Ramaswami, J.:— This appeal under the Letters Patent is from the decision of Imam, J. in a second appeal.

The material facts are not in dispute. The plaintiff landlord sued the tenant-defendants for arrear rent at the annual rate of Rs. 194-8-0. The plaintiff claimed that in the year 1938 the Revenue Officer had reduced the annual rent to Rs. 194-8-0 under section 112A(1)(d), Bihar Tenancy Act. The defence was that in the year 1940 the Revenue Officer had reduced the annual rent to Rs. 116-3-0 according to the rent reduction schedule, Ex. B. The trial court granted a decree at the reduced rate of Rs. 116-3-0. In first appeal the Subordinate Judge considered that the second reduction was ultra vires and granted a decree at the rate claimed in the plaint. In second appeal Imam, J. reversed the decision of the Subordinate Judge holding that the second-reduction was not ultra vires, that plaintiff was entitled to realise rent only at the rate of Rs. 116-3-0. In reaching his decision Imam, J. relied on the Division Bench case, Sir B.D Goenka v. Rajkumar Singh, and on certain obiter dicta of Fazl Ali C.J in the Full Bench case—M.B Ramranbijay Pd. Singh v. Ramagya Kuer.

The critical question to be determined in this appeal is whether the Rent Reduction Officer had jurisdiction to reduce rent for the second time under section 112A(1)(d) within the period prohibited under section 113 of the Act.

The reply to this question depends on the proper construction of sections 112A, 112B and 113 of the Bihar Tenancy Act.

Section 112A enacts:—

“(1) The Collector may, on the application of an occupancy raiyat or a landlord made in the prescribed form, or, if the Governor by notification directs that a settlement of the rents of the occupancy holdings situated in any area, shall be made under this section, on an application made as aforesaid or on his own motion”

take action as described under headings (a) to (e).

In this case we are concerned with heading (d) which is to the following effect:—

“reduce the rent of any occupancy holding, if there has been a fall not due to a temporary cause in the average local prices of staple food crops during the currency of the present rent, to such an extent that the reduced rent shall bear to the previous rent the same proportion as the current prices bear to the prices prevailing—

(i) at the time when the previous rent first became payable, or

(ii) if the previous rent first became payable before the preparation or a record-of-rights under Chapter X and the landlord is unable to prove to the satisfaction of the Collector when the previous rent first became payable, at the time when a record-of-rights was first prepared in respect of the holding”.

Section 112B(1) enacts that—

“An appeal shall lie from an order of any officer other than the Collector of a district exercising the power of a Collector to the Collector of a district and from, an order of the Collector of a district to the prescribed authority; and the decision of the Collector to the prescribed authority on any such appeal shall be final”.

Section 113(1), Bihar Tenancy Act, states:—

“When the rent of a tenure or holding is settled or reduced under this Chapter, it shall not, except on the ground of a landlord's improvement or of a subsequent alteration in the area of the tenure or holding, be enhanced, in the case of a tenure or an occupancy holding or the holding of an under-raiyat having occupancy rights, for fifteen years, and, in the case of a non-occupancy holding or the holding of an under-raiyat not having occupancy rights, for five years; and no such rent shall be reduced within the periods aforesaid save on the ground of alteration in the area of the holding or on any of the grounds specified in subclauses (i) and (ii) of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 112A”.

The principal contention on behalf of the appellant is that since the rent of the holding was once reduced under section 112A(1)(d), the Revenue Officer had no jurisdiction ??? reduce the rent again within the period of 15 years as stipulated under section 113.

