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Munna Lal Agarwal v. District Magistrate

Allahabad High Court
Feb 8, 1984
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Factual and Procedural Background

Petitioner Munna Lal (Munnalal) Agarwal, a licensed retail coal depot-holder, was detained by order of the District Magistrate, Aligarh dated 29-10-1983 under S. 3 of the Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 ("the Act"). The detention followed a report by the Additional District Magistrate (Supplies) dated 29-10-1983, which recounted an incident on 26-10-1983 in which a truck (No. UPB 3862) loaded with hard coke was intercepted; the driver and Munnalal Agarwal could not produce bills or invoices for the coal, and statements suggested the coal was being carried to "Om Coal Depot", Kher. It was alleged that 12 metric tons and 310 kilograms of coal were being transported without entries in records, with intent to effect a fictitious sale, contravening licence conditions under the U.P. Coal Control Order, 1977, and thereby committing an offence punishable under S.7 of the Essential Commodities Act.

The District Magistrate recorded satisfaction on the file and issued a formal order detaining the petitioner on 29-10-1983; grounds of detention were served the same day. The petitioner submitted a representation denying ownership of the coal and explaining his limited involvement (stating he had only allowed the driver to pick him up while the truck was hired by another). The State Government and the Advisory Board considered and rejected the petitioner's representation and confirmed the detention. The petitioner approached the High Court by way of a writ of habeas corpus under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the detention order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the scope of the expression "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community" in S. 3(1) of the Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980?
  2. Whether the petitioner’s act of transporting hard coke without bills/invoices and being present with the truck amounted to an activity falling within clause (a) or (b) of the Explanation to S. 3(1) of the Act — i.e., either committing (or instigating) an offence punishable under the Essential Commodities Act or dealing in an essential commodity with a view to make gain in a manner defeating provisions of that Act (black marketing)?
  3. Whether preparation or steps short of an actual commission of an offence under the Essential Commodities Act (or actual dealing constituting black marketing) are sufficient to sustain a preventive detention under S. 3(1) of the Act?
  4. Whether the claim that the petitioner intended to sell the commodity in the "black market" could be sustained in the absence of a statutory price fixation or material showing that sale would be at an unfair/higher price?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • There was no statutory order fixing the price for sale of hard coke; therefore, there could be no question of that commodity being sold in the black market as alleged.
  • Carrying hard coke without invoices or bills did not, by itself, result in contravention of any statutory provision (the petitioner denied ownership and supplied an alternate explanation about the hiring and movement of the truck).
  • The District Magistrate was not justified in treating carrying the commodity without documents as an illegal act that made the petitioner likely to act prejudicially to supplies essential to the community.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Hard coke is an essential commodity and the circumstances (absence of supporting documents and the quantity being transported to a place other than licensed premises) provided relevant material for the District Magistrate to conclude that the petitioner intended to sell in the black market.
  • The petitioner, as a coal depot-holder, was restricted by the U.P. Coal Control Order, 1977 to retail sales not exceeding 10 quintals to any one consumer and to sell only at the licensed place; transporting more than that quantity and moving it to Kher showed intent to contravene licence conditions and amounts to an offence under S.7 of the Essential Commodities Act via contravention of orders under S.3 of that Act.
  • Such material justified the preventive detention under S.3 of the 1980 Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661 Principle that an explanation appended to a section is an integral part of that section and must be read with it. Used to support the proposition that the Explanation to S.3(1) is part of the enactment and must be construed as integral to the provision when determining scope of preventive detention under that section.
Dattatraya Govind v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 2 SCC 548 : AIR 1977 SC 915 On construction and effect of explanations appended to statutory provisions (role of legislative intent and plain meaning). Reiterated that explanations must be construed according to their plain meaning and on the legislative intent when interpreting S.3(1) Explanation.
Smt. Leharibai v. State of Karnataka, 1981 Cri LJ 1048 (Karnataka High Court) Support for the view that S.3 of the 1980 Act is limited to activities specified in the Explanation. Cited as supporting the Court's view that S.3(1) of the 1980 Act covers only activities described in clause (a) or (b) of the Explanation; relied upon for interpretive position.
Ganga Ram v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, 1982 Cri LJ 1433 (Andhra Pradesh High Court) Approval of the interpretive view expressed in Leharibai regarding the scope of S.3(1) of the 1980 Act. Noted as an approving authority that supports the Court's conclusion limiting S.3(1) to the Explanation's categories.
Malkiat Singh v. State of Punjab, (1969) 1 SCC 157 : AIR 1970 SC 713 Principle that mere preparation to commit an offence (short of commission) does not amount to an offence punishable under the penal provisions considered. Applied to hold that the petitioner's actions up to the point the truck was intercepted amounted only to preparation and therefore did not constitute an offence punishable under the Essential Commodities Act for purposes of clause (a) of the Explanation.
Kamla Prasad v. District Magistrate, Saran, (1975) 1 SCC 314 : AIR 1975 SC 726 A commodity is sold in the black market if it is sold with a view to make undue profit; contextual reliance on statutory regulation (orders under the Essential Commodities Act) can support inference of black market activity. Used to support the Court's statement that black market sale implies a sale to make undue profit; the Court applied it to find absence of material showing undue profit or unfair price in the present case.
Dinanath v. Collector and D.M Keonjhar, (1975) 1 SCC 810 : AIR 1975 SC 1093 Were cited by respondents to argue that statutory price fixation or proof of undue profit is not necessary to infer black marketing. The Court examined the decision and stated that it did not support the respondents' submission; it declined to rely on it to justify detention in this case.
Hema Raj Jhunjhunwala v. State of Bihar, 1982 Cri LJ 1206 (Patna High Court) Observation that "black marketing" in the absence of any fixation of price is a misnomer. Cited by the Court to support the conclusion that without statutory price fixation or material showing unfair pricing, the inference of black marketing is weak.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court undertook a focused statutory-interpretive analysis of S.3(1) of the Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980, paying particular attention to the Explanation appended to that sub-section. The Court:

