issuing a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to admit the petitioners of the said writ petition held that, although the petitioners thereof would be admitted at a later stage and may not be able to complete the courses of studies but they should be given a chance to complete the course of studies and to qualify for a later examination.
47. In the case of Dhirendra Chamoli v. State of U.P ((1986) 1 SCC 637), the Supreme Court, while directing the Nehru Yuvak Kendras to pay to its employees equal pay for equal work expressed hopes that class IV employee should be regularised wherefor posts will be sanctioned by the Central Government in different Nehru Yuvak Kendras, so that those persons could be regularised.
48. In B. Prabhakar Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1985 Supp SCC 432 : AIR 1986 SC 210), the Supreme Court gave an opportunity to the Government to create supernumerary posts wherever they considered it so to do.
49. In this connection, reference may be made to the case of State of Punjab v. Bhagwat Singh (1985 Supp SCC 102 : AIR 1985 SC 981) also. Recently, a Bench of Himachal Pradesh in the case of Anil Minhas v. H.P University, Simla, (AIR 1987 H.P 83), directed the University to increase one seat in the First Year M.B.B.S course in the academic session 1985-1986. In the said decision, the Himachal Pradesh High Court followed the aforementioned judgment of the Supreme Court in the State of Punjab v. Bhagwat Singh (supra)
50. However, this Court in exercise of its power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, cannot direct the State to accommodate several persons by taking them in service, although there is no sanctioned posts therefor.
51. On a consideration of all these aspects of the matter, I hope and trust that the State Government shall create additional posts so that the petitioners may be accommodated keeping in view the fact that the State should act as a benevolent employer and further keeping in view the fact the petitioners have at least put in a few months of service under the State of Bihar and their services had been terminated by reason of a judgment of this Court and not because of any fault on their part.
52. With the aforementioned observations and directions, this writ application is dismissed but there shall be no order as to costs.
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