In the approach to this question it is essential to keep in mind the important distinction between an absolute want of jurisdiction and an irregular assumption of jurisdiction. By jurisdiction is meant the authority which a Court has to decide matters that are litigated before it or to take cognisance of matters presented in a formal way for its decision. As pointed out by West, J. in Amritrav Krishna Deshpande v. Balkrishna Ganesh Amrapurkar “jurisdiction consists in taking cognisance of a case involving the determination of some jural relation, in ascertaining the essential points of it, and in pronouncing upon them”. Objections affecting jurisdiction must relate either to the person the place or the character of the suit. If a Court has competence in these respects. It may exercise jurisdiction and does exercise it whether correctly or erroneously in dealing judicially with a cause placed before it. If however by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, character, or commission, a court is without jurisdiction to entertain any particular auction or matter, neither the acquiescence nor the express consent of the parties can confer jurisdiction upon the court, nor can consent give a court jurisdiction if a condition which goes to the jurisdiction has not been performed or fulfilled R v. Essex Justices, see also Scrutton L.J in Coleshill v. Manchester Corporation.]

A different question however, arises, when it is suggested that a court in the exercise of the jurisdiction, which it possesses, has not acted according to the mode prescribed by the statute. If such a question is raised, it relates obviously not to the existence of jurisdiction but to the exercise of it in an irregular or illegal manner. In such a case the maxim consensus tollit errorem, applies. In Pisani v. Gibraltar the Judicial Committee pointed out that where there was jurisdiction over the subject-matter but non-compliance with the procedure prescribed as essential for the exercise of the jurisdiction, the defect might be waived. In Ledgard v. Bull the Judicial Committee held on the facts of the case that there was no want of jurisdiction but only an irregularity as to its existence. In pronouncing the Committee's opinion Lord Watson stated: “When the Judge has no inherent jurisdiction over the subject-matter of a suit, the parties cannot, by their mutual consent, convert it into a proper judicial process, although they may constitute the Judge their arbiter, and be bound by his decision on the merits when these are submitted to him. But there are numerous authorities which establish that when, in a cause which the Judge is competent to try, the parties without objection join issue, and go to trial upon the merits, the defendant cannot subsequently dispute his jurisdiction upon the grounds that there were irregularities in the initial procedure, which, if objected to at the time, would have led to the dismissal of the suit”. In Meenakshi Naidoo v. Subramaniya Sastri the Judicial Committee dealt with the converse case. Act XX of 1863 had vested in the District Judge a discretionary authority to fill up a vacancy in the committee of a temple. The High Court erroneously entertained an appeal and reversed the order of the District Judge. The Judicial Committee held that neither section 10 of Act XX nor the Civil Procedure Code gave a right of appeal from the authority of the District Judge. There was inherent incompetency in the High Court to deal with the question before it and consent could not confer on the High Court a jurisdiction which it never possessed. In Vishnu Sakharam Nagarkar v. Krishnarao Mathar the Bombay Judges dealt with a case not of want of jurisdiction but irregularity in its exercise. West J. emphasised that “where the jurisdiction over the subject-matter exists, requiring only to be invoked in the sight way, the party who has invited or allowed the court to exercise it in a wrong way cannot afterwards challenge the legality of the proceedings due to his own invitation or negligence”.

Applying these principles it is patent that on a proper construction section 113 of the Bihar Tenancy Act, merely imposes a bar upon the court which may be waived by the party affected. In my opinion, the bar is similar to the one imposed by section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure by which a court is prohibited from trying a suit or issue which has already been decided between the same parties with respect to the same subject-matter of litigation. But it is well settled that the bar of res judicata is one which does not affect the jurisdiction of the court but a plea in bar which a party was at liberty to waive [Rajani Kumar Mitra v. Ajimaddin Bhuiya; Moturi Seshayya v. Sri Rajah Venkatadir].

Several Privy Council cases support the view that a mere violation of an imperative provision of statute cannot affect the jurisdiction of the court.

In Rajah Gobind Lal Roy v. Ramjanam Misser a sale for arrears of revenue contrary to the provision of section 17 of Act XXI of 1859 was sought to be declared as null and void. The Judicial Committee held that even though the estate was sold for arrears which accrued due during the period it was subject to an order of attachment issued by the Collector and, therefore, in violation of section 17 of the Act, the sale could not be treated as null and Void. Lord Macnaghton observed: “In the opinion of their Lordships, a sale is a sale made under the Act XXI of 1859 within the meaning of that Act when it is a sale for arrears of Government revenue, held by the Collector or other officer authorised to hold sales under the Act, although it may be contrary to the previsions of the Act either by reason of some irregularity in publishing or conducting the sale, or in consequence of some express provision for exemption having been directly contravened”.