  1. Explained that S.3(1) authorises preventive detention only where authorities are satisfied it is necessary to prevent a person "acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community." The Explanation narrows the meaning of that phrase to two categories:
    1. committing or instigating an offence punishable under the Essential Commodities Act or comparable control laws; and
    2. dealing in an essential commodity (or under a law relating to such commodity) with a view to gain in a manner which may defeat the provisions of that Act or law (i.e., black marketing).
  2. Compared S.3(1) of the 1980 Act with S.3(2) of the National Security Act and observed that the legislative scheme indicates the 1980 Act was intended to address only the two evils articulated in the Explanation (commission/instigation of an offence under control laws and black marketing), while broader threats to supplies could be addressed under the National Security Act.
  3. Relied on authorities about the interpretive role of explanations in statutes (e.g., Bengal Immunity, Dattatraya Govind) to read the Explanation as integral and restrictive of S.3(1)'s scope.
  4. Analysed the material on which the District Magistrate relied and found it insufficient to bring the petitioner's conduct within clause (a) because:
    • No provision in the U.P. Coal Control Order, 1977 was pointed out to require a person transporting hard coke by truck to carry an invoice or bill; hence mere absence of documents did not demonstrate commission of an offence punishable under the Essential Commodities Act.
    • The respondents' case relied on the hypothesis that the petitioner intended to sell more than 10 quintals or sell outside his licensed premises, but there was no proof that such a sale had actually occurred; at most the conduct amounted to preparation.
    • Applying the principle in Malkiat Singh, the Court held that preparation short of commission is not an offence punishable by the Essential Commodities Act for purposes of clause (a).
  5. Considered clause (b) (dealing with an essential commodity to make gain that would defeat the Act) and found respondents could not identify any specific provision of the Act or other controlled-law provision that was shown to be directly or indirectly defeated by the petitioner's conduct; thus clause (b) was not satisfied on the material.
  6. Addressed the District Magistrate's reliance on "black market" sale and determined that:
    • Black marketing ordinarily implies sale at a price higher than the fair price (either by statutory fixation or judged by market conditions) or with the object of making undue profit;
    • There was no statutory price fixation for hard coke and no material before the District Magistrate to show the petitioner intended to sell at an unfairly high price or to make undue profit;
    • Authorities such as Kamla Prasad were applied to the proposition that black market sale involves undue profit; the Court rejected the respondents' reliance on Dinanath to the contrary and noted the Patna High Court observation in Hema Raj that black marketing without price fixation can be a misnomer.
  7. Concluded that the principal ground relied on by the District Magistrate — that the petitioner was carrying hard coke without documents with a view to sell in the black market and thereby prejudicially affecting supplies — was unsustainable on the available material. Consequently, the detention order under S.3 of the 1980 Act was vitiated.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The petition is allowed. The Court directed that the respondents shall not keep petitioner Munnalal Agarwal in detention pursuant to the District Magistrate's order dated 29-10-1983 under S.3 of the Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980, and shall release him forthwith unless his detention is required for some other case.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The detention order dated 29-10-1983 under S.3 of the 1980 Act was held vitiated on the facts and legal analysis stated, and the petitioner was to be released forthwith unless lawfully detained for another cause.
  • Scope: The Court's decision rests on the interpretation that S.3(1) of the 1980 Act is limited to activities specified in the Explanation (clause (a) and (b)); the Court emphasized that mere preparation to commit an offence or transporting a commodity without documentary proof, without more, does not bring a person within the categories justifying detention under that provision on the present material.
  • Broader precedent: The opinion does not announce a new expansive doctrine beyond its statutory interpretation and application to the present facts; the decision is directed at the sufficiency of material to justify preventive detention in this case and the direct consequence for the parties is release of the petitioner. The opinion does not purport to set a novel rule beyond the statutory construction and authorities it applies.

Judgment concluded: Petition allowed; detainee ordered to be released from custody under the challenged detention order.

Show all summary ...

H.N Seth, J.:— By this petition for a writ of habeas corpus, under Art. 226 of the Constitution, petitioner Munna Lal Agarwal questions the validity of his detention under, the provisions of S. 3, Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), authorised by the District Magistrate, Aligarh, vide his order dt. 29-10-1983.

2. Petitioner Munna Lal Agarwal is a licensee for carrying on the business of retail sale and purchase of coal (coal depot holder). On 29-10-1983 Sri D.C.G Bhargava, Additional District Magistrate: (Supplies) Aligarh, submitted a report to the. District Magistrate Aligarh recommending that the petitioner should be detained under the provisions of the Act The said report mentioned that on 26-10-1983 the Supply Inspector had lodged a first information report at, Police Station Lodh, District Aligarh to the effect that he, along with the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, had checked truck No. UPB 3862 which was loaded with hard coke, dear village Lodh, in the presence of Wazir Chand and Yogendrapal Singh. According to the statement made by driver of the truck, Munnalal Agarwal, proprietor of “Munnalal Coal Depot” who was also present with him, was the owner of the hard coke and was carrying it to “Om Coal Depot”, Kher. Neither the driver nor Munnalal Agarwal could produce the bill or invoice in respect of the coal that was being transported by them. Statement made by Surendra Singh also was to the effect that the said truck had been hired by Munnalal Agarwal for carrying coal to Kher. Thus Munnalal Agarwal was cought carrying 12 metric tons and 310 kilograms coal to Kher without making any entry in his records and with a view to effect its fictitious sale. He had thus contravened the conditions of the licence issued to him under the Coal Control Order, 1977 and committed an offence punishable under S. 3/7, Essential Commodities Act The report further mentioned that Subhas Chandra and Ghamandi Lal Gupta had in their written statements made on behalf of “Om Coal Depot” on 27-10-1983 informed the supply Inspector that they did not enter into any transaction for purchase of coal with any party and that the alleged coal, did not belong to them. According to the Coal Control Order, 1977, no Coal depot holder could effect retail sale of coal to any person, in excess of 10 quintals and that as per Condition No. ‘3’ of the licence in Form ‘C’ it was not open to distribute coal at any place other than that indicated in the licence. It, therefore, appeared that Munnalal Agarwal was carrying the said coal to Kher with view to sell it in black market and he was indulging in activity which was prejudicial to maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community. After perusing the report and papers submitted by the Additional District Magistrate, the District Magistrate recorded his satisfaction on the file thus:

“Perused all the papers that are available on the record as also the report. From these documents I am satisfied that Sri Munnalal Agarwal son of Sri Ram Chandra Agarwal, resident of House No. 105. G.T Road, near Chharra Adda, Railway Gate, Aligarh, is running his business in such a manner which seriously affects distribution of coal. In this connection a first information report has also been lodged against him. He was, without supporting documents, carrying one truck of coal to Kher for selling the same in black market. This is a very serious matter. Let orders for detaining him under the provisions of Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 be issued.”