In Malkarjun Bin Shidramappa Pasare v. Narhari Bin Shivappa it was held that an execution sale could, not be treated as a nullity if the court which sold had jurisdiction to do so even though it erroneously decided that a person who in fact did not represent the estate of the deceased judgment-debtor was such a representative. Lord Hobhouse observed “He contended that he was not the right person, but the court, having received his protest, decided that he was the right person, and so proceeded with the execution. In so doing the court was exercising its jurisdiction. It made a sad mistake it is true; but a court has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right. If it decides wrong, the wronged party, can only take the course prescribed by law for setting matters right; and if that course is not taken the decision, however, wrong, cannot be disturbed. The real complaint here is that the execution court construed the Code, erroneously. Acting in its duty to make the estate of Nagappa available for payment of his debt, it served with notice a person who did not legally represent the estate, and on objection decided that he did represent it. But to treat such an, error as destroying the jurisdiction of the court is calculated to introduce great confusion into the administration of the law”.

In the present case the Revenue Officer admittedly violated section 113 when he granted a second reduction of rent within the prohibited period of fifteen years. But there is no question that he had jurisdiction to act under section 112A of the Act. This section specifies the preliminary conditions or state of facts which alone give jurisdiction to the revenue court. It is patent that the section gives Collector jurisdiction to proceed in two different ways—either on an application or on his own motion; but he can only proceed on his own motion if the Governor by, notification directs a settlement of rent of occupancy holdings situated in any area or any class of occupancy holdings situated in any area made under this section. If in the absence of such notification the Collector proceeds on his own motion, he has inherent lack of jurisdiction. It is also patent that the section deals only with occupancy rights, if, therefore, the Collector proceeds to deal with the rent of a, tenant who is not an occupancy raiyat, again there is lack of jurisdiction. Also if the Collector proceeds on the application of some one who is neither an occupancy raiyat nor a landlord, there is inherent lack of jurisdiction. There is nothing, however, in the section which deprives the Collector of jurisdiction, merely because the rent of the holding had been previously settled or reduced within the period specified in section 113. In my opinion, the Revenue Officer, in the present case, had jurisdiction to effect a second reduction of rent, though he acted in direct violation of the statute.

In the recent case of R v. Ludlow, Ex parte Barnsley Corporation Lord Goddard, C.J stated: “It is now settled law, if the tribunal is acting within its jurisdiction, absence of evidence does not affect its jurisdiction to deal with nor does a misdirection of the tribunal to itself in considering the evidence, nor does a wrong decision in point of law”.

For the appellant an argument was presented that the revenue, court misconstrued section 113 in determining the ambit of jurisdiction and hence we ought to hold that the revenue court acted without jurisdiction. We cannot accept this argument. There is no question of any misconstruction of the statute in the present case. The utmost that can be, stated is that the revenue court not possibly being aware of the previous order acted illegally in violating section 113 of the B.T Act. But as stated by Greer, L.J in R v. Minister of Health Ex parte Glamargan County Mental Hospital: “Where the proceeding's are regular upon their face, and the magistrates had jurisdiction, the superior court will not grant the writ of certiorari on the ground that the court below has misconceived a point of law. When the court below has jurisdiction to decide a matter, it cannot be deemed to exceed or abuse its jurisdiction, merely because it incidentally misconstrues a statute, or admits illegal evidence, or rejects legal evidence, or misdirects itself as fo the weight of the evidence, or convicts without evidence”.

In the present case, I hold on the construction of the relevant provisions of the statute that the Rent Reduction Office had jurisdiction to deal with the second application under, section 112A(1)(d) of the Act.

It is next necessary to examine, and, if possible reconcile the previous decisions of this Court on the point.

In Sir B.D Goenka v. Rajkumar Singh the original rent of the holding was Rs. 65-5-0 but it was subsequently enhanced to Rs. 69-15-0. The tenant applied under section 112 for reduction of rent. The Settlement Officer cancelled the enhancement of rent and restored the original rent of Rs. 65-5-0. Subsequently another application was filed under section 112A(1)(d) and rent was reduced of Rs. 40-6-0. Manohar Lall and Beevor, JJ. held that the second reduction was not ultra vires as there was no lack of inherent jurisdiction in the Revenue Officer and his decision cannot be challenged in a collateral proceeding.

In S.A 159 of 1943 the original rent of the holding was recorded as Rs. 19-8-0; but in the year 1913 the rent was enhanced to Rs. 23-7-6. The defendant first applied for reduction of rent under section 112 but his application was rejected. He filed a subsequent application and the rent was reduced to the khatian rate. Sinha J. held that as the first application was rejected, no second application would lie for fifteen years in view of section 113 of the B.T Act. The learned Judge held that the order of the Rent Reduction Officer was without jurisdiction and granted a decree to the landlord at the increased rate. There was a Letters Patent Appeal (L.P.A 11/44) in which Fazl Ali C.J and Manohar Lall, J. reversed the decision of Sinha J. and held that the Rent Reduction Officer had jurisdiction to reduce the rent on the second application. The learned Judges followed the decision in Sir B.D Goenka v. Rajkumar Singh.

The next case is S.A 57 of 1943 decided by Manohar Lall J. on 17th February 1944. It appears that the Rent Reduction Officer proceeded to entertain a second application for reduction of rent after the previous application had been dismissed on contest. It was contended for the appellant that the order of the Rent Reduction Officer was without jurisdiction. Manohar Lall J. observed “it was the duty of the landlord when they were served with notice to raise objection that the second application was not entertainable because section 113 imposed a bar. If the attention of the Rent Reduction Officer was not drawn to such a matter, he had perfect jurisdiction to decide the amount for which the rent should be reduced. If, however, his attention was drawn to the matter and he decided adversely to the appellant, his decision was still a decision with the jurisdiction and can only he set aside in appeal or revision, as the case may be”. The Hon'ble Judge dismissed the appeal. There was a Letters Patent Appeal (L.P.A 4 of 1944) which was also dismissed. In dismissing the appeal the Acting Chief Justice stated “when an application is made to a Revenue Officer for reduction of rent he has to decide if the question is raised before him, whether there has already been a settlement or reduction under Chapter X. There can be no doubt, whatsoever, that this is a question which he has jurisdiction to decide and must indeed decide, if it is raised. If it is not raised before him, his decision is not necessary on the point. But the fact that it is not raised cannot affect the jurisdiction which he has to entertain an application and to decide such questions as legitimately arise on it”.

The next case is again a decision of Manohar Lall J. in S.A 852 of 1943. In this case also there were two applications for reduction of rent. The first application was dismissed but the learned Judge held that the Revenue Officer did not makes settlement or reduction of rent under Chapter X and section 113 was no bar. In Letters Patent Appeal (L.P.A 35/44) the Acting Chief Justice considered that the first order of the Revenue Officer was made under Chapter X, but even so, the Revenue Officer had jurisdiction to make an order reducing rent on the second application made by the tenants. The Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed.

All the decisions so far cited support the view I have taken, namely, that the Revenue Officer had jurisdiction to entertain the second application for rent.