3. After recording aforementioned satisfaction in the file, the District Magistrate proceeded to prepare the formal order directing petitioner's detention thus:—

“Inasmuch as in my capacity as District Magistrate, I am, in relation to the person known as Sri Munnalal Agarwal son of Sri Ram Chandra Agarwal, resident of House No. 105, G.T Road, near Chharra Adda, Railway Gate, Aligarh, satisfied that it is necessary to detain him with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the distribution of commodities essential to the community;

Accordingly, I in exercise of my powers under S. 3(2)(a). Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980, direct that said Munnalal Agarwal who is at present confined in district jail Aligarh be, under S. 3(1) of the aforesaid Act, detained by the Superintendent of Jail at the same place as an ordinary class detenu.”

and served it upon the petitioner on the same day, that is, 29-10-1983.

4. Along with the order of his detention, the petitioner was also served with the grounds on which the requisite satisfaction of the District Magistrate was said to have been founded. The grounds indicate that the District Magistrate had on the basis of facts disclosed in the report made by the Additional District Magistrate (Supplies) concluded that the petitioner was likely to act in a manner prejudicial to supplies of a commodity essential to the community on following grounds:—

(1) That he was found carrying coal to Kher without accounting for it in his records and with a view to effect its fictitious sale. He had thereby committed an offence punishable under S. 3/7, Essential Commodities Act;

(2) That he was carrying the said coal to Kher with a view to sell it in black market; and

(3) That under the Coal Control Order no coal depot holder could sell any coal outside the place of his business as shown in his-licence and in quantity in excess of 10 quintals.

5. The petitioner made a representation to the State Government wherein he denied that the, coal recovered on 26-10-1983 belonged to him. According to him one Kishan Kumar resident of Buland Shahar was bringing coal in Truck No. DHL 4537 from Benaras. On 23-10-1983 when he reached Sikander Rao, district Aligarh, at about 3 a.m his truck was overturned and Kishan Kumar lodged an information with regard to that incident at Police Station Sikander Rao on 24-10-1983. As Kishan Kumar was anxious to see that the coal which was being carried in the truck, reached, its destination he contacted the petitioner who also carried on the business of hiring of trucks at his coal depot. Due to certain reasons petitioner's trucks were not available on that date. Accordingly, he referred Kishan Kumar to “Chaudhari Transports” for hiring a truck. He also told Kishan Kumar that in case there was any difficulty, he could contact him at the coal depot. After hiring Truck No. UPB 3862, Kishan Kumar informed the petitioner about it. The petitioner also requested Kishan Kumar to tell the driver that when on its return trip the truck was to proceed to Kher, he should pick up the petitioner, who also had some urgent work at Kher, from his coal depot and to carry him to Kher. Accordingly, when the truck, after being loaded with coal at Sikander Rao, was proceeding towards “Om Coal Depot” at Kher, the driver stopped it in the way and picked him up as well. At that time driver of the truck told him that Kishan Kumar had stayed back for getting his overturned truck inspected and that is why he did not come with him. The petitioner asserted that in the circumstances he was not responsible for producing the invoice etc. in respect of the coal carried in the truck.

6. In due course the representation made by the petitioner was considered by the State Government and the Advisory Board which rejected the same and the order for petitioner's detention was confirmed by the State Government. Being aggrieved, the petitioner has approached this Court for relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution.

7. A perusal of the order for petitioner's detention made by the District Magistrate on the file shows that in his opinion the activity of the petitioner in carrying coal without valid documents with a view to sell the same in what he considered to be black market was an activity which was prejudicial to maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community as envisaged by S. 3 of the Act and that it was necessary to detain him with a view to prevent him from indulging in similar activity in future.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that inasmuch as there did not exist any statutory order passed by any competent authority fixing the price for sale of hard coke, there could be no question of selling that commodity in black market. Moreover, the alleged activity of the petitioner in carrying hard coke in a truck unaccompanied by invoice and bill, etc., did not result in contravention of any statutory provision. The District Magistrate was, therefore, not justified in treating such activity as illegal and to, on its basis, conclude that the petitioner was indulging in any activity which was prejudicial to maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community. The grounds on which the order for petitioner's detention was based were thus irrelevant and non-existent. Accordingly, the impugned order stands vitiated.

9. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents contended that hard coke is an essential commodity. According to him, the circumstances in which the petitioner is alleged to have been found carry the same provided relevant material for the District Magistrate to conclude that the petitioner was going to sell hard coke in black market and that the said activity was prejudicial to maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community. The order for petitioner's detention founded on such material is fully in accordance with the provisions contained in S. 3 of the Act.