Learned advocate for the respondents, however, relied on Mahadeo v. M.B Ramranbijay Pd.. In this case a tenant first applied for reduction of rent. The Revenue Officer reduced the rent from Rs. 24-3-9 to Rs. 21-7-0 under section 1124(1)(d) of the B.T Act. A few days later on a second application the Revenue Officer made an order reducing the rent of the holding from Rs. 24-3-9 to Rs. 12 under section 112A(1)(d) of the B.T Act. Manohar Lall, Acting Chief Justice and Ray, J. held that the Rent Reduction Officer had no jurisdiction to reduce rent. They distinguished the case of Sir B.D Goenka on the ground that the second application did not contain materials different from those upon which the first application was founded. There are two reasons for which I find it difficult to accept this decision as correct. In the first place section 113 of the B.T Act was a bar irrespective of the fact that the first application was made under section 112 on 112A(1)(d) of the Act. In the second place this decision directly conflicts with the decision of Manohar Lall, J. in S.A 57 of 1943 in which the first application well as the second application were under section 1124(1)(d) of the B.T Act and on precisely the same grounds. Even so Manohar Lali, J. held in that case that the Revenue Officer, had jurisdiction to entertain the second application for reduction of rent. His decision was confirmed by the Acting Chief Justice and Imam J. in Letters Patent Appeal (nos. 4 and 5 of 1944). With the greatest respect I am constrained to hold that the decision in Mahadeo v. M.B Ramranvijay Pd. is incorrect.

Learned advocate then cited Bengali Sahu v. Gudri Tanti in support of his argument. In this case the original rent of the holding was Rs. 65 as agreed in a kabuliat of 1914. The rent was, however, enhanced in 1919 to Rs. 82-14-0. The tenant made an application to Collector under section 112A(1)(d) for reduction of rent on ground of a fall of local prices of food crops. On 20th May, 1939, the Revenue Officer reduced the rent to Rs. 35-15-0, the tenant had also applied for cancellation of enhancement under section 112A(1)(a) and on 18th July, 1939, the Revenue Officer had cancelled the enhancement, which order had the effect of substituting the original rent of Rs. 65. The landlord sued for rent at the rate of Rs. 65 but the lower courts granted a decree at the rate of Rs. 35-15-0. In Letters Patent Appeal Harries C.J and Fazl Ali J. held that the decree was correctly made. But the ratio of the case does not actually support the argument of the learned advocate. Harries, C.J observed that the second order “need not be treated as interfering with the rent but merely as an order cancelling the enhancemnet, an order which was wholly unnecessary by reason of the earlier order reducing the rent to Rs. 35-15-0”. The learned Judges did not pronounce that the Revenue Officer had no jurisdiction to make the second order but they only considered that the second order was unnecessary in the context of facts. Hence this case is not inconsistent with I.L.R 24, Patna 120 and with the other decisions of the Court which I have already reviewed.

In the present case I hold that the Revenue Officer had jurisdiction to make the second reduction of rent under section 112A(1)(d) of the Act. The decision of Imam, J. is correct and I would dismiss this appeal with costs.

Meredith, J.:— I agree to the order proposed.