10. In order to appreciate the submissions made before us it will be useful to determine the scope of the expression “acting in any manner prejudicial to maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community”, used in S. 3 of the Act. Relevant portion of S. 3 of the Act runs thus:—

“3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons. (1) The Central Government or a State Government or any officer of the Central Government not below the rank of a Joint Secretary to that Government specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, or any officer of a State Government, not below the rank of a Secretary to that Government specially empowered for the purposes of this section by that Government, may, if satisfied, with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community it is necessary to do so, make an order directing that such person be detained.

Explanation.— For the purposes of this sub-section the expression “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community” means-

(a) committing or instigating any person to commit any offence punishable under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955), or under any other law for the time being in force relating to the control of the production, supply or distribution of, or trade and commerce in, any commodity essential to the community; or

(b) dealing in any commodify-

(i) which is an essential commodity as defined in the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955), or

(ii) with respect to which provisions have been made in any such other law as is referred to in cl. (a),

with a view to making gain in any manner which may directly or indirectly or tend to defeat the provisions of that Act or other law aforesaid”.

11. This section empowers the authorities specified therein to detain any person on being satisfied that it is necessary to do so with a view to prevent such a person from 1 acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community.

12. Explanation added to sub-s. (1) of S. 3 explains that for purposes of the sub-section the expression “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of suplies of commodities essential to the community” would mean-

(a) committing or instigating any person to commit any offence punishable under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955) or under any other law for the time being in force relating to the control of the production, supply or distribution of, or trade and commerce in, any commodity essential to the community; or

(b) dealing in any commodity-

(i) which is an essential commodity as I defined in the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955), or

(ii) with respect to which provisions have been made in any such other law as is referred to in cl. (a)

with a view to making gain in, any manner which may directly or indirectly defeat or tend to defeat the provisions of that Act or other law aforesaid.

13. Whereas under cl. (a) any activity which results in committing or instigating any person to commit any offence punishable under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, etc., is to be treated as an activity prejudicial to maintenance of supplies essential to the community, the activity contemplated by cl. (b) for this purpose is the activity which amounts to dealing in essential commodity as defiled in Essential Commodities Act or any other commodity essential to the life of the community with a view to make a gain in a manner which would defeat the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act or some defeat the provisions of the Esqential Commodities Act or somother law referred to therein. Generally speaking, whereas according to cl. (a) a detention order can be passed with a view to prevent a person from committing an offence punishable under the Essential Commodities Act or under any other law relating to control of production, supply or distribution of a commodity essential to life of the community, that according to cl. (b) can be made with a view to prevent that person from, indulging in what is commonly known as black marketing. The Act was thus intended to prevent aforementioned two evils only. The position becomes crystal clear when the provisions contained in S. 3 of the Act are read in juxta-position with the provisions contained in S. 3(2), National r. Security Act, 1980 which runs thus:—

“(2) The Central Government or the State Government may, if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing I him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order or from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained.

Explanation.— For the purpose of this subjection “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community” does not include “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community” as defined in Explanation to sub-s. (1) of Section 3 Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 and accordingly, no order of detention shall be made under this Act on any ground on which an order of detention may be under that Act.”

14. Generality of the expression “prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies essential to the community” used in S. 3, National Security Act, is wide enough to include within its ambit not only the activities of the nature envisaged by Explanation to S. 3(1), Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980, but also other activities having direct or indirect bearing on maintenance of supplies essential to the community. But then the Explanation added to sub-s. (2) of S. 3, National Security Act, excludes from its ambit such activities which even though are prejudicial to the maintenance, of supplies essential to the community, are covered by the Explanation to sub-s. (1) of S. 3, Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980. This makes the legislative intention quite clear that whereas action to prevent prejudicial activities of the nature specified in Explanation to S. 3(1), Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, can be taken under that Act, that for preventing remaining activities which affect maintenance of supplies essential to the community can be taken under the National Security Act.

15. It is now well settled that an explanation appended to a section or clause gets incorporated into it and becomes an integral part of it and has no independent existence apart from it. There is, in the eye of law, only one enactment of which both the section and the explanation, are two inseparable parts, they move in at body if they move at all. See Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 661 at p. 667). The orthodox function of and explanation is to explain the meaning and effect of the main provision to which it is an explanation and to clear up any doubt or ambiguity in it. But ultimately it is the intention of the Legislature which is paramount and mere use of a label cannot control or deflect such intention. It must be remembered that the Legislature has different ways of expressing itself and in the last analysis the words used by the Legislature are the true repository of the intent of the Legislature and they must be construed having regard to the context and setting in which they occur. Therefore, even though the provision in question has been called an explanation, we must construe it according to its plain and not on any a priori consideration. (See Dattatraya Govind v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 2 SCC 548 : AIR 1977 SC 915 at p. 928).