Agarwala, A.C.J:— I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of Ramaswami, J., and I agree that this appeal must be dismissed. The relevant portion of section 112A of the Tenancy Act provides that the Collector may, on the application of an occupancy raiyat, reduce the rent of an occupancy holding, if there has been a fall, not due to a temporary cause, in the average local prices of staple food crops during the currency of the present rent to such an extent that the reduced rent shall bear to the previous rent the same proportion as the current prices bear to the prevailing prices. Section 113(1) provides that when the rent of an occupancy holding is reduced under this Chapter, no such rent shall be reduced within a period of fifteen years save on certain grounds irrelevant to the present case. Section 112B provides for an appeal from an order reducing rent, and states that the decision of the appellate authority shall be final. A consideration of the language of sections 112A and 113 shows that the Collector is empowered to exercise his power of reducing rent on being satisfied (1) that the applicant is an occupancy raiyat; (2) that there has been a fall not due to a temporary cause in the average local prices of staple food crops during the currency, of the present rent; and (3) that the rent has not been reduced within a period of fifteen years. In order to acquire jurisdiction to make an order reducing the rent, the Collector must be satisfied with regard to each of these matter, and it follows that he has jurisdiction to decide each of them. A party aggrieved by the decision of the Collector with regard to all or any of these matters has a right of appeal under section 112B. Stated in the simplest terms, the question for decision is whether an erroneous decision of the Collector with regard to any of the three points specified above ousts his jurisdiction to make, an order reducing the rent of the holding. On behalf of the appellant landlord it is contended that the Collector cannot give himself jurisdiction by wrongly, deciding any of these matters. This, however, appears to me to be an entirely erroneous view because the Legislature has given the Collector jurisdiction to determine all the facts including the existence of the preliminary facts on which depends the further exercise of his jurisdiction to reduce the rent in suitable cases. This is clear from a recent decision of the King's Bench Division in Rex v. Ludlow. That case arose out of an application under the Reinstatement in Civil Employment Act, 1944, section 9 of which provides: (1) A person who is or claims to be a person to whom this Act applies and claims that he has rights under this Act which are being or have been denied him, may, within the prescribed time, apply to a reinstatement committee for the determination of any question relating to his rights, if any, under this Act, and the committee shall determine that question, (2) Where the committee are satisfied that default has been made by the former employer of the applicant in the discharge of his obligations under this Act, the committee may make either or both of the following orders according as is in their opinion appropriate, having regard to all the circumstances of the case and the nature and extent of the default. By section 10 an appeal is provided to an umpire or deputy umpire, and it is declared that such umpire or deputy umpire may make any determination or order which a reinstatement committee may make under the provisions of this Act, or may dismiss the appeal, and his decision shall be final. It will be observed that in a case brought before the reinstatement committee three questions may arise, namely, (1) whether the person applying is a person to whom the Act applies and has rights under the Act; (2) whether the person against whom the application is made was that person's employer at the relevant time; and (3) whether default has been made by the former employer of the applicant. In the case under consideration the respondent had applied to a reinstatement committee to be reinstated in her former employment. The committee rejected the application on the ground that it was time-barred. On appeal the deputy umpire allowed the appeal and directed that the applicant be reinstated. By the provisions of section 10 of the Act that decision was final so far as the reinstatement committee and the deputy umpire were concerned. The employers (Burnsley Corporation) however applied for a writ of certiorari to bring up and quash the order of the deputy umpire, alleging that the applicant was not in their employment when she joined the forces. If it were a fact that she had not been in the Corporation's employment at the relevant time, she was not a person to whom the Act applied at all. If, on the other hand, she had been in the employment of the Corporation at the relevant time, the latter were bound to reinstate her on a finding by the reinstatement committee or the deputy umpire that they had defaulted in doing so. It was observed by Lord Goddard, C.J that it would be useless for the committee to decide that question unless they had previously decided that the applicant was a person to whom the Act applied and gave rights, and that the person against whom the application was made was the applicant's employer. He observed: “I cannot see that the powers of the reinstatement committee could have been expressed in clearer language than they are by section 9(1) of the Act, and, by section 10(2), the deputy umpire is placed in the same position as the committee. The deputy umpire decided that the woman in question was a person to whom the Act applied and who had rights under the Act, that Barnsley Corporation were her employers at the relevant time, and that default had been made by them. It seems to me that, he has decided the three things to decide which he has been clothed with jurisdiction by the statute, and that, therefore, the application for certiorari must be refused.” Similarly, in this case, as I have indicated above, there are three things which the Collector must decide in order to clothe himself with jurisdiction to reduce the rent of a holding, and it, follows that he has jurisdiction to decide these questions without which he cannot exercise the powers conferred on him by the statute and which are dependent on the existence of those conditions.

This question has been before a Bench of which I was a member on two previous occasions. In the first of these, Syed Abdul Hayat v. Dukhan Mahto, decided on the 12th of December, 1946, the question arose in a suit by the landlords for a declaration that an order reducing the rent of the defendants was without jurisdiction on the ground that the Rent Reduction Officer had no power to make the reduction in view of the fact that a previous application for reduction of rent had been made and had been dismissed. I there observed: “When an application for reduction of rent is made to the Revenue Officer, if his power to make an order is challenged on the ground that there has already been a settlement or reduction of rent under Chapter X, he must necessarily, have the power to decide that question, and he can decide it only on evidence placed before him by the parties. In this case no evidence was placed before him by the parties, which would have enabled him to come to the conclusion that he had no power to make an order reducing the rent in these cases. The only question, therefore, is whether, his these circumstances, the appellants are entitled to succeed in a suit in which they challenge the power of the Revenue Officer to make the order of reduction on the ground that there had been a previous settlement of the rents. It is a well-understood principle of law that, if a party, who has a valid defence to the exercise of jurisdiction by a Court or Tribunal, refrains from placing that defence, before the Court or Tribunal, and permits the Court or Tribunal to proceed on the assumption that that; defence is not available, he cannot afterwards succeed in having the order of the Court or Tribunal vacated on the ground that, if that defence had been placed before the Court or Tribunal and considered, the Court or Tribunal would not have made the order complained of.” The latter observation was based on the decision of the Privy Council in Ledgard v. Bull where Lord Watson stated: “When the Judge has no inherent jurisdiction over the subject-matter of a suit, the parties cannot, by their mutual consent, convert it into a proper judicial process, although they may constitute the Judge their arbiter, and be bound by his decision on the merits when these are submitted, to him. But there are numerous authorities which establish that when, in a cause which the Judge is competent to try, the parties without objection join issue, and go to trial upon the merits, the defendant cannot, subsequently dispute his jurisdiction upon the grounds that there were irregularities in the initial procedure, which, if objected to at the time, would have led to the dismissal of the suit.” Authority is hardly required for the proposition that where a Court is clothed with jurisdiction to decide a particular matter a wrong decision, either with regard to the facts, or with regard to the law, does not render its decision a nullity. That proposition is well illustrated by the case of Malkarjun Bin Shidramappa Pasare v. Narhari Bin Shivappa. The facts were that an executing Court erroneously decided that a deceased judgment-debtor was represented by a person who in fact did not represent him. Lord Hobhouse observed: “He contended that he was not the right person. But the Court, having received his protest, decided that he was the right person and so proceeded with the execution. In so doing the Court was exercising its jurisdiction. It made a sad mistake it is true; but a Court has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right. If it decides wrong, the wronged party can only take the course prescribed by law for setting matters right, and if that course is not taken, the decision, however wrong, cannot be disturbed……………. But to treat such an error as destroying the jurisdiction of the Court is calculated to introduce great confusion into the administration of the law.” Still less is a person entitled to treat as nullity a decision of a competent tribunal when as in the present case, he has himself refrained from placing before the tribunal the facts on which it might have been invited to hold that it had no jurisdiction to deal with the matter.

The second case which came before a Bench of which I was a member was Arabinda Bandhu Banerji v. Hargauri Tewari, decided on the 12th of December, 1946. There an application for reduction of rent having been dismissed, a further application was made which was allowed, neither party having informed the Court of the result of the previous application. The landlords sued to recover at the original rate of rent and were met by the defence that the rent had been reduced. The plaintiffs-landlord challenged the validity of the order reducing rent in view of the dismissal of the first application relying on section 113 of the Tenancy Act. A Second Appeal was heard by Manohar Lall, J. who upheld the contention of the plaintiff appellant that the order reducing the rent was valid. His decision was upheld in Letters Patent Appeal it being observed that “when an application is made to a Revenue Officer for reduction of rent, he has to decide, if the question is raised before him whether there has already been a settlement or reduction under Chapter X. There can be no doubt whatsoever that is a question which he has jurisdiction to decide, and must, indeed, decide if it is raised. If it is not raised before him, his decision is not necessary on that point. But the fact that it is not raised cannot affect the jurisdiction which he has to entertain the application and to decide such questions as legitimately arise on it. In the present instance the appellant did not raise before the Revenue Officer the question whether there had already been a settlement or reduction of the rent under Chapter X so as to debar him from making an order for the reduction of the rent. The order of the Revenue Officer reducing the rent, therefore, cannot be challenged in this collateral proceeding.”

The decisions in these Letters Patent Appeals establish that when the attention of the Revenue Officer is not invited to the existence of a previous order made on an application for reduction of rent, an order reducing the rent on a subsequent application can neither be set aside by the Civil Court or treated as a nullity in a collateral proceeding. I find no reason to differ from the view which I expressed in those two cases.

S.H

Appeal dismissed.