16. Viewed in the light of the provisions contained in S. 3(2), National Security Act, the Legislative intention becomes evidently clear that the expression “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community” used in S. 3(1) of the Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980, covers within its ambit only such activities as have been specified in cl. (a) or (b) of the Explanation appended to the said sub-section and no other activity. Accordingly, only such activities which result in committing or instigating any person to commit any offence punishable under the Essential Commodities Act or under any other law for the time being in force relating to control of the production or supply or distribution of, or trade and commerce in, any commodity essential to the community or dealing in any commodity which is an essential commodity as defined in Essential Commodities Act, 1955, or with respect to which provisions have been made in any such other law, with a view to making gain in any manner which may directly or indirectly defeat or tend to defeat the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act or other such law, alone can be considered to be activities to prevent which an order for detention under S. 3(1) Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1983, can be passed. We are in this view supported by the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Smt. Leharibai v. State of Karnataka, 1981 Cri LJ 1048. The view expressed by the Karnataka High Court in this regard seems to have been approved by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Ganga Ram v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, 1982 Cri LJ 1433 (para 24).

17. As already stated, the District Magistrate has in the present case decided to direct petitioner's detention inter alia on the ground that petitioner's activity in carrying hard coke without valid documents (that is bill and invoice) with a view to sell the same in black market is an activity which was prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of a commodity essential to the community as envisaged by S. 3(1) Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act. We have already explained that such an-activity can be considered to be prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community only if it falls within the ambit either of cl. (a) or cl. (b) of the Explanation to S. 3(1) of the Act. In the instant case, the case of the respondents is that the aforementioned objectionable activity of the petitioner falls in cl. (a) of the Explanation inasmuch as it amounts to commission of an offence punishable under the Essential Commodities Act. Section 7, Essential Commodities Act, provides for punishment for contravention of any order made under S. 3 thereof. According to learned counsel for the respondents, the case falls under cl. (a) of the Explanation inasmuch as the petitioner had contravened the provisions contained in U.P Coal Control Order, 1977. However, our attention has not been invited to any provision in the U.P Coal Control Order, 1977, which restricts movement of hard coke by a truck or obliges the person transporting it to carry invioce or bill in respect of that commodity along with him. Accordingly, it cannot, be said that merely because the petitioner was carrying coal in the truck without bill or invoice, he committed an offence punishable under the Essential Commodities Act and his case would not fall under cl. (a) of the Explanation to S. 3(1) of the Act.

18. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, urged that the fact that the petitioner was carrying 12 metric tons and 310 kg. of coal in truck No. UPB 3862 itself shows that he was going to sell that coal at a place other than his licensed premises. As a coal depot-holder the petitioner was entitled to effect only, retail sale of coal as provided in U.P Coal Control Order, 1977. The expression “retail sale” as defined in the U.P Coal Control Order means sale of coal not exceeding 10 quintals on a day to any one consumer. The petitioner had thus contravened the provisions of the U.P Coal Control Order as he was going to sell more than 10 quintals at a time to some one. Further, according to cl. ‘3’ of the licence issued to him under the provisions of the U.P Coal Control Order, 1977, the petitioner could sell coal only at the place of business as indicated in his licence, but then he was going to sell it at Kher, that is, at a place other than his place of business and as such he had contravened Condition No. ‘3’ of his licence and thereby committed an offence punishable under the provisions of the U.P Coal Control Order.

19. In this regard it will be pertinent to note that it is not the case of the respondents that the petitioner had either sold more than 10 quintals of coal to any one or that he sold it to some one at a place different from that indicated in his licence. Their case is that he was a going to do so after taking the coal to Kher. Provisions of the U.P Coal Control Order would in this regard stand violated only if actual sale of more than 10 quintals of coal at a place other than that indicated in petitioner's licence had taken place. Whereas cl. (a) to the Explanation provides that committing or instigating any person to commit an offence punishable under the Essential Commodities Act would constitute an activity prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community; it does not lay down that preparation to commit an offence punishable under the Essential Commodities Act would also be deemed to be an activity prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community.

20. On the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Malkiat Singh v. State of Punjab, (1969) 1 SCC 157 : AIR 1970 SC 713, it is clear that the activity of the petitioner, till the stage the truck was checked in the way, merely amounted to preparation to commit an offence which has not been made punishable under the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Accordingly, the District Magistrate was not justified, in proceeding on the basis that preparation made by the petitioner to dispose of the said coal in one lot at a place other than the place of business as indicated in his licence was an activity prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies as defined in cl. (a) of Explanation to S. 3(1), Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980.

21. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents next, attempted to justify the view of the District Magistrate that the petitioner had indulged in activity prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community by referring to cl. (b) of the Explanation and urged that while transporting the said coke by truck without the covering documents and with a view to sell the same at Kher the petitioner was dealing in a commodity, which was an essential commodity, with a view to make gain in a manner which may directly or indirectly defeat or tend to defeat the provisions of the Act. When called upon to identify the provision of the Act, object whereof, was being directly or indirectly defeated by the said activity, learned Govt. Advocate was not able to identify any such provision. We are accordingly not satisfied that the alleged objectionable activity of the petitioner can be said to be prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodities essential to the community in the sense in which the said expression has been defined by cl. (b) of Explanation to S. 3(1) of the Act either.

22. Moreover, we find that one of the principal reasons why the District Magistrate concluded that the petitioner was indulging in an activity prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies of commodites essential to the community was that the petitioner was going to sell hard coke in black market. Normal concept of selling a commodity in the black market is to sell the same at a price higher than that which, in the circumstances, would be its fair price. Fairness of the price may be judged either on the basis of the price fixed under some statutory provision or with reference to social and economic conditions prevailing in the market. In the instant case it is not disputed, that no statutory price for sale of hard coke had been fixed by any statutory authority. There was also no material before the District magistrate on the basis of which he could feel satisfied that the petitioner was going to sell said hard coke at a price higher than which, considering prevailing economic conditions, could be considered to be fair.

23. In the case of Kamla Prasad v. District Magistrate, Saran, (1975) 1 SCC 314 : AIR 1975 SC 726, the petitioner of that case was detained under the provisions of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act on the ground that he had hoarded stock of match-boxes and soaps and concealed the same without displaying the stock and further that he had refused to sell the same to a purchaser saying that he had no stock. It was accordingly inferred that the petitioner was indulging in activity which was prejudicial to the maintenance of supplies essential to the community, in the sense in which the expression had been used in a provision similar to that contained in S. 3(2), National Security Act. The Supreme Court concluded that dealing in match-boxes and soap was governed, by the provisions of the Bihar Essential Commodities Other Than Food-grains Prices and Stocks (Display and Control) Order, 1967, issued under the Essential Commodities Act and notwithstanding that match-boxes were commodities not covered by Sch. II which mentioned the commodities which could not be withheld from sale, the activity of the petitioner was such on the basis of which the only conclusion that could be drawn was that the petitioner was hoarding the stock for the purposes of sale in black market and thus to make undue profit. This decision of the Supreme Court goes to support the view that a commodity can be said to have been sold in black market if it is so, sold with a view to make undue profit.

24. Learned counsel for the respondent referred us to the case of Dinanath v. Collector and D.M Keonjhar, (1975) 1 SCC 810 : AIR 1975 SC 1093, in support of his submission that existence of a statutory price or the commodity being sold for earning undue profit is not a prerequisite for finding that the commodity was being sold in black market. We have carefully read the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, but we do not find anything therein to support the submission made by learned counsel for the respondent. Indeep, a Division Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Hema Raj Jhunjhunwala v. State of Bihar, 1982 Cri LJ 1206 at p. 1213 (para 16) has gone to the extent of saying that the question of black marketing in the absence of any fixation of price at any stage is simply a misnomer.

25. We accordingly conclude that one of the principal reasons for directing petitioner's detention, namely, that his activity in carrying hard coke without valid documents with a view to sell the same in black market was prejudicial to maintenance of supplies essential to the community as contemplated by Explanation to S. 3(1), is, not sustainable and the order for petitioner's detention stands vitiated. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed. The respondents are directed not to keep petitioner Munnalal Agarwal in detention in pursuance of the order of the District Magistrate D/- 29-10-1983, made under S. 3, Prevention of Black Marketing and Maintenance of Supplies of Essential Commodities Act, 1980 and to release him from custody forthwith unless petitioner's detention is otherwise required in connection with some other case.

26. Petition allowed.